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This thesis analyses the extent to which particular electoral system features and 
rules affect the opportunities for, and proportionality of, the representation of 
certain far right and regionalist at various sub-national levels in key European 
Community member states. 
The thesis employs data provided in a unique data base at the University of 
Plymouth. This data includes a wealth of information concerning shares of the 
votes and shares of the seats for as many identifiable parties as possible in a range 
of sub-national elections in the post World War Two period and measures the 
proportionality of elections using three indices of proportionality. 
Various authors have previously attempted to Identify which electoral features are 
primarily the cause of disproportionatty at the national electoral level. Within 
this thesis we will test their claims at various sub-national levels in several west 
European states. We will also assess the impact of these electoral features upon the 
representation opportunities of certain far right and regionalist parties, as we 
have examples of these parties being both *smair and Marge' at the sub-national 
level. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION - WHY COMPARE THE FORTUNES OF MINORrTY PARTIES IN 
WE$T EUROPEAN $ljP-NATIONAU EmCTlQNS? 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 The Background To This Thesis 
A significant part of political science research has focused upon the relationship between 
elections, electoral ^sterns and party representation. Books and entire journals have been 
dedicated to this subject (disciesed in Chapters One to Three). One cannot fail to notice, 
however, that the focus of research is almost entirely dedicated to elections and parties at 
the national level. Data at this level is relatively easy to collect and such elections are 
viewed as being the *most important form of widescale democratic participation. 
Occasionally, some attention has been paid to second order elections - primarily European 
elections, but also sub-national elections, though generally speaking this has been on a far 
smaller scale. 
Why is this the case? Are sub-national elections unimportant? Whilst this may have been 
arguably the case in the past, the focus has changed in several countries in recent elections. 
Elections held below the national level are becoming recognised as an important and valid 
indicator of public opinion. General elections occur infrequently, usually every four or 
five years, though sometimes less. Sub-national elections are much nK>re frequent yet are 
still relatively 'ignored* by political research. The reason why might not be difficult to 
find. Whilst a national assembly is a single representative body, sub-national government 
is much more complex • often operating on at least two or three levels. The number of such 
elected bodies stretches to thousands in some countries alone and elections are often 
'ongoing' in some countries. In 1994, for example, Germany heW some 16 elections on one 
level or another. Although some research on sub-national elections has been carried out. It 
is usually limited to single country case studies. 
This research began as a Polytechnic Central Funding Council (PCFC) research Initiative 
entitled 'Local Electoral Systems in the European Community' established by Dr. Colin 
Railings and Dr. Michael Thrasher at the Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre. 
University of Plymouth. The purpose of this study was two fold: 
First, to identify key data sources and establish to what extent sub-nationat data bases 
already existed. Then to create a unique data base of sub-national election results of our 
own. Using the twelve European Union member states as a framework^ we collected as 
much detail as was available on electoral systems, electoral timing, participating parties 
and each party's share of the votes/ seats. This applies to aU levels of sub-national 
government. The ultimate aim was to collate comparable, cross-national data indicating 
features such as method of election and voter participation. There were several key 
criteria, therefore, which data had to meet to be both 'useful' and comparable (see below). 
Second, to engage in research based on these data in order to produce a PhD assessir^g the 
influence of the electoral system and specific rules upon the representation of far right and 
regionalist parties In selected countries. The choice of these parties will be explained in 
later chapters when the post-war development and electoral history of certain far right and 
regionalist parties will be considered. In particular, a resounding surge of literature and 
research has attempted to account for the 'rise' of such parties In the 1980s and 1990s 
throughout much of western Europe. Whilst some authors have debated the imminent 
1 When this research project commenced In 1992 the European Union had 12 member 
states - Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netheriands, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. As a result, this 
thesis viriH not use data from the three member states which joined the European Union In 
1995. 
demise of the liberal democratic state and the rise of the ^fascist phoenix' (Husbands 
1992a, Ignazi 1992. Betz 1993 & 1994, Eatwell 1994) most research has focused upon 
the fate of these parties at the national electoral level. Hence we should not be surprised by 
complacent conclusions that they are only *smair parties which pose little, if any, threat to 
traditional party systems. We wish to argue that an analysis at the subHiational electoral 
level is necessary because: 
1) Snrrail parties in national electoral terms are not necessarily 'small' at the sub-national 
level - this is particularly true for regionatist parties which, by their very definition, 
only prevail in certain geographic areas of a country. 
2) Electoral features are very different at the sub-national level. There are more seats 
available, effective thresholds are lower and, in some cases, the electoral system is 
different to that at the national level. 
3) Research is beginning to suggest tiiat we should be nnore aware of 'contextual voting'. As 
the fortunes of national governing parties are not directly at stake at the sub-national 
level(s) voters may behave differently, opting for a variety of new, local and small parties 
though still retaining their preference for mainstream parties at general election time. 
As we are interested in which electoral rules in particular act as the most significant 
hurdles to far right and regionalist party representation, there are three main reasons why 
our analysis focuses on the sub-national level: 
1) Electoral rules may differ from those imposed for national elections. In Germany, we 
see variations of PR electoral systems operating at the Laender level. In Italy, the regions 
continue to use PR despite the reforms in favour of a partial plurality system for general 
elections since 1993. In Britain, we have examples of multi-seat divisions compared to 
strictly single-member constituencies at the national level. This allows voters the 
opportunity for 'split-ticket' voting where they choose candidates from more than one 
party. 
2) The 'context* of sub-national elections is different to national elections. Turnout is 
generally lower. Whilst we caruiot accurately account for patterns of vote-switching, we 
can examine the extent to which small parties generally perform better in second order 
elections when there is Mess at stake', because they offer the opportunity for 'protest 
voting'. 
3) If we can demonstrate that the above point is a correct analyss of snDal) party success in 
sub-national elections, we can then begin to test more effectively those electoral features 
and constraints which appear 'irrelevant' at the national level. When our 'small' parties 
start to poll in excess of 15 percent shares of the vote at the sub-national level they are no 
longer particularly small and we can more accurately demonstrate the effect of de jure and 
de facto thresholds, district magnitudes and seat distribution methods. Electoral 
opportunities for small parties increase at the sub-national level by^ are nevertheless still 
highly dependent on the electoral system within which they operate. 
It has not been feasible to study every far right and regionalist party in the European Union. 
In some countries they simply do not exist. In others, we have experienced problems in 
acquiring suitable data (see below). The case studies chosen for analysis in Chapters Three, 
Five and Six were, therefore, to some extent decided by the parameters of our data base. 
Despite this, it is felt that a suitable cross section of cases have been analyzed in order to 
highlight which electoral features are important to existing far right and regional parties 
in temis of translating votes into seats. Before introducing this analysis, however, it is 
first necessary to describe the process involved in the creation of such a potentially large 
data base and the restrictions encountered in doing so. 
1.1.2 Producino the Data 
The data base developed at the University of Plymouth contains two types of Informatioa-
1) Information about how many levels of sub-national government are directly elected in 
each European Union nrrember state, and which electoral ^s tem is employed at each level 
(and indeed if changes have ocoirred). 
2) Raw data concerning the (tete of elections, seats available, each party's votes and seats, 
and turnout. The first four are vital to our analysis of proportionality whilst the latter is a 
helpful addition2. Our intention was to collect as much available data as possible for the 
post Worid War Two period. For the purposes of this thesis we have used data relating to, 
and including. 1994. 
Unfortunately, both elements of the data collection proved to be a process of slow, continual 
acquirement throughout the research period. We were able to find extraordinarily little 
written about the structure of sub-national governments and the related electoral systems 
(Martin Harloffs The Structure of Local Government in Europe being one of the few 
examples). We also found that different sources often contradicted one another, and 
verifying facts often proved difficult At the towest electoral level, for example, where 
there are several thousand communes/ municipals in some countries, sonrw authors produce 
a rounded estimate of the number of elected bodies whilst others ^ e a nnore precise figure. 
A more serious problem concerned conflicting information about the electoral systems. 
This may not be surprising if we bear in mind Nohlen's comments described in Chapter Two 
Section 2.1. cortceming problems with the use of unclear terminology in electoral system 
analysis. PR systems are often described as using 'highest averages' or 'largest 
remainders* without specifying the precise method. Others are described as 'majority' 
2 Proportionality refers to the extent to which a party's share of the votes/seats con-elate. 
Exact proportionality occurs when all participating parties have an exactiy equal share of 
the votes/seats. The probability of proportionality occurring is affected by a variety of 
factors discussed in Chapter Two. 
systenns without any specification of whether this means simple plurality or absolute 
majority (or of how the tatter Is derived If this Is the case). This is not only confusing for 
the researcher, but supports our view that sub-national elections have been significantly 
under-explored. 
The collation of actual data also proved a formidable challenge. In order to analyze 
accurately the proportionality of electoral systems we require certain information. This 
includes assembly size (and district magnitude when it is different), each party's share of 
the vote and share of the seats (preferably in raw form rather than expressed as a 
percentage) and preferably without the use of the 'others' categoryS. An added benefit 
(though not a necessity) was levels of turnout. Some countries proved easier to assemble 
data for than others. In the case of Britain, for example, the local elections database at the 
University of Plymouth was irrvaluable In terms of the detail and breadth of Information it 
provides. 1 am also Indebted to Johan Ackeart of the Katholieke Unlversitat Leuven/ 
Limburgs Universitar Centrum for providing a wealth of highly detailed data regarding 
Belgian local elections held between 1976 and 1988. Surprisingly, these tvyo sets of local 
electk^n data were the only computerized sets we could locate. The sheer amount of data 
involved in sub-national elections has cleariy discouraged others elsewhere from collecting 
such Information. 
In relatkjn to sub-national election data in Germany, we were unable to locate a central 
source. Yet by applying to each state Statistisches Landesamt we were quickly supplied with 
a large quantity of relevant data in printed form. Each state provided us with at least Land 
level data and often commiBial level data as well. Thus we have been able to com(»le data 
3 'Others' is a term frequently used In electoral analysis to lump together a number of small 
parties. These parties often win no seats or are not members of the main party system. This 
process actually hinders the ability to measure true disproportionality in an election and 
does not reflect the actual number of participating parties. 
bases for every state but one (Baden-Wuntemburg failed to reply). I am grateful for the 
support of these states and for the sheer detail of data which stretches far b^ond that 
required for this thesis. Likewise, I would like to thank the Dutch Centraat Bureau voor de 
Statistiek for supplying detailed provincial and gemeenten election data for the post-war 
period (and to the PCFC fund for purchasing this data). I would also like to thank the 
Department of Environment in Dublin for supplying a comprehensive data set of local 
election results for the Republic of Ireland. Further thanks are directed towards the 
Association of County Councils in Denmark for their assistance, the Service Central de la 
Statistique et des etudes Eamomiques for supplying some relevant data for Luxembourg, and 
the Secretaria de Estado dS? AcMnistracao Local e do Ordenamento do Territorio for 
supplying Portuguese data. 
Data from other countries was obtained in only partial form. We received most support 
from strongly regional areas in Spain. I am grateful for the cooperation of the ALnta de 
Galicia, the Ajuntament de Barcelona and the Basque Director de Processos Electorates del 
Departmento de Interior. Similarly, we received limited, though valuable, responses from 
autonomous regions in Italy, and I would like to thank the Quadewi Deil'Ossen/atorio 
Elettorale in Toscana, the Regione Autonma friuVhVenezia GiuUa Cortsiglio Regionale arKlthe 
Consiglio Regionale del Trentino-Alto Adige for their assistance. Unfortunately, two 
countries remain'dataless'. The obvious omission is France. Although we were able to 
locate an election data source, we found the infonmation incomplete for our purposes^. 
Despite many attempts we were also unable to find any suitable information regarding sub-
national elections in Greece. 
4 Particularty because of the omission of the number of seats available, and to who they 
were awarded. 
1.1.3 Aims apd Qbjectives 
We have outlined the general aims of the research project and highlighted some of the 
problems and limitations encountered in assembling the relevant infomiation. The thesis 
consists of two basic objectives - Chapters One to Three will provide the justification for an 
analysis of sub-national electoral systems. Chapters Two and Three will also act as a 
literature review of the established, national based research into electoral systems and 
party system development and change. Our second objective, carried out in Chapters Foifl- to 
Six, is to test some of these generalisations by using observations we have made about sub-
national electior^s and party systenre in various West European countries, and in relation to 
the electoral fortunes of far right and regionalist parties in particular. 
Analysis of sub-national, as opposed to national elections, may provide interesting and 
unique findings. In this chapter we examine a range of political factors which support the 
view that sub-national elections may be a useful starting point from which to analyze the 
electoral development and fortunes of a variety of new and small parties. For several 
reasons these parties are relatively overiooked at the national electoral level in many 
countries. While sub-national elections have often been castigated as 'unimportant', 
research is now emerging which in fact suggests otherwise aruJ argues that sub-natiortal 
elections may provide important evidence of 'contextual voting'. 
In Chapter Two we analyze the main elements of electoral systems which operate in 
European Union states. Besides discussing their actual mechanical operation we will also 
consider the debates which focus upon the political implications of electoral systems. Since 
we are primarily interested in the prospects for minority parties we should be aware of 
the way in which certain electoral rules work to the disadvantage of all but the largest 
parties. In the same way, the issue of proportionality also has political implications and we 
will discuss the appropriateness of various proportionality measures which have been 
encountered in the research literature. 
In Chapter Three we will consider some of the traditions and transfomrations associated 
with the establishment of party systems in western Europe and focus upon the established 
literature relating to the emergence and electoral opportunities for new and small parties. 
The main focus of this chapter will be to outline those far right and regionalist parties 
which will be used for detailed analysis in Chapters Five and Six. Thus, we need to consider 
in which countries such parties exist and thrive, provide a brief outline of their electoral 
history, and assess whether and how far they are an established party on the national 
electoral scene. 
In Chapter Four we begin to use our data base to test some of the issues that were raised in 
Chapters One, Two and Three. For example, we will compare the extent to which turnout 
and mainstream party support has been declining at various sub-national levels within 
several European states. Because we are able to test data from differing sub-national 
electoral levels, we can also make some initial observations about the influence of district 
magnitude, de jure and de facto thresholds, and various seat distribution systems. As such, 
Chapter Four takes a broad approach to analyzing sub-national elections, whilst In Chapters 
Five aruj Six our analysis will be much more narrowly focused. 
In Chapter Five we will consider the impact of district magnitude, thresholds and the seat 
distribution method upon far right representation in several countries at various sub-
national levels. We will also consider the extent to which support for the far right 
demortstrates pattenis of being second order protest voting. In Chapter Six we will analyze 
the effect of district magnitude, thresholds and the seat distribution method upon regionalist 
party representation in several countries in sub-national elections. We will also consider 
the extent to which various regional parties are large or small parties - that is, the extent 
to which they are established within the sub-national party system. 
In our final chapter we will draw together our findings and reiterate to what extent 
assessments made about the significarKe of electoral rules at the national level can still be 
applied at the sub-national level. We will make some general observations about electoral 
systems by suggesting which rules are most discriminatory to the representation of small 
parties, we can demonstrate where parties such as the far right and regionalists can and do 
benefit from an appreciation of electoral ^sterns and proportionality. Sub-national 
elections are important for new and small parties, as barriers are not as formidable as at 
the national level. The actual number of votes needed to secure seats is lower, the issues 
may be different and the media and publicity demands associated with a general election are 
not as strong. Sub-national elections, therefore, offer the first rung on the ladder of 
political respect for small parties because organisational and systemic factors are less 
inhibitive, and in terms of political control there is Mess-at-stake'. 
1,2 Stutjyirig Small Parties in Western Europe 
The term western liberal democracy acts as a broad definition for a collection of similar, 
yet still individualistic, national political systems which operate within the advanced 
industrial democracies. Despite some recognised natiorv-bound particularities, liberal 
democracies are collectively grouped by several basic requirements. Smith labels these 
requirements as (i) fully-representative institutions, (ii) unrestricted party formation, 
(iii) freely-contested elections, and (iv) the operation of a competitive party system 
(Smith 1983: 2). It is possible to argue that elections are the most basic form of political 
expression in contemporaiy advanced society (Gallagher, Laver & Mair 1995, Jackman 
10 
1994). What is of interest is their impact upon party systems, with specific attention 
being paid to the promotion and exclusion of certain group interests. As Taagepera and 
Shugart claim: "electoral rules can make or break a party" (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 
2) . 
Individual political parties frequently emerge and disappear yet electoral systems and party 
systems are assumed to retain a high degree of continuity and stability at the national level 
(see Chapter Three section 3.2). What this thesis seeks to identify is the extent to which 
changes may occur initially at the sub-national level. Muller-Rommel (1991) suggests 
that the reluctance of academics to tackle the issue of political parties on anything lower 
than a national level has led to a marginalisation of the significance of small parties. In 
other words: 
" ... because power is concentrated in the centre, .the dominant concerns 
of political punditry and psephology are with those parties which are 
likely to gain that power and with the support they need in order to 
achieve it." (Railings & Thrasher 1993c: 367) 
In statistical analysis small parties are often reduced to the label 'others' which hinders 
analysis. By employing a unique electoral data base created at the University of Plymouth 
we can more appropriately concentrate upon the outcome of electoral support at the 
sub-national level. Within this chapter we will clarify the themes which are central to the 
development of this thesis. This necessitates (i) a literature review of existing research 
regarding electoral change in Western Europe, and (ii) an explanation of why an analysis of 
support for regionalist and far right parties at the sub-national level may provide an 
interesting case study from which to base future analysis of electoral and party system 
change. 
In the past two decades, West European politics has experienced a period of change, often 
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transgressing and challertging many traditional assumptions regarding electoral and party 
politics, and the eariy 1980s is viewed by some academics as the beginning of a political 
watershed (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984, Dalton & Kuechler 1990, Denver & Crewe 
1985, Pladgett 1993). The post Cold War detente, atong vwth the emergence of 
'post-materialist' issues have together left a mark upon many areas of political behaviour. 
The growth in environmental and other post-materialist concerns and a emphasis on greater 
political co-operation at the European Union rather than the nation state level, and the 
collapse of comnrrunism in the 1990s, may all have played a role in changing the nature of 
electoral and party system politics in many European states. Yet new and small parties are 
often faced with a variety of constraints, including limitations on the availability of 
canddates, limited finances, and limited publicity and media attention. By succeeding at the 
sub-national electoral level, however, minority parties are able to gain a step up the ladder 
of institutional representation which may or nriay not lead to a place in the national electoral 
scene. Our method of comparative analysis is necessary in order to answer important 
questions regarding where minority parties can expect to rrmimize their electoral 
potential. That is to say, which electoral features offer the greater opportunity for 
representation. 
Others (Dalton & Kuechler 1990, Hamiel & Robertson 1985, Kolinsky & Paterson 1976) 
have attempted to ask why voters choose new parties. Instead, we are asking how successful 
such parties can expect to be at the local level - that Is, what representation do certain 
small parties receive. We should be clear that electoral rules form one half of the equation 
that determines who wins power - the other half being the actial vote polled by a partyS. 
The choice of the two party families in this thesis is a strategic one. First, we may or may 
5 A party receiving very few votes cannot realistically expect representation under any 
electoral system. As the share of the vote increases, however, the opportunities for 
representation increase though this will be controlled by electoral rules. 
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not expect to see regionalist parties perform particularly well in sub-national elections 
(see section 1.5 below). Second, parties of the far right have become the focus of 
considerable electoral research since the late 1980s (von Beyme 1988, Betz 1994, 
Hainsworth 1992, MericI & Weinberg 1993, Stoss 1991). The conclusions we make about 
the impact of electoral systems and rules upon the representation of these parties at the 
sub-national level may be by no means unique to regionalist and far right parties, but may 
provide important and interesting lessons for any small party attempting to gain a foothold 
on the ladder of electoral representation with only limited resources. 
A significant amount of research has examined the interdependent relationship existing 
between electoral systems and party systems (Bartolini & Mair 1990, Blais & Carty 
1988, Bogdanor & Butler 1983, Ujphart 1994a, Rae 1967). The development of political 
parties within western European countries can be traced back to the nineteenth century 
when their function was to satisfy two conditions; the development of plural forces in 
society and the increasingly recognised importance of political representation (Daalder 
1992: 270). The establishment of mass-appeal parties, however could only occur with 
large-scale enfranchisement (La Palombara & Weiner 1990). The very notion of a 'party 
system' implies that there exists a process of development which involves elements of 
tradition and continuity, with the electoral system being just one potential, though 
significant, influencing factor. A *party system' is a feature in which at least two parties, 
and often more, participate, and as such 'free, democratic' elections are intrinsic to the 
very notion of legitimate government in a westem liberal democracy (Schattschneider 
1942, Pomper 1992). Yet the extent to which multi-party systems can be classified as 
similar is complicated by the nature of the parties within each system. The ideological 
positioning of each party is a primary element of classification along with their 
preparedness to co-operate with other parties. Such features can have dramatic effects 
upon the way in which governing party coalitions are formed. 
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A further constraint is the extent to which sonrte political interests are excluded by legal and 
electoral system rules. Countries such as Germany, for example, use both electoral laws 
and, in some cases, legislation to impose an outright ban upon the electoral participation of 
particular parties. Such exclusion is primarily justified by the desire for 'stable 
govemment*, yet problems can arise when those excluded parties represent particular 
ethnic, linguistic and regional minorities. This exclusion serves to generate feelings of 
perceived marginalisation and disillusionment with the political system which may be 
expressed in both electoral and norvelectoral terms. This increasingly common experience 
in the post-war period can be viewed as a primary factor responsible for the fragmentation 
of particular party systems (Ackaert 1993, Delmartino 1988, Hueglin 1986, Mughan 
1979, Rokkan & Urwin 1982, Rose & Urwin 1975) - especially the decline of 'catch air 
parties. In some cases a radical refonn of electoral procedure has occurred (Donovan 
1995, Katz 1995). In relation to the whole cortcept of traditional party classification 
Urwin suggests that regional parties provide a challenge, since they offer very Irttie in the 
way of common ideology/policy, whilst their interpretation of the structure of society itself 
can be challenging (1983: 227). 
This thesis will be concerned with comparatively analyzing the relationship between 
specific electoral and party systenrs in key western European countries where 
regional/sub-state nationalist and right-wing extremist parties experience a range of 
electoral success. By using data from the sub-national level we can assess where far right 
and regionalist party support is strongest, in which areas representation occurs, and 
finally how proportional such representation is. In the next chapter we will review the 
existing literature on electoral systems and the proportionality of electoral systems. 
Before ddng this we need to consider some of the most r e c ^ stucfies which debate the 
changing nature of electoral stability in West Europe and the reasons why second order 
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elections may be important. 
1.3 Electoral Change and Volatility jp W^stjerp Europe 
This once traditional belief among psephologists in a stable process of partisan alignment 
(Lipset & Rokkan 1967) has been challenged over the last twenty years. The idea that 
certain social groups maintain a long-term identity with particular parties may no longer 
hold true, creating a fragmentation in established party systems. Italy, for example, is 
witnessing a decline in the signiflcance of lortg-term religious and class cleavages which are 
instead being replaced by an increase in territorial-centred political activity. The actual 
electorate itself has also ctenged. Mair suggests: 
"... there has been an enormous expansion of the European electorates in 
the past thirty years ... the size of the average European electorates has 
increased by more than one-third since the eariy 1960s ... There are, in 
short, a whole host of new voters out there." (1993: 126) 
In Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Dalton et a/argue that the period of 
social unrest which occurred in countries such as France, Britain and Germany In the 
1960s acted as a catalyst in the demand for political change (1984: 3-4). A combination of 
factors have served to promote such a change. These may Include; individual socio-polrtical 
groups which have challenged the notion of deference to established political power, an 
intemational recession which has weakened political power in some of the strongest 
industrial rtations, and a proliferation of interest groups focusing on individual rights. 
Furthermore, the growth of small parties has undoubtedly been aided by the decline of 
•traditional' parties. In Italy, the decline in support for the Communist and Christian 
Democrat parties has created significant electoral space for other parties and groups. 
States such as Belgium and Germany have witnessed the growth of new parties which are 
encouraged to participate by the decentralised and federalised nature of the system. It is 
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largely within this process of change that sub-national and extremist interests have 
themselves become represented as new political parties. 
Yet this concentration upon research of 'electoral volatility' since the 1970s has largely 
failed to accommodate for, or address the significance of, certain minority parties within 
Europe. Crewe, for example, recognises the limitations of the commonly used Pedersen 
Index of electoral volatility^, since the very criteria used to classify the existence of a 
'party' does not take into account the significance of specifically regionalist parties such as 
the Scottish National Party (Denver & Crewe 1985: 9). Existing research-suggests that 
party systems are relatively flexible in the fact that they change as a result of social 
developments. At the same time, however, a similar transformation of electoral systems 
has not significantly occurred since countries are "tied by local political conditions and 
traditions" (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 4). Within this thesis, it is possible to consider 
how relatively stable electoral systems have created or limited the possibilities for 
fragmenting party systems to reformulate themselves and accommodate minority parties. 
1.4 The t^ l^qtionghip getyfe^n Electoral $ysterps and New and Srpall Parties 
The simple reason why the corxrepts of electoral and party systems have become so 
inextricably (inked is highlighted by Blondel, when he states that electoral procedures "are 
powerful instruments of political er>gineering", which are able to "shape" the identity of 
party systems (Blondel 1990: 176). Establishing the extent to which this is true provides 
a challenge, which implies both overt and covert effects. The p^chological impact that a 
particular balloting system has upon the choices made by voters is much harder to measure 
and has in fact become a political weapon employed by parties from time to time. 
6 The Pedersen Index of electoral volatility is a measure of the net electoral ctenge for each 
party's share of the vote between each electioa 
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highlighted by the demand for proportional representatiori by the Liberal Democrat f^rty in 
Britain. In comparison, the effect that thresholds (see Chapter Two for an explanation and 
Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six for examples) have upon the number of parties 
gaining effective representation is much clearer. 
The concept of 'universal rights' can also have a profound effect upon party systems. This 
is an issue which is becoming increasingly controversial as western Europe continues to 
witness a process of significant demographic change. Some minority groups such as 
refugees and 'guest-workers', for example, suffer the disadvantage of not being able to 
participate in some or all electior^ in certain European countries. It is possible that small 
pockets of 'ru>n-nationals' (whether they be defined in ethnic, religious, linguistic or 
cultural terms) will become geographically concentrated, and hence 'localised' in particular 
countries. At the same time, localised pockets of 'nationalists' may develop due to 
resentment created by non-natk>nals who take up employment and make use of state-funded 
welfare and education services. This may have two consequences. 
First, we may identify a proliferation of political parties which focus their appeal below 
the national level. Although they are not necessarily driven by primarily territorial 
concerns, they are regional to the extent that their appeal is aimed towards a geographically 
concentrated sector of the electorate. Second, political parties which rely on a regionally 
distinct set of voters are more likely to gain effective representation at the sub-national 
level of goverrvnent, and may only succeed in gaining representation at this level. Rose and 
Urwin claim that in national elections smaller parties are more likely to present a 
full-slate of cancfidates in PR multi-seat elections than they are In single seat, plurality 
systems as the latter requires a concentration of support (Rose & Unwin 1975: 19). The 
concentration of support required to secure representation at the 5ub-natior>al level, 
however, is not so great In particular, Muller-Rommel claims that new and small parties 
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which have emerged in recent years have "emerged spontar^ eously on the local level as 
politically Independent citizen-initiative groups" (1990: 209). It is possible, therefore, 
that electoral participation begins at the local level for small parties. 
A particular focus of academic research into the relationship between electoral systems and 
party representation has focused upon the method of seat allocatioa Our starting point for 
the analysis of minority parties will focus upon the existence of three seat allocation 
systems within Europe - namely plurality, proportional representation (PR) and the 
single transferable vote (STV). The rules and patterns associated with plurality and 
proportional representation systems in particular will be empbyed In this thesis to assess 
the actual and potential significance of minority parties within Europe at the sub-national 
level. It is certainly the case that constituencies which are both multi-member and elected 
via proportional representation present a far greater opportunity for the effective 
representation of small parties than in the single-member majoritarian systems. Our aim 
is to show, using quantitative data, how seat allocation is one feature of electoral systems in 
Europe which determines the extent to which 'popular support' for minority parties is 
effectively translated into sub-national govemmental representation. Other electoral 
system features which are relevant to this analysis include district magnitude, the use of 
thresholds, and (possibly) the timing of elections. 
Analysis of the relationship between electoral and party systems has generated an orthodoxy 
within political science, which .will be considered in greater detail in proceeding chapters. 
Generally speaking, Rae (1967) identified the existence of three rules in relation to the 
impact of electoral systems at the national level. These are: 
- all electoral systems tend to yield disproportionate results. 
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- alt electoral systems tend to reduce the effective number of pariiamentary parties 
compared to the actual number of electoral parties. 
- all electoral systems can manufacture a pariiamentary majority for a party that 
has not received a majority vote support (Lijphart 1984: 1 59). What a concentration 
upon successive elections at the sub-national level in this thesis will seek to show relates to 
Rae's second rule. That is, the extent to in which particular electoral features act as a 
make-or-break variable from which far right or regionalist parties may succeed in 
entering the framework of representation and possibly government. 
Hauss and Rayside (1978) claim that there are both institutional facilitators and political 
facilitators which may help to explain the development of new parties in western 
democracies since 1945. One institutional facilitator is the electoral system, though Hauss 
and Rayside claim that it is not necessarily the case for national elections that new parties 
are encouraged by proportional representation although they are hindered by 
majoritarianism and plurality systems. Hauss and Rayside do, however, claim that regional 
parties benefit in decentralised federal systems, and furthermore that the development of 
new cleavages and strains is significant for the emergence of new parties. 
In terms of the creation and success of new parties, Hauss and Rayside claim that cleavages 
need to be politicised, and also that it Is an advantage if the cleavage is geographically 
concentrated. Similarly, Harmel and Robertson (1985) argue that the frequency of new 
parties within a state should increase as the cultural and social diversity expands. Whilst 
they agree with Hauss and Rayside that new party success is related to the electoral system 
they do add an extra claim that the electoral system does not relate to new party fonnation -
which explains why we are as likely to find case studies for this thesis in plurality systems 
as we are in PR systems. Muller-Rommel suggests that new parties have a greater chance 
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of electoral support if they introduce new issues which are not already represented by 
existing parties (1990: 213). The literature and research on electoral volatility in 
westem Europe since the late 1970s, therefore, is of relevance to our analysis of 
sub-national elections. 
For the purpose of this thesis, particular attention will be focused upon the electoral 
significance of sub-nationalist (including linguistic) parties and parties of the far right 
since (i) these tend to be geographically concentrated and so significant evidence of electoral 
support at the regional level may not necessarily be reflected at the natior^l election level, 
and (ii) such parties may benefit from a weakening of national state ties. They succeed 
electorally when there exists a perceived dissatisfaction with the established ruling elite 
and/or the established political system in gerteral - which of course may include both the 
dominant party system and the effect of electoral features (Betz 1993, Dalton & Kuechler 
1990, Donovan 1995, Eatwell 1994, Mair 1991, Roberts 1995, Waters 1994). (iii) 
New parties are more likely to prefer autonomy at the local level in order to maximize 
individual level interests "and participation (Dalton & Kuechler 1990: 217-8). 
Muller-Rommel (1991: 2) suggests that a truly comparative analysis of small parties tes 
been hindered by several factors. First, small parties are assessed as being 'politically 
unimportant' though of course we are unable to predict which unimportant parties may 
become important e.g. the Greens in Germany have successfully launched themselves onto 
the national electoral scene and act as coalition partners in several Laender. Second, tow 
national support makes comparative analysis difficult. This may not apply, however, to the 
sub-national level where the parties we intend to study can often poll in excess of a 15% 
share of the vote. Furthermore, electoral system rules and constraints are more effectively 
meastfl-ed at the sub-national level as we are dealing with more concentrated areas of 
electoral support and smaller district magnitudes. Smith acknowledges the problems 
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created by assessing 'small parties' on a purely pariiamentary party level, and uses the 
case of the Scottish National Party to suggests that, "... this kind of competition draws 
attention to the need to include the sub-national as well as the national level of a party 
system, if the relevance of small parties is to be considered in all its aspects" (1991: 30). 
Mair suggests that a 'small' party is one which polls between 1% and 15% share of the vote 
nationally (1991: 43) but this, of course, overiooks the significance of regional variations 
in all levels of election but which are more likely to be proportionately rewarded at the 
sub-national level. In comparison, Deschouwer suggests that Mair's definition of a small 
party would in fact apply to almost every party in Belgium due to the fragmentation of the 
political and constitutional systems (1991: 135). Thus an analysis at the sub-national 
level allows us the opportunity to assess the effects of a number of electoral features which 
may not be brought into consideration natranally when the share of the vote is too 'small'. It 
may be the case that new, including far right and regionalist. parties become involved in 
local politics before launching themselves onto the national electoral scene. Indeed, 
electoral success at the sub-national level may form a pattern that precedes natiorial 
electoral participation. Whilst much comparative electoral analysis has focused on national 
elections, we will employ this new data base to 'go back to the roots' of potential electoral 
support. 
1.5 Why Stu<tr Second Qrder Elections? 
Established methods of measuring the representative effectiveness of electoral systems have 
primarily been employed at the national level. Thus, dtsproportionality measures may fail 
to register the occurrence of deep-seated regiortal trerwls, whk:h becomes most evident at 
the sub-national electoral level. This is supported by Irvine who observes that, "Under 
conditions of strong regional divergence in voting, an Index of Proportionality calculated 
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from national figures will understate the true disproportionality of results across the 
various regions." (1988: 22) 
The definition of Britain as the archetypal two-party system at the national level may thus 
be more correctly identified as a system of several differing two-party systenns at the 
sub-national level - e.g the dominance of the Labour Party and the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) in Scotland, compared to the high level of support for the Conservative Party in the 
South East and the relatively strong support for the Liberal Democrats in the South West 
This point is supported by Katz, who argues that the categoric-vote plurality system 
common to Britain in fact only favours a two-party system most accurately at the 
individual constituency level rather than the overall national level. As a result, Britain 
tends to experience the most number of different local party systems compared to countries 
which operate under large district PR systems - as occurred in Italy before the reforms of 
1993 (Katz 1980: 115 - see Chapter Four for a more detailed explanation). Small parties 
which are effectively able to focus their appeal towards a geographically cortcerrtrated 
electorate at the sub-national level add a degree of complexity to the whole issue of 
electoral-party system relations. 
A small though significant amount of research has assessed the significance of second order 
elections (Reif & Schmitt 1980, van der Eijk, Franklin & Oppenhuis 1994). Reif and 
Schmitt define first order elections as national pariiamentary elections in pariiamentary 
^stems and national presidential elections in presidential systems. Second order elections 
thus become all other elections e.g. European electiorts, by-elections, municipal elections, 
regional elections and elections to second chambers (Reif & Schmitt 1980: 8). Whilst the 
research by Reif and Schmitt and van der Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis has generated 
hypotheses of second order voting behaviour based purely upon elections to the European 
Pariiament, we will outiine their findings in order to test in later chapters whether 
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similar patterns occur at the sub-national level. 
Reif and Schmitt (1980) attempted to measure various 'dimensions' which may produce 
different voting patterns in second order elections to those t\^t are observed in first order 
electior^. Rrst, the 'less-at-stake' dimension suggests that (i) turnout is lower in second 
order elections - this will be considered in several countries in Chapter Four, (ii) the 
prospects for new and small parties are brighter in second order elections as voters may 
choose patties they 'prefer* at this stage rather than voting rationally/tactically as occurs 
at the first order election, (iii) the percentage of spoilt and invalid ballots increases, and 
(iv) government parties suffer due to the voters' increased propensity to use second order 
elections as a 'protest' against policies and actions of the day. Second, Reif and Schmitt refer 
to the 'specific-arena' dimension. In this situation voters in second order elections take 
into account other than merely national issues. Truly 'local' issues may have greater 
implications in some countries, and the number of 'local' and independent candidates is 
likely to increase at the sub-rrationai level. Third, Reif and Schmitt refer to the 
Mnstitutional-procedurar dimensioa These are features of the electoral system such as 
seat distribution method and thresholds to representation which nrray not be the same as 
those used in first order elections in some countries (Reif & Schmitt 1980: 9-12). The 
result of Reif aruJ Schmitt's research suggests that the 'less-at-stake' dimension may be 
crucial for small parties, the electoral success of various green parties in Europe 
reinforcing this claim. Second, they claim that regional parties perform better in second 
order elections, and that electoral thresholds do not discourage small parties from 
contesting second order elections. We can use our data base to test these latter two claims. 
Van der Eijk, FrartWin and Oppenhuis suggest that second order elections act as 'markers' of 
each political party's standing. A vote-switch away from the main party/ies in favour of 
smaller parties is an indicator of the government's popularity and as such allows parties to 
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adapt poficies in time for the next general election to prevent a more permanent voter 
realignment. Second order elections also have the positive role of providing publicity for 
new small parties, which may not have the finances or personnel to compete natioTHAnde in 
a national election. Furthermore, the technical obstacles are reduced - for example, the 
number of votes needed to pass a threshold is lower (Van der Eijk, Franklin & Oppenhuis 
1994: 1-3). Third, they assess the significance of election *timing'. Second order elections 
are more likely to display warnings of discontent towards the goveming parties if they are 
held in the run-up to a general election rather than just after one (Franklin, van der Eijk 
& Oppenhuis 1994: 8). We do not seek to prove that the above hypotheses apply to all 
sub-national elections in Europe or indeed all of the time. What they do demonstrate 
though, Is that previous research and claims made about both electoral volatility and change 
and in particular the future prospects for far right and regionalist parties require further 
comparative analysis at the non rurtional level, and in our case we will analyze the 
sub-national level. In the next section we will consider some explanatiorw of why analysis 
at the sub national level may be increasing in importance. 
1.6 The Q^pline Qf thg C^r t^ral gtgte 
It has been argued (Batiey & Stoker 1991, Page 1991) that a more autonomous level of 
sub-national govemnrrent is likely to be of greater interest to the electorate and thus 
produces higher levels of turnout in local elections. A decline in turrtout may be one 
characteristic of an electorate which is becoming dissatisfied with government Turnout is 
not a feature of the electoral system itself, unless of course, there is compulsory voting as 
applies in Belgium and Italy, and did in the Netherlands until 1970. Low turnout In an 
electoral district may influence the number of marginal seats in an election, thus 
increasing the probability of inter-party power exchange after each election. 
Furthermore, low turnout in a PR multi-party system may benefit the smaller parties, 
24 
especially in terms of creating opportunities for multi-party coalition govemment (in 
Chapter Two Section 2,2.4 we will discuss compulsory voting and declining turnout). 
We have already mentioned that the generic term 'liberal democracy' applied to the twelve 
member states of the European Community has little analytical value since it tends to 
assume commonality without recognising the true depth of diversity. It is when we come to 
analyse local govemment systems that this notion of diversity is further demonstrated 
This occurs not only between states but, as will be shown, within individual countries 
between different levels of sub-national govemnr^ent (See Appendix C for an outline of 
suk>-national govemment in each of the 12 European Union member states). This is where 
the issue of autonomy may be significant - that is, the extent to which local govemment is 
independent from the constraints of central govemment. Local authorities in Britain and 
Laender in Germany can be identified as two extreme examples of autononrry in Europe. In 
particular, it has been argued (Page 1991, Sharpe 1993) that the establishment of 
regionalisation in the form of a quasi-autonomous system of govemment in some European 
countries ( e g Spain. Italy) h ^ acted as a replacement for, or at least an acceptable 
alternative vehicle to, national govemment control. This may then act as a stabilising force 
in an otherwise fragile political system which has the potential for nation state crisis. 
Whilst the precise powers of each country's local government are not a particular concem 
of this thesis, this may influence perceptions about the significance of electoral 
participation at the local level This may also go sonr»e way toward explaining why some 
minority parties achieve apparent success at the sub-national level, yet fail to translate 
this into success at the national level (see the eariier discussion of secor>d order voting 
behaviour in this chapter). Stoker adopts the accountability hypothesis by arguing that the 
British model of local govemment demonstrates a lack of faith in local political control and 
democracy. As a result, feelings of remoteness and lack of legitimacy are reflected in low 
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electoral turnout (1991: 11). ft does not follow, however, that PR autonnatically ensures 
high turnout or that more 'proportlonar forms of PR increase its likelihood. Furthermore, 
elections held in compulsory voting PR countries since the 1980s have been characterized 
by declining turnout (Blais & Carty 1990, Jackman 1987, Jackman & Miller 1995), 
though data from Belgium and Italy suggest that this decline is only very small. 
Despite the restraints created by the absence of a singular common centraHocal 
government structure, Blair suggests that 'local democracy and participation' in general is 
largely determined by three common features. First, the extent to which voters participate 
in the democratic process between elections. Second, the Imagery and prestige that the local 
political executive projects. For example, the system of cumu! des mandats in France 
enables political representation at the local level to act as a power base for individuals and 
parties at the national level. A similar system operates in the Republic of Ireland. Finally, 
the size of local authorities is important, as voters will not feel as 'attached' to local 
government which represent large populations as they will to an authority which 
represents smaller group interests (1991: 48-53). Related to this is the effect of district 
magnitude - that is the number of seats in each electoral division. Britain acts as an 
exception to the norm in this case since local wards exhibit a district magnitude ranging 
from one to three seats which is far smaller than the rest of our European examples. 
Roche suggests that local government as it operates in continental Europe tends to be 
characterised by certain features not common to the British model - such as; a large 
rmmber of small local bodies ( e g communes in Frarice arul Italy, and Gemeiruien in 
Germany), a highly stratified overall structure by which all local bodies have relatively 
the same rights/powers and which are determined by constitutional law, and state control 
over local administration tends to be far ntore decentralised (Roche 1982: 11). Yet an 
issue which has been largely overiooked at the sub-national level is the impact of the 
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electoral system. Not only does this have a psychological impact upon how the electorate 
uses its vote, but it is the key decision behind which party gets what degree of power in 
terms of seats. 
The issue of centre-periphery cleavages in contemporary western Europe, where 
regior>al-issue politics may have become impottant for sub-national electoral politics is 
relevant to this thesis. The centre-periphery cleavage is one of the three central pillars 
central to the Lipset-Rokkan thesis on party formation which will be outlined in greater 
detail in Chapter Three Section 3.3. We will adopt the assumption made by Gottman that 
"centrality is certainly being challenged" (Gottman 1980: 17) - although the reasons why 
individuals choose to identify with locally based rather than nationally based parties is too 
broad and complex an issue to be dealt with in this thesis. What should be apparent, 
however, is that the sub-national electoral system may act as an accessible vehicle for 
minority party representation and establishment within the general party system. 
Sharpe claims that the last twenty years have witnessed an increase in the significance of 
one particular level of sub-national government and: 
T h i s new institutional type either takes the form of an entirely new 
system of regional elected govemment exercising executive, and 
sometimes legislative, powers (Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Pottugal 
in part and possibly Greece), or it is a strengthened and refuriaished 
county level of local govemment (Norway, Sweden, the UK and some 
Lander in West Germany)... In a few cases, such as France (the 
departement) and Gemtany (the Regierungsbezirk), an essentially 
administrative meso level, has also taken on a new lease of life." (Sharpe 
1993: 1) 
We appear, therefore, to be witnessing a general increase in the autonomy and powers of 
sub-national interests in many EU member states - no better exemplified than by the 
constitutional creation of a Belgian federal state in 1993. Furthermore, some would argue 
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that the simultaneous strengthening of numerous decision-making powers for the 
institutions of the EU has created a challenge to the legitimacy of, and indeed a "redundancy" 
(Sharpe 1993: 2) of the powers once vested in the nation-state. Thus, the nrrotivation 
behind an analysis of electoral systems and party representation at the sub-national level is 
further justified. If it is possible to argue that the nat|or>-state is no lor^er the prinrtary or 
only form of legitimate govemment in the eyes of the electorate, then it is vital that we 
analyse the impact of electoral systems and voting patterns upon party systems at the 
sub-national level since this is the basis from which minority and new parties can launch 
themselves into national and intematior^l political systems. 
1 7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have attenrrpted to outiine some of the features arKJ changes which have 
occurred in west European electoral politics since the tate 1970s and which have created a 
situation where it may be useful comparatively to analyse the outcome of sub-national 
elections. Whilst there are many issues and aspects which it is not possible to assess within 
this thesis alone^ we have chosen to analyze the influence of the electoral system upon the 
proportionality of far right and regionalist party representation. 
To summarize, in relation to electoral volatility and change in western Europe, we have 
shown that an increasing consensus among psephologists suggests that partisan dealignment 
is on the increase due to the weakening of traditional cleavages and the changing nature of 
the electorate. As a result, the strength of the larger 'catch-air parties in the post-war 
period may be under threat from a variety of small and new parties. Second, the existing 
literature tends to undermirte the significance of small parties, particularty by employing 
the category 'other parties* in many countries at the national electoral level of analysis. 
7 For example, why is turnout declining, why voting patterns are changing. 
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Despite the post-materialist and post-communist atmosphere emerging in western Europe 
since the 1980s. there are few *new' major parties - except, potentially, the Greens in 
some countries and political parties in Italy. Logically, therefore, we may expect small and 
new parties to perform better in sub-national elections because the demand upon resources 
is not as high, and voters may be more irxlined to vote for them. Furthermore, electoral 
system variations will also have an effect 
In relation to the general impact of electoral systems, existing literature suggests that new 
parties are encouraged by proportional representation and that regioruil disproportionality 
is often underestimated at the national level of analysis. Furthermore, we outlined the 
small amount of research which considers the significance of second order elections, 
suggesting that the prospects for new and small parties are more beneficial compared to 
general election opportunities, though this is also affected by 'political' and 'timing' 
factors. A 'political' feature of sub-national elections may be the declining respect in the 
central state. As local autorramy increases, sub-national elections are likely to be taken 
more seriously. Furthermore, success at the sub-national level may provide small parties 
with the necessary base from which to launch themselves into the national electoral scene. 
Before moving onto sub-national electoral analysis, we will consider the established 
literature concerning electoral systems and proportionality in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER TWO - AN ANALYSIS QF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND RULES IN WESTERN EUROPE 
2.1 Introduction 
Electoral systems have been defined as, "those rules which govern the processes by which 
preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated in to the 
election of decision makers" (Blais 1988: 100). Before being able to analyse sub-
national electoral representation in terms of 'proportionality' and the representation of 
minority parties, it is first necessary to provide a literature review of existing theories 
and beliefs which have, to a large extent, developed as a result of analysis at the national 
electoral level. Within this chapter, therefore, we will focus upon numerous, potentially 
influential, aspects of electoral systems and rules as they operate in western Europe. In 
order to analyse these features in later chapters we will use our data to assess overall 
proportionality within Chapter Four, and the proportionality of far right and regionalist 
party representation in several countries (in Chapters Five and Six respectively). 
Analysis at the sub-national level is important because electoral features differ between 
levels - a common example is district magnitude. The ballot system and seat distribution 
system often varies at the sub-national level compared to those operating at the national 
level - an example being France (see Appendix C). By selecting various elections as case 
studies (dependent upon the existence of far right and regionalist parties and the 
availability of data) we can test hypotheses which have examined proportionality and 
representativeness based upon national election studies. These hypotheses will be referred 
throughout this chapter as and when appropriate. 
Although we ascertained in Chapter One that comparing local government structure and 
status involves a significant degree of diversity, this may not necessarily be the case when 
comparing electoral systems and their impact upon minority party representation. 
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Electoral systems may be analyzed on three levels; (i) differences between national and 
local electoral systems, (ii) differences between localities within each country, and (iii) 
differences between local electoral systems between countries, It is the latter two that 
provide the focus for this thesis. The weakening of 'traditional cleavages' such as class and 
religion since the 1970s (see Chapter Three Section 3.3) has led to a reassertion of 
territorial cleavages exemplified by increased regionalism in Britain, Italy and Belgium 
and thus justifying an analysis at the sub-national level. In particular, the political 
significance attached to sub-national elections will have an important bearing on the 
results, and as such: 
"... an analysis of voting patterns at an "unimportant" election may 
throw a good deal of light on voters' attitudes to parties and other 
political phenomena ... if major differences emerge between turnout and 
voting patterns at different levels, it may be inferred that these 
attachnrtents are not so strong as to prevent voters from feeling free to 
depart from their traditional allegiances when this can be done without 
infiicting a real punishment upon the party to which they normally feel 
tied." (Gallagher 1989: 22) 
Thus, using our data, we can test Gallagher's claim that one may witness variations in 
voting behaviour in sub-national elections as they are second order elections (see Chapter 
One section 1.5). If sub-national elections in western Europe realty are secorxi order 
elections we may expect to see a range of small, extreme, fringe and periphery parties 
benefit 
Candidate popularity and local issues may be just two factors accounting for different 
voting patterns at the sub-natiorral level. Whilst we cannot account for candidate 
popularity or highlight important local issues, it is possible to measure the effect of 
particular electoral rules. As Rae suggests: 
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"Some electoral systems are less violently prejudiced in favour of large 
parties than others, but all of them seem at least slightly biased in that 
direction. It follows that no electoral systems positively accelerate the 
development of small parties, but some are weaker brakes against their 
development than others." (Rae 1967: 69) 
It is our intention to analyze electoral systems at the sub-national level in order to 
ascertain which electoral systems are more 'proportional' in rewarding far right and 
regionalist parties in contemporary Europei. For example, whilst parties with a small, 
geographically concentrated electorate, or those with a large, thinly spread level of 
support have slim opportunities for participation in government at the national level, the 
simple plurality system is not always an obstacle. As Curtice suggests: 
"The ability of the singte-member-plurality system to discriminate 
against third parties is wholly contingent upon the electoral geography of 
their support. The system does discriminate against parties whose 
support is geographically evenly spread - but does not discriminate 
against those third parties whose support is geographically 
concentrated." (1992: 194) 
If this is true for national level elections then it must be equally appropriate, if not more 
so, for parties which are geographically concentrated at the sub-national level. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to outline the existing literature which focuses upon 
particular electoral features and rules that may be influential for minority party 
representation - for example, district magnitude and the use of thresholds. Second, the 
established literature covering the various electoral formulae which are in operation in 
western Europe will be analyzed (Appendix C provides an outline of the various electoral 
systems operating at the sub-national level in the twelve European Union member states). 
1 Rae suggests that small parties become disadvantaged when polling a share of the vote 
below 20% at the national level (Rae 1967: 72). We will test in later chapters whether 
this is the case at the sub-national level. 
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Third, we will outline the different ballot systems employed within these states and 
demonstrate that there are often links between the ballot system and the seat distribution 
system. Finally, we will analyze the concept of 'proportionality* - specifically in terms of 
its effects upon small parties. A review of existing electoral indices of proportionality 
will be provided to show that since they use national election data to measure 
disproportionality, they may overiook or marginalise the significance of minority party 
representation and establishment in certain countries at the sub-national level. 
Blais, following Rae (1967), identifies three key components in the classification of an 
electoral system - the ballot structure, the constituency stmcture, and the formula for 
seat allocation (Blais 1988: 99). In comparison, Katz (1980) Identifies four significant 
elements of electoral laws; the electoral formula, the ballot formula, district size, and the 
existence of an intra-party electoral choice. We have chosen to vary our method of 
analysis slightly. We will initially consider general electoral rules such as district 
magnitude, the use of supplementary seats, thresholds and compulsory voting (see section 
2.2). Second, we will consider electoral formulae and ballot systems (sections 2.3 and 
2.4) before finally considering the issue of disproportionality (section 2.5). The logic 
behind this ordering is that electoral rules and electoral formulae are our basis for 
analyzing far right and regionalist party representation in Chapters Five and Six. A range 
of proportionality indices will be employed to illustrate the differing extents of 
proportionality and disproportionality both within and between local election levels. Three 
indices have been chosen, to avoid the possibility of systematic bias as any single index has 
potential fiaws (see section 2.5). 
It is generally accepted that there are three methods of election - plurality, 
majoritarianism and proportional representation (Rae 1967), although this does not 
imply that all elections strictly follow one process alone e.g. Italy since 1993 l^s adapted a 
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combination of plurality and PR for national elections. Extensive research into the 
political consequences of electoral systems led Ujphart to the following summary: 
"The typical electoral system of majoritarian democracy is the 
single-member district plurality or majority system; consensus 
democracy typically uses proportional representation. The plurality and 
majority single-member district methods are a perfect reflection of 
majoritarian philosophy: the candidate supported by the largest number 
of voters wins, and all other voters remain unrepresented. Moreover, 
the party gaining a nation-wide majority or plurality of the votes will 
tend to be over represented in terms of pariiamentary seats. In sharp 
contrast, the basic aim of proportional representation is to represent 
both majorities and minorities and, instead of over representing or 
under representing any parties, to translate votes into seats 
proportionally." (Lijphart 1984: 150) 
Ujphart, therefore, reiterates the customary assumption regarding the relationship 
between electoral and party systems, and that the opportunities for minority parties at the 
national level are restricted to proportional representation (PR) systems. Since our aim 
is to compare the representation of certain minority party families at the sub-national 
level within various European countries, we will first provide a review of existing 
analyses regarding the impact of electoral systems upon effective representation. The 
British model of categoric voting (in single member constituencies) and plurality elections 
acts as an exception to the rule of proportional representation which dominates much of 
continental Europe. Yet it is unsatisfactory to assume (as may be derived from Lijphart's 
quote) that proportional representation implies conformity - rather it is a loose, generic 
term applied to various forms of balloting and seat distribution systems. So what exactly 
do we mean by proportional representation? 
The aim of Proportional Representation (PR) is to use a list or alternative vote system to 
register voter choices, and to distribute seats in a way that 'proportionately' reflects the 
overall popularity of parties/candidates. Blais asserts: 
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"The main virtue of proportional representation is a broad and fair 
representation. Almost by definition, proportional representation is 
fair, since the PR formula is intended to give each party a share of the 
seats more or less equal to its share of the votes ... This raises four 
questions. First, how accurately does proportional representation 
reflect opinions? Second, does it really allow for a greater diversity of 
viewpoints to be expressed? Third, does it foster consensus politics? 
And finally, does fair and broad representation contribute to the political 
order?" (Blais 1991: 243) 
As such, we cannot discuss proportional representation as a neutral requirement but must 
judge it in terms of its political consequences. Blais emphasises the crucial point that 
'proportionality' can inherently contain various implications, e^t to what extent may it be 
desirable to exclude particular, minority interests? A central criterion of 
proportionality, therefore, may be the extent to which small parties do, or should, receive 
seats. Ultimately, this has greater implications for proportionality as the number of small 
parties and their overall share of the vote increases (see Chapter One Sections 1.2 and 1.3 
for a discussion of the decline of mainstream party electoral popularity). 
A large amount of research has been produced since Rae (1967) on the mechanics of 
electoral systems, yet we are still faced with the problem of conflicting terminology. For 
example, Nohlen suggests: 
"There is no clear and uniform understanding in the comparative 
literature on electoral systems of what is meant by the terms "majority 
rule," "plurality system,""PR," etc. In addition, there is the category of 
so-called mixed systems, used as a residual category, the meaning of 
which varies considerably from one author to another." (1984: 83) 
In order to rectify Nohlen's observation, we need to establish which systems operate in 
which country. This is based upon the combined effects of various electoral rules, seat 
distribution formulae and ballot systems. We will now consider the role of certain 
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electoral rules in contemporary European elections. 
2.2 Electoral Rules and Their Effect Upon Party Representation 
This section focuses upon electoral rules which may be particularly influential in affecting 
the representation of mirK>rity parties. District magnitude is a feature of all contested 
elections whilst compulsory voting, supplementary seats and de jure (constitutional) 
thresholds will only apply in certain cases. These rules are not a direct consequence of the 
electoral formula per se. but it may be the case that an identifiable relationship exists 
between the formula and the rules employed in each country - e.g. thresholds may form a 
part of a majoritarian system but not a simple plurality one. In this chapter we will 
outline the meaning of, and previously established generali^tions about, these rules before 
analyzing their impact upon representation and proportionality in Chapters Four. Five and 
Six. 
2.2.1 District Magnitude 
The term district magnitude relates to the number of seats available in each electoral 
divisions and may be one of two sorts - single-member or multi-member divisions. The 
relationship between district magnitude and ballot system is intrinsic. For example, the 
use of multiple votes in single-seat districts is of no value, although what may be 
significant is the distinction between categoric voting and the single transferable vote in 
such areas. The greater the number of seats per district, the greater the opportunity for 
proportional representation in multi-party elections (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 19) -
2 The term division is used here to encompass a range of terms for electoral areas ag. ward 
(England and Wales), division (Scotland), gemeinde and land (Germany), province (the 
Netheriands. Belgium and Spain) etc 
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although again this is related to our understanding of the term "proportionality" and the 
number of parties campaigning, since the probability of every party attaining an exactly 
proportional share of votes and seats is slim. Rae (1967) and Taagepera and Shugart 
(1989) identified district magnitude as being the strongest determinant of 
proportionality, although research produced since the 1980s has focused upon the 
significance of the effect of the electoral formula or particular rules upon proportionality 
(Lijphart 1994a). Rose suggests that the wide disparity of district nnagnitude between 
countries using PR at the national level makes generalisations regarding proportionality at 
this level difficult (1984: 76). Such disparity, however, may not be as great at the 
sub-ruitional level and thus highlights the potential value of our comparative analysis. 
Taagepera claims, "As district magnitude is reduced, a PR system gradually starts 
penalizing the small parties, an effect reaching its strongest degree when M3 becomes one" 
(1984: 91), and further evidence suggests ttet minority interests, for example female 
candidates, have greater possibilities of winning seats in multi-member districts (Blais 
1991). This argument is also supported by Taagepera and Shugart (1989) who suggest 
that as district magnitude increases, the number of parties competing is likely to increase. 
A tow district magnitude can have a 'psychological* effect upon voters which discourages 
them from voting for the smaller and more extreme parties - hence the contradictory 
situation occurs in which multi-member districts encourage more small parties to 
participate which ultimately enhances the likelihood of disproportionality occurring 
(Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 114-124). As such, we will test the relationship between 
the district magnitude and the electoral formula upon both far right and regionalist parties 
in several countries at the sub-national level in later chapters. 
3 M = district magnitude 
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2.2.2 Supplementary Seats 
In certain cases where proportional representation is employed, a number of seats are 
reserved in a 'pool', and are allocated in the final stages to the under represented parties -
hence providing a greater degree of proportionality (Hermens 1984). This process has 
been employed in general elections held in Germany since 1945. For example, six 
supplementary seats (Ubertiangmandate) were applied to the outcome of the 1990 first 
all-German general election, and all six were awarded to the Christian Democratic Union. 
As a result, this party received a 45.7% share of the first ballot votes and was slightly 
over rewarded with 48.6% share of the total seats (Conradt 1993: 114). Supplementary 
seats, therefore, do not necessarily benefit the smaller parties, but attempt to reduce the 
greatest cases of disparity in the ratio between each party's share of votes and seats. 
Supplementary seats at the sub-national level are employed in the Saariand (see Chapter 
Four section 4.5.2) but cannot be studied in depth in this thesis due to a lack of data. 
2.2.3 Thresholds 
An argument frequently used against proportional representation is that it can over reward 
very small parties, and create a situation of coalition and blackmail potential (Lijphart & 
Grofman 1984). As a result some countries employ a minimum vote threshold for 
representation (a de jure threshold), which operates as a significant barrier to parties 
which appeal to a minority electorate, or whose vote may be diversely spread over 
electoral districts. Such thresholds are currentiy used in all French and German 
sub-national elections and Spanish municipal elections (see Appendix C). Taagepera and 
Shugart point out that a disadvantage of constitutional thresholds is the arbitrary nature of 
the cut-off point - for example, whv is the threshold in Germany 5% and not a lower or 
higher figure? (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 37) 
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For the purposes of this thesis, Germany will act as a case study for the impact of de jure 
thresholds upon the representation of far right parties, and Spain as a case study for the 
effect of de jure thresholds upon the representation of regionalist parties. A further aspect 
of thresholds, however, which can be applied to all elections is the concept of de facto 
thresholds - also referred to by Lijphart as a threshold of exclusion (Lljphart 1994a: 
25). This is defined as the maximum percentage share of the vote that under particular 
conditions is insufficient for a party to win a seat. We will demonstrate in later chapters 
that the de facto threshold is not a standard figure but will range between systems and 
elections depending on a combination of factors. 
Electoral features which may affect this threshold include district magnitude, the number 
of competing parties and the electoral formula. In many cases, the de facto threshold is 
often higher than a constitutional threshold (see Chapters Four, Five and Six). For 
example, the 5% threshold which applies In Germany does not guarantee representation for 
all parties polling a 5% share of the vote or more, and we will demonstrate that a small 
district magnitude can create de facto thresholds often in excess of 10% share of the vote. 
By considering, therefore, shares of the vote for the largest party not to win seats under 
various sub-national electoral systems, we may be able to identify which electoral formula 
or rules are most influential in determining which parties secure representation. 
2.2.4 Compulsory Voting and Turnout 
Although we do not always consider turnout as fitting into the classification 'electoral 
rules', it may in fact be directly related to the imposition of certain electoral fonmulae and 
rules. It is a feature which we will pay some attention to in this thesis in order to question 
whether there is a relationship between levels of turnout and changes in the level of 
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support for particular mirKwity parties. Research produced since the mid-1980s has 
moved away from the traditional cultural-historical approach to electoral participation 
and instead has focused upon institutional and electoral attributes. The predominant rule 
affecting turnout is compulsory voting (Blais & Carty 1990, Jackman & Miller 1995) - a 
feature which is used in Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece, and which applied in the 
Netherlands until 1970. 
Other features may also be influential to turnout but to an extent which is much more 
difficult to quantify precisely. Research has previously identified a correlation between 
levels of turnout and unicameralism (Jackman & Miller 1995), the number of competing 
parties and the use of PR (Blais & Carty 1990). What is of particular interest to this 
piece of research is Jackman's claim (1987) that increased disproportionality discourages 
minor-party supporters from voting at all. As such, small parties have important lessons 
to learn from an understanding of which electoral ^stems, rules and features are most 
likely to affect the transformation of votes into seats. 
As a balance to the above argument that disproportionality depresses minor-party support, 
it is also possible to argue the case that conrtpulsory voting encourages small party support. 
If we refer back to Chapter One Section 1.5 we suggested that support for small, 
particularly extremist, parties may be explained in terms of being a protest vote against 
the mainsueam and governing parties. Whilst the electorate may 'protest' in other 
countries by not voting, in compulsory voting systems they are more likely to protest by 
choosing small, fringe and anti-system parties. This section has focused upon specific 
electoral rules which may affect participation and vote-to-seat conversion. We will now 
consider the various advantages and disadvantages associated with the predominant electoral 
formulae. 
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2.3 The Classification of Electoral Formulas 
Nohlen suggests that we should not evaluate PR using the criterion of plurality, and 
likewise should not evaluate plurality using the criterion of PR (1984: 87), but what 
exactly are these criterion? As stated in Section 2.1, it is generally accepted that there 
are three basic methods of electioa and we can classify them as follows: 
2.3.1 - Plurality 
Within western Europe the plurality system is predominantly associated with all elections 
held in Britain (though not in Northern Ireland)^. This system enables the candidate with 
the most votes (not necessarily an absolute majority) to be elected. It is also referred to 
as First Past The Post, and operates with two basic variations:-
i) Each voter has a single vote in a division with one seat (the British model for national 
elections). Lijphart states that single seat, single member districts are the norm in 
national elections (1994a: 9). 
ii) In multi-seat districts, a semi-categoric system is operationalised. In two seat 
districts, for example, voters have two votes and the two cancBdates receiving the nrKWt 
votes receive seats. Altematively, in list systems the candidate list may be 'blocked' so 
that the order of the candidates on each party list does not change and so the first name on 
the list is given priority. In other circumstances, an ordinal system operates where the 
voter is allowed to select particular names from their chosen list, or indeed add candidates 
not included in the list. In the example of list ballots, elections often occur over two 
4 Beyond Westem Europe the plurality system is used in Canada, India, New Zealand and the 
USA (Ujphart 1994: 18). 
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rounds, so that only candidates with absolute majorities win seats in the first round, 
whilst second round seats may be gained with a relative majority (see section on 
majoritarianism). 
The advantages of a plurality system are seen to be that it produces strong govemment by 
encouraging a two-party (or two-and-a-half party) system and stable one-party 
govemment, thereby encouraging the developnrient of 'people's parties' which appeal to a 
wide range of electors (Rae 1967, UJphart and Grofman 1984, Blais 1991). 
Furthermore, a plurality system offers a means of manufacturing a pariiamentary 
majority. Blais suggests that its primary quality is one of "decisiveness" (Blais 1991: 
242) - that is to say, the election result is clear as to who wins and who loses power. In a 
situation of coalition multi-party govemnrient, by comparison, the actual formulation of 
govemment and distribution of power may not directly reflect the real share of votes. 
Also, if we are to measure 'stability' in terms of frequent elections and frequent changes of 
government, it has been suggested that PR does not create more elections but the 
govemments that are formed under such a system do exhibit a shorter life expectancy 
(Blais 1991). 
There is an exception to the tertdency that plurality systems create stable, long-term 
government, ag, the British general election of Febniary 1974 which led to the creation of 
a minority govemment and the calling of another election only eight months later. Irvine 
suggests that 
"Apart from being potentially unrepresentative, plurality electoral 
systems tend to be capricious. By capriciousness, I mean simply the 
unequal weighting of votes, and vote ^i f ts , in different parts of the 
country... As a result, the economic and cultural incompatibilities of the 
separate regions, which we may call the social bases of regionalism, are 
exacerbated by the po//t/ca/bases of regionalism." (Irvine 1988: 17) 
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As such, the mechanical inequalities of a plurality system are further entrenched by strong 
social inequalities which vary from area to area, such as malapportionments. Politically, 
we may question the extent to which a one-party nrtajority stable government is 
appropriate/most desirable, or indeed does it imply that PR encourages weak and unstable 
government? We cannot answer this here, but we can assess the impact of electoral 
systems upon new and small party representation. Plurality systems generally favour the 
larger parties, though they are not necessarily a hindrance to smaller, geographically 
concentrated parties. Because of their disproportionai tendency, they rarely operate 
thresholds (see exception under majoritarianism) though Lijphart (1994a) suggests that 
the effective threshoki is approximately a 35% share of the vote. 
2.3.2 - Majoritarianism 
At the national level, the majority rule is employed in French elections only, with the 
exception of the 1986 election where PR was employed and subsequently abandoned. This 
differs from the above mentioned plurality system by requiring an absolute majority (i.e. 
50% of the total valid vote plus one vote) rather than a relative majority. Since absolute 
majorities are a rare occurrence in multi-party elections, this system is usualty used as 
only part of a two-round election (see above) or in single-seat constituencies using the 
Aftemative Vote. 
In relation to the use of a majoritarian electoral system, its advantages are said to be 
similar to that of the plurality system in that it produces a single-governing party, and 
hence a more effective government (Blais 1991, Lijphart 1994b). For example, research 
5 Malapportionment refers to the situation created when voting populations are unequally 
sized across regions/districts or when there are unequal district magnitudes in 
multi-member elections which do not reflect variances in voter population size. 
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carried out by Blais and Carty suggests that the probability of a majority government 
increases by 59% in a plurality system and by 42% in a majority system compared to a 
PR system (Blais & Carty 1987: 214). Furthermore, Ujphart and Grofman suggest that 
"... from a practical point of view it may be a potent weapon against 
antisystem parties; whereas the disproportionality of the plurality rule 
mainly hurts the smaller parties that are not regionally concentrated, 
the [majoritarian] system's disproportionality discriminates against 
extrennlst parties even when they are relatively large." (Lijphart & 
Grofman 1984: 10) 
In terms of its disadvantages, the nnajority system only works when the support of at least 
half the electorate is guaranteed to any one party (this may be aided by using the 
alternative vote). Otherwise, parties become involved in electoral pacts in which 
personality and ability to perform 'behind-the-scenes' deals can take precedence over real 
voter interests. The use of a two-balbt majority system, therefore, actually encourages 
alliances which do not include extremist or anti-system parties (Lijphart & Grofman 
1984: 10. Fischella 1994: 185). Furthermore, the 'will of the majority' is not 
necessarily in the interests of the unrepresented minority. Again, Lijphart (1994a) 
suggests the effective threshold is approximately a 35% share of the vote, though of course 
a de jure threshold will already have been put into operation after the first round ballot 
2,3.3 - Proportional Representation 
In terms of the advantages of the third method of election, Proportional Representation 
(PR) is frequently identified as producing broad and fair representation (see the lower 
measures of disproportionality in Table 2.2 in section 2.6). As such it engenders notions 
of 'legitimacy', and demands a consensus-building mechanism which fosters harmony and 
order that is necessary in a diverse and heterogeneous society (Blais 1991). Yet the 
concept of proportionality (see section 2.5) is itself contentious, and is ultimately affected 
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by district magnitude i.e. in single-seat districts, the result under a PR and plurality 
election would be the same. We will demonstrate later that variance in district rrwgnitude 
is important in contributing towards proportional representation (Ujphart 1994a: 159). 
In terms of *fainr^ess', PR is the system most suited to small parties. Yet this may again 
question the notion of proportior^irty, since it has been suggested that some national 
systems may 'over-represent' small parties - a charge directed against the Free 
Democratic Party (FOP) in Germariy which has had a role as coalition partner to both 
major parties (the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union and the Social 
Democratic Party) in most of the post war period, since the potential power created via 
coalition may lead to greater access to power than its actual electoral popularity deserves 
(Lijphart & Grofman 1984: 5). Yet PR does enable more diverse representation in 
societies which are divided by regional cleavages (for example, Belgium, Spain and ^ l y ) , 
thus supporting Palombara's claim that: 
"... elections by plurality would so distort the political complexion of the 
country as to leave the unrepresented minorities no alternative to 
seeking new and perhaps violent means of achieving expression." (La 
Palombara 1953: 245) 
By analyzing the electoral fortunes of far right and regionalist parties in Europe we are 
considering the representation of a diversity of interests within society. As such we are 
able to test Powell's assertions that PR has two sets of consequences; it produces more 
parties, and produces some extremist parties - although the number of votes and seats 
won by a party may not be proportionate to their allocated power (Powell 1986). The 
disadvantage of PR is highlighted by Duverger's claim that PR tends to promote 
'personality' over 'ability to govem'. since, "by dispersing the voters among numerous 
independent parties, PR prevents the citizens from expressing a clear choice for a 
governmental team. It transfers this choice to the party leaders" (1984: 32). There 
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are four predominant types of PR seat distribution employed throughout Europe which 
are referred to as either highest average (divisor) methods or largest remainder 
(quota) methods. The d'Hondt and modified Sainte l.ague systems belong to the hi^est 
average group whilst the Imperiali/Hare-Niemeyer and the Droop systems are referred 
to as largest remainder methods. Their method of calculation and general effects upon 
proportionality are outlined below. 
2.3.3a The d'Hondt System -This system has been used in national elections in westem 
Europe in France (in 1986 only), Germany (until 1983), and is employed In 
Luxembourg, Spain, Switzeriand, Portugal, Finland, the NethertandsG, and b^ond 
Europe in Israel. Under this highest average method of seat distribution, the total vote 
for each party is divided by the number of seats won in order to give each party as 
proportionate a number of seats in relation to votes as possible. The d'Hondt formula 
attempts to minimize the over-representation of the most over-represented party 
(Gallagher 1991:. 35), and is the least proportional variant of PR (Ujphart 1990: 
484). The formula used for each party is:-
partv share of total votes 
seat (s) won + 1 
(Source: Rae 1967: 31) 
therefore, a new average for each party s determined before each seat is allocated and 
this worics against the interests of the smaller* parties (Gallagher 1991, Lijphart 
1990). The main weakness is that the distribution of votes is highly unlikely to be 
6 It was also used in Sweden, Denmark and Norway until the eariy 19SOs when It was 
replaced by the modified Sainte Lague. 
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exactly proportional, and so the largest parties are likely to be over represented, whilst 
very small parties are treated severely and party fragmentation is discouraged 
(Gallagher 1991: 35). The minimum share of the vote required to secure a seat (the cb 
facto threshold) will depend upon a combination of district magnitude, the total vote and 
the number of parties competing. Lijphart (1990) claims this formula is more than 
twice as disproportionai as the largest remainder Hare and the Sainte Lague formulae. 
Taagepera and Laakso (1980) classify d'Hondt systems as having an *eariy rise profile' 
- that is to say, it is generous to parties polling 15% and more, but heavily penalizes 
those polling less than 5% and produces a 'break even effect' for those polling between 6 
- 13%. 
2.3.3b The modified Sainte Laaue Formula - This formula has been used at the national 
level in Sweden since 1952 (with a 4% threshold since 1970), Norway since 1953 and 
Denmark since 1953. This is similar to the d'Hondt formula but uses differing 
averaging fractions. For example, the first denominator equals 1.4 rather than one, and 
the relative distarrce between denomirtators is larger (using odd Integers e.g. 3, 5, 7 
etc). This system favours middle-sized parties rather than the largest ones, but a^ in 
disadvantages the smaller parties due to the increased threshold. Taagepera arKJ Laakso 
(1980: 431) classify the modified Sainte Lague formula as having a 'flat profile' as it 
is the closest to ideal proportionality for any party size, with the 'break even point' of 
representation being 2- 4%. 
2.3.3c The Hare-Niemever System - This fonmula has been used in national electk>ns 
in Germany since 1987, and Greece (in conjunction with the d'Hondt system) since 
1990. A quota is devised as such:-
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total number of votes 
total number of seats 
(Source: Lijphart 1994a: 154) 
For every whole quota reached a party gains a seat. Any remaining seats are given to the 
parties with the largest remainder - hence rewarding small parties which may have 
suffered under the d'Hondt procedure. A variation of the Hare-Niemeyer system is the 
Imperiali formula where the initial quota is devised as such:-
total number of votes 
total number of seats + 2 
(Source: Rae 1967: 34) 
- again, this has the potential of rewarding small parties. The use of lower quotas 
means fewer seats need to be allocated via remainders. Taagepera and Laakso (1980) 
classify largest remainder formulae as having an 'early rise profile' , thus engendering 
the same characteristics as the d'Hondt formulae. 
2.3.3d The Droop Quota System (Haaenhach-Bischoff ) - The Droop Quota is determined 
as such:-
Total number of valid votes +1 
Total number of seats + 1 
(Source: Sinnott 1995: 16) 
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This system is preferred for alternative-candidate ballots (also known as the STV 
system) as opposed to party lists. A cyde of seat allocatwn continues using lower 
preferences until all seats are filled Results are identical to those under the d'Hondt 
formula (Ujphart 1994a: 192). 
In his study of electoral laws, Lijphart claims that the Hare system is the most 
proportional, the modified Sainte Lague and both Droop systems are less proportional, 
whilst the d'Horuft and Imperial! systems are the least proportional (Lijphart 1994a: 
159). The outconfYe of selected formulae in our study will depend upon the availability of 
data and will be considered at the sub-national level in the data analysis chapters. 
We can see, therefore, that there are various general advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the different types of electoral systems currently operating in western 
Europe, and the choice of a particular system may be related to preferences of which 
parties should receive political power. Rose considers the issue from a different angle 
by suggesting that the effect of different systems upon the number of parties is one of 
degree rather than kind, since PR systems are just as likely to produce a majority party 
government as plurality systems are likely not to produce one (1984: 79) . The central 
issues regarding the advantages and disadvantages surrounding electoral systems are 
namely (i) is a one-party style of government or coalition government preferred? arKl 
(ii) should small parties be rewarded with seats? This latter issue can be broken down 
into further questions (i) where should the 'cut-off line for defining 'small parties' be 
drawn? and (ii) are all small parties to be treated equally - even if they promote an 
extremist or anti-system ideology? these two points are analyzed in Chapters Five and 
Six in relation to far right and regionalist parties. Next, we will consider ballot 
systems. Ballot systems do rrot hold the same importance for proportionality as district 
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magnitude and seat allocation formulae, and as such they will not be a direct concern of 
our later analysis. They do, nevertheless, raise the issue of the representation of 
minority rights. 
2.4 Ballot System? 
The actual mechanians of voting - or voting procedures - are often related to the 
electoral system employed. For example list-ballots are most frequent in multi-seat 
districts, or multi-round elections. Balloting has two extreme forms; categoric ballots 
- where the voter is allowed to choose only one candicfate/party (;.e. Britain and 
block-list systems) per seat available, and ordinal ballots - where the voter is 
required to list choices in order of preference with the number of choices reflecting the 
number of seats to be filled (as exemplified by the Single Trarisferable Vote). It is more 
common, however, for ballots to lie somewhere between these two types - for example, 
in party-list systems voters may vote for a limited number of candidates within a single 
party or Mist', whilst panachage allows for cross-party/list options (as experienced in 
France). It is more usual to connect categoric ballots with the plurality formula and 
ordinal ballots with PR, as we can see by referring to the ballot systents in 
contemporary western Europe outiined in Table 2.2 (section 2.6). 
It can be seen, therefore, that the British electoral system at the national level offers 
the most straightforward ballot system - each voter may choose only one candidate in a 
single-seat constituency and the plurality rule to seat allocation is applied. PR 
systems, however, offer a variety of ballot alternatives which reflect different levels of 
preference and require various degrees of voter knowledge/ sophistication - the 
block-list system offering the least choice and systems which allow voters to 'add 
candidate names' being the most liberal. 
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2.4.1 Categoric/Plurality Voting - is also referred to as the first past the post system 
and often used in single-seat districts, though sometimes in multi-seat districts. Under 
this procediFe, each voter may have a single vote, or a number of votes equal to the 
district magnitude, and the candidate(s) with the most number of votes are elected. 
Under the French two ballot system, voters choose only one candidate/party in each 
rourtd, but of course may, and sometimes have to (due to withdrawal/elimination) 
change their preference between ballots. 
2.4.2 - Single Transferable Voting (STV) - Used in multi-seat districts along with the 
Droop Quota method of seat allocation (see section 2.3.3.d). Votes are sorted into first 
preference and any carKlkiate attaining the Droop Quota is elected with any surplus votes 
being redistributed proportionately among the second preference candidates. If no 
candidate is elected immediately the candidate with the fewest first preferences is 
eliminated and their second preference votes are redistributed as before. The process 
continues until all seats are filled. Katz (1984: 135-137) suggests that STV is 
difficult to classify along the lines of the usual two system model, since it is close to PR 
in terms of proportionality, but does not rely upon party appeal - rather on the 
popularity of individual candidates. As a result, STV tends to localise and personalise 
politics (see the analysis of Irish elections in Chapter Four), allowing minor parties 
and independents to stand where they only have a reasonable chance of winning. PR, on 
the other hand, tends to nationalise the electoral process, therefore making small 
parties present candidates in all constituencies, and we have already discussed the 
problems of presenting nation-wide lists for small and new parties in Chapter One 
Section 1.2. 
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2.4.3 List Systems - These allow for varioie degrees of freedom of choice for the voter. 
For example, blocked lists (or closed lists) merely present a ranked list of candidates 
under a party title. The voter may only choose between parties, and seats are then 
distributed to candidates according to the number of seats won and their rank on the list. 
In open list systems, voters may either vote only for a party, or express a preference 
for a particular candidate(s) - although this implies a greater degree of voter 
awareness and interest Finally, the panachage system as employed in France allows 
voters to choose a party, but also to express a preference for cancfidat^ from other 
party lists (Marsh 1985: 366). How does the use of different ballot systems relate to 
proportionality? 
Ujphart claims that there is no direct link between ballot structure and 
disproportionality (Lijphart, 1994a; 124), and therefore it is likely that the previous 
features analyzed in this chapter such as district magnitude, thresholds arKi electoral 
formulae will more clearly demonstrate why disproportionality occurs. However, 
Lijphart also clainns (1990: 492) that there is some relation^ip between the ballot 
system and the effective number of parties, as shown in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1 - Average Effective Numbers of Elective Parties Qassified by Ballot Structure, 
1945 - 1985. 
BALLOT STRUCTURE EFFECTIVE PARTIES 
Categorical 3.92 
Ordinal 3.64 
Source: Based on data In Lijphart 1990: 492. 
Ujphart (1990) suggests that in single member district systems, ordinal ballots 
create a higher degree of multi-partism than categorical ballots - e g a four party 
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system compared to a two party system Also, ordinal ballots create more 'sincere* 
voting and reduce the risk of 'wasted' votes. The link between the ballot structure and 
multi-member districts, however, is, according to Lijphart, much weaker. So far we 
have considered the various rules and formulae which are most commonly used in Europe 
at both the national and sub-national electoral levels. We have also reviewed the 
existing literature regarding the advantages and disadvantages of these various systems 
which has developed from analysis at the national level - particularly in relation to the 
type of governing party system they produce and to what extent they encourage the 
participation of 'small parties'. Next we shall offer some methods for measuring how 
'fair* any combination of ballot system, seat distribution method and particular 
electoral rules is. 
2.5 Defining and Measuring Disproportionality 
A prinrtary driving force behind any comparative analysis of the effect of electoral 
systems and rules upon party representation is the need to ascertain how fairty votes 
are transformed Into seats (Rose 1984: 74) . Disproportionality occurs whenever a 
political party/candidate receives a share of seats that is not eqial to its share of the 
votes (Lijphart 1994a, Monroe 1994). In the article "Proportionality, 
Disproportionality and Electoral Systems" (1991), Gallagher maintains that despite the 
voluminous analysis concerning the proportionality of different electoral systems, 
relatively little consideration has been given to the various implications derived from 
the term "proportionality" itself. It is inevitable in single-seat districts, and highly 
probable in multi-seat districts, that seat allocation will never reflect equally each 
party's share of the votes We need to be aware, therefore, of how inequality is 
measured, and this can be done in two ^^ecific ways - the absolute difference between a 
party's seats and votes, or the ratio between a party's seats and votes (Gallagher 1991: 
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38 ) . 
Disproportionality is not affected by the method of seat distribution alone - one also 
needs to consider the vote distribution between parties, the availability of seats 
(district magnitude), the impact of electoral thresholds and the number of competing 
parties. In terms of district magnitude, a larger number of parties requires a larger 
number of seats per district if high proportionality is to occur. This has led Hermens to 
suggest that true proportionality can only be achieved by using supplementary seats 
(1984: 29) - see section 2.2.2 in this chapter. Yet the most pertinent issue regarding 
proportionality in this thesis is Gallagher's comment that 
"Ideally, a test for the proportionality of an electoral formula should 
concentrate on the average amount of disproportionality produced within 
each constituency rather tiian the outconre at the rational level." 
(Gallagher 1991: 44) 
If we apply Gallagher's comments to the sub-national level of electoral representation, and 
by identifying particular regions, counties, provinces and communes in various countries 
we may begin to identify greater variations in proportionality and in party system 
formation than can otherwise be observed at the national level. This may be because (i) 
voting behaviour is different between general and sub-national elections, or (ii) the 
nature and importance of government formation at the national level renders relatively 
little interest in r>on-goveming parties, which may not be the case at the sub-national 
level. 
Yet the debate over proportionality nray be taken one stage further. Cox and Shugart 
suggest that it is rK>t the way in which disproportionafity is measured that is significant, 
but rather the pdrtical character of disproportionality, that Is to say, "the extent to which 
different methods of PR favour large parties over small. This, after all, has the more 
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direct impact on the party system" (Cox & Shugart 1991: 350). By concentrating our 
analysis at the sub-national level we can compare the effect of electoral features such as 
district magnitude, thre^olds, low shares of the votes and increased party competition 
upon the proportionality opportunities for particular far right and reglonalist parties. It 
is only when electoral systems produce different sets of party systems at the sub-national 
level (both from national party systems and between different electoral regions) that the 
question of which particular features enhance proportionality can be more substantially 
answered. 
Gallagher (1991) identifies four possible influences upon disproportionality; the vote 
distribution, the district nrtagnitude, malapportionment and the use of thresholds. He 
stresses the significance of district magnitude as a major detemiinant at the national level. 
This suggests that Gallagher realises the weakness incurred by generalising analysis at the 
nation-state level which overiooks/dismisses the possibility of strong regional deviations 
(see quote above). The chances of misleading generalisations occurring may be reduced by 
(a) concentrating on the sub-national electoral level and (b) focusing upon and comparing 
specific sub-national divisions. In their analysis of disproporttonaiity, Taagepera and 
Laakso (1980) claim that district magnitude, the number of electoral rounds and 
^adjustment rules' are more important than the seat distribution method (Taagepera & 
Laakso 1980: 423). In comparison, Lijphart (1993) suggests that a total of eight 
explanations may account for electoral disproportionality. These are: the electoral 
formula, district magnitude, electoral thresholds, assembly size, ballot structure, 
malapportionment, presidentialism and apparentement. Riedwyl & Steiner (1995) 
summarize Ujphart's findings as being that the combined influence of (in decreasing 
order) district magnitude and electoral thresholds, electoral formulas, and the assembly 
size are the most significant influences upon electoral proportiorrality. District 
magnitude, the implications of electoral thresholds and the seat distribution method are 
55 
three electoral features which we are able to test in relation to the representation of far 
right and regionalist parties in Chapters Five and Six respectively, and we will test 
whether it is still the case at the sub-national level that electoral fonmulae and district 
magnitude are the strongest influences upon minority party representation. 
In relation to the measurement of disproportionality, several indices have been developed 
in order to measure differences between electoral systems. Research, unsurprisingly, has 
so far focused upon national elections, although it is still important for us to assess the 
existing literature, as this contributes towards the debate of what 'proportionality' 
actually means and how it should be measured. Gallagher suggests that different PR 
systems embody different concepts of what proportionality actually means so that "a key 
point that is often overiooked is that measures of disproportionality and allocation formulae 
are inextricably bound up with each other" (Gallagher 1991: 38). Hence, it would be 
unwise to rely upon any single measure of disproportionality as this will Inevitably favour 
particular seat alkx:ation formula(e). We will now outline some established indices of 
proportionality before choosing three in particular to use for our purposes. Indices 
measuring absolute disproportionality include the Loosemore-Hanby Index, The Rae Index 
and the Least Squares Index, whilst the Sainte Lague Index measures the ratio of 
disproportionality. The most frequently used indices are outlined below. 
2.5.1 Loosemore-Hanbv Index O. In this model, disproportionality (D) is equal to the 
total percentage by which over-represented parties are over-represented (which is also 
the same as the total percentage by which under-represented parties are 
under-represented). It is calculated by adding the absolute differences between the vote 
(Vj) and seat shares (Si)for alt parties and then dividing by two, which can be expressed in 
the following way: 
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D= V z Z r V i - Si] 
(Source: Ujphart 1994a: 60) 
This model tends to understate the proportionality of PR because it ts too sen^tive to the 
number of parties participating in each election ag. the greater the number of small 
parties receiving no seats, the higher the disproportionality measure (Lijphart 1985: 
10) though of c o u r ^ this is affected by grouping together small, non-seat winners as 
'others'. As a result of their initial analysis in 1971, Loosemore and Hanby concluded that 
(a) plurality systems produce the highest levels of disproportionaPity and (b) differetKes 
between PR systems are most likely to derive from differences in district magnitude and 
the variance in the number of competing parties, both of which will be considered in 
relation to the proportionality of far right and regionalist party representation in later 
chapters. This index also minimizes the disproportionality of the largest remainder 
method of seat distribution (Gallagher 1991: 39). Since this Index was derived from the 
principles of the largest remainders electoral fomnula, it is prone to the same weaknesses 
and biases as these formulae (see section 2.3.3). 
2.S.2 The Rae Index: This is similar to the Loosemore-Hanby Index, but involves adding 
the (fiffererrces between the share of the votes (Vi)and the share of the seats (Sj) for each 
party which wins at least 0.5% of the total share of the vote and cfividing this total by the 
total number of parties (1/n). As such, this index measures disproportionality per party 
rather than per election. This can be expressed as the equation: 
l = i / n Z [ V i - Si] 
(Source: Ujphart 1994a: 58) 
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Gallagher suggests that the Rae Index will be less useful when a proliferation of small 
parties occurs, as the index will overstate the proportionality of multi-party systems 
{Gallagher 1991: 40). Since it may be the case that small parties are more likely to exist 
where there are PR systems (see Chapter One section 1,4), this formula ultimately 
overestimates the level of proportionality produced under PR. A further problem with 
this index is that measurement is hindered when several small parties shares of the votes 
and seats are categorised under the title 'other parties' (Ujphart 1985: 10) as this 
effectively produces 'one party' for analysis when in fact there may be many, very small 
parties which is not unusual in extremely proportional systems. 
2.5.3 The Least Squares Index: Developed by Gallagher, this is similar to the Rae Index in 
that the vote-seat difference for each party is squared (Vj - Si) 2, all the values are added 
together, the sum (Z) divided by two and firtally the square-root is taken (V) . This 
formula expresses disproportionality on a scale from Q-lOO, and can be expressed in the 
following way: 
L S q = V l V 2 l ( V i - Si) 2 ] 
(Source: Lijphart 1994a: p.61) 
This index measures the disproportionality per election as the Loosemore-Hanby Index 
does, but tends to register a few large discrepancies in vote-seat shares rather than 
numerous very small ones. Hence, overall proportionality is not unduly influenced by 
extreme but peripheral results. Gallagher refers to the Least Squares Index as a *happy 
medium' between the Loosemore-Hanby and Rae Indices (Gallagher 1991: 41). 
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2.5.4 The Sainte Laoue Index: This index seeks to measure proportionality in terms of the 
difference between the seats and votes ratio for each party. It is calculated In the 
following way for each party; the percentage votes value Is sii^tracted from the percentage 
seats value (Sj - Vj). This value is then squared [(Sj - Vj) 2 ] and divided by the votes 
percentage value for that party [(Sj-Vj) 2 /Vj] . The sum of these values for each party is 
the Sainte Lague measure of disproportionality. This formula can be expressed in the 
following way: 
SL = I [ ( S i - V i ) 2 / V , ] 
(Source: Gallagher 1991: 39) 
This measurement will result in the value zero when proportionality is perfect, although 
the lack of an upper limit for disproportionality (infinity) does not particularly enhance 
comparison with other disproportionality measures. For example, is a Sainte Lague 
measure of 8 compared to a Sainte Lague measure of 10 a large or small difference? We 
can talk about 'more' or 'less' proportionality, but not in terms of degree, because there is 
no upper limit. It is not biased, however, towards any particular seat distribution 
formula which is a weakness of the Loosemore-Hanby scale. 
2.5.5 Rose's Index of Proportionalitv: This index attempts to nrieasure the degree of 
proportionality for each election by using the following formula :- the sum of the 
cfiffererK:e between each party's percerrtage share of votes ami its percentage share of 
seats(Zj [Vj - Sj]) is divided by two ( V a ) and subtracted from 100 (1984: 74). This 
formula can be expressed in the following way: 
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R = 100 - V z Z i [Vi- Si] 
(Source: Fry & McLean 1991: 52) 
The closer the measure is to 100, the greater the proportionality. However this Index has 
also been criticised as being too insensitive to the number of parties (Bartolini & Mair 
1990: 162). 
Gallagher suggests that the outcomes of the Least Squares and Loosemore Hanby Incfices 
strongly correlate (1991: 48). Of course, the results one would expect to find under 
any of these indices would be very different in many countries if electiorts at the 
sub-national level were analyzed (especially In those countries with strong regional 
parties and established societal cleavages). Indeed, as Irvine claims; "Under conditions 
of strong regional divergence in voting, an Index of Proportionality calculated from 
national figures will understate the true disproportionality of results across the 
various regions" (Irvine 1988: 19). 
Such divergence may become more apparent with an analysis of electoral systems and 
proportionality at the sub-natiortal level. Of interest to us are the Implications that 
disproportionality has for the electoral fortunes of particular small party families, and 
which electoral features have the strongest impact upon the proportionality of 
representation. 
2.6 Conclusjpps 
Table 2.2 outlines those sub-national election systems operating within the European 
Union which employ various electoral formulae and ballot systems and gives Gallagher^s 
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(1991) average measures of disproportionality for these countries at the national level in 
a ten year period: 
Table 2.2 - A Comparison of Electoral Formulae and Ballot Sys tems in European Sub-National 
Elect ions, Compared with Three Measures of Disproportionality Derived From National Election 
Results Held Between 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 9 . 
Plurality Systems 
COUNTRY ELECTORAL.LEVEL B A L L O T SYSTEM 
England 
Wales 
Scotland 
County Coundt 
District Council 
London Boroughs 
Metropolitan Districts 
County Council 
District Council 
Regional Council 
District Council 
Categoric 
C a t e g o r i c ' 
Categoric 
Categoric 
Categoric 
C a t e g o r i c ' 
Categoric 
Categoric 
Measures of Disproportionality for UK general elect ions, 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 9 : 
Loosemore Hariby Index 2 0 . 0 
Least Squares Index 16 .6 
Saint Lague tndex 2 3 . 5 
* Districts with multi member wards adopt a variation on categoric ballots where the number of 
vo tes per voter Is equal to the number of s e a t s available. This is not an ordinal sys tem as 
preferences are not ranked at all. 
Majohtarian Systems 
COUNTRY ELECTORAL L E V E L B A L L O T SYSTEM 
France 
Italy 
Communes 
Departments 
Communes (electorate of 
1 5 . 0 0 0 +) 
2-ballot list 
2-baItot list 
2-ballot list 
Measures of Disproportionality for French General Elect ions, 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 8 : 
Loosemore Hanby Index 19.6 
Leas t Squares Index 14 .3 
Saint Lague Index 20.1 
continued. 
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Proportional Representation Systems 
COUNTRY ELECTORAL L E V E L S E A T ALLOCATION BALLOT SYSTEM 
Belgium Communes tmperiali Preferential L i s t s 
Denmark Communes d'Hondt Preferential L i s t s 
Counties n / a U s t s 
Germany Gemeinde d'Hondt Party L i s t s 
K r e i s e d'Hondt Party L i s t s 
Land v a r i e s Party L i s t s 
Greece Communes v a r i e s L i s t s 
Ireland T o w n s Droop Quota S T V 
Count ies. Droop Quota S T V 
Italy Communes v a r i e s U s t s 
Prov inces v a r i e s L i s t s 
Regions v a r i e s U s t s 
Luxembourg Communes d'Hondt U s t s 
Netherlands Communes d'Hondt U s t s 
Prov inces d'Hondt L i s t s 
Portugal Municipios d'Hondt Blocked U s t s . 
Spain Munidpios d'Hondt Blocked U s t s 
Prov inces d'Hondt Blocked U s t s 
Measures of Disproportionality for PR-type General Elect ions, 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 9 : 
Country Loosemore Hanbv Least Sauares Saint l^aue 
Belgium 8.2 3 .9 6 .9 
Denmark 3.4 1.8 3.5 
Germany 1.4 1.0 1.3 
G r e e c e * 5.8 4 .2 3 .2 
Ireland 4 .7 3 .3 2 .9 
Italy 4 .8 2 .7 3.0 
Luxembourg 2.7 4 . 4 5.8 
Netherlands 2.7 1.4 2.1 
Portugal 6.6 4 . 3 5.6 
Spain 15 .4 9 .7 14.7 
only applies to 2 elections held in 1 9 8 9 . 
Source of disproporttonaiity measures: Gallagher 1 9 9 1 . 
If we compare the disproportionality measures for elections at the national level for the 
European Union member states, we can see that disproportionality is slightly lower in the 
majoritarian system (France) compared to the plurality system, but is considerably lower 
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in virtually all proportional representation systenis. Whilst electoral systenns are by and 
large the same at the sub-national level in those countries using proportional 
representation (although district magnitude does change), the electoral system in Britain 
is different (because there are examples of multi ^ t wards) and in Italy, because of 
recent electoral reforms. Gallagher's disproportionality measures at the national level are 
useful, because we can compare them in later chapters with disproportionality measures at 
the sub-national level. 
Within this chapter we have attempted to provide a comprehensive literature review of the 
existing research which focuses upon the operation and political consequences of electoral 
systems In western Europe. There are three basic components to electoral system^ a 
method of ballot, a method of seat allocation, and other rules which vary significantly 
between countries. We have not only focused upon specific rules which may affect 
representation (such as district magnitude, thresholds and supplementary seats), but also 
upon the different electoral formulae (including the variations in PR) and the ballot 
formulae. Despite the variaru:e in research conclusions, existing analysis has over-
whelmingly focused upon electoral systems at the national level - and hence findings tend to 
be generalised and focus on the effects ipon the main parties only. Whilst the same seat 
distribution formulae are frequently employed at the sub-national level our analysis may 
produce different results because we are focusing upon much smaller electoral divisions -
often dealing with smaller 'quotas' and 'remainders'. The effects of seat availability may be 
revealing at the sub-national level because of the more nunrterous ranges of district 
magnitude, e.9. between one and three seats in Britain, often below fifteen seats in 
communes and often between sixty and one hundred plus in the regions and Lsender. 
In relation to which electoral features are most likely to affect proportionality, Rae 
(1967), Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Gallagher (1991) stress the significance of 
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district magnitude, whilst Lijphart (1990) and Blais and Carty (1987) concluded that 
seat alkx:ation formulae and magnitude have the strongest effect upon electoral 
disproportionality. Can we isolate a particular factor at the sub-national level? Research 
by Blais and Carty (1989) suggests extremist parties' shares of the seats are lowest in 
majority systems - followed by plurality and PR. Furthermore, Lijfrfiart (1994b) 
reaffirmed the conventional belief that minority representation is more likely in PR 
systems than under plurality. We can show that all electoral rules contrive to impose cfe 
facto thresholds to potential representation. Terminology such as 'stability* (in relation to 
plurality) and 'falmess' (in relation to PR) has been used to justify electoral systems at 
the national level. But sub-national electiors do not decide the government of the day and 
other outcomes may be wore appealing to voters. This may explain why so many countries 
operate different, or variations on, the electoral system used to appoint national 
governments. 
We have outlined the various indices used to measure disproportionality, ensuring that we 
are aware of the biases and limitations of each. In particular we teve stressed the 
complexity involved in understanding proportionality and its political Implications. What 
is the purpose of using one type of seat distribution method over another {ag. divisors 
versus largest remainder), and why use thresholds? There is obviously some political 
motivation to 'include' some and 'exclude' others, as the electoral system has an important 
bearing upon the rtature of the party system. There are two basic types of 
disproportionality - one of absolute (£fference between seats and votes and one of ratio 
between seats and votes. In Chapters Four, Five and Six we will use three indices to 
measure disproportionality. The LoosenKwe Hanby Index is particularly sensitive when we 
have a number of unrepresented small parties - which is most likely to occur in small 
communes - the lowest electoral level. The Least Squares Index enables us to identify the 
larger vote-seat discrepancies rather than numerous very small ones. Finally, the Sainte 
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Lague Index measures the ratio of disproportionality and is not biased towards particular 
seat distribution formulae, unlike the Loosemore Hanby scale. 
Our ultimate objective in this thesis is to demonstrate the effect of electoral systems and 
rules upon two particular party families - these being parties of the far right and 
reglonalists. Generally speaking, significant comparative electoral analysis of these two 
families has been overiooked since t h ^ tend to be 'too small' at the national electoral level. 
We have assembled sufficient evidence from sub-national elections in a range of European 
states to embark on such a comparative analysis. Our analyss of these parties at the 
sub-national level seems more justified if we take into consideration the literature on 
second-order elections. Whilst a lack of finances and candidates may hinder small parties 
participating in national elections the same may not be the case at the sub-national level. 
Similarly, a different pattern of voting behaviour where the electorate 'punish' or reject 
the mainstream parties gives the far right and regionalists the opportunity to poll more 
than a mere handful of votes - thereby providing substance for a comparative analysis. 
Whatever the political opportunities, all small parties have important lessons to learn 
from understanding which electoral rules and features most affect proportionality. In our 
next chapter we will provide a review of the literature examining party systems in 
westem Europe and attempt a working definition of what is understood by the terms far 
right and regionalist parties in this context. 
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CHAPTER THREE - PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE: TRADITIONS-
TRANSFORMATIONS AND SMALL PARTIES 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two we reviewed the various electoral systems and rules which are prevalent 
among European Union member states and the implications that these have for the 
proportionality of representation in national elections. Just as electoral systems have 
become a central focus for political analysis, the formulation and stabilisation of party 
systems in Western Europe has received a similar level of individual and comparative 
interest. The aim of this chapter is to review existing literature on party system 
formation and stability and to provide a definition of those parties within the European 
Union which will act as the analytical basis for Chapters Five and Six of this thesis. The 
electoral successes of far right and regionalist party families have created problems for 
the definition of party systems since the 1980s, and an analysis of these two groups is 
interesting as: (i) electorates appear to be changing away from mainstream parties 
towards the far right and regionalists in all elections, and (ii) these are the type of 
'minority party' we discussed in Chapter One section 1.4 which may first appear in sub-
national elections. In support of this, Upset and Rokkan stated in 1967 that: 
"The early electoral systems all set a high threshold for rising parties. 
It was everywhere very difficult for working-class movements to gain 
representation on their own, but there were significant variations in 
the openness of the systems to pressures from the new strata. The 
second ballot systems ... set the highest possible barrier, absolute 
majority, but at the same time made possible a variety of local 
alliances among the opponents of the Socialists: the system kept the new 
entrants underrepresented, yet did not force the old parties to merge or 
to ally themselves nationally." (1990: 115-6) 
Can we say that electoral thresholds have provided the same hindrance for regionalist and 
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far right parties in the latter part of the twentieth century? Before considering this point 
in later chapters, we need to pay greater attentton to the growth of new and small parties, 
and to define what exactly we mean by a small or minority party. 
As with the analysis of electoral systems, research into party systems has tended to be 
focused at the national level. With the use of our urwque data base, we are able to map out 
the comparative emergence and development of far right and regionalist parties onto the 
electoral scene at the sub-national level in various European states. The ultimate level of 
success for parties in this thesis should be the ability to become a part of the party system 
at the sub-rtational level, as it is the ability to affect policy at the sub-national level that 
enables new and small parties to move upwards c^to the national electoral scene. Before we 
move on to electoral and representative success in later chapters, this chapter will 
provide an overview of some of the understandings and orthodoxy concerning the 
establishment of party systems in Westem Europe. 
3 ,? P^fininq Political Parties 
We can broadly define a political party as a feature with two specific characteristics. It is 
some form of 'organisation' (of people and/or interests) which is involved in the process 
of contesting elections (Sartori 1976, Gross & Sigelman 1984: 464, Daalder 1992: 270). 
To talk of a 'party system' involves more than just a loose collection of political parties 
which may vary from election.to election. As Pomper suggests: "Particular kinds of 
parties also fit with particular kinds of government and different concepts of democracy" 
(Pomper 1992: 156). The term 'system' itself is central, since It implies some level of 
acceptance, co-operation and consistency. It also implies that those parties which are 
members of the system will have some impact upon the policy process from time to time. 
The basic model of electoral system and party system relations - as emphasised by 
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Lijphart (1984) and others - is well documented. Single-member district, plurality 
elections are seen as encouraging a two-party system which is associated with stable 
democracy, whilst proportional representation in multi-district elections engenders a 
multi-party system - at times associated with unstable democracy. 
As was noted in Chapter One the appeal of catch-all, non-ideological parties (Kirchheimer 
1990: 50-60) has gradually declined since the 1980s, and is more evident in some 
countries than others. Emerging literature suggests that west Europe is experiencing a 
party system crisis in the late twentieth century (see Chapter One section 1.3). The 
reasons for this change are explained by Betz in the following way: 
"In the decades following the second worid war, the liberal democracies 
of western Europe enjoyed a remarkable degree of social and political 
stability. Sustained economic growth, growing individual affluence, 
and the expansion and perfection of the welfare state each contributed to 
a social and political climate conducive to political stability while 
eroding support for extremist solutions on both the left and right. 
However, stability and consensus were only short-lived. The 
resurgence of ideological and political turbulence in the late 1960s, 
rising social conflicts in the early 1970s, and the spread of mass 
protest by new social movements in the 1980s were symptoms of a 
profound transformation of West European politics. Its contours are 
becoming visible in the eariy 1990s." (Betz 1993: 413) 
Ignazi (1992) suggests that the Implications of this for contemporary party system change 
are observable on two levels. First, there is increased Mntraparty volatility', and second, 
there is a decline in party identification influenced by changes in society and polity (Ignazi 
1992: 3). By referring to party system change in France, Appleton and Ward suggest that 
systemic factors may act as a catalyst. Within the tenm 'systemic factors', we can identify 
features such as changes in electoral rules, the decentralisation of state power and the 
financing of political parties (Appleton & Ward 1993: 74-5). What is important to this 
thesis in general, therefore, is (i) how certain 'minority' parties have become established 
on the sub-national electoral scene, and (ii) to what extent they are 'proportionally 
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represented' in relation to their share of the votes at the sub-national level - this second 
point will be presented as a detailed case-study in Chapters Rve and Six. Yet before doing 
this we need to establish the differerKe between which parties compete and which have 
power - that is, the effective number of parties. 
3.2n1 The 'Effective' Number of Parties 
If we are to assume that the total number of parties participating in any election is not 
necessarily the same as those that are counted as participating in a party system, then we 
must adopt Lijphart's assumption that: 
"The most important problem in determining the number of parties in 
a party system is whether to count snrtall parties and, if not, how large 
a party has to be in order to be included in the count" (Lijphart 1984: 
116) 
Thus effective parties are those that can govem, and elective parties are those that win 
representation. In relation to the effective number of parties at the national level Laakso 
and Taagepera claim that 
"The typical West European elections around 1949 involved effectively 
4.2 parties... The early 1970s saw a sudden steep rise to 4.5 effective 
parties... Since 1970 the trend has been upwards or stable in almost 
all countries considered. What may look like a purely national 
phenomenon in the study of each countiy separately becomes part of a 
wider trend when one uses the notion of effective number of parties for 
a systematic cross-national study." (Laakso & Taagepera 1979: 15-
19) 
If increased opportunities for new and snrrall parties are recognised at the national electoral 
level, then surely the opportunities should be even rosier at the sub-national level. 
Furthermore, we must bear in mind that although new parties emerge on the electoral 
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scene in various countries at different times, it is not usual to see the reverse - old 
estabftshed parties disappearing. There are examples of very small parties declining - for 
example, the Communist Party of Great Britain is now on the very fringes of electoral 
politics both nationally and locally. Unprecedented changes, however, occurred in the 
Italian party system in the eariy 1990s. Although the Christian Democrat Party (DC) fell 
from goveming party to obscurity virtually overnight it has, on a much smaller scale, 
reemerged as the Popular f^rty. At the same time the Communist Party (PQ) did not 
exactiy 'disappear' but quickly re-organised as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). 
It may be, therefore, that party systems are actually increasing in size as cultural and 
political diversity becomes a feature of the modem European state, and this should be 
initially identifiable within sub-national elections. 
3.3 Chanoina Partv Systems in West Europe 
We have already outlined to some extent in Chapter One section 1.3 the.issue of electoral 
volatility in contemporary western Europe. To what extent has this affected the traditional 
party systems and has it led to the fomration of numerous new and minority parties? Mair 
(1993) suggests that three aspects are often cited as being responsible for party system 
change - these are; aggregate electoral volatifrty (the reluctance of voters to vote 
'traditionally'), the mobilisation of new parties (in terms of both issues and style) and the 
decline of the traditional party in organisational and representational terms. Yet Mair 
feels that despite these so-called explanations, "the impression of persistence often 
remains much more striking than does that of discontinuity" (Mair 1993: 1Z2-3). 
In relation to the development of west European party systems, the Lipset-Rokkan theory, 
first published in 1967. attempted to provide a broad comparative frameworic of 
contemporary party ^ s t e m development. Briefly, this approach suggests that party 
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formation is a function of cleavages which derive from three historical junctures: (i) the 
reformation/counter-reformation experience of 1450-1650, (ii) the common 
experience of national revolution between 1780 and 1939, and (iii) the effects created by 
the industrial revolution, experienced at various times by different countries since the 
1770s (Upset & Rokkan 1967: 1-64). As a result, the three most important cleavages 
are; (i) centre-periphery cleavages - arising out of national revolution, (ii) 
state-church cleavages - resulting from the reformation and counter-reformation, and 
(iii) rural-urban cleavages - deriving from both industrial revolutions and 
centre-periphery cleavages, with particular cleavages being more prevalent in some 
countries than others. 
Lipset-Rokkan identified a breakpoint in the 1920s, by which time party systems had 
become 'frozen' throughout most of western Europe, and in fact remained so until the 
1980s. The main problem with the Lipset-Rokkan theory, however, derives from the 
very nature of the fact that it is a broad typology. By Identifying three very general types 
of social cleavage. Upset and Rokkan described a process which Is by no means uniform -
varying between countries, and even regions, over a long period of time. The attempts to 
define a broad framework mean that not all countries fit easily into this schema, the 
Republic of Ireland being such an example^. What Is important to this thesis Is the centre 
- periphery cleavage of the Upset-Rokkan theory which is regaining salience. Sub-state 
nationalist and regionalist parties are, therefore, not a new phenomena, though several 
have affirmed their role in the sub-national party system by consistently winning 
significant shares of available votes and seats throughout the 1980s and eariy 1990s. Yet 
by concentrating on the Upset-Rokkan thesis alone there exists an explanatory vacuum in 
1 A fourth cleavage, emerging after the Upset-Rokkan thesis, has been the transition 
towards post-Industrial society, which has been most overtly characterised by 
green/ecology parties. 
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terms of the rising trend of pan-European right-wing extremism which, like the Greens, 
may draw its existence from the cleavages developing in post-industrial societies 
(Muller-Rommel 1990). Before developing our analysis of sub-national electoral 
systems and proportionality, we need to consider some important new parties which have 
emerged in the last two decades and which have become recognised as a feature of the 
electoral scene. 
Wolinetz claims that European party systems have displayed various signs of fragmentation 
from the 1970s but that the immediate causes of fragmentation vary from system to 
system. In Belgium, for example, fragmentation derives from the increased tensions from 
the 1960s surrounding the language issue. In the Netherlands, fragmentation was a 
reaction against perceived consociationalism and lack of serious opposition, and in Britain 
fragmentation derived from the problems of economic decline which has been matched with 
a growth in Scottish nationalism. As a result, claims Wolinetz: 
"The parties which have profited from the unfreezing of party 
alignments are as diverse as the sources of fragmentation. The 
beneficiaries include Poujadist-style protest parties ... parties 
expressing communal claims ... and parties of the left" (Wolinetz 
1990: 230-1) 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is Wolinetz's claim that it is electoral laws which can 
be identified as being responsible for preserving the established parties' status quo and 
limiting the opportunities for party system change. An important factor for him is the 
occurrence of de jure and de facto thresholds (see Chapter Two section 2,2.3) which 
cushion the decline of established parties by providing a hurdle for new and small parties 
to overcome (Wolinetz 1988: 310-312). This will be tested in later chapters. 
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Furthermore, it is possible that different two-party and multi-party systems occur 
within each country at the sub-national level. If this is correct, then the notion of Britain 
as a two-party system characterised by the Labour and Conservative Parties, for example, 
may be accurate at the aggregated national level only. An analysis of local elections (and 
individual constituency results) may provide evidence of numerous two-party systems, 
which include most prominently the Liberal OenrK>crats, the Scottish National Party and 
Raid Cymru. In cases of proportional representation, we may have situations where high 
levels of decentralisation and multiculturalism also erurourage more than a single party 
system at the sub-national level. Examples of this occurring in Belgium and Germany, for 
example, will be analyzed in Chapter Four. 
3.4 Defining 'New' gpd 'Minority' Parties 
The social and political upheavals which have characterised political change in many 
European countries sirrce the 1970s have been matched with the growth of various new 
parties. Wolinetz identifies small religious parties, right-wing protest parties, linguistic 
and green parties as just some examples (Wolinetz 1988: 3). Before outlining the 
electoral success of particular small parties, it is first necessary to define which west 
European political parties fit into our two examples for analysis, these being (i) parties of 
the far right and (ii) regionalist party families. In this chapter we will seek to provide a 
general picture of the history of their electoral participation. Is it simply the case that 
proportional representation systems foster more effective representation and therefore 
continued electoral presence, whilst a plurality ^ s t e m effectively discourages parties of 
these two families from partidpating In elections at the sub-national level? We must 
presume that the participation of far right and regionalist parties in elections in Britain 
and the range in their electoral representation success requires a nnore complex 
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explanation. 
Our aim in this thesis is not to develop a critique of which ideological strands and policy 
proposals are essential if a party is to be classified as a nnember of the far right or 
regionalist family * this has been attempted in literature elsewhere (Urwin 1983, Ignazi 
1992. Betz 1993 & 1994, Blondel 1994, Muller-Rommel 1994). We will, however, 
use some of these parties as case studies from which to analyze electoral success. 
3.4-1 Parties of the Far Right 
Problems often occur when using the label 'extremist* to identify parties, as parties at 
extreme ends of the political axis are not deemed acceptable by governing and coalition 
parties of the day, which conform to a mainstream pattern of polides appealing to the mass 
of the electorate. There is the added distinction of identifying a 'party*, as opposed to a 
social movement. As argued earlier.(section 3.2) we will assume that a party includes any 
organised group which enters into elections at either the national or local level of 
government. Some anti-system parties are excluded from electoral participation. An 
overt example of this is the effect of Article 21 of the German Basic Law which: "declared 
ineligible for election parties seeking to impair or destroy the democratic basic order or 
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany" (Rose 1983: 28). This law 
was used to outlaw the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party in 1953 and the Communist Party in 
1956. 
The terms *far right* and 'extremism* can themselves be highly emotive, historically tied to 
the twentieth century experiences of National Socialism and Fa^ism, and this makes the 
categorisation of this family of parties particularly difficult. Smith classifies extremist 
parties as 'marginal parties* because their estrangement from central and moderate parties 
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limits their coalition potential (1991: 36). Voemian and Lucardie (1992) have 
attempted to redefine the concept of extremism in light of recent European trends, by 
focusing upon the concept of political system legitimacy crisis. They argue: 
"Even if extremists accept the formal constitution, they reject the 
dominant political cufture and party system. They condemn ait 
established political parties, government as well as opposition, either 
because political parties as such are seen as decisive and therefore 
evil, or because these particular parties do not represent ordinary 
people. Right-wing and Left-wing extremists today agree on this point, 
If on nothing else." (Voerman & Lucardie 1992: 35) 
Under this definition, therefore, they appear to be a party which potentially could benefit 
from declining party identification and widespread electoral disillusionment. Betz defines 
'radical right-wing populist parties' as those 'rejecting individual and social equality, 
opposing the social integration of marginalized groups, and appealing to xenophobia' (Betz 
1993: 413) In comparison, IgnazI claims that the generic group 'extreme right' consists 
of two particular strands. The 'old extreme right' is ideologically linked with fascisms, 
whilst the 'new extreme right* does not have recognlable ties with fascism but is 
extremist in its anti-system attitudes - fitting Betz's definition. 
Despite identifiable yet limited success at the national level, an analysis of far right 
parties at the sub-national level may prove that their prevalence as minority parties Is 
far more sustained. In relation to the existence of popular support for far right parties in 
contemporary Europe, Ignazi and Ysmal suggest that 
2 Which, in Ignazi's view, includes the NF, BNP, CP86, DVU-Ust D, and NPD. 
3 Defined by Ignazi (1992) as the REP, VB, PFN and CD. 
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"The electoral success of extreme right parties seems on the face of it 
to be inversely related to their relationship with fascism. Where they 
are ideologically linked to the fascist experience they fail to grow; 
where they do not claim any heritage from fascism their growth 
displays a positive trend." (Ignazi & Ysmal 1992: 1) 
Such an explanation of far right electoral success may demand rujmerous qualifications. 
The term 'fascism' is positively value-laden. Is, for example, a party's 'ideological link to 
fascism' a label recognised by the party leadership and membership, or is it one designated 
by others outside the party? The usage of the term 'fascism', like 'terrorism', can often be 
Identified as a propaganda tool rather than a useful party label (Griffin 1991, Hainsworth 
1992). Second, what is meant by the term 'electoral success'? Does this refer to the 
number of votes polled or the effective exchange of votes Into seats? Of course, support via 
the ballot box is an essential beginning to any party's electoral growth. The essential 
question we seek to answer is not particularly which far right parties can attract voters, 
but to what extent these parties are effectively and proportionately represented. 
Ignazi claims that established attempts to explain party system change do not sufficiently 
account for the enrtergence of far right parties in Europe sirtce the 19805, particularly 
since there is no archetypal 'class' of far right electorate (Ignazi 1992: 5). Thus, an 
analysis of how electoral support for the far right Is transformed Into representation 
becomes even more important. Whilst it is difficult to ascertain what sort of voter chooses 
the far right and why, we can more effectively compare where far right parties poll their 
greatest shares of the votes at the sub-national level and to what extent they secure 
representation in sub-national government. For the purposes of this research, we will 
focus upon the electoral fortunes of far right parties In Germany, the Netheriands, Belgium 
and Great Britain, which are outlined in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Examples of West European Far Right Parties, Indicating Country of Origin and Year 
Formed. 
COUNTRY PARTY NAME YEAR FORMED 
Germany National Democ^ic Party 1964 
Republikaner Party 1983 
German People's Union List-D 1987 
The Netherlands Boerenpartij 1960 
Netherlands Volksunle 1971 
Centrumpartij 1980 
Centre Democrats 1984 
Belgium Volksunie 1954 
Parti de Forces Nouvelles 1975 
Vlaams Blok 1978 
Front National 1984 
Britain National Front 1967 
British National Party 1980 
3.4.1a Germany: Under Ignazi's definition of extreme right-wing parties in Europe 
(1992) there are three far right parties in Germany. At present, the most prominent is 
the Republikaner Party (REP) which has experienced various periods of peaks and troughs 
in support in its relatively short existence, and support tends to be focused in certain 
geographic areas: 
"Under the leadership of Schonhuber, a relatively broad organisational 
structure was set up so that, in 1989, the party had a presence in each 
of the German Laender. However, it still had organisational problems at 
the local level as well as problems in finding adequate members for 
leading positions at alt regional levels." (Westle & Niedermayer 1992: 
89 ) 
Republikaner Party participation (see section 3.4.2a) reinforces our earlier claim that 
small parties may be most electorally successful at the sub-national level, since 
organisational and financial constraints which may hinder nation-wide contestation may be 
less of a challenge. 
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3.4.1 b The Netheriands: parties of the far right have frequently contested elections, and in 
recent years have tended to poll significant results in the larger cities. Voerman and 
Lucardie claim that there is no solid social base or ideological right-wing tradition 
(Voerman & Lucardie 1992: 36), which may suggest that the far right in the Netheriands 
is predominantly an example of protest voting, and therefore we might expect to see 
greater far right support in sub-national elections where there is Mess at stake'. We can 
relate this to the argument subscribed to by Van der Eijk et al (see Chapter One section 
1.5) that an influential factor in 'anti-system' support is the timing of an election. If far 
right support In the Netheriands Is a 'protest vote' it is more likely to occur in second 
order elections preceding a national election than in those held simultaneously with or 
shortly after a general election. Husbands identifies four waves of heightened Dutch 
right-wing extremist support in the post-war period; 1963-67, March 1974, 1982-84 
and the cun-ent wave which began in March 1990 and is continuing to grow (1992b: 
105) . 
3.4.1c Belgium: Fitzmaurice claims that the General Election of November 1991 marked 
the ringing of alarm bells in relation to the rise of the far right in Belgian electoral 
politics (Fitzmaurice 1992: 300). As was mentioned in the discussion of Belgian political 
parties in Chapter One, we must be aware that we are dealing with three separate party 
systems. Table 3.1 identifies four far right parties existing in Belgium under Ignazi's 
definition (Ignazi 1992: 8) - these being Vlaams Blok (VB), Volksunie (VU), Parti de 
Forces Nouvelles (PFN) and Front National (FN). 
3 .4 . Id Britain: We can identify two far right parties participating in British elections. 
The National Front (NF) was officially formed in 1967 as a merger of various far right • 
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social movements^, whilst the British National Party (BNP) vwis not formed until 1980. 
Eariler surveys Identify far right support as being concentrated in such areas as the East 
End of London and parts of the West Midlands, particularty in places where the economy Is 
struggling and traditional heavy industry is in decline, and membership of these parties is 
predominantly male, young and workir^ class (Halnsworth 1988, Harrop et al 1980, 
Shipley 1978). Electoral success (see section 3.4.2d) has been isolated and sporadic. 
We will now provide a general picture of far right electoral support In our four-country 
case-studies before analyzing the proportionality of representation In greater detail in 
Chapter Five. 
3-4.2 Far Right Electoral History in Four Case Studies 
3.4.2a Germany: In Table 3.2 we outline changing patterns of far right support across 
Germany for a range of elections (from the European level to the local level) over a 30 
year time span. 
Table 3.2 - Patterns of Far Right Electoral Support in Germany 1965-1994 (expressed as a 96age 
of al) valid votes) 
ELECTION LEVEL YEAR 
Bundestag 1965 
NPD 2.0 
REP 
DVU 
European Parliament 
NPD 
REP 
DVU 
7969 
4.3 
7 9S9 
1.6 
7.1 
1.6 
7957 
0.6 
0.6 
7990 
2.4 
7994 
1.9 
continued... 
4 These movements were the Greater Britain Movement (led by John Tyndall), the British 
Natiorral Party (not to be confused with the present BNP) and the League of Empire Loyalists. 
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Land 1986 1987 1988 199Q 1991 1992 
REP 3.0 1.2 1.0 4.9 - 10.9 
DVU - - - - 6.2 6.3 
Locai 1989 1992 1993 
REP 7.5 8.0 8.0 
Note: % shares of the vote are expressed as shares for the country as a whde for Bundestag and 
European elections and as shares for the Land as a whole for Land and local elections. 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
As we can see from Table 3.2, the National Socialist Party (NPD) is the oldest surviving 
far right party in Germany, providing us with a longer range of data from which to 
compare peaks and troi^hs in support In Laender elections held between 1966 and 1968 
the NPD secured representation in the states of Baden-Wurrtemburg, Bavaria, Bremen. 
Hesse, Lower-Saxony, Rhineland - Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein though was not so 
successful in the Saariand, Hamburg and North Rhine Westphalia, therefore suggesting a 
pattern of regionalisatioa By the time of the 1989 European Elections, the NPD overall 
share of the vote stood at only 1.6%, though this was overshadowed by the success of the 
Republikaner. The NPD also enjoyed a limited amount of success in Frankfurt in the 
Hessen local elections held in March 1989. 
The German People's Union (DVU-List D) had existed as a socio-political moven^nt since 
the eariy 1970s. Concentrated in the state of Bremen, the DVU-List D secured one seat in 
the Landtag in 1987 as the party polled a share of the vote just above 5% in the city of 
BremertiavenS. In the following Bremen Land election held in September 1991 the DVU 
built upon its support, polling a 6.2% share of the vote overall and over 10% share of the 
vote in the city of Bremerhaven alone, entitling the DVU to six seats in the Land 
pariiament. Electoral success continued with the 1992 Schleswig-Holstein Land elections 
5 The state of Bremen is effectively two city states, Brenr>en and Bremertiaven, which act as 
separate electoral constituencies. 
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where the DVU polled 6.3% and won six seats, making it the third largest party in this 
election. 
The Republikaner Party's (REP) first noticeable electoral success came In the 1986 
Bavarian Land election where the party secured an overall share of the vote of 3% (see 
Table 3.2). This election result entitled the party to 1.32 million Deutchmarks of state 
funding, effectively used by the party in the campaign for the 1989 West Beriin City 
election in which it polled a 7.5% share of the vote and secured 11 seats. The 7.1% share 
of the vote polled by the REP In the European Elections in 1989 was enough to secure the 
party six seats, and entitied the party to almost 6 million In state election subsidies 
(Roberts 1992: 331). The issue of reunification was the focus for the first all-German 
federal election in December 1990, which witnessed a slowing down in the growth of the 
far right, partly due to the proliferation of internal divisions within the party. The REP 
provided candidates In eight of the nine former West German Land elections held in 1990 
but failed to reach the 5% threshold in every case - its best result being 4,9% polled in 
the Bavarian Land election. This has led Westle and Niedermayer to claim: 
"... available data on REP support indicate t l ^ the party is more a 
reservoir of protest articulated by different social groups than it is an 
organisation with a clear socio-structural base. Since the end of 
1989, the results of all German opinion polls unanimously indicate 
that the established parties in Germany have succeeded in the 
reintegration of the majority of these protest voters, thereby reducing 
the REP to a relatively marginal political force within the German 
party system." (Westle & Niedermayer 1992: 98) 
The REP has experienced similar peaks and troughs in support in the 1990s. The 1992 
Baden-Wurrtemburg Land elections saw the party poll a 10.9% share of the vote, making 
the REP the third largest party in this state. Die Republikaner polled over 8% share of the 
vote in the Berlin local elections of that year and over 8% share of the vote in the Hessen 
local elections held in March 1993, yet polled below 5% in all land elections held between 
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September 1993 and September 1994. The October 1994 General Electran left the 
Republikaner unrepresented in the Bundestag with only 1.9% share of the vote. The 
tendency for the REP to perform badly in elections held immediately prior to a national 
election whilst its best results occur in mid-term years when many governing parties are 
Judged as unpopular reinforces the claims of Westle and Niedermayer as outlined above, 
and van der Eijk et al in Chapter One section 1.5 that electoral timing is significant when 
assessing far right success in Germany. 
3.4.2b The Netheriands: Support for the nnain far right parties in the Netheriands in the 
post-war period has the following pattem: 
Table 3.3 - Patterns of Far Right Electoral Support in the Nethertands 1966-1991 (expressed as a 
%age of the total valid vote) 
ELECTION LEVEL YEAR 
Genera/ £/ect/on 7 S77 1981 1982 1986 1989 
BP 0.8 - 0.3 -
NVU 0.4 0.1 - - -
CP/CP86 - 0.1 0.8 0.4 
CD . . . 0.1 0.9 
European Parliament 1984 1989 
CP/CP86 2.5 
CD - 0.8 
Provincial 1966 1987 1991 
BP 6.7 
CP/CP86 - 1 .2* 0.3 
CD - 0.3 1.0 
Municipal 1966 1962 1990 
BP 5.7 
CP/CP86 - 0.2 
CD - - 0.5 
* in the province of Flevoland only. 
Note: %ages equal the share of the vote for the country overall in general and European elections, 
provincial elections and municipal elections. 
Source: Husbands 1992b: 104-106. 
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From Table 3.3 we can see that the Boerenpartij (BP) peaked in electoral support in the 
1966 provincial elections with a 6.7% share of the vote. The BP actually survived in the 
national Pariiament until 1981 (when no candidates stood). The Nederiands Volksunie 
(NVU) began contesting elections In the 1974 municipal elections In The Hague (pdlmg 
1.8%), and in the 1977 General Election the party polled 0.4% share of the vote 
nationally. Although the party faced a judicial ban for a while in 1978, by the time of the 
1981 General Election the NVU was able to present lists in nine of the 18 districts, but 
secured only an overall share of the vote of 0.1 %. 
The contemporary far right in the Netheriands appears to be Increasing as a challenge to 
the established parties in more recent elections. Although the Centrumpartij (CP) polled 
only a total 0.1% share of the vote in 1981, the party was slightly more successful In 
1982, polling 0.8% share of the vote (see Table 3.3) and securing one seat In the Dutch 
pariiament. Shortly after the 1986 General Election, the party reformed as the CP86, 
though electoral participation was weak in the 1987 provincial elections. In the 1986 
elections the Centrumdemocraten Party (CD) was the weaker far right party, polling less 
than the CP In the General Election (0.1 %) and winning no seats. In the 1989 European 
Elections the CD polled 0.8% share of the vote, and slightly improved this to a 0.9% share 
of the vote in the General Election of September that year (see Table 3.3) - enough to 
secure one seat. In the municipal elections held in 1994, the party provided lists in 43 
municipalities and secured a total of 77 seats. 
3.4.2c Belgium: Changes in far right electoral support In Belgium produce the following 
pattem: 
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Table 3.4 - Patterns of Far Right Electoral Support in Belgium 1949-1991 (expressed as a %age 
of the total valid vote) 
ELECTION LEVEL YEAR 
General 1949 1961 7977 7 957 1985 7957 7997 
VU 2.1 3.5 11.1 9.8 7.9 8.0 5.9 
VB - - - - - 1.9 6.6 
FN - - - - 0.5 0.9 1.7* 
PFN - - . - - 0.7 0.5 -
European Parliament 1989 
VU 5.4 
VB 4.1 
Regional 1989 
VU 2.1 
VB 2.1 
FN 3.3 
PFN 1.0 
Provincial 1988 
VU 8.2__ 
* = of French lists only. 
Note: %ages equal the share of the vote for the country overall in general elections, european 
elections, regional elections, and provincial elections. 
Source: De Winter 1994; University of Rymouth Local Election Database. 
The Vlaams Blok (VB) was unable to poll more than 2% share of the vote in General 
Elections held between 1978 and 1987. though the party did win one seat in the 1978, 
1981 and 1985 General Elections, and increased this to two seats in 1987. Yet from the 
period 1987 onwards the party became an increasingly significant electoral force in and 
around the city of Antwerp - for example, the VB secured four seats on the Antwerp 
provincial council in 1987. The 4.1% share of the vote polled in the 1989 European 
Elections nationally (see Table 3.4) can effectively be broken down into a 6.6% share of 
the vote in Flanders and a 20.8% share of the vote in Antwerp. Of the 2.1 % share of the 
vote polled in the 1989 Brussels Regional Election, this actually equals 13.4% share of the 
vote of the Flemish lists. The 6.6% polled in the 1991 General Election translates into 
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10.3% for the Flanders region. The party's strongest area of support was again in Antwerp 
where the party became the largest party with 25.1% share of the vote. The VB also polled 
well in Ghent (10%). Louvain (5.6%) and Bruges (5%). By comparison, the party polled 
only 3.9% share of the vote in Brussels. In local elections held in October 1994, the VB 
polled 28% share of the vote in Antwerpen, securing the party 18 of the 55 available seats 
and making it the largest party in this area. 
The Volksunie (VU) is another example of a Flemish far right party, and support in 
elections held in the post-war period is outlined in Table 3.4. Ackeart claims that the VU 
performs better at the national level of election than at the local level (Ackeart 1989), 
which is certainly true when comparing the 1989 Brussels regional election with the 
1991 general election, but not so when comparing the 1988 provincial election results 
with those from the 1991 general election. In terms of the far right in the Waltonian 
sector, the electoral data presented in Table 3.4 indicates that popular support for the 
Parti de Forces Nouvelles (PFN) and the Front National (FN) parties in the Wallonian 
sector of Belgium is much smaller than popular support for the Flemish far right. 
3.4.2d Great Britain: How has electoral support for parties of the far right in Britain 
compared with our previous examples? 
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Table 3.5 - Patterns of National Front Electoral Support in Great Britain 1974-1983 (expressed 
as a % age of total valid vote) 
YEAR OF ELECTION 
1974G(F) 1974G(0) 1976L 1977CLC 1979G 1983G 
3.3 3.1 8.9 . 5.1 1.4 1.1 
Note: all percentages are average scores for. seats contested and not for overall elections. The 
very small number of far right candidates would render the latter too small for any substantive 
analysis. 
G = General Election L = Local Elections GLC = Greater London Council Elections 
Sources: Eatwell 1992; Han-op, England & Husbands 1980. 
Support for far right parties in Great Britain has been particularly localised and sporadic 
(see Table 3.5). For example, the NF gained its best ever parliamentary result in the 
1973 West Bromwich by-election with a 16% share of the vote, and this encouraged the 
party to field 54 candidates in the General Election of February 1974, at which the party 
could only muster an average share of the vote of 3.3%. This result were significant 
enough, for Gable to make the claim that 
By the first of the two 1974 general elections ... their [NF] percentage 
of votes In both national and local elections was steadily increasing well 
beyond the odd-ball and fringe vote of the eariier post-war, far-right 
groups. (1991: 246) 
The ability to mobilise the electorate in local elections (see Chapter Five for more detailed 
analysis) has never really occurred in General Elections since the late 1970s. Despite the 
NF fielding 303 candidates in the 1979 General Election, it could only muster an average 
share of the vote of 1.4% and this in fact marked the decline of the National Front In 
British electoral politics. The election of a Conservative Government under the leadership 
of Margaret Thatcher quickly put a halt to predicted growth in far right electoral support. 
Conservative policies such as a restriction on immigration and a renewed authoritarian 
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attitude towards law and order effectively removed what had been the basis of the extreme 
right's appeal and, therefore, "any sort of political appeal via the ballot box" (Gable 
1991: 249). Internally the far right has suffered a severe identity crisis due to 
fractionalization and splintering of interests. By the time of the 1987 General Election the 
far right could only muster one NF and two BNP candidates - of which the highest share of 
the vote was a mere 0.6%. 
Claims made by Whiteley (1979) that the National Front was Britain's fourth largest 
party in terms of electoral support have been dismissed by Eatwell who argues that, 
•"During the 1970s the National Front held hopes of becoming England's third electoral 
force, but by the 1980s it had collapsed into minuscule rival factions" (1992: 175). Yet 
shortly after Eatwell posed the question "Why Has the Extreme Right Failed in Britain?", a 
BNP candidate was elected as councillor in a Tower Hamlets by-election despite the 
apparent hindrance of the plurality electoral system, thus reviving a wave of speculation 
about the regeneration of extreme right politics in 1990s Britain and begging the question 
'has the far right failed In Britain?' Within Chapter Five we will consider in closer detail 
those electoral features in both PR and plurality electoral systems which may encourage 
electoral support for parties of the far right and, vice versa, which features actually 
hinder representation for such parties. 
Our next two sections wilt provide an identical method of analysis to regionalist parties in 
contemporary Europe. We will attempt to clarify a definition of the term 'regionalist 
party' as well as provide a general overview of the electoral performance of several 
regionalist parties which will form the basis of analysis in Chapter Six. 
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3.4.3 Reoionalist Parties 
As with parties of the far right, we may also face problems in attempting to classify 
regionalist parties. Urwin defined regional parties as follows: 
"What separates these parties out from the mass of European parties is 
the nature of their claim upon the state. They identify with, and make 
claims upon the central government on behalf of, territories and 
groups that are not coincident with state boundaries and national 
populations. In fact, territorial identity is the only thing that all have 
in common." (Urwin 1983: 232) 
We can see, therefore, that regionalist parties do not necessarily fit the left-right 
orthodoxy of party classification. Smith (1991) categorises regionalist parties as 
•detached parties* due to their limited competition potential by appealing to specific social 
and cultural cleavages - this is particularly the case for linguistically driven parties, 
such as those in Flanders and Wallonia, Val d'Aosta, Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
Terminology such as ethno-regionalist, autonomist and sub-state nationalist is often used 
(Rokkan & Urwin 1983, Blondel 1994, Muller-Rommel 1994) although this can create 
problems when developing an ideological classification for such parties. Within the realms 
of this thesis, however, we are not primarily concerned with the specific policy 
programmes of regionalist parties, but the electoral and representative success of parties 
which are located within quite distinct geographic areas below the national or state level, 
since for regionalist parties in particular we might expect electoral success to be related 
to the level of electoral competition. In Chapter Six, we will provide a detailed analysis of 
regionalist party representation in Belgium, Italy, Spain and Great Britain as the data 
available enables a detailed analysis. Before doing this will provide a general outline of 
regionalist party electoral success in those states. 
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Table 3.6 - Examples of West European Regionalist Parties, Indicating Country of Origin and Year 
Fomied 
COUNTRY PARTY NAME YEAR FORMED 
Belgium Rassamblement Walloon 1965 
Front des Francophones 1965 
Italy Lombardy League 1984 
Lega Nord 1989 
Union Valdotaine 1945 
Spain Convergenca 1 Unio 1979 
Esquenra Republicana de Catalunya 1931 
Herri Batasuna 1975 
Basque Nationalist Party 1895 
Galician Nationalist Bloc mid 1970s 
Britain Scottish National Party 1934 
Plaid Cvmru 1925 
3.4.3a Belgium: Numerous regionalist parties have flourished in Belgium at different 
points in the post-war period. In Brussels, the regional interest was first engendered in 
the Rassamblement Walloon (RW) which has since been replaced electoraily by the Front 
des Francophones (FDF). The FDF initially polled welt in the Brussels region, although 
since the 1970s ft has more or less acted as a single parly with the RW, to the extent that 
only one party fields candidates in each electoral unit to prevent Vote-splitting'. 
3.4.3b Italy: The proliferation of regionalist parties in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s may 
not come as a surprise if we accept Woods claim that: 
"Changes in Italian society ... have undermined the effectiveness of the 
post-war centre-periphery linkages. The economic modernisation of 
northern and central Italy in the post-war period has resulted in the 
development of a nrwre complex and differentiated society." (Woods 
1992: 58) 
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In terms of the electoral system, Pridham identifies two significant factors which have 
contributed to regional party success in Italy. First, the existence of certain cleavages 
(especially ethnic and ethno-linguistic) has prevented the party system from crystallising 
into two cohesive blocks which may disadvantage small parties. Second, the PR electoral 
system enables small parties to benefit from the Imperiali (highest remainder) system of 
seat distribution (1991: 80). We have stated in Chapter Two and will demonstrate in later 
chapters, however, that the Imperiali system favours larger parties (Lijphart 1994a: 
24) and as such we must presume that Pridham is comparing the effect of Imperiali to 
non-PR systenrts rather than other methods of seat distribution within the generic PR 
group. Strong periphery interests and ethnic cleavages have resulted in a particular form 
of voting behaviour known as voto df appartenenza, being established in Italian electoral 
politics (Pridham 1991: 77) . 
Yet not all regional parties in Italy are ethno-linguistically driven. The Lega Nord (a 
coalition of several smaller regional leagues) appears to be closer in ideology, if indeed it 
has one, to the Wallonian and Scottish regionalists (/.e. it is economically driven), than 
some of its Italian counterparts. It is the most vociferously right-wing of the Italian 
regionalist parties in terms of its anti-immigration and anti-Southern stance, and its 
frequent attacks on the political dominance of Rome due to the proliferation of 
partitocrazia. The Lega Nord's predominant campaigning point is for the division of Italy 
into three self-goveming regional federations (the South, the Centre and the North). 
Cassese and Torchia account for League Party electoral success in the following way: 
"The growing weakness of the Communist Party is probably a 
prominent factor of the leghe success, because the right-wing 
electorate was no longer afraid of weakening the Christian Democrats in 
casting their vote for the leghe ... The leghe are probably nrore a 
renewed signal of the north-south cleavage than a signal of emerging 
regional identities." (1993: 99) 
90 
As such, we can see that regionalist party electoral success in Italy has arisen through a 
combination of factors. First, socio-cultural diversity has persisted and indeed has been 
accentuated by post-war modemisatioa Second, the 'timing* of electoral success has had as 
much to do with the collapse of the mainstream parties than wrth the appeal of regional 
party policies themselves. Other regionalist parties in Italy include the Lombardy League, 
the Union Valdotaine, the Sardinian Action f^rty and the Sotrth Tyrol People's Party. The 
latter three are all successful, but only in local and regional elections, as they have 
difficulty in getting the issue of autonomy onto the national political scene (see section 
3.4.4b). 
3.4.3c Spain: In relation to parties and party systems within Spain, Colome asks: 
T h e party system in Spain and Catalonia poses a series of questions in 
relation with its shape. Is the Spanish system a unitary one with 
different subsystems corresponding to nationalities and regior\s or, on 
the contrary, is there a plurality of differentiated party systems with 
their own characteristics?" (Fossas & Colome 1993: 39) 
Within Spain, Catalonian, Basque and Galician nationalism have a much longer history than 
other examples of regionalism cited in this chapter, as their origins can be traced back to 
the nineteenth century. Both Catalonia and the Basque country were the only two 
industrialized regions of Spain until the 1950s. Catalonian rationalism is based upon the 
fact that despite this successful early industrialisation and modernisation, Madrid has 
continued to dominate as the political centre of Spain. As Pi-Sunyer suggests, 'The Catalan 
case illustrates that capitalism is capable of developing in different ways, even directions; 
and it should rKtt really surprise us to find a bourgeoisie, such as the Catalan, that is not 
linked to the construction and consolidation of the state" (Tiryakian & Rogowski 1985: 
266). A similar pattern of industrialisation and modemisation has taken place in the 
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Basque region. In both regions, this economic prosperity has been matched with an 
independent linguistic and cultural identity, separate from the otherwise 'Castilian' Spain. 
The Convergenca i Unio and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya parties have used their 
relative economic success as a basis for promoting recognition of their particular 
ethno-linguistic identities. They were preceded, however, by eariier regionalist parties 
which had enjoyed some measure of electoral success. For example, the Lliga Regionalista 
won 12 seats in Catalonia in 1901, whilst the Solidaridad Catalana won 41 Catalan seats in 
1907. 
The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) has a republican and left-wing political 
background. The party was electorally strong in the immediate democratisation period 
(claiming 14 of the 1 35 seats in the 1980 Catalan autonomous elections), though has since 
seen its popular support decline and it is now much smaller than the rival regional party 
in Catalonia. In comparison, the Catalonian Convergenca i Unio (CiU) is a nationalist 
conservative party which has been one of the two largest parties in the Catalan region since 
1984 (along with the Socialist PSC). 
The Basque country also has two regional parties - the largest being Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV), with the Herri Batasuna (HB) - a left-wing radical party, founded later but 
being much smaller. Regionalism in Galicia has a much lower profile than in Catalonia and 
the Basque region. The regionalist interest in Galicia is represented by the BNG (Galician 
National Bloc), formed in the period following Franco's death. The BNG is the third largest 
party in the region - polling 18.7% and taking 1 7.3% of the seats in the 1993 regional 
elections. In comparison, Galicia is characterized as economically isolated and under-
developed, largely relying upon its agricultural resources. Linguistic identity was revived 
in the late 19th century and *galicianism' was supported from the 1960s by the church 
and universities. 
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3.4.3d Britain: Analysis of regional parly success in Britain provides a useful comparison 
with regional parties in other European states due to the different electoral system. The 
simple plurality electoral system ensures that small parties are hampered when support 
Is diluted nation-wide. Yet regionalist parties which concentrate their appeal to a limited 
area may overcome the obstacles created by this system. Whilst the potential for the 
pariiamentary representation of regionalist parties has so far been limited, the 
possibilities for effective control in local government may appear more optimistic. As 
Eagles & Erfle suggest 
"One of the most widely remarked upon of all trends in British 
elections since 1955 Is a growing regional divide, such that 
increasingly the national two party system is being replaced by 
emergent two party systems in the north and the south of the country." 
(Eagles & Erfle 1993: 105) 
In fact, at the sub-national level we can identify different party systems for England, 
Scotland and Wales. In relation to regional parties in Scotland, the mere handful of Scottish 
National Party (SNP) members in Pariiament compares unfavourably with the party's 
success in Scottish sub-national elections - only three MPs were elected in 1992 out of 72 
candidates. The SNP*s overall share of the vote in 1992 was 1.9%. but this can be more 
realistically understood in terms of a 21.5% share of the Scottish vote. The party's 
electoral impact began to be felt in 1967 when it won a pariiamentary by-election, and it 
has been suggested that electoral support for the SNP is based on various factors, including 
disillusionnnent with central govemment and the belief in the need for 'economic 
self-dependency' following the discovery of North Sea oil in the 1970s (Brand, Mitchell & 
Surridge 1994, Newell 1994). 
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The growth of regionalist parties in Wales, involves a national identity that has both 
economic and ethnic elements. The success of the coal industry has played a vital role in 
the development of the Welsh economy ami beliefs in economic self sufficiency. 
Furthermore, the persistence of the Welsh language has provided a 'label' of sub-national 
identification and has been marked by a resurgence in lee and in teaching. The Welsh 
nationalist party. Plaid Cymru (PC), was able to contest 50% of the Welsh pariiamentary 
seats by 1959, though electoral success did not occur until the 1960s (in the Carmarthen 
by-election held in 1966). In the 1992 General Election, Plaid Cymnj polled an overall 
0.5% share of the vote which can be effectively expressed as 8.8% of the total Welsh vote. 
The party secured four seats out of the 38 contested 
3.4.4 Regiopalisi; Party Electoral History in Four, Case Stucjies 
This section will focus upon general patterns of regional party electoral support across 
national and second order elections to provide a general picture of the peaks and troughs in 
popular support. 
3.4.4a Belgium - We can analyze regional party electoral success at a number of electoral 
levels. In gerieral, we can summarize that the RassamWement Walloon (RW) at the 
commune level had in fact declined from being a 'moderate' size party to being alt but 
nonexistent by 1988. A similar decline of electoral support for the FDF at the commune 
level is evkJent Since 1981, support has been as follows: 
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Table 3.7 - Patterns of Regionalist Party Electoral Support in Belgium, 1981-1991 (expressed as 
a %age of total valid vote) 
ELECTION LEVEL YEAR , 
General 1981 1985 1987 1991 
RW 5.5 0.6 0.8 1.2 
FDF-PPW - - 1.2 1-5 
Local 1982 1988 
RW 5.8 1.5 
Note: local election %age shares of the vote are for the Wallonian region only. 
Sources: European Journal of Political Research - Political Data Yearbook 1 992 Vol.22 No.4, 
Ackaert 1993: 18. 
We can see from Table 3.7 that the FDF-PPW have maintained a stable though small share 
of the votes between 1987 and 1991. What is of more interest is a comparison of RW 
shares of the vote between local and national elections. The RW in Wallonia appears to poll 
a larger share of the vote when participating in local elections as opposed to general 
elections. This may suggest that within the region of Wallonia there exists a section of the 
electorate that is more likely to vote RW in sub-national elections and that, for whatever 
reason, is deterred from voting in this way in Belgian general elections. This may be 
explained by (i) the Reif and Schmitt, Franklin et a/theories of second order voting, or 
(ii) our hypothesis suggested in Chapter Two section 2.2.4 that compulsory voting 
encourages 'protest voting'. 
The second order voting hypothesis would expect the RW to perform better in sub-national 
elections because there is 'less-at-stake'. Voters may choose the RW because it represents 
sub-national interests better, or because they are protesting against mainstream national 
parties in between general elections - either or both may apply in the Belgian case. Our 
hypothesis concerns the impact of compulsory voting upon electoral outcomes. Rather than 
abstaining, voters in compulsory voting countries who become disillusioned with 
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mainstream parties may instead choose to protest by voting for small parties. We cannot 
prove whether one or the other hypothesis is correct, both may be to some extent, but we 
can see that support in local elections has been higher than in general elections throughout 
the 1980s. 
Although the FDF contested all 19 Brussels communes in 1976 and 1982, contestation 
rates had declined by 1988. The RW has never been as electoraily strong as the FDF in the 
Brussels region, and had in fact virtually disappeared as an electoral participant by the 
late 1980s, as Table 3.7 shows. The RW's first identifiable weakness has been its limited 
ability to provide lists in each of the 262 communes in the Walloon region. For example, 
the RW contested 49 communes in 1976, but only 9 communes in 1988. What it is 
important to ask however, is how well the RW performs in the communes where it has 
been able to provide lists. In Chapter Six we will question whether there is evidence to 
suggest that the RW strategically organises itself to provide lists in only those communes 
where it expects to secure a significant vote. 
3.4.4b Italy:- Table 3.8 outlines the outcome of recent Italian elections in relation to 
regional party support: 
Table 3.8 - Patterns of Regionalist Party Electoral Support in Italy, 1979-1994 (expressed as a 
%age of the vote) 
ELECrtON LEVEL YEAR 
Chamber of Deputies 7 987 1992 7 994 
Usj - 8.7 8.5 
LL 3.2 - -
SVP - • 0.6 
Senate 1987 1994 
LL 2.5 
Psd'Az - 0.3 
continued. 
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European Parliament 1989 
LL 8 .1 * 
Regional 7 979 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1993 
LL _ . _ 0 . 5 * 2 .7 * - - 18 .9* -
LN - - - - 0.5 - - 8.7 -
U V * * - 27.1 - 24.7 - 34.2 - (0.2) 37.3 
P s d ' A z * * * 3.3 13.7 - - - 12.3 - (0.1) 
Note: All %ages are shares of the vote for the country as a whole except for: 
* = Lombardy League share in the region of Lombardy only 
** = Share of the vote in the Val d'Aosta region only (except 1990) 
* * * = Share of the vote in the Sardinia region only (Except 1990) 
Sources: Bull & Newell 1995: 87. Leonardi & Anderlini 1992: 181. 
The Lombardy League made its electoral debut in the 1985 regional elections - polling 
0.5% in Lombardy. In 1987 it polled 3.2% in the Chamber of Deputies and 2.5% in the 
Senate. A comparison of party performance between the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
elections held in 1992 and 1994 shows that the regionalist Lega Nord received a similar 
level of support in both elections, though it benefited from the revised electoral system by 
receiving 55 seats in 1992 compared to 11 seats in 1994 (with extra seats as part of the 
Freedom Alliance). Also in the 1994 Chamber of Deputies elections, the SVP polled 0.6% 
nationally and claimed 3 seats (the party's usual level of rep in these elections), whilst 
the PSd'Az polled 0.3% in the Senate. 
Is there evidence to suggest that regionalist parties perform better electorally at the 
sub-national level? The Lombard League has displayed a range of popular electoral 
support between the various regions. In regional council elections held in 1990, the 
Lombard League polled 0.8% share of the vote in Tuscany, 2.9% share of the vote in 
Emilia-Romagna, 5.1% share of the vote in Piemonte, 6.1% share of the vote in Liguria 
and 18.9% share of the vote in Lombardy. Table 3.8 includes the regional election results 
from 1990 for those 15 Italian regions that do not enjoy special autonomous status. The 
'new' Lega Nord (formed as an amalgamation of the Lombardy League and other small 
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groups) became the fourth largest party in the 1990 elections with a 4.8% share of the 
vote. We can also see from the results of general elections held since in Table 3.8, that this 
was in fact the beginning of the League's electoral success - hence suggesting that regional 
party electoral success is by no means limited to the sub-national level. The Lega Nord has 
only been electorally active in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region since the 1993 regional 
elections. Despite this the party has taken a significantly high share of the vote for a new 
party - ranging from 17.6% in Trieste to 33.4% in Tolmezzo. It was, in fact, the largest 
party in all of the five Friuli provinces following the 1993 elections. 
The other regional parties in Italy have demonstrated a range of electoral success. For 
example, the UV has been the largest party in the Val D'Aosta region since 1983 and has 
actually strengthened its average share of the vote from 27.1% in the 1983 regional 
elections to 37.3% in the 1993 regional elections. In the 1990 regional elections the UV 
polled 1.9% in Veneto and 0.8% in Tuscany (0.2% nationally). The PSd'Az has shown a 
general increase in its share of the vote in the Sardinian region since 1974. Although the 
PSd'Az still remains a relatively 'small' party, this party is significant enough to stake a 
claim in the distribution of seats. Psd'Az success has ranged from 3.3% and one seat in 
1979, to 13.7% and 11 seats in 1983 and 12.3% and 10 seats in 1989. In the 1990 
regional elections, the PSd'Az polled 0.9% in Veneto and 0.1% nationally. 
3.4.4c Spain:- In Spain, the electoral success of various regional parties in elections held 
from 1979 to 1993 is outlined in Table 3.9: 
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Table 3.9 - Patterns of Regionalist Party Electoral Support in Spain, 1979-1993 (expressed as a 
% age of the total valid vote) 
ELECTION LEVEL YEAR 
General 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 
CiU 2.7 3.7 5.1 5.1 4.9 
Regional 1980 1981 1984 7585 1986 1988 1990 1993 1994 
CiU 27.7 - 46.6 - - 45.5 - - -
ERC 8.9 - 4.4 - - 4.1 - - -
HB 16.0 - 14.6 - 17.5 - 18.3 - 16.3 
PNV 37.0 - 41.8 - 23.6 - 28.5 - 29.8 
BNG - 6.2 - 4.2 - - - 18.7 -
Local 1987 1991 
CiU 35.2 34.0 
ERC 2.3 2.5 
Note: %age shares of the vote are national shares for general elections. In the regional elections 
the %age share of the vote is for the region of Catalonia only for the QU and ERC, for the Basque 
region only for the HB and PNV, and for the Galician region only for the BNG. %age shares of the 
vote for local elections refer to results in Barcelona only. 
Sources: Atlas Electoral de la autat de Barcelona: 1977-1989. Ajuntament de Barcelona. 
Barcelona Eleccions Locals 1991. Sen/ei d'Estadistica, Ajuntament de Barcelona, Keating 1993: 
418. 
Although we have a limited amount of data on the autonomous regional elections for 
Catalonia, we are able to analyze the Catalonian Autonomous Elections held between 1980 
and 1988 and the local elections held in Barcelona in 1987 and 1991. Whilst the two 
major parties in Catalonia (the socialist PSC and the regionalist CiU) have increased their 
share of the vote, this was achieved at the cost of support for the PSUC/IC and the other 
regionalist party, the ERC. If we consider the results from the 1988 Catalan regional 
elections in more detail, we find that the IC was slightly under-represented as its share of 
the seats was 6.7% whilst polling a 7.7% share of the vote. The ERC, however, was 
slightly over-rewarded with seats (receiving 4.4% of the seats with a share of the vote 
equal to 4.1%) despite the fact that it polled less over the whole of the region than the tC. 
This suggests that the Catalonian region does not act as a single electoral area and that the 
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ERC actually benefits from a concentrated level of support in certain districts. 
The CiU has been the largest polling party in the Catalonian regional elections from 1980 
(28%) to 1988 (45.5%), therefore not only remaining the largest, but also increasing 
its popularity. In relation to the local elections held in Barcelona, the nrost significant 
changes in party ^pport have favoured the regionalist CiU - the second largest party in 
Barcelona since 1983 (when it polled a 27% share of the vote). The smaller regional 
party - the ERC - has always polled only a low share of the vote and as such is unlikely to 
be represented because (i) it falls below the 3% threshold of representation, or (ii) the 
use of ten electoral districts each with a district magnitude of fifteen seats acts as a 
threshold of exclusion for all small parties. This will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Six. 
The Basque electoral system at the regionalist level is similar to the one operating in 
Catalonia 6 The 75 seats in the regional assembly are elected via the three provinces -
each allocated 25 seats. Although the regionalist party Herri Batasuna (HB) is not the 
largest party in the Basque region (this is still the Basque Nationalist Party - PNV), it has 
maintained its hold as either the second or third largest party since 1980 with its lowest 
poll being 14.6% in 1984. 
Elections to the Autonomous Region of Galicia use the rfHondt method of seat distributioa 
For the 75 seats in the regional assembly (this rose from 71 seats in 1989), the four 
provinces effectively act as individual electoral divisions. As such, there are 24 seats in 
the province of A Coruna, 21 seats in Pontevedra, and 15 seats in the provinces Lugo and 
Ourense. The largest regionalist party is the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), which is the 
6 Seats are allocated via the d'Hondt system and a 3% threshold operates. 
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third largest party in the region. 
3.4.4d Great Britain:- electoral support for the two main regionalist parties since the late 
1970s is oudined in Table 3.10: 
Table 3.10 - Pattern of Regionalist Party Electoral Support in Great Britain, 1978-1994 
(expressed as a %age of the valid vote) 
ELECTION LEVEL YEAR 
General 1987 1992 
SNP 14.0 21.5 
PC 7.3 8.9 
European Parliament 1994 
SNP 33.0 
Regional 1982 1986 1990 1994 
SNP 13.6 18.2 21.8 26.8 
County 1981 1985 
PC 9.4 9.1 
District 1978 1982 799? 1992 
SNP 24.2 15.5 - 24.3 
PC - - 10.7 -
Note: %age shares of the vote relate to share for Scotland only for SNP and share for Wales only 
for P C 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
In terms of sub-national electoral success for the Scottish National Party (SNP) we can 
observe a wide variation in the level of support between districts and regions. A total of 
445 seats were available in the 1986 regional elections - the SNP providing candidates for 
a total 330 (approximately 75%). Overall, the party polled 18.2%, which is a growth in 
support of 4.8% compared to its share of the vote in the 1982 regional elections. The 
number of seats secured by the SNP in 1986. however, was by no means proportional. The 
SNP won 36 seats overall, this represents a mere 8.1% of the total seats available and 
10.9% of the seats actually contested by the party. In the 1992 district elections, the SNP 
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fielded candidate in all but 2 of the 53 districts, although in terms of actual electoral 
success the SNP has ranged from being a minor party to shares of the vote as large as 
46.1% in Moray, and 44.2% in Angus. A general analysis of Scottish regional election 
results in the period 1974 to 1994 led Bochel and Denver to claim: 
"... Labour is cleariy the dominant party in Scotland. The SNP have a 
fair claim to be the second party since they have out polled the 
Conservatives in the last three elections whilst Liberal Democrat 
support is rather variable." (Bochel & Denver 1994: xii) 
Overall, the SNP has gradually increased its share of the vote in district elections. It is 
important to note, however, that the SNP increased the number of canddates It fielded in 
1988 by approximately 50% compared to elections held in the eariy 1980s. This has been 
matched by a two-fold increase in the overall number of seats it has won (113 in 1988 
compared to 54 in 1980). Is it the case that the SNP has become the Scottish counterpart 
to the Liberal Denrwrats in parts of England? The SNP is not helped by the fact that it is 
'fishing in the same waters' as the Labour Party in Scotland (Brand, Mitchell & Surridge 
1994). The Labour Party's successful attempts to rework itself Into a convincing and 
electable party of national government has Nndered the progression of the SNP beyond a 
certain peak. In terms of the consistency of SNP support, Brand et al claim. 
"One striking feature of Nationalist support at General Elections is that 
there are very few constituencies where they regularly have a strong 
vote. It comes and goes unpredictably. The SNP does not have a very 
happy record in local government, or even a very extensive one." 
(Brand, Mitchell & Surridge 1994: 629) 
Yet the regional elections of 1986 followed a new trend in electoral contestation in Scotland 
first identified in 1982 where the number of parties contesting each seat was on the 
rise, and it will be interesting to see (in Chapter Six) if the SNP benefits in multi-party 
contests. 
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For the 1990 Scottish Regional Elections, the SNP provided candidates for 3 4 8 of the 4 4 5 
available seats ( 7 8 . 2 % ) , a slight increase of 18 candidates compared to the 1 9 8 6 election. 
The SNP pdled an average share of the votes of 2 1 . 8 % (and increase of 3.6% on the 1986 
elections). Whilst the Conservative Party polled 19 .6% in 1990 compared to the SNP*s 
21 .8%, the two parties won 52 seats and 4 2 seats respectively. This confirms the findings 
we made from the 1986 results - the SNP has successfully built upon its electoral base to 
become the second most popular party in several regions and many electoral divisions, 
though unfortunately there are no prizes for second place in a first past the post electoral 
system. For the 1994 Scottish Regional Elections, the SNP contested 8 1 . 9 % of the 
available seats, polled an average share of the votes of 26 .8% and secured 73 seats . The 
SNP actually improved its share of the votes in every region except Dumfries and Galloway. 
The Welsh regionalist party. Plaid Cymru, extended its national representation to four 
members of parliament in the 1992 General Election, but more Importantly became the 
second party in Wales as a result of the County Council elections held in 1 9 9 3 (the Labour 
Party being the largest party in Wales). A s Table 3.10 shows, electoral support for PC is 
stronger in sub-national elections than is the case for general elections. As with the SNP 
in Scotland, PC enjoys concentrated support in particular areas. Christiansen identifies 
two geographic areas of predonninant PC support - Gvvynedd County in the North West and 
Mid-GlanrK)rgan and Gwent in the South of the country (Christiansen 1 9 9 4 ) . and we will 
consider the impact of the electoral sys tem in areas where support is strongest in more 
detail in Chapter Six. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Within this chapter we have attempted to provide a broad overview of the existing 
literature on party systems in general and new and small parties in particular. We have 
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shown that a party system is more than a haphazard coalition of parties which is prone to 
complete change between each election. Rather, it requires some notion of consistency, 
centrality of ideology and willingness to cooperate - as 'marginal' and 'detached' parties, 
the far right and regionalists may not be easy partners for party system participatioa Yet 
the change in electoral support towards parties such as these since the 1 9 8 0 s cannot be 
overiooked 
We have suggested that the Upset-Rokkan thesis of party formation is in some aspects 
'dated' but still has important implications for party formation in the late twentieth 
century - particularly in terms of the centre-periphery cleavage. We have also discussed 
some of the problems involved in defining 'minority parties' and categorising new parties. 
We have shown that the percentage of votes polled in general elections often conceals more 
than it tells, and says little if anything about regional enclaves of strong support. We have 
also outlined some of the problems associated with the terms far right and regionalist 
parties, although this was intended as a means of clarification to justify which parties 
form the core case-studies in Chapters R v e and Six, and we have chosen the most accepted 
c a s e s of both far right and regionalist parties in order to analyze electoral success . We are 
not primarily concemed with why these parties attract support but what happens in terms 
of representation when they do. 
In later chapters we will consider the ef fect of specific electoral features upon the 
representation of far right and regionalist parties at the sub-national level in Europe. 
Before we do so, however, we can make some general observations about electoral features 
which may help or hinder small parties. In Chapter Two we suggested that the political 
consequences of electoral systems are often overiooked by contrasting purely aggregate 
national-level results. What is of particular importance is the effect of specific formulae 
and rules within individual electoral divisions. It is important to remind ourselves that in 
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Chapter One we outlined research which suggests new party formation is not a result of the 
electoral system, though effective representation is (Hauss & Rayside 1978) . 
Finally in this Chapter we presented a general overview of the electoral s u c c e s s of far right 
and regionalist parties - both nationally and sub-nationally. This helps to demonstrate 
just how small or large such parties are in particular countries and localities and how the 
level of electoral support may be determined by the order of election. It is important to 
remember that financial and organisational constraints make sub-national elections the 
most accessible forum for participation for most new and small parties. The following 
chapters will take the form of case studies and data analysis In two aspects: 
1) Chapter Four will consider general patterns of sub-national electioris In several states. 
We will focus upon electoral systems artd rules and their general impact upon parties. 
2) Chapters Five and Six will consider the impact of sub-national electoral systems and 
niles specifically upon far right and regionalist party representation. This detailed 
analysis will show which electoral features in particular affect the proportionality of 
representation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - ANALYZING THE PROPQRTIQNALfTY OF SUB-NATIONAL ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS: THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS. 
4.1 Introduction 
In previous copters we have outlined the development of established approaches 
towards the academic analysis of electoral systems and party systems^ in relation to 
westem Europe. Our primary concern is that this analysis has largely concentrated 
upon national elections, with limited attention being paid to 'second order* elections. In 
this chapter we will nnake some general observations about the various electoral 
systems which operate at the sub-national level in several European states^ to set the 
scene for a later evaluation of those electoral features which may affect the 
representation of far right and regionalist parties in sub-national elections. We can use 
sub-national electoral data as a further test of the assumptions made In Chapters Two 
and Three regarding electoral and party systems. We have shown in Chapter Three that 
far right and regionalist political parties succeed in winning votes in both national and 
sub-national elections in numerous European countries. Our later analysis involves 
questioning how effectively these votes at the sub-national level are transformed into 
seats and thus considers the relationship between electoral systems, their rules and 
proportionality. 
The framework for each case-study will take the form of a four-pronged analysis. We 
will consider (i) each country's electoral system and different rules, (ii) the impact of 
specific electoral rules upon general representation, (iii) the level of 
1 The seven case studies chosen for the chapter were chosen because in six cases these 
countries are relevant for our analysis of far right and regional party success. The case 
study of the Republic of Ireland has also been chosen because it enables us to analyze the 
effects of the STV system. 
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disproportionality created by translating votes into seats and (iv) variations in the 
sub-national party system. In terms of the electoral system we will outline, where 
appropriate Information is available to us, features such as the timing of elections, the 
size of electoral divisions, the use of thresholds and the levels of tumout. All of these 
factors may have an influence upon small party representation. Not only is it important 
to compare the overall effect of very different electoral systems ag. plurality versus 
PR, but it is crucial to compare very similar systems where only one or two of the 
electoral variables differ, as this enables an understanding of which variables are most 
relevant when considering small party representation. Fluctuations in tumout may 
have a significant effect ( s e e Chapter T w o section 2 .2 .4) . For example, it will be 
interesting to s e e if all parties experience a drop in support if tumout decreases, or if 
some parties perform relatively better? If the latter is tme in relation to regionalist 
and far right support, this may suggest sonriething about the nature strength of 
commitment and belief in ideology, though this is not an aspect that we can ultimately 
prove in this thesis. 
In relation to party representation we will also consider which parties regularty 
participate in sub-national elections, and which parties gain effective representation, 
as representation for small parties is most likely to begin at the sub-national level. The 
ability of small parties to gain sub-national representation is vital for building upon 
existing levels of support and, where relevant, receiving financial support We can test 
at the sub-national level how 'stable* such parties are - do they emerge and participate 
sporadically, or are they a nrrore frequent and established feature of the party system? 
Electoral sys tems do not provide an exhaustive explanation of small party 
representation in west Europe. Many other features nnay affect electoral opportunities 
- for example, party funding, a c c e s s to the media, and the impact of particular political 
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and \oca\ issues. Yet these are not the concern of this thesis since not only are they 
difficult to quantify but they also tend to be related to the political nature of each 
country independently and as such do not necessarily lend themselves to successful 
comparative analysis. Our purpose here will be to show how different electoral systems 
are more or less effective in translating a particular party's share of the vote into its 
share of seats. In essence, it is necessary to ask which rules appear the most important 
for parties with a small, yet concentrated share of the vote. 
In order to compare the effectiver)ess of electoral systems in general, and specific 
features in particular, we will employ three indices of proportionality. Our previous 
analysis in Chapter Two section 2.5 has shown that a single index is insufficient, 
because the different indices reflect different interpretations of proportionality. For 
example, some indices appear more favourable to particular forms of PR (Gallagher 
1991 ) , and any measurement which concentrates on national elections will not identify 
significant regional variations in proportionality which may become apparent when we 
conduct analysis at the sub-national level. The aim of this chapter is to measure the 
disproportionality of var io i^ sub-national electoral ^ s t e m s as a whole, whilst in 
Chapters Five and Six we will consider the proportionality of far right and regionalist 
party representation in particular. 
A s demonstrated in Chapter Two, any index of disproportionality may measure one of two 
general features - the absolute differerKe between a party's seats and votes, or the ratio 
between a party's seats and votes. In Chapter Two section 2.5 we discussed in detail the 
advantages and disadvantages of different indices and suggested which three we will use 
in this thesis. Summarizing, they are: 
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Loosenrtore-Hanby Index D - Disproportionality Is equal to the total percentage by which 
over represented parties are over represented per election, on a scale of 0 - 100. This 
model is most sympathetic towards the largest remainder method of seat distribution and 
can understate the proportionality of a system due to its sensitivity to the number of 
parties participating in each election. 
Least Squares Index - measures disproportionality per election within a scale of 0 -
100 in terms of absolute differences. It Is more "sensitive" than the Loosemore-Hanby 
model In terms of identifying a few large discrepancies between vote and seat shares 
rather than numerous less significant ones. 
Sainte Lague Index - measures disproportionality in terms of the difference between the 
seats and votes ratio for each party. This index will record the value zero when 
proportionality is perfect, although there is no upper limit for disproportionality. 
Whereas the other indices measure absolute differences between a party's vote and seat 
shares, the Sainte Lague Index measures the relative differences and is not biased 
towards any particular seat distribution method. 
Before we analyze In detail the proportionality of various electoral systems and features 
we will present a brief overview of the electoral profile of seven European states -
these being the Netheriands, Belgium, Germarry, the Republic of Ireland, Britain, Spain 
and Italy. This choice reflects a diversity of west European electoral systems and rules. 
The Netheriands, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy each employs some type of PR, 
whilst Germany and Spain employ constitutional thresholds to prohibit the 
representation of very small parties. Britain employs a simple plurality system in 
predominantly single-seat divisions, although there are also examples of multi-seat 
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divisions. Finally, the Republic of Ireland uses the Single Transferable Vote method (see 
Appendix C for greater detail and an outline of those European Union member states not 
included here). 
4 .2 - Seven European States: A Brief Electoral Profile 
4.2.1 The Netheriands Local Government in the Netheriands operates on two 
administrative levels (see Appendix C ) . On the highest level, the Netheriands is 
organised into twelve provincial regions, and it is a t this level which will be the focus of 
analysis in this chapter. As such, it is important to place provincial electoral politics 
in context, as they may be affected by current issues and timing, and by perceptions of 
how ^important', or effective, sub-national government is. For Toonen, the provincial 
level of government is an important intermediary between national and truly local 
(gemeenten) levels of power, since: 
"The province is a constitutionally defined and legally independent, 
territorial general-purpose government unit. It is constitutionally 
entnjsted with a general competence (autonomy) and among other things 
is charged with the general supervision of Dutch municipalities. The 
Dutch province is a fully fledged layer of government with its own 
constitutional, legal and democratic legitimation and a directly elected 
representative body." (Toonen 1993: 118 ) 
This implies that at the provincial level at least, elections are recognised as having a 
significant political role, yet turnout for provincial elections has been lower than at 
both the national and municipal level since the late 1 9 8 0 s (see Table 4 .1 ) . 
All provinces follow the same electoral timetable and use a party-list ballot system, and 
seat distribution is determined via the d'Hondt method of PR (Andeweg & Irwin 1993: 
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81 - 8 9 ) 2 . There is no formal application of either thresholds or supplementary seats, 
but we can test whether the district magnitude acts as a dl? factx) threshold. Since 
compulsory voting was in force in Dutch elections until 1 9 7 0 we may a s s e s s the effect if 
any of changes in tumout upon the spread of party representation, which m ^ have 
important implications for small parties. As Koole suggests: 
"European and sub-national elections showed a decline in voting turTK»ut 
in the Netheriands recently. In the public debate this was interpreted 
very often as a sign of a widening gap between voters and politicians. It 
is equally arguable, however, that voters act rationally in so-called 
'second order' elections, because there is less at stake." (Koole 1994: 7-
8 ) 
It is the representation of right-wing extremist parties in the Netheriands a t the 
sub-national level that is of particular interest in this thesis (see Chapter F ive) . In 
this chapter we will consider whether there exists a general pattem of party support 
across all the provinces, or whether party popularity has varied between provinces. 
We will also consider the effects of changing tumout and the influence of district 
magnitude at the provincial level. Do these factors influence disproportionality and how 
important is the relationship between the number of competing and number of elected 
parties? We will also consider the extent to which various electoral rules continue to 
create db fecto thresholds at the provincial level which work against the interests of 
small parties. 
4 .2 .2 Belgium Since 1 9 9 3 , Belgium has been classified as a federal state in order to 
accommodate the diversity of the different Walloon and Flemish cultures, and as such has 
been faced with a process of widespread state reform - including considerable electoral 
2 Direct elections have been held every four years since 1958 with the exception being 
Provincial elections held in 1987 rather than 1986 . Another exception is the Flevoland 
province which was not 'created' until 1 9 8 5 . 
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reform. Sub-national govemment in Belgium has a three level structure: 
communales/gemeenten, provinces and three regions (see Appendix C ) . Any 
comprehensive analysis of local elections is only feasible from 19763, and there have 
been several waves of local govemment reform, serving to reduce the actual number of 
divisions. Ackaert ( 1 9 9 3 ) suggests that In Belgian local elections In general, national 
political parties are becoming increasingly important at the expense of local lists -
primarily due to the significant refomrts of 1976. The late 1 9 6 0 s mariced the split of 
the three major parties along linguistic lines and, therefore, the fragmentation of the 
Belgian party system is far more marked than in many other European countries. For 
example, in the municipal elections held in 1988. approximately 4 0 % of the lists 
presenting candidates could be labelled as local/minority parties. Deschouwer suggests 
that this exemplifies the inappropriateness of a study of Belgian election results at the 
national level, since parties only compete in their own particular regions ( 1 9 9 1 : 1 4 3 ) . 
In relation to our later chapters of analysis, the Belgian local electoral sys tem is 
valuable because it provides examples of both regional and right-wing extremist 
parties. 
For the purpose of analysis, we can identify three consistent features in Belgian ^ b -
national elections. Despite the fragmented nature of the Belgian system, all municipal 
elections are held on the same day and, therefore, subject to the sanie national political 
climate. All Belgian elections are subject to compulsory voting and. although tumout is 
much higher than the norm In non-compulsory sub-national elections, a declining trend 
has developed. Finally, candidates are presented In the form of party-lists and all seats 
are distributed via the Imperial! largest remainder/quota system - a method recognized 
as over representing the larger parties (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 3 4 ) . 
3 Until 1 9 7 6 the Home Department was only responsible for publishing the results from 
main or larger populated cities. 
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In relation to general patterns in local electiorvs held in Belgium, in section 4.3.2 we 
will briefly discuss the main party share of the vote in order to establish whether any 
general pattems of change have occurred, and also whether there are any variations in 
party support between the regions. Second, we will compare district magnitude and 
consider whether this af fects the overall level of disproportionality. The disparity 
between the number of parties participating in an election and the number of parties 
which win seats may be related to the district magnitude, thus the possibility for true 
proportional representatk>n in a multi-party system is enhanced by making a larger 
number of seats available. Third, although there are no formal thresholds for 
representation in Belgian municipal elections, we will also be able to establish the range 
of de facto thresholds which operate at the communal level. 
4 .2 .3 Germanv Sub-national government in Germany operates on three levels (see 
Appendix C ) , and the present sub-national government system was established in the 
period 1 9 4 5 - 4 9 after the defeat of National Socialism. The right to local 
self-government is guaranteed under the Basic Law, and Scarrow suggests: "Since the 
1960s , local government elections have become an increasingly important arena of 
partisan struggle in the Federal Republic of Germany." (Scarrow 1993: 3 8 1 ) 
The national party system has traditionally been classified as a three-party sys tem and, 
since the 1 9 8 0 s , a four-party sys tem. While small regional parties were initially 
important in the post-war period in states such a s Lower Saxony, Bavaria and 
North-Rhine Westphalia, their significance all but disappeared (except in Bavaria) by 
the 1 9 6 0 s (Conradt 1993: 1 9 5 ) . Conradt acknowledges that new parties benefit when 
initially concentrating their electoral appeal at the Land level (a point proven by the far 
right NPD during the 1 9 6 0 s and the Greens in the 1 9 8 0 s ) , as the electorate often use 
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Laender elections to voice opinions about national politics rather than local issues 
(Conradt 1993: 196) . This suggests that the second order hypothesis of protest voting 
may be an appropriate model for voting behaviour in Germany. Despite the high number 
of non-party candidates and voter-groups which stand in sub-national elections, the PR 
list system tends to operate to the benefit of organised parties (Gunlicks 1986: 1 6 2 ) . 
What may be of interest for German party politics is whether power shifts in Laender 
elections have consistently acted as indicators of change in national politics (Conradt 
1993 : 1 9 6 ) . 
In this chapter we will focus our analysis upon the Laender level of the German electoral 
system. Since reunification In 1990 , the Federal Republic of Germany consists of 
sixteen states or Laender. The central concem of this chapter, however, will be the 
eleven Laender of the former West Germany since this provides us with a greater time 
span of 'democratic* elections from which to conduct a comparative analysis Germany is 
similar in nature to the Netherlands and Belgium in that it operates a PR system, but 
does it display similar levels of * proportionality' of representation? Differences often 
occur between the electoral systems within each LaerKler. The decentralised r^ture of 
German politics enables each Laender to determine Its own specific form of PR and we 
can witness a variation in ballot systenns and, more importantly, nnethods of seat 
distribution. This may have significant implications for the sub-national party ^ s t e m 
within each Laender. and particulariy for the representation of small parties. It will be 
interesting to a s s e s s the impact of the different seat distribution formulae used in order 
to test Gunlicks' claim that; "Experience in Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia 
... suggests that the Hare-Niemeyer system favours the small parties, whereas the 
d'Hondt method favours the larger parties" (Gunlicks 1986: 179 ) . Within this chapter 
we can also a s s e s s the impact upon proportionality of (I) district magnitude which 
ranges significantly between Laender, and (ii) the impact of the 5% threshold - the only 
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constant feature of German Lsender elections - as this is the initial hurdle which small 
parties need to overcome to gain effective representation. Furthermore, we can also 
consider the changes in tumout and consider whether this has led to changes in party 
support. 
4 .2 .4 The Republic of Ireland Ireland consists of sub-national government on two levels 
(see Appendix C ) . All local elections in Ireland are covered by the Local Government Act 
( 1 9 4 1 ) and the Electoral Act ( 1 9 6 3 ) , and the number of seats per constituency ranges 
the size being determined by the national legislature. Until recently, local government 
in the Republic of Ireland had enjoyed relatively little autonomy and as such was not held 
in particularly high esteem by the Irish electorate (Sinnott 1995 : 2 5 5 ) . A s a result, it 
has been suggested tha t "Local elections in the Republic of Ireland might reasonably be 
regarded as merely ersatz versions of general elections." (Gallagher 1989 : 22 ) . If this 
is the case we may witness pattems of protest voting in second order elections. Whilst 
the Local Govemment Act ( 1 9 9 1 ) have since produced limited reforms in terms of 
autononiy, this has not affected the actual electoral system. 
The nature of the STV electoral system means that members of the same party are often 
in competition with each other. A s a result there is often a greater emphasis upon 
personality and local issues in Irish elections. Local elections are irKreasingly 
becoming dominated by the major national parties, especially since local elections are 
viewed as a 'launching pad' for potential members of the Dail. Yet this should not under 
estimate significant differences between national and local election results, sirKe it is 
often the case at the local level that the major party(ies) do ' less well' while the 
smaller, and especially local-interest parties, poll a larger share of the vote than in 
national electiorts (Sinnott 1995: 2 5 6 ) . All local elections in Ireland tend to exhibit a 
relatively high tumout compared to some of its European counterparts (usually around 
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6 5 % of the total electorate), although as one would expect this is lower than the level of 
turnout witnessed in Irish national elections. Tumout tends to be higher in rural 
periphery areas. 
For the purposes of analysis in this chapter we will analyse county and county borough 
elections in Ireland. What is significant for our analysis is the fact that each county and 
county borough is divided into smaller electoral divisioris. The size of each assembly, 
therefore, is not the same a s the district magnitude which is much smaller, and district 
nrtagnitude is one of our constraints which can affect small party representation. First, 
we will consider variations in tumout and party support between areas in Ireland. In 
relation to the proportionality of sub-national elections in Ireland we will (I) consider 
the Impact of variations in district magnitude, and (ii) measure to what extent varying 
factors create db fecto thresholds which may affect the representation of small parties, 
particulariy if support is spread thinly over the county / county borough. 
4 .2 .5 Great Britain The British sub-national govemment system is organised on two 
levels (see Appendix C ) . There are two examples of single-tier local govemment, the 
32 LorKk)n Boroughs and the 36 Metropolitan Districts, which employ the usual 
plurality voting procedures. In relation to the higher tier of sub-national govemment, 
England and Wales were, until recently, represented by 4 7 counties/ local authorities'* 
and, until 1995 , Scotiand consisted of nine regional councils and three island councils. 
Until the 1 9 8 0 s at least, British sub-national electoral research focused upon three 
general observations. First, tumout in local elections had been much lower than at 
4 As a result of the recent Local Govemment Commission, 14 unitary authorities have 
replaced the two tier system in parts of England, and 22 new unitary authorities have been 
implemented in Wales. 
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national elections, implying that local government has generally been seen as 
'ineffective' and lacking in political strength. Turnout is lower, however, at county 
council level elections, rather than at the district council level despite most functions 
being administered at the county level (Railings & Thrasher 1992) . Second, the 
electoral system discourages voters from supporting minor parties since this might lead 
to a 'wasted vote' - thus another factor which may foster a low level of turnout. Finally, 
it was generally assumed that local elections merely acted as a 'popularity poll' for the 
government of the day, rather than reflecting the electorate's interest in real, local 
issues. This latter point in particular is no longer valid as a sweeping statement about 
all local elections as recent research on 'context voting' demonstrates (Railings & 
Thrasher 1 9 9 3 c ) . According to Railings and Thrasher ( 1 9 9 3 b ) , several overall 
comments can be made about changing patterns in county council elections. First, the 
number of unopposed seats has gradually declined thereby increasing the number of 
party-competition case-studies, particulariy between the three main parties. Second, 
the number of truly 'independent' candidates has gradually declined, although at the same 
time the number of "others", or minority parties ( e g Green Party, British National 
Party, Plaid Cymru) has risen. As such, we may witness evidence of an increase in the 
number of different sub-national party systems between regions as well as a diversity 
in the types of parties represented in each region. 
Scottish regional elections operated on a different timetable to the English and Welsh 
counties. Bochel and Denver ( 1 9 9 4 ) identify several periodic trends in Scottish 
regional elections. First, the number of candidates entering each election has increased, 
although again the number of Independent candidates has declined. There is an 
identifiable trend in which turnout in regional elections tended to be lower than at the 
district level of elections, although this was been reversed in the 1990s . Third, the 
Labour Party was consistently the largest party and indeed has increased its share of the 
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vote since the mid-1980s. The main losers were the Conservative Party and 
Independents. The Scottish National Party (SNP) was a major beneficiary and became 
the second largest party in terms of overall share of the vote since the 1990 regional 
elections - the same has also been true, incidentally, for district elections (Denver in 
Railings & Thrasher 1993b) . We can say. therefore, that Britain generally speaking 
exhibits a two-party system although a variation occurs between which two parties 
dominate at the sub-national level. 
Our analysis in this chapter will focus upon county elections In England and Wales and 
regional elections in Scotland occurring before 19955 This, therefore, excludes 
analysis of the 32 London boroughs and the 36 Metropolitan boroughs, although specific 
reference may be made to these where deemed appropriate. We will compare the 
number of uncontested elections since 1989 and to identify whether there is a locational 
pattern to their occurrence (uncontested elections are extremely rare in PR elections). 
Second, we will consider the effect of district magnitude at the county level upon 
proportionality, and the effect of the seat distribution system upon proportionality. We 
can consider whether county/region wide generalisations tell the whole story of small 
party support and representation, 
4 .2 .6 Spain Spanish sub-national government Is organised on two levels -
municipalities and regions (see Appendix C ) . Since the establishment of the 1 9 7 8 
Constitution, Spain has gradually developed a stronger decentralized system of sub-
national govemment. The initial elements of the local govemment system were laid 
down by the 1985 Local Govemment Act. Martin Harloff (no date) suggests that the 
5 Analysis at this level Is made less complicated by the fact that county councils are elected 
as a whole (as opposed to In thirds as is the case in some district elections) In 
single-member divisions. 
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extent of powers at the municipal level varies depending upon the levels of financial 
assistance from higher levels of government. 
Electoral turnout is lower in regional elections than at national elections - around 60% 
compared to 77% - but is slightly higher at 63% in the most autonomous regions (see 
Cuchillo 1993). Cuchillo suggests that the threshold rule may be one factor encouraging 
lower turnout. Due to the fact that democracy in Spain Is fairiy young, there exists a 
'weak implantation' of political parties in Spain (Cuchillo 1993: 228) which may not 
fit well with the electoral system which demands a high degree of political 
consciousness. 
4.2.7 Italy Italian sub-national government operates on three levels (see Appendix C). 
Successive elections in Italy have witnessed a gradual decline in support for the two 
major parties, the christian democratic DC and the communist PCI, to the point where 
Italy experienced a radical reformation of the party system in the earty 1990s. The 
virtual collapse of the traditional 'catch-all' parties is just one factor which 
encouraged the spectacular electoral success of several regional parties, such as the 
Sardinian Action Party, the South Tyrol's Peoples Party, the Lega Nord and the Union 
Valdotaine. 
The imposition of regionalism was seen by many as an effective solution for safeguarding 
the democratic system against the centralization previously associated with the fascist 
authoritarian regime of Mussolini (Cassese & Torchia In Sharpe 1993). Keating 
(1993) suggests that, as a result, sub-national politics In Italy has become dominated 
by four questions: (i) the question of the South, (ii) the integration of culturally 
distinct minorities, (iii) the institution of regional government, and (iv) the 
performance of local government. The first point is Important as Southern Italy has 
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remained poor and more religious compared to the modern industrialised North, and has 
retained predominantly christian democratic voting patterns. The second point is 
important as separatist and autonomist movements have appeared at various stages, eg. 
in regions such as Sardinia, Val d'Aosta, South Tyrol/Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezi-
Giulia. 
Despite the high number of communes, local government in Italy has remained 
considerably centralized. Financial powers were limited in 1972, Allum (1995) 
suggests that the Italian sub-national government system is similar to the French 
system as a hierarchical relationship exists where the region Is superior to the 
province and the province is superior to the commune, and Keating suggests that the 
whole system is pervaded by party politics (1993: 245). 
The exposure of Tangentopofi, and its implications for the DC as a whole and many 
established political figures, has had a dramatic effect upon the Italian party system. 
Another feature of Italian politics of interest to this thesis is the electoral reforms of 
1993. Salvati suggests that the referenda of 1991 and 1993 on changing electoral laws 
were successful, not because people really understood the 'pros and cons' of 
proportional representation versus a majoritarian system, but because voting against 
the previous system was seen as a way of expressing their dissatisfaction with the "old 
politicians" (1995: 87). Donovan argues: "Electoral reform was able to be presented 
as completing a process of democratization and of modernization which would put an end 
to deeply rooted failings" (1995: 61-2). 
Electoral reform occurred because of "elite outsiders using the referendum 
instrument" (Donovan 1995: 47) , not because of a decision initiated by parliament. 
The highly proportional PR system was blamed for the political fragmentation and short 
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lived governments, exacerbating corruption and a centre-dominated system. In March 
1993 the local govemment electoral system was reformed, so that at the local level the 
lists supporting the winning mayoral candidate receive 60% of the seats. The mayor is 
elected by a two-round majority ballot, with only two candidates being allowed to 
progress to the second round. As such, there now exists a heavy focus upon the personal 
qualities of mayoral candidates in local elections. 
We have provided a brief outline of the general observations made about sub-national 
elections in the six countries used for Chapter Five and Chapter Six, and one additional 
country. We will now make some specific observations about the effects of various 
electoral features upon them, beginning with an overview of variations in sub-national 
party systems in all seven states. 
4.3 - Variations in Sub-National Partv Systems 
In this section we will outline examples of different sub-national party systems within 
countries. Since Belgium and Genmany are both examples of federal states, we may 
expect to witness greater diversity than is witnessed in the more centralised states. So 
to what extent do sub-national party systems within countries differ? 
4.3.1 Belgium As previously mentioned, Belgium consists of three separate party 
systems which include the regional equivalent of 'main' parties e.g. christian democrats, 
socialists and liberals, as well as purely regional parties. The French speaking parties 
present candidates in both the Wallonian and Brussels regions whilst Flemish parties 
participate in Flanders and Brussels. Although Brussels is geographically situated 
within Flanders, its population is predominantly French speaking, and although 60% of 
the Belgian population Is Flemish, only 20% of Brussels is so (Temperton 1992/3: 
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63). A significant feature of Belgian communal elections is the strong performance of 
'local lists' in many areas. Whilst countries such as Britain and the Netherlands have 
experienced a gradual decline in support for truly local candidates in sub-national 
elections, the same cannot be said for Belgium. 
A notable feature of the Flemish gemeenten elections is the lack of a uniform pattern in 
voting behaviour, and we must therefore assume that voting is influenced by a multitude 
of factors which are likely to include local issues and personalities. Whilst the 
christian democratic CVP is the largest party in terms of overall share of the vote, its 
popularity is declining in many gemeenten. Nor is there evidence of a straightforward 
change in electoral support from the CVP to support of another party. Those parties 
benefiting include the liberals, the far right and the greens - suggesting that vote 
switching may not simply be from a single party to another but may be more complex. 
The most important question when identifying changing voting patterns, therefore, is to 
try to identify any plausible trends within the five provinces. If this cannot be 
significantly established, then we must assume that specifically local issues are at stake. 
The CVP have lost votes in favour of the liberal PVV in the Antwerpen and West 
Vlaanderen provinces. In the same provinces, the CVP has also lost votes to the Flemish 
nationalist VU party. In terms of voter swings towards the left of the party spectrum, 
the CVP is losing support to the socialist SP in the Brabant province and towards AGALEV 
in Brabant and Antwerpen. As such, the picture painted of changing party support at the 
gemeenten level in Flanders is a complex one. The larger parties in 1976 have seen 
their support dwindle in some areas to a variety of other parties, which in many cases 
have included local lists. The picture is even more complex when we bear in mind that a 
decline in support for the main parties is by no means the rule, since the CVP has 
succeeded in increasing Its share of the vote in numerous gemeenten. 
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A similar pattern emerges in the Wallonian region, in that the nrain parties have 
witnessed a decline In support, which has benefited the liberal PRL, the green ECOLO and 
various local lists. In comparison to events in Flanders, however, the Wallonian 
nationalist RW have all but disappeared from the electoral scene since the early 1980s. 
Again, the most important issue Is the need to establish whether changing patterns In 
voting trends fall Into provincial boundaries. At the communal level, the christian 
democratic PSC have lost voters to the PRL in the provinces of Liege and Brabant, whilst 
in the province of Hainaut the PSC has seen a swing in its support towards local lists in 
the late 1980s. 
The picture of party success is a complex one even In the region of Bmssels where there 
are only 19 communes. The bilingual structure means that we cannot talk about 
singular main parties but rather dual parties e g the SP/PS, CVP/PSC and the PW/PRL 
with each party presenting the relevant faction according to linguistic prevalence. The 
exception to the main parties presented so far is the FDF (Brussels French Party) - the 
dominant party In the communes/gemeenten of Oudergem, EtteriDeek, Vorst, Schaarbeek, 
S t Lambrechts-Woluwe and St. Pieters-Leeuw in the 1988 elections. Other 
communes/gemeenten in Brussels are a mixture of socialist, christian democratic and 
liberal dominated. As such, there is no particular pattern to party support at the sub-
national level in Belgium which is explainable without looking at micro-level local 
issues and politics. 
4.3.2 Germany We have already mentioned that Germany is characterised by a 
four-party system. Due to the existence of social cleavages parties of the left and right 
have their own regional strongholds. For example, the traditionally Catholic Land of 
Bavaria Is donrtinated by the CSU (Bavarian sister-party to the CDU). The state of 
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Baden-Wurttemburg has endured a series of coalitions - initially between the christian 
democratic CDU and liberal FDP, and since 1992 a CDU-led coalition has held power. 
Since 1980, North-Rhine Westphalia has been governed by the social democratic SPD, 
in coalition with the Greens since 1995. Lower Saxony is predominantly Protestant and 
has endured a series of coalition governments in the post-war period, though the 1990s 
marked the establishment of a red-green coalition (the SPD and Greens). In both the 
Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland Palatinate Laender, elections have been dominated by 
the CDU (sometimes in coalition with the FDP), although both have witnessed a reversal 
in the late 1980s/eariy 1990s with the election of an SPD govemment. Hamburg, 
Bremen and Hesse (mainly Protestant) has been dominated by the SPD - in Hessen and 
Bremen the SPD is currently in coalition with the Greens. The Saariand is 
predominantly Catholic and was controlled by the CDU until the mid-1980s but has 
since witnessed a shift in favour of SPD control. Until the late 1980s, therefore, 
German laender tended to be governed by parties which were most likely to appeal to the 
traditional religious cleavage. Not only is religion becoming a weaker cleavage, but the 
much debated politikverdrossenheit has led to the expansion of the party system and 
challenges to the FDP's role as primary coalition partner. 
4.3.3 Ireland In terms of party support in the Republic of Ireland, Coakley and Wolohan 
(1979) suggest that there are Identifiable regional patterns to party support. For the 
elections held in 1979, for example, Fianna Fail tended to receive a fairly balanced level 
of support except in Dublin where support was low. The Labour Party performed best 
In the South-East and West between Louth and Limerick. Sinn Fein The Workers Party 
(which became The Worker's Party In 1982) polled well In Dublin, WIcklow, 
Waterford and Cork, whilst Provisional Sinn Fein gained its strongest vote in the border 
counties. Other smaller parties were specifically regional based. Dublin, for example, 
was home to the supporters of the Communist and Socialist parties, the Community 
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group and the Socialist Labour Party. The Donegal Progressive Party gathered its 
support from Protestant voters in East Donegal, and independents polled strongest in 
border areas (Coakley & Wolohan 1979: 95). 
Do Coakley and Wolohan's claims regarding the regionalisation of party support in 1979 
still hold true? There has been a general decline In support for the two main parties -
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael (Sinnott 1995: 255). Whilst the average share of the vote for 
these two parties was 74.1 % in 1979 6 this had dropped to 64.3% by 1991. The 
results from the 1991 County elections suggest it is still true that these two parties are 
weakest in and around Dublin - their collective vote In the electoral county of South 
Dublin, for example, being 47.6%. The Labour Party remains at its strongest in the 
South-Eastern counties, polling 22.9% in Limerick County Borough and 20,6% In 
Waterford County Borough in 1991. At the same time, Labour was absent from elections 
in Leitrim, Longford, Monaghan and Roscommon. The Progressive Democrats are also 
weak in these areas and similarly poll well in the South East. Their strongest results in 
1991 were in the counties of Limerick and Galway and the county borough of Gaiway 
(polling 15.5%, 10.8% and 22.1% respectively). 
The Wori<ers Party performed most successfully in the southern counties and Dublin in 
1991. Whilst its candidates polled 10.9% in the electoral county of Dun Laoghaire, the 
party's strongest result was 22% In the County Borough of Waterford. The Green Party 
remains a relatively small electoral force in Irish sub-national politics. Its strongest 
support lies within Dublin. In 1991 the Green Party polled 8.5% in Dublin Fingal and 
11.4% In Dun Laoghaire. Sinn Fein remains strongest in the border counties. In 1991 
6 Note - due to the unreliability of election data prior to 1985, the collective share of the 
vote used Is the 'least best'. Some texts attribute a higher share of the vote to Fine Gael 
which would make the decline in support even more dramatic. 
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Sinn Fein polled 13.9% in Monaghan, 9.0% in Leitrim and 7.1% in Louth. Whilst 
Independents remain an electoral force in all county and county borough elections, their 
strongest perfomrtance in 1991 was in Donegal (29.1%) and WIcktow (21.1%). We 
can see that there are particular regional trends to party support in the Republic of 
Ireland, especially for smaller parties. 
4.3.4 The Netherlands Generally speaking, the Netherlands is viewed as a country which 
has a national party system as opposed to one with distinct sub-national patterns. Can 
we identify changing patterns and areas of particular party support at the provincial 
level? In Drenthe the PvdA has always been the largest party between 1958 and 1991. 
with the CDA in second place. Others gain only a handful of seats. In Utrecht, the PvdA is 
declining in favour of support for the CDA. Various other parties have gained a couple of 
seats. Of particular interest have been the far right BP (four seats in 1966), the 
ecologists GL (four seats in 1991) and the far right CO (one seat in 1991). In Zeeland 
again the PvdA is losing to tte CDA. In Groningen the PvdA remains the largest party, 
although in terms of small parties the far right BP took three seats in 1966, and the GL 
four seats in 1991. 
In Umburg the KVP was the largest party between 1958 and 1966, the CCP in 1970 
and the CDA since 1974. Small BP support has existed in Limburg (the party held four 
seats in 1966, one seat in 1970 and two seats in 1974), and tfw GL took three seats in 
1991. In Overijssel the KVP was the largest party between 1958 and 1966, as was 
PAK in 1970, the PvdA in 1974 and the CDA since. The BP secured four seats in 
Overijssei in 1966. one in 1970 and two in 1974, and the GL won two seats in 1991. 
In Freisland the PvdA and CDA have alternated as the largest party, whilst the 
regionalist FNP has consistently secured between one and four seats since 1966. In 
Gelderiand, the KVP was the largest parly between 1958 and 1970, with the CDA being 
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the largest since 1978. In North Brabant the KVP was the largest party between 1958 
and 1970, and the CDA from 1974 to 1991. The BP secured five seats in North Brabant 
In 1966 and 1974. In North Holland and South Holland the PvdA was the largest party 
until 1991 - now it is the CDA. In North Holland, the BP secured six seats in 1966 and 
the CD won one seat in 1991, whilst in South Holland the BP won four seats in 1966 and 
the CD one seat In 1991. 
4.3.5 Britain Changes in local voting behaviour in Britain since the 1980s have 
significantly been to the detriment of the Conservative Party. In English County Council 
elections, Conservative support rose from 38.4% In 1985 to 42.2% in 1989, but 
declined to 35.6% in 1993. In the same elections Labour Party support changed from 
30.0% to 31.1% to 31.2%. and Liberal DenrKxrrat support changed from 27.9% to 
20.2% to 29.3% respectively. 
In the Welsh county council elections also held in 1985, 1989 and 1993, Conservative 
Party support changed from 15.2% in 1985 to 16.5% in 1989 and 12.5% in 1993. 
For the Labour Party, the total share of the votes was 45.2%, 46.0% and 47.1%, and 
the Liberal Democrats experienced shares of the votes of 12.9%, 7.3% and 10:9% 
respectively. At the same time, Plaid Cymru has seen it support increase from 8.6% in 
1985 to 15.6% in 1993. 
In Scotland, regional elections were held in 1986, 1990 and 1994. For the 
Conservative Party, support swung from 16.9% in 1986. to 19.6% in 1990, to 13.7% 
in 1994. For the Labour Party, support changed from 43.9% to 42.7% to 41.8%, and 
for the Liberal Democrats from 15.1% to 8.7% to 11.9%. The regionalist Scottish 
National Party has seen its support at the regional level significantly increase from 
18.2% in 1986 to 26.8% in 1994. Of course, what these general results do not do is 
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indicate geographically concentrated changes In party support, which may Indicate that 
sub-national elections in Great Britain are really a series of numerous smaller two 
party systems. 
4.3.6 Spain In ail but those regions with special autonomy, national parties and national 
politics dominate at the regional level. In the autonomous communities, the party 
systems are more distinct For example, in Andalucia in 1990, the socialist PSOE was 
the largest party, foltowed by the PP. The regionalist lU-AC and PA both polled between 
10% - 12% shares of the votes. In the Basque Country in 1984 and 1988, the 
regionalist PNV was the largest party, followed by the PSOE and HB (an electorally 
smaller regionalist party). In the Catalonia region In 1988 and 1992, the regionalist 
CiU was the largest party, followed by the PSOE and IC (Communists). The smaller 
regionalist party, the ERC, is growing In support. Finally, in Galicia in 1985, the CP 
was the largest party, followed by the PSOE and the regionaiist party BNG. The pattern 
of party support at the regional sub-national level in Spain, therefore, appears to be 
linked to the issue of autonomy. Highly autononK>us regions have their own parties 
which vary in electoral size (some have more than one regionalist party - e.g the 
Basque Country and Catalonia), and national mainstream parties are not always as 
popular as In non-autonomous regions. 
4.3.7 Italv If we take 1990 as the point of reference, the Italian sub-national party 
system was dominated by the DC in most regions with ordinary status - ranging In 
popularity from 28.6% share of the vote in Lombardia to 58.8% in Mollse. The 
communist PCI dominated in Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Toscana and Umbria - the centre 
•red band*. Support for the socialist PSI was fairly evenly balanced, whilst the Lega 
Lombarda was the second largest party In Lombarc^ with a share of the vote of 18.9%. 
The DC was also the largest party in many regions with special status (Trieste, Friuli-
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Venezi-Giulia, Sicily and Sardinia), but Val d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige were all 
dominated by 'others' (predominantly regional autonomist parties). 
The DC continued to dominate at the municipal level In 1992, though the significant 
changes which have taken place within the party system since this date mean that we 
have yet to see a stable party system re-established at both the national and sub-
national level. As such, Italy, at least until the 1990s, was characterised by Yegionar 
party systems. The traditional parties prospered In their own particular 'bands' which 
were a dominant feature of post-war Italian politics. However, as with Spain, there are 
particular regions which (i) enjoy greater autonomy from state control, and (li) have 
their own political parties which vary in electoral size. 
There are apparently no overall trends to sub-national party systems In the seven 
countries studied. An extreme case is the Netheriands where national parties dominate 
and regionalism (except to a small extent in Freisland) is unheard of. On the other hand 
Belgium has no 'national' parties, but rather linguistic variants of 'traditional' parties 
as well as numerous truly regional and local parties at the sub-national level. Our 
other cases lie somewhere in between these two extremes. Thus, sub-national party 
systems must be influenced by factors beyond the electoral system alone. What we will 
do in the remainder of this theas is assess the extent to which electoral rules and 
features affect overall proportionality and the representation of certain minor parties. 
Our analysis will now focus upon the specific effects of electoral features on party 
representation at the sub-national level. For this exercise only some of our seven case 
studies will be analyzed. This is for two reasons (i) complete or appropriate data sets 
were not always available for each characteristic in each country, (ii) the aim in this 
chapter is to highlight differences rather than similarities. We will first measure 
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whether a correlation exists between turnout and party support in the Netheriands, 
Germany and Ireland and assess whether this has had a significant impact upon 
particular parties. As was shown in Chapter Two, turnout is not necessarily an 
electoral rule, but may be affected by perceptions of electoral fairness. Included here 
will be an analysis of uncontested elections in Britain. It will be interesting to see 
where non-contestation is likely to occur, and whether it is a declining feature of sub-
national elections. 
4.4 - Variations in Turnout and Partv Support in Sub-National Elections 
Before analyzing the impact of specific electoral rules and formulae upon small party 
representation at the sub-national level, we will make some observations about the 
effect of changes in tumout, with reference to elections in the Netheriands, Germany and 
Ireland. Our aim is to establish whether (i) turnout has declined at the sub-national 
level and (ii) has this affected party representation at the sub-national level? Have 
changes in voting patterns occurred at an overall level, or are changing electoral trends 
reliant upon purely 'local' factors? We will also consider the changing patterns of 
uncontested elections in Britain to demonstrate the way in which party contestation is 
increasing at the sub-national level. There is, obviously, no relationship between 
tumout and party support in uncontested elections. Yet the declining occurrence of 
uncontested elections in Britain does allow voters a greater choice and, therefore, 
encourages turnout, and may also encourage the smaller parties to participate. 
4.4.1 The Netheriands As mentioned eariier, the Netheriands had compulsory voting 
until 1970. Table 4.1 presents the turnout figures for three national, provincial and 
gemeenten elections for the country as a whole and also includes the figures for two 
provinces which illustrate the range in tumout. Three sets of elections at both the 
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national and sub-national level were chosen to highlight a change in longitudinal 
patterns. Of particular interest is the change between the 1950s and 1970s, whilst 
elections in the 1990s were chosen to reflect the current electoral climate. 
Table 4.1 - Trends in Tumout(%) in Selected Dutch National, Provincial and Gemeenten 
Elections. 1958-1994 
TYPE OF ELEOION YEAR OFELECTON 
7955 7959 7974 1977 7990 7997 7 994 
National Election - 95.6 - 88.0 - - 78.3 
Provincial Elections 91.4 _ 74.S - - 52.1 
(average turnout) 
North Brabant 92.9 - 69.2 - - 46.9 
Freisland 91.7 - 80.5 - - 63.0 
Gemeenten Elections 94.6 68.7 62.3 
(averaqe turnout) 
Sources: Wolinetr 1995. Nederlands Centraal Bureauvoor de Statistiek. 
The figures presented in Table 4.1 clearly demonstrate that turnout in all elections has 
been in significant decline since the abolition of compulsory voting In 1970. Prior to 
1970, turnout was over 90% at the national, provincial and communal levels, although 
it was, and still is, higher at general elections than in provincial elections and has 
become higher In local elections than in provincial elections. Furthermore, the 
differences between tunnout in national and provincial elections has become more 
pronounced since 1970. By identifying those provinces where turnout was highest and 
lowest in the 1991 provincial elections we can also see that a significant variation in 
turnout exists between the provinces which was not the case before 1970. The strong 
difference between turnout in North Brabant and Freisland has, however, remained and 
increased since 1974. For example, less than 50% of the electorate voted in North 
Brabant in 1991 despite the fact that the Netherlands is viewed as having a highly 
proportional system. Other factors miist be at play. How has differential turnout been 
reflected In provincial variations in party support? Changing shares of the vote for 
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individual parties Is not an issue here, as changing voting patterns between individual 
parties are likely to be affected by many issues other than turnout (&£^ personal 
circumstances, leadership imagery, political and economic climate). By assessing the 
vote share of the main parties as a whole in relation to turnout we may be able to 
identify sub-national changes in support for the mass-based, or national, parties. 
It is first necessary to define the 'main' parties. Gallagher, Laver and Mair claim that 
the highly fragmented nature of Dutch politics encourages a proliferation of political 
parties. For the purpose of this analysis we have adopted their (1995: 162) definition 
that the three main parties are the Labor Party (PvdA), Christian Democratic Appeal 
(CDA) and the Liberal Party (WD) , though this means we cannot assess every election 
In the time-scale 1958 to 1991 7. Table 4,2 denrtonstrates how the major party vote 
has changed within each province between 1987 and 1991. 
Table 4.2 - Changes in The Combined Vote-Share (%) for the Main Parties for Dutch Provtndal 
Elections, by Province, 1987 and 1991. 
PROVINCE YEAR OF ELECTION DIFFERENCE (%) 
Freisland 83.2 77.2 -6 .0 
Limburg 85.2 76.6 -8 .6 
Overijssel 83.2 73.6 -9 .6 
Gelderland 81.2 70.4 -10 .8 
Groningen 78.4 66.5 -11.9 
Utrecht 76.8 64.3 -12 .5 
Flevoland 76.0 62.4 -13.6 
Drenthe 87.0 73.2 -13 .8 
North Holland 79.1 65.1 -14.0 
North Brabant 87.4 73.1 -14 .3 
South Holland 79.4 64.9 -14 .5 
Zedand 76.6 61.1 -1 5.5 
Source: Nederlands Centraal Bureauvoor de Statistiek. 
The resute from Table 4.2 emphasize that the 'nationalised* nature of Dutch electoral 
7 For example, the CDA was formed in 1980 as a merger of the AR. CHU and KVP. 
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politics is declining at the sub-national level. In the case of the 1991 provincial 
elections we can see that the main party share of the vote was lower than in the 1987 
elections in all twelve provinces. Support for the three main parties declined by at least 
6% between 1987 and 1991, and this decline was strongest in the targe urban 
provinces such as North Brabant, North Holland and South Holland, but also In Zeeland. 
Overall, this analysis does not provide a promising picture for the traditional, major, 
national parties in the Netheriands. If we recall our analysis of turnout in Table 4.1 we 
can see that the province with the highest turnout, Freisland, is also the province where 
the main parties have most successfully retained support. Likewise, the province with 
the lowest tumout. North Brabant, also experienced one of the sharpest declines in 
support for the three main parties. A pattern, therefore, may be emerging in Dutch 
sub-national elections. As tumout is declining, the main parties are losing electoral 
support to the advantage of smaller parties such as the greens, the far right and other 
social movements such as pensioners' groups, though we would need to see this trend 
confimried in later provincial electior^ to substantiate this theory. 
4.4.2 Germany A decline in tumout in Germany at the Laender electoral level may have 
significant implications for the representation of certain parties, particulariy since the 
5% threshold is in operation. A party of the far right, for example, which has a 
relatively small but strongly committed electoral base may benefit when tumout in an 
election Is low and less committed voters abstain. In general, tumout levels have proved 
to be relatively consistent throughout the Laender and have steadily remained around the 
75% - 85% mark throughout the post-war period - a figure which one may expect to 
witness in national elections and which suggests that the German electorate identify 
Laender govemment as being politically significant. The lowest single case for tumout 
prior to the 1990s was 62.2% in Lower Saxony (1947) whilst the highest was 92.9% 
in West Beriin (1958). For more recent elections the figures are 65.2% (Hamburg in 
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1991) and 82.4% (the Saariand in 1990) respectively. Table 4.3 demonstrates 
changing patterns of turnout for selected German Laender across a range of elections. 
Since elections in each Laender do not follow an identical timetable, cases have been 
chosen over the post-war time span when elections occurred in the same year in several 
Laender in order to demonstrate the general fluctuations in turnout. 
Table 4.3 - Trends in Tumout (%) in General Elections and Selected Laender Elections in 
Germany - 1950 - 1991 
YEAR OF ELECTION 
1950 1967 7 965 1978 1980 1990 1991 7 994 
Bundestag - - 86.7 - 88.6 78.6 - 79.1 
Land 
Bavaria 79.9 - - 76.6 - 65.9 - 68.0 
Bremen - 76.1 - - - - 71.3 -
Hamburg - - - 75.8 - - 65.2 -
Hessen 64.9 - - 87.7 - - 70.8 -
Lower Saxony •- 78.0 - 78.0 - 74.6 - 73.8 
Saarland - - - - - 79.9 - 83.5 
Source: University of Plymouth Elections Database, Paterson & Southem. 1991: 185. 
The range in turnout figures presented in Table 4.3 demonstrate that turnout varies 
considerably between Laender, both within the same year and across time across 
particular Land. We cannot offer a single simple explanation, but turnout may be 
related to election timing (see Chapter One, section 1.5) The apparent decline in 
turnout by the 1990s is reinforced by two cases of Laender elections in 1992 held in 
Schleswig-Holstein and Baden-Wurttemburg where tumout was 71.2% and 69.3% 
respectively (though this was not always the case in the 1994 Land elections). If the 
lower levels of tumout that appeared in the examples chosen for 1991 appear to be 
typical of expected turnout levels, we may be witnessing a trend of declining turnout 
which may be significant for the emergence and growth of small parties at the Laender 
level in Germany. 
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Is there evidence that declining turnout in German Laender elections has affected the 
overall representation of the main parties? As with other countries, it is first 
necessary to identify the 'main' parties. The main parties in Germany can be identified 
as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister-party the Christian 
Social Union (CSU), the Social Democrat Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party 
(FDP), and the Green Party (Die Griinen) (Poguntke & Boll in Katz & Mair 1 9 9 2 ) . By 
comparing the main party share of the vote for various Laender over a series of elections 
in Table 4.4 we can see that, in general, their shares of the vote had increased and were 
exceptionally high - thus reinforcing Conradt's claim outlined eariier (section 4 .3 .2 ) 
that regional parties which were significant in the early post-war period have almost 
disappeared. 
Table 4.4 - Combined Vote-Share (%) for the Main Parties in German Laender Elections, 1950-
1990. 
L^ND YEAR OF ELECTION 
7 550 1978 1990 
Bavaria 55.4 96.7 92.5 
Hamburg - 93.9 -
Hessen 95.0 96.9 -
North-Rhine Westphalia - - 97.6 
Saarland - - 96.1 
Lower Saxony - - 97.2 
West Berlin - - 82.9 
Source: University of Rymouth Local Elections Database 
Table 4.4 demonstrates that the main parties tend to dominate elections at the Laender 
level and have Increasingly done so in the post-war period, though the figures would be 
different if we had chosen not to include the Greens as a main party. Although small 
compared to the CDU and SPD, the Greens had become a significant coalition partner by 
the eariy 1990s and now frequently outpoll the FDP. The most significant example of 
135 
main party decline in electoral support is West Berlin, where the main parties secured 
only 8 2 . 9 % of the vote in 1990 - far lower than in previous elections in West Berlin 
and indeed other Laender. The explanation for the decline in this Land is related to the 
s u c c e s s of parties more generally associated with the former East Gemnan s ta tes -
particularly the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Biindnis 90 /Grune 
coalition. In other Laender, the much smaller rate of decline in the combined main party 
vote is more frequently linked to a growth in support for the far right (see Chapters 
Three and Five) . This may be little more than a temporary electoral blip which can be 
accounted for as a 'protest vote' (see Chapter One section 1.5), although it may also be 
the case that we are witnessing a genuine process of electoral decline for the main 
German Forties at the sub-national level which is not ye t as strong as in the 
Netherlands. 
4 .4 .3 Ireland Sinnott ( 1 9 9 5 : 8 8 ) suggests that turnout in local elections is relatively 
high because these elections are an important launch pad for progression into Dail and 
Senate elections. Local election turnout in the Irish Republic is on average lower than 
that for national elections - peaking In 1967 at 69%, and turnout in both has declined 
since the late 1970s . The average turnout in national elections had fallev) from 7 5 . 7 % 
in 1 9 7 7 to 6 8 . 5 % in 1989 . Similariy, average tumout at the county council elections 
fell from 6 2 . 5 % in 1 9 7 9 to 5 5 . 1 % in 1 9 9 1 , though of course this is still considerably 
higher than average tumout figures for county council elections in Great Britain. What 
is of interest, however, is the range In tumout between counties. Table 4 .5 identifies 
two counties/county b o r o u ^ with the two highest and lowest turnouts respectively for 
the County Council Elections held in 1985 and 1991 . 
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Table 4,5 - Trends in Turnout (%) for Irish General and County Council Elections, 1985 and 
1991, and Related Councillor and Electorate Ratios for 1991. 
TYPE OF ELECTION YEAR COUNCILLOR-ELECTOR RATIO 1991 
1987 1989 
General Electron 72.7 68.5 
County Council 1985 1991 
Leitrim 81.9 75.2 1:936 
Roscommon 75.4 72.5 1:1475 
Dun Laoghaire 44.7 41.7 1:5036 
Dublin County Borough 42.1 42.2 1:6893 
Source: Department of Environment, Dublin. Chubb 1 992: 79. University of Plymouth Local 
Elections Database. 
The figures represented in Table 4.5 suggest a rural-urban difference exists in tunnout 
with electoral participation higher in rural areas - especially if we add that five of the 
six cases of lowest turnout are in and around Dublin itself. What is of most interest is 
the range in turnout. In 1985 , for example, the county with the largest turnout, 
Leitrim, is almost twice that in the County Borough of Dublin. What may also be of 
relevance to an analysis of turnout is not only the rural-urban divide but also electoral 
area size. Chubb suggests that; "It is probably the sense of community, together with 
easier canvassing and a perceived obligation for social reasons in small communities to 
be seen to vote, that explains the higher turnout" (Chubb 1992: 2 8 1 ) . If we compare 
the ratio of councillors to the size of the electorate in the counties listed for 1991 in 
Table 4 .5 , the figures endorse the view that turnout in county elections is related to a 
sense of locality and community. Councillors in the County and County Borough of 
Dublin effectively represent at least five to six times more voters than councillors in 
the county of Leitrim. 
Is there evidence to suggest that declining turnout has affected party support? Since the 
1920s , party politics in the Republic of Ireland has been dominated by three main 
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parties - Fianna Fail (FF ) , Fine Gael (FG) and the Labour Party (LAB) (Chubb 1 9 9 2 : 
9 5 ) . If we compare changing electoral support for these parties within the county of 
Leitrim and the county borough of Dublin between the 1974 and 1991 elections and with 
their support in general elections held between 1973 and 1989 . we find the following 
patterns: 
Table 4.6 - Changes in the Combined Party Vote-Share (%) for the Main Parties in Selected 
General Elections and in Leitrim County and Dublin County Borough Elections, 1973 - 1991. 
YEAR 
1973 1987 7989 
General Election 95.0 78.0 83.0 
7 974 7985 7997 
Leitrim 85.8 79.9 78.8 
Dublin 77.7 80.8 61.8 
Source: Department of Environment, Dublin. Chubb 1992: 95. 
We can see from Table 4 .6 that there have been significant shifts in main party support 
in both Leitrim and Dublin, though this obviously has little to do with the turnout in 
county and county borough elections. In Leitrim, Fine Gael has lost considerable support 
since the mid 1 9 7 0 s which has benefitted both Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein. In Dublin, the 
main parties share of the vote declined by alnfK>st 16% between 1974 and 1991 . The 
primary explanation for this relates to the increase in the number of participating 
parties. Support for Fianna Fail. Fine Gael and the Labour Party has declined to the 
benefit of the smaller parties - namely Sinn Fein, the Workers Party, the Progressive 
Democrats and the Green Party. 
4 .4 .4 - Uncontested Elections 
An analysis of tumout will usually compare the difference between elections where 
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turnout is computsory and voluntary. Some elections require no turnout at all - these 
being uncontested elections. While uncontested elections are extremely rare under PR, 
this is not rrecessarily the case in British sub-national elections, in the previous 
section we discussed main party support and turnout In this section we will determine 
where uncontested elections are likely to occur. It is not unusual in British elections to 
see refererKe to 'uncontested elections', though these are far more likely to occur in 
Wales than elsewhere. This section of analysis will briefly outline the pattern of 
uncontested elections in county council elections in 1 9 8 9 and 1993 for England and 
Wales, and regional elections in 1990 and 1 9 9 4 for Scotland to demonstrate how the 
likelihood of uncontested elections is decreasing. 
Table 4.7 - The Frequency of Uncontested Seats in County Council and Regional Council Elections 
in Britain, 1989 - 1994. 
YEAR UNCONTESTED SEATS %AGE OF SEATS UNCOtsfTESTED 
England 1989 64 2.1 
1993 60 2.0 
Wales 1989 145 28.8 
1993 111 22.1 
Scotland 1990 38 8.5 
1994 29 6.4 
Sources: Railings & Thrasher 1993b. Bochel & Denver 1994. 
From the figures in Table 4 .7 , we can deduce that uncontested elections are least likely 
to occur in English County Council elections, with only 2 . 1 % and 2 .0% of seats 
uncontested in the 1989 and 1993 elections respectively. Although uncontested 
elections appear to cover much of the geographic spread of England, there is a higher 
concentration in a few counties. In 1989. for example, there were 12 uncontested seats 
in Durham. 9 in Cornwall, and 9 in Northumberland. These counties still accounted for 
the majority of uncontested sea ts in the 1 9 9 3 election - 9 in Durham, 10 in Cornwall 
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and 12 in Northumberland. 
The picture of uncontested seats in Wales is much more widespread. Only the county of 
South Glamorgan had fully contested elections in 1989 and 1993. The largest case of 
non-corrtestation in both elections occurred in Powys, where 67 .4% and 5 6 . 5 % of seats 
remained uncontested in 1989 and 1 9 9 3 respectively. Norvcontestation is also a 
limited feature of Scottish regional elections. Only 8 . 5 % and 6.4% of seats were 
uncontested in the 1 9 9 0 and 1994 elections respectively. Furthermore, we can identify 
a specifically geographic trend to uncontested seats. In 1990, for example, a total of 
4 8 % of seats in the Highland region were unchallenged, as were 31 .4% of the seats in 
Dumfries and Galloway. Two regions had only a single uncontested seat - these being Fife 
and the Borders. Every seat was contested in the remaining five regions. In 1 9 9 3 , the 
number of regions experiencing norvcontestation had been reduced to three. The 
Highlands was again the region with the highest level of nor>-contestation ( 3 1 . 5 % of 
sea ts ) . In Dumfries and Galloway 2 0 % of seats were uncontested and in the Borders 
1 8 . 5 % of seats ( 5 seats) remained ufKontested. Hence we can see that whilst the 
frequency of uncontested seats is gradually declining we are still able to identify 
regional corrcentratlons where they are more likely to occur. We will now focus our 
analysis upon specrfic electoral rules and features which may affect small party 
representation - beginning with district magnitude. 
4 . 5 - District Magnitude and Proportionality 
In Chapter Two we concluded that research at the national electoral level had stressed the 
significance of district magnitude in relation to general representation and overall 
proportionality. It appeared that the smaller the district magnitude and the greater the 
number of competing parties, the more likely disproportionality was to occur. We will 
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now examine whether this is also the case at the sub-national level using data from the 
Netherlands. Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Great Britain to reflect diversity in 
district magnitude at different electoral levels and differences in electoral sys tems in 
order to a s s e s s which parties are likely to be most affected by variations in district 
magnitude. 
4.5.1 The Netherlands As was mentioned in Section 4 .2 .1 , the most notable change in 
district magnitude in the Netheriands occurred with the creation of a new directly 
elected province - Flevoland in 1985 . The overall pattem of change in relation to the 
number of sea ts available in each province is reflected in Table 4 .8: 
Table 4.8 - Changes in District Magnitude in Dutch Provincial Elections, 1958 - 1991. 
PROVINCE 1958 7 974 7 997 
Drenthe 35 47 51 
Utrecht 41 59 63 
Zeeiand 42 47 47 
Groningen 45 55 55 
Umburg 45 63 63 
Overijssel 47 59 63 
Freisland 50 55 55 
Gelderiand 62 71 75 
North Brabant 64 75 79 
North Holland 77 79 79 
South Holland 82 83 83 
Flevoland - - 43 
Total 590 693 756 
Source: Nederiands Centraal Bureauvoor de Statistiek. 
We can see from Table 4 .8 that all provinces have increased in district magnitude, 
although the small provinces appear to have increased at a greater rate than larger 
provinces. T o what extent has this been reflected by differences in the proportionality 
of elections held in the smallest and largest provinces? By applying our measures of 
proportionality (outlined in Section 4 .1 ) to examples of both small and large provinces 
141 
over three s e t s of electior« we find the following: 
Table 4.9 - Measures of Disproportlonality for Three Sets of Provincial Elections Held in 
Zeeland and South Holland. 1958-1991. 
ProDortionatitv Indices Zeeland SoLith Holland 
1958 7974 7997 7958 7974 7997 
Loosemore Hanby 2.1 5.1 2.3 1.9 3.1 3.8 
Least Squares 1.3 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.8 
Sainte Lague 1.5 4.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 3.3 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
The measures of disproporttonality shown in Table 4 .9 tend to suggest that (i) the 
electoral sys tem adopted at the provincial level in the Netheriands is in general highly 
proportional, and (ii) that proportionality has slightly decreased in most cases since 
1958 (the main exception being Zeeland where disproportionality rose considerably in 
1974 then declined again by 1 9 9 1 ) . Since the Loosemore Hanby figure is the highest in 
every c a s e in both provinces we can also claim that disproportionality tends to derive 
from numerous c a s e s of small vote-seat differences rather than a few larger 
discrepancies, and this is related to the actual number of parties participating in each 
election. A consideration of similar data from the other provinces follows a similar 
pattern, as all the incCces measurements tend to be low. We have evidence to suggest, 
therefore, that district magnitude alone in Dutch provincial elections has little direct 
effect upon disproportionality generally, as even the lowest case of district magnitude 
( e g Zeeland in 1991 ) is large enough to produce low levels of disproportionality. We 
must bear in mind, however, that the 4 7 seats in the province of Zeeland is high 
compared to the district magnitude of Dutch gemeenten which we will consider later. 
If we reconsider Table 4 .9 , we can identify an important exception, in the 
disproportionality measures in the 1991 provincial elections. A s all three measures of 
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disproportionality are lower in Zeeland than in South Holland w e must assume that 
disproportlonality is not a result of district magnitude alone. T h e explanation behind 
disproportionality lies with the number of elected parties in e a c h province. In Zeeland, 
for example, all eight competing parties won seats . In South Holland, however, only 
eight of the thirteen competing parties won seats. Five parties polled a store of the vote 
of 1% or less - hence the Loosemore Hanby measure is 3,8 and higher than usual for 
South Holland in 1 9 9 1 . This result of higher disproportionality in a province with 
much higher district magnitude is significant for our analysis of which electoral 
features are most salient to disproportionality. Whilst a very sniall district magnitude 
nrtay be a particular impediment to proportionality ( s e e the analysis in this section of 
Belgium and Ireland), in large district magnitudes a combination of the number of 
parties and the seat distribution method becomes increasingly significant, particularly 
when there are numerous parties polling a very small share of the vote. Since large 
district magnitude may encourage small parties to participate, district magnitude alone 
may not be a sufficient guarantee of proportionality. 
4 .5 .2 Germany As with provinces in the Netheriands, there is a significant variation in 
Landtag size across the West German Laender, and it will be interesting to witness 
whether there is a variation in proportionality between the smallest and largest Laender. 
We have applied our indices of proportionality to various land elections held since the 
1 9 8 0 s to reflect the diversity in district magnitude. 
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Table 4.10 - Measures of Disproportionality for Selected Land Elections Held in Germany. 
1981-1992. 
MWD SEATS LH LS SL YEAR 
Saarland 51 6.6 4.6 7.0 1990 
Schleswig-Holstein 89 7.0 5.0 7.1 1992 
Bremen 100 4.1 2.6 3.7 1991 
Hessen 110 2.9 2.4 2.8 1991 
Hamburg 121 4.3 2.3 4.5 1991 
Berlin 133 1.7 1.1 1.1 1981 
Bavaria 204 9.3 7.0 10.3 1986 
North-Rhine Westphalia 237 2.5 1.8 2.6 1990 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
A s wrth our analysis of provincial elections in the Netheriands, Table 4 . 1 0 provides 
little evidence to suggest that proportionality is directly linked to assembly size alone in 
the German Laender. In the large Land, the disproportionality measures are generally 
low, though we can s e e in the smaller s tates that Schleswig-Holstein displays a higher 
level of disproportionality than the Saarland despite its larger assembly size. The most 
extreme case of disproportionality occured in Bavaria in 1 9 8 6 which, despite the high 
assembly size, displays a much higher level of disproportionaiity for all three measures 
than elections elsewhere. Assembly size alone, therefore, is not a sufficient explanation 
of disproportionality in Germany a t the regional level. In relation to disproportionality 
itself, the Loosemore Hanby figure in every case is higher than the Least Squares 
nr)easure. We can assume from this that disproportionality tends to derive from 
numerous c a s e s of small vote-seat differences (which would be partly created by the use 
of the S % threshold) rather than a few larger discrepancies. Also notable is the higher 
level of disproportionality registered by the Sainte Lague Index compared to the Least 
Squares measures. The latter measures absolute differences between vote-seat shares, 
whereas Sainte Lague identifies differences in ratio. Hence the relative differences in 
representation between parties Is greater t ^ n the initially observed absolute 
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difference. Gallagher claims that: 
"... the largest single contributor to disproportionality as measured by 
the Sainte Lague index comes from the small parties and 'Others' who win 
no seats. If every group for which a vote total is reported wins a seat, 
the result looks much more proportional." (Gallagher 1991: 47 ) 
As our analysis of the Bavarian Landtag election of 1986 represented in Table 4.11 
shows, 'Others' gained a total share of the vote of 5.4% but no seats. This should not be a 
surprising outcome even for a PR system, especially one that operates a 5% threshold 
for representation. It does mean, however, that the Least Squares measure for 'others' 
of 29 .2 is significant enough to provide a high overall disproportionality measure, as is 
the obvious over representation of the CSU in this case (receiving a 7% greater share of 
the seats than its share of the votes). 
Table 4.11 - The Bavarian Land Election 1 986 - Comparing Vote Shares, Seat Shares and 
Measurements of Disproportionality 
PARTY 
MEASURES CSU SPD Grune FDP Others TOTAL 
Votes % 55.8 27.5 7.5 3.8 5.4 100 
Seats % 62.8 29.9 7.3 - - 100 
Loosemore Hanby 6.9 2.4 0.1 3.8 5.4 9.3 
Least Square 48.2 5.8 0.0 14.4 29.2 7.0 
Sainte Lague 0.9 0.2 0.0 3.8 5.4 10.3 
Source: Bayerisches Landesamt fur Statistik und Datenverarbeitung. University of Plymouth 
Local Elections Database 
A further factor which affects assembly size and disproportionality occurs when Laender 
are broken down into smaller electoral districts. Lijphart acknowledges the fact that: 
In PR systems, proportionality - and the chances for small parties to 
gain representation - are necessarily very limited when there are only 
two or three representatives per district. (Lijphart 1994a: 11) 
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A valid analysis of proportionality should, therefore, include assembly size, number of 
districts and average district magnitude (assuming assembly size and district magnitude 
are not the same) . In relation to those Land outlined in Table 4 .10 , North-Rhine 
Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg are all treated as one electoral district, 
thereby providing district magnitudes of 237 , 8 9 and 121 respectively. Yet in the City 
state of Bremen, there are 2 electoral districts - Bremen has 8 0 seats and Bremenhaven 
20, a division which may have a small effect upon proportionality. Finally, the Saariand 
has 41 of its 51 sea ts divided between 3 districts. Overall proportionality, however, 
should not be affected by this since the remaining 10 sea ts are supplementary seats (see 
Chapter Two section 2.2 .2) used as a proportionality safety-net for the Land as a whole. 
We can see from Table 4 . 1 0 that disproportionality for the Loosemore Hanby and Sainte 
Lague indices were especially high in the Saariand and must assume that without the use 
of supplementary sea ts it would be higher, as only three parties passed the 5% 
threshold (the CDU, the SPD and the FDP). A s such, we are still no closer to proving a 
positive correlation between assembly size, district magnitude and proportionality in 
German Laender elections and in later sections w e will consider other electoral features 
operating In Germany which may affect proportionality. 
4 . 5 . 3 Ireland In the Repubfic of Ireland, counties and county boroughs do not operate as 
single electoral districts - therefore assembly size is not equal to district magnitude. 
We will first analyze the overall proportionality of the smallest and largest counties and 
county borough councils before considering the Impact of smaller district magnitudes. 
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Table 4.12 - Council Size and Proportionality in Irish County and County Borough Councits. 
1991. 
COUNTIES SEATS LH LS SL 
Monaghan 20 5.0 3.8 2.9 
Cork 48 11.5 6.6 9.2 
COUNTY BOROUGHS 
Galway 15 11.2 7.2 10.7 
Dublin 52 13.9 8.4 10.5 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: Local Elections 1991. Dublin. University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
Table 4 .12 shows that there is no correlation between overall council size and 
proportionality. In fact, the very reverse has occurred as almost all disproportionality 
measures are greater where more sea ts are available. This could be for two reasons; (i) 
the S T V system itself is prone to create situations of disproportionality and (ii) the 
allocation of sea ts via smaller electoral areas effectively limits the possibility of true 
proportionality occurring. This second point is crucial for our analysis of district 
magnitude and proportionality. The county of Monaghan. for example, consists of four 
'local areas' , ranging in size from four to six members. In Cork, there are eight local 
areas vwth between four and seven seats. For the respective county boroughs, there are 
three local areas in Gatway ranging between three and seven seats , whilst in Dublin 
there are a total of twelve areas with a range of three to five seats. This, therefore, 
shows that district magnitude remains relatively small despite the overall s ize of the 
county or county borough, and at least partly explains why disproportionality does not 
correlate with the total number of sea ts available. It is more appropriate to conclude 
that where the distribution of sea ts is determined within smaller electoral divisions, 
only the larger parties within each electoral area are likely to receive the majority o f 
the seats. If we compare overall party shares of the votes and seats for the counties of 
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Monaghan and Cork, for example we can identify the effect that seat distribution has 
within several small areas. 
Table 4.13 - Party Vote and Seat Shares (%) and Measures of Disproportionality for County 
Council Elections in Monaghan and Cork, 1991. 
PARTY 
Monaghan FF FG SF Ind WP Total 
Votes% 40.1 32.8 13.9 12.2 1.0 100 
Seats% 40.0 3S.0 10.0 15.0 - 100 
Loosemore Hanby 0.1 2.2 3.9 2.8 1.0 5 .0 
Least Squares 0.0 4.8 15.2 7.8 1.0 3 . 8 
Sainte Lague 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.6 1.0 2 . 9 
Corit FF FG LAB PD WP Gr. SF Ind Total 
Votes% 36.6 35.4 6.1 5.5 4.3 2.2 0.4 9.6 100.1 
Seats% 39.6 41.7 8.3 2.1 2.1 - - 6.3 100 
Loosemore Hanby 3.0 6.3 2.2 3.4 2.2 2.2 0.4 3.4 1 1.5 
Least Squares 8.9 39.3 5.0 11.7 4.9 4.8 0.2 11.2 6 . 6 
Sainte Lague 0.2 1.1 0.8 2.1 1.1 2.2 0.4 1.2 9 . 2 
Source: Local Elections 1991, Dublin. University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
Table 4 .13 demonstrates that disproportior^lity was more likely to occur in Cork for 
two reasons. First, whilst the vote and seat shares for each party in Monaghan were 
relatively close, disparity was greater in Cork - the most significant of which was Fine 
Gael which received a 6 .3% larger ^ a r e of the seats than its share of the votes. Second, 
there were more parties in the Cork elections, thereby increasing the number of 
occasions in which disproportionality could occur. A total of five parties were 
under-represented in the Cork election - their collective share of the vote of 2 2 % 
resulting in a total 1 0 . 5 % share of the seats ( two being totally unrepresented). As 
such, district magnitude Is significant in Ireland as we are presented with electoral 
divisions which are closer to a multi-seat plurality situation than the PR elections 
operating at the Dutch Provincial and German Land levels. From our evidence produced 
when studying Ireland, we can claim that district magnitude does appear to Increase in 
significance as a feature affecting disproportionality when the number of sea ts available 
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is below 10. 
4 .5 .4 Belgium: Our analysis of district magnitude in Belgium will focus upon the lowest 
sub-natiorral level where district magnitude is much smaller than in Dutch provinces 
and German Laender, but larger than for county council elections in Ireland. Due to the 
sheer number of communes and gemeenten, w e will compare only a handful of the 
smallest and largest municipalities. For the Wallonian and Flanders region the 
proportionality for district magnitudes of 9 sea ts has been compared with district 
magnitudes of 4 7 seats or more. 
Table 4.14 - Proportionality Measures for the Smallest and Largest Municipalities by Region in 
Belgium, 1976 and 1988. 
FLANDERS 
SEATS MUNICIPAL YEAR Loosemore Hanbv Least Sauares Sainte Laaue 
9 Mesen 1976 13.6 12.4 16.4 
9 Horbeke 1976 10.2 10.2 4.7 
47 Bmgge 1976 6.3 3.9 5.6 
55 Antwerpen 1976 7.5 4.4 7.3 
9 Mesen 1988 3.8 3.6 1.2 
9 Horbeke 1988 12.4 8.3 11.2 
47 Brugge 1988 8.3 4.8 5.1 
47 Antwerpen 1988 4.8 2.7 4.1 
WALLONIA 
SEATS MUNICIPAL YEAR Loosemore Hanbv Least Sauares Sainte Laaue 
9 Tellin 1976 6.0 5.9 2.1 
9 Tinlot 1976 11.7 10.3 13.6 
51 Liege 1976 6.5 4.1 5.0 
51 Chart eroi 1976 4.6 3.4 2.9 
9 Tellin 1988 4.4 1.2 4.0 
9 Tinlot 1988 15.6 13.5 14.7 
51 Liege 1988 8.1 4.8 6.6 
51 Charleroi 1988 8.8 6.8 6.5 
Source: J . Ackaert, Kathdieke Universiteit & Umburgs Universitair Centnjm, University of 
Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
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The data presented for two regions in Table 4 . 1 4 again suggests that electoral 
proportionality is determined by far more complex factors than district magnitude 
alone. There appears to be little consistency in proportionality measurements, both 
between communes and gemeenten with similar district magnitude or indeed within each 
municipality between elections. In Flanders, the proportionality measures for the two 
largest gemeenten remain relatively consistent, although in the 1988 election 
disproportionality is still higher in Brugge than in the much smaller gemeenten of 
Mesen. The same observations apply to communes in Wallonia, and the much higher 
disproportionality measures for the municipalities of Uege and Charleroi than in Tellin 
in 1988 again reinforce the claim that district magnitude alone is not a primary cause 
of disproportionality in Belgian local elections. Since there is no institutional 
thresholds constraining representation, we must presume that other factors such as the 
number of competing parties and the seat distribution system are responsible for these 
variations in disproportionality. 
4 .5 .5 Great Britain In relation to assembly size and proportionality in Great Britain, 
Table 4 .15 compares the overall proportionality of counties and regions with small and 
large numbers of seats , using our three measures of proportionality. For the purpose of 
comparative analysis, two English counties, Welsh counties and Scottish regions have 
been selected for comparison. Proportionality has been nneasured at the county/region 
level as an aggregate for two se ts of electiorrs held in 1985 and 1993 in the counties and 
1 9 8 6 and 1994 in the regions. 
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Table 4.15 - A Comparison of Assembly Size and Proportionality in Selected Counties and 
Regions 1985-1994. 
Countv/Reaion Assembly Size Year LH Z.S Si. 
Fife 46 1986 18.8 16.8 19.6 
46 1994 24.4 17.4 67.7 
Powys 53 1985 19.1 15.7 16.5 
46 1993 19.8 15.4 15.8 
West Sussex 71 1985 17.8 15.4 14.0 
71 1993 5.4 4.5 2.3 
Dyfed 80 1985 17.1 13.4 22.3 
72 1993 15.5 13.3 19.6 
Hampshire 102 1985 7.9 6.8 2.3 
102 1993 9.9 8.2 4.7 
Strathclyde 103 1986 32.2 26.5 43.5 
104 1994 31.2 26.7 41.4 
LH = Loosemore Hanby Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
T h e results presented in Table 4 . 1 5 confirm no relationship between assembly size at 
the county/region level and proportionality in a plurality system. The most 
proportional county In England is West Sussex in 1993 , yet this is an example of a 
medium sized assembly in our analysis. This result is particularly surprising when we 
consider the much higher disproportionality measures produced by an overall analysis 
of West Sussex in 1 9 8 5 - disproportionality w a s at least 10 points lower for each 
measure in 1 9 9 3 than in 1 9 8 5 . Similariy, the highly disproportional scores in 
Strathclyde in both elections despite the large number of seats available tends to suggest 
that the electoral system distorts the representation of parties. We can see in Table 
4 . 1 6 why this occurred. 
151 
Table 4.16 - Party Vote and Seat Shares (%) in the Strathdyde Region - 1986 and 1994, 
Year Lab SNP Con Ub SDP/LD M Green Other 
1986 Votes% 52.6 17.5 13.1 7.5 6.7 1.8 0.2 0 . 5 * 
Seats% 84.5 1.9 5.8 4.9 - 2.9 - -
1994 Votes% 51.5 26.3 10.7 - 8.0 1.8 0.3 1 .3* 
Seat5% 82.7 6.7 2.9 - 5.8 1.9 - -
* Others in 1986 = Comm, RCP, RAG. TCRM. In 1994 = SML, Comm. RLP, PPP. 
Sources: Bochel & Denver, 1986. Bochel & Denver. 1994. 
Table 4 .16 demonstrates that the high measures of disproportionality In Strathclyde 
derive from the significant over representation of the Labour Party in both elections. 
Nearly all other parties were under represented, although the parties suffering to the 
greatest degree were the Conservative Party and the Scottish National Party. The slight 
over representation of Independent candidates in both elections suggests that these 
candidates were successful in targeting small areas of expected support effectively (or 
stood for unopposed seats ) . Thus it is of relatively little use to discuss proportionality 
and overall sub-national results in plurality sys tems because the assembly size by no 
means relates to district magnitude. What is important of course is that what we have 
been discussing is assembly size artd not district magnitude which is usually one seat in 
Britain. As such, cumulative disparity at the county and regional level is likely to be 
lower than at the individual electoral division level. Where the district magnitude 
equals one seat and the number of parties rises, disproportionality will always increase. 
We can agree with Taagepera that district magnitude does significantly penalize small 
parties as it becomes closer to one. The claims made by Rose that the cfisfrarity between 
district magnitude a t the national level renders corv:lusions about proportionality 
difficult are not true here. We have a sufficient range of district magnitude at various 
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electoral levels to demonstrate their significance. We can support Lijphart's ( 1 9 9 4 a ) 
claim that district magnitude is not the strongest detemiinant of proportionality at the 
highest sub-national levels ag, regions, Laender and provinces. This is not true for 
counties and regions in Great Britain though, where district magnitude is equal to one 
seat and not the overall number of seats in the authority. 
We could, however, also support claims made by Rae ( 1 9 6 7 ) and Taagepera and Shugart 
( 1 9 8 9 ) that district magnitude is a strong determinant of proportionality for elections 
held at the communal level in the smallest communes (ag. 10 sea ts and below), in Irish 
county and county borough elections, and in British local elections. What we have 
demonstrated in this section is that (i) district magnitude becomes a more apparent 
cause of disproportionality when it is low (/.e. below 10 seats ) , and (ii) at the land and 
provincial level where district magnitude is significantly higher other factors become 
more important to proportionality. District magnitude does not, therefore, operate in 
an electoral vacuum. A s the number of available seats increase, the number of 
participating parties may also increase - a factor which will also influence 
disproportionality. In order to understand disproportionality more clearly, it is 
necessary to analyze other e i e c t c ^ l features such as electoral thresholds and the effects 
of specific electoral formulae. 
4 .6 - The Impact of De Jure Thresholds upon Proportionality 
We denrKxtstrated in Chapter Two that de jure thresholds are employed in a handful of 
European states as a measure to 'block' the excessive representation of very small 
parties. These are often identified in Germany, for example, as being parties of the far 
right. There also operates (in all countries) a higher dfe fecto threshold which varies in 
relation to a number of factors. The important factor to bear in mind about any de jure 
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threshold is that it Is an exclusion clause, rather than guaranteeing inclusion, and as 
such we may identify cases where parties that exceed the threshold stilt remain 
unrepresented. In this section we will focus upon Germany only. 
4.6.1 Germany In order to analyse the impact of de jure thresholds upon 
proportionality, Laender elections which produce an overall high level of 
disproportionality have been chosen for analysis, and the focus will be upon the highest 
share of the vote for a party not winning a seat . A significant level of disproportionality 
will be assumed to occur when at least two of the measures have a disproportionality 
score of 10 or more. Table 4 .17 outlines elections in which we can identify high 
measures of disproportionaiity. Columns 3-5 refer to the measures of 
disproportionality, whilst columns 2 and 6 register the share of the vote and the parties 
which were the largest to be unrepresented. 
Table 4.17 - A Comparison of Measures of Disproportionaiity and the Highest Vote for a 
Non-Seat Winning Party, Germany Land Elections 1947-1988. 
Laender Vote% LH LS SL Party Year 
Bremen 5.3 10.4 7.3 11.2 Others 1983 
Hamburg 4.8 10.9 7.0 12.3 FOP 1978 
Hessen 5.0 14.4 11.8 11.4 Others 1950 
Saarland 4.4 11.4 7.2 12.8 FDP/DPS 1970 
Schleswig Holstein 7.9 17.6 14.4 20.5 Others 1947 
4.4 10.6 6.9 11.7 FDP 1988 
West Berlin 4.9 12.2 7.0 13.9 DP 1954 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
Table 4.17 demonstrates that for ail those cases where a specific party is named (as 
opposed to the group 'others') , that party's share of the vote is below the 5% threshold 
and as such we can tentatively suggest at this stage that this legislative constraint has 
had an impact upon the proportionality of the Laender elections. For the three c a s e s in 
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which the share of the vote is 5% or more we face a problem in that this share 
represents ^others' and as such we do not know the number of parties/candidates this 
Includes or their actual individual shares of the vote. Yet a closer examination of the 
Hamburg elections in Table 4 .18 highlights the strict effect that the 5% rule can have 
upon proportionality, especially for parties which are very close to but below the 
threshold. 
Table 4.18 - A Comparison of the Main Party Vote & Seat Shares and Measures of 
Proportionality - Hamburg Land Elections, 1978 and 1991. 
PARTIES 
CDU SPD FDP 
1978 Votes % 37.6 51.5 4.8 
Seats % 42.5 57.5 -
Total Disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 10.9 Least Squares = 7.0 Sainte Lague = 12.3 
CDU SPD GRUNE FDP 
1991 Votes % 35.1 48.0 7.2 5.4 
Seats % 36.4 50.4 7.4 5.8 
Total Disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 4.3 Least Squares = 2.3 Sainte Lague = 4.5 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
Table 4 .18 emphasises the agnificance that a 0 .6% share of the vote increase between 
1978 and 1991 made for the FDP and proportionality in general. A 4 . 8 % share of the 
vote in 1978 left the FDP unrewarded, but in 1991 a share of the vote of 5 .4% not only 
secured seven sea ts in the Hamburg Landtag for the FDP, but also left it slightly 
over-represented. As such, the 5% threshold in this Instance can be seen to have had a 
significant effect upon the overall proportionality of Hamburg Landtag elections. 
Furthermore, by comparing three elections held in Bavaria we can demonstrate that the 
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5% threshold is one of exclusion rather than one of inclusion. Table 4 .19 compares each 
party's share of the vote and seats with the overall pnDportionality for each e lect ioa 
Table 4.19 - A Comparison of the Main Party Share of the Votes and Seats and Measures of 
Proportionality - Bavarian Land Elections, 1946 (December), 1962 & 1966. 
PARTIES 
CSU SPD WAV KPD FDP 
1946 Votes % 52.3 28.6 7.4 6.1 5.7 
Seats % 57.8 30.0 7.2 - 5.0 
Total Disproportionality: 
6.8 Loosemore Hanby = 6.9 Least Squares = 5.9 Sainte Lague = 
CSU SPO FDP GDP Others 
1962 Votes % 47.5 35.3 5.9 5.1 6.2 
Seats % 52.9 38.7 4.4 - 3.9 
Total Disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 8.9 Least Squares = 6.1 Satnte Lague = 7.3 
est; SPD NPD FDP Others 
1966 Votes % 48.1 35.8 7.4 5.1 3.6 
Seats % 53.9 38.7 7.4 -
Total Disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 8.7 Least Squares = 6.4 Sainte Lague = 9.6 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
The elections of 1962 and 1966 demonstrate that when parties with 5.1% share of the 
vote are unrepresented this does not necessarily succeed in raising the 
disproportionality measures to a level that we can judge as being particularly 
significant for Gemiany ( e g above 10) . The example of the 1946 election, where the 
KPD secured 6 .1% votes but no seats in fact produces the lowest measure of 
disproportionality (because the proportionality between every other party's vote and 
seat shares is much less than in subsequent elections). By considering the extent to 
which the largest parties are over represented in all three elections, we can conclude 
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that an increasing gap in the vote to seat ratios is likely to have a stronger effect on the • 
measurement of disproportionality than the 5% threshold rule. The elections held in 
1 9 4 6 and 1962 show that disproportionality is lower when the vote-seat ratio is close 
despite the impact of the threshold rule. Whilst the use of a (5%) threshold may have 
important implications for small parties (see Chapter Five) it does not appear 
significantly t o affect overall proportionality within Laender elections, possibly because 
large district magnitude creates an opportunity for disproportionality in small areas to 
be balanced out by other factors. Small parties at the higher electoral levels, therefore, 
tend to be primarily hindered by the 5% threshold rather than the availability of seats 
in the first instance. We will now consider the more frequent occurrence of de facto 
thresholds. 
4 .7 - De facto Thresholds and Proportionality 
We suggested in Chapter Two that it is often more appropriate to analyze small parly 
representation in terms of the restrictions created by de facto thresholds. De facto 
thresholds do not operate at a constant share of the vote level as is the case with de jure 
thresholds, but vary depending upon (i) the number of sea ts available, (ii) the number 
of parties competing, and (iii) the distribution of the votes. In order to a s s e s s the 
general impact of de facto thresholds upon representation in sub-national elections we 
will consider a cross sect ion of examples taken from the Netheriands, Belgium and 
Ireland. 
4.7.1 The Netheriands If we conader the share of the vote for the largest party not to 
win a sea t in each province in the 1991 Dutch provincial electior«, we find the range as 
follows: 
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Table 4.20 - Comparing the Highest Share Of The Vote (96) For A Party Not Winning A Seat. 
1991 Dutch Provincial Elections by Province. 
PROVINCE VOTES % PARTY PROVINCE VOTES % PARTY 
Flevoland 1.9 CD Gelderiand 0.6 CD & SP & LPG 
Drenthe 1.7 SGP/RPF North Brabant 0.6 DG 
Groningen 1.2 SP Freisland 0.5 CD 
Umburg 1.2 SP North Holland 0.4 CP86 
South Holland 1.0 SP Overijssel 0.4 SP 
Utrecht 0.8 SP 
Source: Nederiands Centraal Bureauvoor de Statistiek. 
We can see from Table 4 . 2 0 that the percentages in general are extremely low - below 
2 % in every case - the highest case is in the Revoland province. These results are in 
fact consistent with eariier provincial elections, and also our findings expressed 
eariier, that only very small parties are excluded from representation. Not only does 
this suggest that the Dutch system of in provincial elections is one of extreme 
proportionality, but it also suggests that parties will only be dissuaded from standing at 
the provincial level If they realize that their support-base Is potentially very low. A s 
was shown in section 4 .5 , however, as other electoral features become more significant, 
large district magnitudes generally have little significant impact upon proportionality, 
and therefore it may be nrKwe useful to compare this de facto threshold with those for 
other countries using PR systems, but operating a t lower electoral levels and employing 
smaller district magnitudes. 
4 .7 .2 Belgium Belgium is also a country that does not apply a formal threshold to its PR 
electoral systenx We have already stated rn Ctepter Two (section 2 .3 .3c) that the 
Imperial! method of seat distribution tends to benefit the larger parties. We can thus 
expect to Identify dl? ^ c to thresholds operating in municipal elections, and It is probable 
that such thresholds will be higher than those in the Netheriands at the provincial level 
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due to the influence of lower district magnitudes. Other data relevant to this analysis Is 
the number of competing parties. In any election, the number of votes required for a 
party to secure a seat increases as the district magnitude decreases. Similariy, as the 
number of parties participating in each election increases the probability of every 
party gaining representation decreases. In cases where there are numerous non 
represented parties and the de facto threshold is particularly low, this will only have an 
adverse affect upon certain proportionality measures (primarily Loosemore Hanby). 
We are, therefore, more interested in one party not being represented when Its share of 
the vote is higher than, say, the 2 % threshold that we established exists in Dutch 
provincial elections to establish differences in the dfe fecto thresholds. 
By comparing the district nnagnitude (DM) with the number of competing and number of 
elected parties for the 1988 elections in three gemeenten in the province of North 
Brabant we can observe the effects upon proportionality. The findings are outlined in 
Table 4 .21 : 
Table 4.21 - A Comparison of District Magnitude, Competing Parties, Elected Parties and 
Proportionality Measures for Three North Brabant Gemeenten, 1988. 
Gemeenten DM No. Parties No. Elected LH LS SL 
Sever 9 3 2 15.0 13.4 12.5 
Haacht 21 5 4 10.0 7.3 8.5 
Dilbeek 33 7 5 9.3 5.6 7.8 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholieke Universiteit & Umburgs Universitair Centrum, University of 
Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
We can see from Table 4.21 that (I) disproportionality increases as some parties are 
unelected, but (ii) there is not a direct relationship between the number of unelected 
parties and dtsproportlonalrty. Hence, other factors must also be important - such as 
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the district magnitude and the distribution of votes. In the gemeenten of Sever where 
district magnitude is low, the unsuccessful party in 1988 was AGALEV which polled a 
4 . 1 % share of the vote. The largest non-seat winning party in Haacht (with medium 
district magnitude) was AGALEV with a 6.1% share of the vote, and the de facto threshold 
thus appears to be larger in Haacht than in Bever. The lower measures of 
disproportiof>ality in Haacht, however, suggest that the seat distribution method is 
actually a more important influence on proportionality, and it is probable that the 
largest party in Bever was considerably over-rewarded with sea ts due to the effects of 
the Imperial! system. We can see from Table 4.21 that in the gemeenten of Dilbeek 
which has a large district magnitude two parties were unrepresented, yet the largest non 
represented party was AGALEV which polled only a 3 .9% share of the vote. In larger 
gemeenten, therefore, the de facto threshold does decrease. 
These examples demonstrate that the de facto threshold decreases as district magnitude 
increases, but also that a combination of the Imperiali method of seat distribution and 
the number of elective parties have a notable intpact upon the level of disproportionality 
that occurs in each municipality. The number of elective parties in Bever is in fact low, 
and it may be the case that AGALEV would have remained unrepresented with a 
considerably higher vote share than 4 .1%. This is confirmed by a comparison with the 
gemeenten of Zuienkerke in the West Vlaanderen province. In the 1982 gemeenten 
elections in this municipality the district magnitude was eleven sea ts and two of the 
three competing parties were rewarded with seats. The absolute measures of 
disproportionality were slightly lower than in Bever - the Loosemore-Hanby measure 
was 12.8 and the Least Squares measure registered 11.3, though the Sainte Lague 
measure of 14.8 was slightly higher (suggesting that the ratio between the vote and seat 
shares for the two represented parties w a s larger in Zuienkerke than in Bever) . In 
Zuienkerke, however, the unrewarded party was the Socialist Party (SP) - polling a 
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12 .8% share of the vote. This suggests that the Imperial! system in a division with low 
district nragnitude has the potential to create a high de facto threshold (at least 10% 
share of the vote) compared to the much lower thresholds in Dutch provincial elections. 
We have applied a similar analysis in Table 4 . 2 2 to communes in the Belgian provinces 
of Liege and Namur for the 1988 elections: 
Table 4.22 - A Comparison of District Magnitude (DM), Competing Parties, Elected Parties and 
Proportionality Measures for Communes in Liege and Namur, 1988. 
UEGE 
Communes DM Wo Parties No. Elected LH LS SL 
Stoumont 11 3 2 13.0 11.5 15.1 
Liege 51 9 5 8.1 4.8 6.6 
NAMUR 
Communes DM No Parties Wo. Elected LH LS SL 
Somme Leuze n 3 2 10.3 9.0 11.5 
Namur 45 6 4 3.7 2.6 2.0 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholteke Universiteit & Umburgs Unlversitair Centrum. University of 
Plymouth Elections Database. 
A similar pattem emerges as was demonstrated by the previous analysis of Brabant. 
Disproportionality appears t o be significantly larger in the smaller communes despite 
the fact that fewer parties remain un-represented than In the larger communes. As 
such, we again have evidence to suggest that the d ? facto threshold is related to the 
district magnitude. In the Liege commune of Stoumont, for example, the ecology party 
(ECOLO) remained unrewarded despite polling a 1 3 % share of the vote. By comparison, 
although four parties were unrepresented in the commune of Uege in 1988 , the largest 
of these were the comnminists (PCB) which polled only 3 % share of the vote. The total 
'wasted vote' in Uege in 1 9 8 8 was a mere 4 . 7 % . Similarty, the unrewarded party in 
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1 9 8 8 in the Namur commune of Somme Leuze was the Local List 1 which secured a 
1 0 . 3 % share of the vote, whilst in the commune of Namur the two unrewarded parties 
each polled below 1% of the vote (/.e. the Local List 1 polled 0 .8% and the PCB polled a 
0 .6% share of the vote) . By comparing district magnitude, the number of competing and 
seat winning parties, and the measures of disproportionality for a range of communes 
and gemeenten in Belgium using the 1988 local elections as a case-study, we can see that 
there is not always a direct correlation between district magnitude and 
disproportionality alone. There is, however, a direct correlation between the district 
nnagratude and the de facto threshold which affects small party representation. Whilst 
debates about de jure thresholds focus on the arbitrary nature of cut off points, the 
significance of db fecto thresholds has to a large extent been overiooked in the literature. 
We agree with Ujphart ( 1 9 9 4 a ) that they are a significant threshold of exclusion. 
Small parties must, therefore, leam about how thresholds of exclusion operate If they 
wish to maximize their electoral opportunities. 
4 . 7 . 3 Ireland In our PR case studies, we have demonstrated that there exist either dfe 
Jure electoral thresholds to restrict the representation of very small parties, or <h 
facto thresholds which derive from the district magnitude and the number of competing 
parties. We have shown in section 4 .5 .3 that the use of relatively small electoral areas 
throughout the Republic of Ireland limits the extent to which proportionality occurs and 
indeed the smallest electoral areas are probably closer in outcome to the plurality 
s y s t e m in multi-member wards than to any PR system. The following examples 
demonstrate how the use of numerous small electoral districts within each county have 
created d? ^ ctD thresholds which hinder small party representation. 
In the Dublin-Belgard 1985 county elections, for example, one of the 2 6 available seats 
was secured by an independent candidate with a 1.4% share of the vote, whilst in the 
162 
same elections Sinn Fein received a total share of the vote of 4 .6% and remained 
unrepresented. Since Dublin-Belgard consists of seven electoral areas in all, we can 
assume that electoral support for the four Sinn Fein candidates was split across the 
electoral county and no single candidate received high enough support to win a s e a t A 
similar situation has been experienced by the Lab<»ir Party In the county of Tipperary 
N.R, where the 21 council seats are divided into four electoral areas. Two of these seats 
were secured by norvparty candidates with a conective vote of 5.5%. Yet the eight 
Labour Party candidates secured only one seat despite polling a collective share of the 
vote of 12.6%. Similar experiences were repeated in the county council elections of 
1991 . The 2 6 seats in the electoral county of South Dublin were allocated via no less 
than seven electoral areas. As a resutt, an independent candidate with 2 .5% of the 
overall share of the vote secured one seat, whilst the four Sinn Fein candidates who 
secured an overall share of the vote of 3 .7% remained unrepresented. 
The use of small electoral divisions ( a g between three and seven seats) within Irish 
county council elections therefore weakens the level of proportiorwlity. The use of STV 
may encourage greater voter participation but the use of electoral areas with a snnall 
district magnitude does not necessarily make these elections any more 'proportional' 
that those for multi-seat wards under a plurality sys tem. The real district magnitude is 
effectively the sze of each electoral area and as such the de facto threshold will vary 
depending on the number of seats available and the number of candidates. A s a result, a 
party fielding several candidates in numerous electoral areas with a scattered level of 
support is just as susceptible to the 'wasted vote* syndrome as small parties 
participating in plurality elections. We will next consider the relationship between the 
seat distribution method and proportionality. 
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4,8 - The Seat Distribution Method And Proportionalitv 
In this section we will consider the impact upon proportionality of some of the different 
seat distribution methods within PR and plurality systems. It is well established that 
plurality works in the interest of the one or two larger parties, and it was suggested in 
Chapter T w o section 2.3.3 that some PR systems operate to the benefit of larger parties. 
We will consider the implications of the seat distribution method at the sub-national 
level in Germany and Britain. 
4.8.1 Germany: German Laender elections provide a suitable example of different PR 
methods of seat distribution - nanrtely the rfHondt and Hare-Niemeyer quota methods. As 
such we can test the claim made by Gunllcks, as outlined in section 4 .2 .3 , that small 
parties will perform better under the Hare-Niemeyer method of seat distribution. 
Taking into consideration the impact of the threshold constraint, it will be of interest to 
test whether parties gaining at least 5% or more of the vote would receive a different 
share of the vote when a different method of seat distributbn is u s e d Due to the 
limitations of the availability of suitable data we will only analyze three elections held 
in Bavaria (each party's share of the vote Is presented in Table 4 .19 ) , where the 
d'Hondt method of seat distributk)n was used. If GunFicks' claim is correct, we may see 
an alteration in the allocation of seats using the Hare-Niemeyer quota method. Table 
4 .23 compares the number of seats won by each party in 1946 , 1962 and 1 9 6 6 
respectively when the d'Hondt seat distribution method was used, and compares these 
figures with the distribution of seats , should the Hare-Niemeyer method had been 
employed. 
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Table 4.23 - Comparing Methods of Seat Distribution for the Bavarian Landtag Elections 1946 
(December). 1962 & 1966. 
1946 
SEAT METHOD CSU SPD WAV FDP KPD 
D'Hondt 
Hare Niemeyer 
104 
94 
54 
52 
13 
13 
9 
10 11 
1962 
SEAT METHOD CSU SPD FDP GDP Others 
D'Hondt 
Hare Niemeyer 
108 
97 
79 
72 
9 
12 10 
8 
13 
1966 
SEAT METHOD CSU SPD FDP NDP 
D'Hondt 
Hare Niemeyer 
110 
102 
79 
76 11 
15 
15 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
As Table 4 .23 demonstrates, a change from the d'Hondt to the Hare-Niemeyer method of 
seat distribution has a considerable effect for proportionality in general and for small 
parties in particular - especially those which only just pass the 5 % threshold and a s 
such are still too 'small' to qualify for seats under the highest average d'Hondt method. 
It is clear from the results presented above that the d'Hondt method substantially 
over-rewards the largest party and that small parties can be severely penalised as a 
result. It may be the c a s e , however, that there is a political motive for over-rewarding 
the largest parties in Bavaria - Le. the potential number of coalition possibilities is 
reduced by using a tfHondt seat distribution system. 
4 . 8 . 2 Britain: The cumulative ef fects at the country level of a plurality electoral 
sys tem on representation in Great Britain are outiined in table 4 .24 . 
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Table 4.24 - Electoral Trends in English and Welsh County and Scottish Regional Elections, 1985 
- 1994. 
Enaland Year Con Lab L/A tnd Green Other 
Votes% 1985 38.4 30.0 27.9 2.5 1.2 
Seats% 43.6 32.2 20.2 3.3 0.7 
Votes% 1993 35.6 31.2 29.3 3 .0 * 1.0 
Seats% 31.2 37.3 27.8 3 . 8 * -
Wales Con Lab L/A Ind Green PC Other 
Votes96 1985 15.2 45.2 12.9 12.5 8.6 5.6 
Seats% 9.1 53.3 6.5 25.7 3.6 1.8 
Votes% 1993 12.5 47.1 10.9 1 3 . 3 * 0.6 15.6 
Seats% 6.4 54.2 6.8 24.3 0.2 8.2 
Scotland Con Lah L/A Ind SNP Other 
Votes% 1986 16.9 43.9 15.1 4.8 18.2 1.1 
Seats% 14.6 50.1 9.0 17.8 8.9 0.4 
Votes% 1994 13.7 41.8 11.9 4.2 26.8 1.5 
Seats% 6.8 48.6 13.7 14.3 16.1 0.4 
* Independent and Others classified together. 
Sources: Railings & Thrasher, 1993b. Bochel & Denver, 1994. 
Table 4 .24 emphasises the maricedly disproportionate nature of the seat distribution 
system of representation in Britain, arxd we can also see that some parties ( e g 
Independents compared to the Conservatives in Wales In 1993 , Independents compared to 
the SNP. and the Liberal/Alliance compared to the Conservatives in Scotland in 1986 , 
and the Independents compared to the Conservatives and Uberal/AlliarKe in Scotland in 
1994 ) win more seats than parties which appear to have a greater share of the votes - a 
feature one would not expect to occur under PR, Under plurality systems, a party which 
is able successfully to concentrate support in targeted seats will gain more effective 
representation than a party with more votes spread over a larger number of diviaons. 
Yet when the overall results for county and regional elections are viewed in terms of the 
'national average' we can see that extreme cases of under and over representation begin 
to balance each other o u t What is the effect of this, upon overall proportionality? 
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Table 4.25 - Disproportionality Measures for the Overall County Council and Regional Council 
Elections in Britain. 1985-1994. 
Year Loosemore Hanby Least Sauares Sainte Laaue Total Seats 
England 
1985 8.2 6.8 3.5 3005 
1993 6.9 5.5 3.0 2998 
Wales 
1985 21.3 13.4 26.5 552 
1993 18.1 11.8 18.5 502 
Scotland 
1986 18.8 13.0 44.1 445 
1994 18.7 12.6 34.2 453 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
The disproportionality measures outlined in Table 4.25 are hardly surprising when we 
compare the results produced by a plurality system as compared to those one would 
expect under any PR system. The much lower level of disproportionality found in the 
English counties compared to disproportionality in Wales and Scotland is related to the 
number of seats available, and also to the number of unopposed seats claimed by 
Independent candidates in Wales and Scotland - see section 4.4.4. The number of 
available seats in England in 1993, for example, was almost six-fold that of the whole of 
Wales, and over six and a half times larger than the number of seats in the Scottish 
regions in 1994. This reinforces our claim that the more electoral divisions that are 
included in an 'average' analysis, the weaker the impact that individual extreme cases of 
proportionality have. We can see that disproportionality, therefore, is distinctly larger 
in plurality elections than in PR elections, although the nationwide pattern of 
disproportionality is diluted as the number of contested seats significantly increases. 
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4.9 - Conclusions 
This preliminary analysts of five separate electoral systems using our data of sub-
national election results provides some interesting findings. For example, we concluded 
that Dutch provincial elections tend to reinforce the claim that the Netherlands operates 
a highly proportional electoral system. Since it would not be practically possible for 
every elective party ttet participated in each election to be represented, we have 
nevertheless demonstrated that it is the case that only parties with an extremely low 
vote share fail to win seats at the provincial level. The combination of the PR method of 
seat distribution and the size of district magnitude in these elections produces high 
levels of proportionality, and the use of the d*Hondt formula creates a de facto threshold 
of around 2%. Furthermore, the Indices used demonstrate that any disproportionalrty 
that does occur tends to result from numerous sn^ll discrepancies in vote and seat 
shares for each party. TWs is indicated by the consistently lower measure of the Least 
Squares Index compared to disproportiortality as measured by the Loosemore-Hanby 
Index. Yet despite high proportionality, we can identify a pattern of significant decline 
in tumout since 1970, and since 1987 a decline in electoral support for the main, or 
national, parties. 
Comparative analysis of German Laender elections is more complex since the only truly 
consistent feature is the 5% representation threshold. Variations in tumout artd results 
may be affected by the timing of elections as few Laender hold elections on the same day. 
We have demonstrated that the proportionality of each Land system is affected by 
varying factors, assembly size alone cannot be identified as the primary source of 
disproportionality. The hypothesis that German elections have been more or less 
domiriated by the n^in national parties since the 1960s appears to hold true at the 
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Laender level. The four main parties (since the arrival of the Greens in the early 
1980s) have continued to succeed in dominating both the vote and seat shares. R«:ent 
elections, however, have also shown that small parties can gain a foothold. Recent Land 
elections have also denror^rated that turnout appears to be on the decline from the usual 
level of 75%-85%. If tumout levels and main party vote shares continue to decline, 
then we may begin to witness a growth in the electoral success of new and snrtall parties. 
We have shown that disproportionality in the German Laender electoral system is 
influenced to various extents by two specific features. Although the 5% threshold is a 
barrier to the representation of very small parties, its impact upon overall 
disproportionality is not conclusive. For the two Laender analyzed, the 5% threshold 
appeared to affect proportionality in Hamburg, but not in Bavaria. In the latter we 
identified that disproportionality was more likely to result from large discrepancies in 
share of the votes and share of the seats ratios for all parties rather than because of the 
non representation of small parties. Furthermore, there is evidence to support 
Gunlicks* claim that seat distribution methods can penalize smaller parties. By applying 
the Hare-Niemeyer system to three Bavarian elections we were able to demonstrate that 
several parties which attained the 5% qualification in terms of their share of the votes, 
but which were nevertheless excluded from seats under the d'Hondt system would have 
perfomried much better. Whilst the d'Hondt seat distribution system does not hinder 
proportionality in the Netherlands, there is evidence that it is a hindrance in Germany. 
Of course, there may be *politicar reasons for applying a less proportional fonm of seat 
distribution, ag, desire to exclude small parties from coalition formation. Far from 
generalising about electoral trends in Genman Laender elections, the above analysts 
shows, if anything, that we are in fact dealing with irKiividual electoral systems which 
produce a wealth of information suitable for interesting comparative analysis. 
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In relation to the sub-national electoral system which operates at the municipal level in 
Belgium we were able to demonstrate that parties can only really be Marge' at the sub-
national level because of re^onal fragmentation. District magnitude alone does not 
account for disproportionality even in small communes and gemeenten. The district 
magnitude does, however, affect the de facto threshold. In the smallest communes and 
gemeenten parties which poll as much as 12% and 13% shares of the vote (which is 
considered as large at the national level of elections in Belgium) are left unrepresented 
as they are hindered by the Imperiall system which only rewards the very largest 
parties. The combination of the Imperiali system and small district magnitudes creates 
high de facto thresholds and is the greatest hindrance to small parties. 
The analysis of county and county borough elections in the Irish Republic demonstrates 
that the STV system engenders characteristics and patterns ^sociated with both PR and 
plurality. Although counties and county boroughs vary significantly in overall seat size, 
this has relatively little impact upon proportionality. The central feature of 
sub-national elections in Ireland is that all counties and county boroughs are broken 
down into much smaller electoral areas, each ranging in size from three to seven seats. 
The use of STV may foster greater participation because there is not the same perception 
of a 'wasted vote' as occurs in a simple plurality system. We have seen, however, that 
turnout is likely to be higher in rural periphery locations where there is, perhaps, a 
greater feeling of conrununlty, thus emphasising the importance of a perceived 
connection between local elections and local issues to participatk>a The absence of the 
'wasted vote* syndrome does not mean that STV is more proportionaL The use of 
relatively small district magnitudes ensures that the Irish electoral system still 
penalises snnall parties which have a geographic spread of electoral support. Non-party 
affiliated candidates which can capitalize on local issues and personality appeal are 
beneficiaries from the STV system. 
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A feature of Irish sub-national elections which tends to distinguish them from the other 
cases in this chapter is the overall low number of parties for the country as a whole. 
There are a far greater number of parties in the Netherlands, Gemrany, Belgium and 
Britain than in the Irish Republic. Conversely, Ireland has the greatest occurrence of 
Independent and 'non-party' candidates. Though Fianna Fail and Fine Gael remain the two 
larger parties in sub-national elections their levels of support are on the declirie, and 
they are consistently 'punished* in local elections to the benefit of other candidates. It is 
still possible, however, to identify strong regional variations in particular party 
support. 
Our analysis of plurality elections as held in English and Welsh counties and Scottish 
regions provides an interesting comparison with the eariier analyses of the different 
forms of PR, We have identified much higher measures of disproportionality for all 
three indices used. This suggests that not only Is absolute disproportionality in 
representation between parties likely to occur, but also that the ratio by which larger 
par t is are over-represented is likely to be strong. The evidence presented confirms 
the hypothesis that cfisproportionality appears to be reduced as we aggregate vote and 
seat shares to their highest possible level (in this case a country level). Since the 
electoral system remairts the s a n ^ for all elections we must conclude that the impact of 
extreme cases of disproportional representation are balanced out as the accumulated 
number of seats increases. Only by considering elections provisionally at the 
district/divisional, and then at the ward level, can we be more precise about the effects 
of a plurality system upon disproportionality. 
Our various analyses of elections at the county/district and regiort/division level in 
Britain denwnstrate that if we assess proportionality in terms of aggregate 
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representation at the county/regional level, the number of seats available is likely to 
affect proportionality. What is also important is (i) the number of participating 
parties and (ii) the overall percentage of parties winning seats. Since only one party 
can win in single-seat wards, disproportionality will be affected as the number of 
parties not winning seats increases. As our analysis at the aggregate level has ^ Town, 
the largest party is frequently over-represented with seats, and it is not unusual to 
witness parties with a small average vote securing seats while parties with an average 
in excess of 20% of the vote are apparently unrewarded. The first past the post system 
does not necessarily penalize small parties, but the most successful parties are those 
which are able effectively to mobilise support in targeted wards (and this may be 
affected by many factors ranging from firtancial resources, local grass roots support, 
and an available candidate). A party with a moderate level of widespread support, on the 
other hand (as is often the case for the Liberal Democrats and SNP), will often be 
penalised by the plurality system. The next two chapters of this thesis will focus upon 
those electoral mles analyzed In chapters Two and Four and their effect upon the 
representation of those far right and regionalist parties outlined in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE REPRESEm-ATION OF FAR RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPEAN 
SUB-NATIONAL ELECTIONS. 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to be able to analyze the electoral success of those far right parties outlined in 
Chapter Three sections 3.4.1 & 2 in European sub-national elections we will test the 
effects of various electoral rules and features which we have previously outlined in 
Chapter Two and which we measured for their effect upon general representation at the 
sub-national level in various countries in Chapter Four. By employing previously 
identified indices of proportionality we can identify particular cases in which far right 
parties are over or under represented and seek to explain which features of the electoral 
system are most likely to generate disproportionality. We have previously shown that the 
potentially influential factors are; district magnitude (DM), the effect of de jure and cb 
facto thresholds and the method of seat distribution. Furthermore, fluctuations in general 
voting behaviour may also affect support for the far right. For example, the timing of an 
election may be significant as a result of on going events or be judged in relation to the 
closeness to the previous or next general election (see Chapter One section 1.5). In 
addition, it may be interesting to measure the electoral performance of the far right in 
compulsory voting elections Belgium, although any conclusions regarding this aspect 
should be treated cautiously as we lack a truly comparative study. Hence, we are 
considering what effect changing popular support has had upon the far right and to what 
extent different electoral rules have reflected changes in relation to representation. 
It may be the case that some far right parties can be labelled as a 'significant* member of 
the party system. This is affected by the number of candidates contesting each election, 
the level (importance) of the election, the geographic location of where far right 
candidates stand and the appearance of *populist' candidates. As such, we are looking for 
sub-national 'hotbeds' of far right support which are not always identifiable at the 
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national level. Obviously, It may be inappropriate to make conclusions about electoral 
system effects in general without also acknowledging the contextual implications which 
may be important in assessing rises and falls in far right support. If we recall our 
definition of contemporary far right parties in Europe (Chapter Three Section 3.4.1), we 
are presented with a convergence of research which suggests that far right electoral 
support is a 'protest* against mainstream parties and governments (Betz 1993, Taggart 
1995). In Chapter One we suggested that 'protest* voting is nwjst likely to appear in 
second order elections and as such we would expect the optimal level of far right electoral 
support to be voiced in sub-national elections in all countries (Halnsworth 1992). 
We will examine the impact of district magnitude on far right party representation in 
Germany, the Netheriands, Belgium and Britain. Our analysis of de jure thresholds will 
focus upon Germany, and that of de facto thresholds on Belgium. We will consider the 
salience of the second order hypothesis in relation to patterns of far right support in 
Germany, the Netheriands and Britain. Finally, we will assess the impact of the seat 
distribution method upon far right representation in Germany the Netheriands and 
Britain. Our first section relates to the influence of district magnitude. 
5.2 The Impact of District Magnitude Upon Far right Representation 
Our analysis of district magnitude in Chapter Four showed that its effect upon 
disproportionalrty varies depending on electoral level and the range of district magnitude. 
We will develop this analysis by comparing far right electoral performance in areas with 
a range of district magnitudes, assessing the opportunities for representation, and the 
effect of district magnitude in relation to other electoral features, such as thresholds and 
the seat distribution formula. We concluded in Chapter Two that district magnitude has 
been cited as the most significant factor affecting the proportionality of electk>ns at the 
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national level by Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Gallagher (1991). In Chapter Four, 
however, our findings were not as conclusive. We concluded that as the average size of 
electoral divisions decreases {ag. we move from the national to the sub-national level of 
analysis) features such as the number of competing parties and the seat distribution 
method may have a more evident impact upon proportionality. We will consider far right 
support in a variety of sub-national elections in order to measure the significance of 
district magnitude for this family of parties. 
5.2.1 Germany We demonstrated in Chapter Three sections 3.4.2a, that electoral support 
for far right parties in Germany varies both over time and between the states. As such, 
there is little evidence suggesting any long term consistency to far right support in 
Germany. We concluded that the most obvious hindrance to support for the far right at the 
Laender level of elections has been the 5% threshold. In Table 5.1 we outline the handful 
of elections is which parties of the far right successfully overcame this threshold hurdle, 
allowing us to analyse the effects of district magnitude: 
Table 5.1 - A Comparison of Far Right Representation and District Magnitude at the Land Level in 
Germany, 1966-1992. 
STATE DM YEAR PARTY VOTES % SEATS % 
Schleswig Holstein 89 1992 DVU 6.3 6.7 
Hessen 96 1966 NPD 7.9 8.3 
Bremen 100 1967 NPD 8.8 8.0 
Bremen 100 1991 DVU 6.2 6.0 
Bavaria 204 1966 NPD 7.4 7.4 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
From the results presented in Table 5.1 there is little evidence at the Land level in 
Gennany to support the hypothesis that district magnitude affects the representation of 
far right parties which have surpassed the 5% threshold. There is very little 
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discrepancy between the share of the vote and the share of the seats won by far right 
parties within this range of elections. The weakness with this level of analysis, however, 
is that we are comparing Land where the district magnitude (DM) is significantly large in 
every case. If we relate back to Chapter Four, we demonstrated that district magnitude at 
the Land level is not the primary determinant of disproportionality. Whilst the 5% 
thresholds appears to be the primary hurdle for far right parties at the Laender election 
level, a more comprehensive analysis of district magnitude may benefit from a 
consideration of gemelnden elections, as (i) the number of votes needed to exceed the 5% 
threshold is lower, and (ii) the district magnitude is significantly lower. 
If we focus upon the German Saariand gemeinden elections held in June 1989, for 
example, we can see that the far right National Democratic Party (NPD) stood in only five 
of the 317 districts, and in four the party polled a share of the vote ranging from 3.3% to. 
4.7% and hence failed to reach the 5% threshold. In Wadgasen, however, the party polled 
a 6.2% share of the vote yet was still left unrepresented (as were the Liberal FDP). 
Table 5.2 shows the overall results for this Land in general and for the gemeinde of 
Wadgasea 
Table 5.2 - District Election Results for Saariand as a whole and the Gemeinde of Wadgasen 
1989. 
ELECTION PARTY 
Saarland CDU SPD FDP NPD Green 
Votes % 36.8 46.3 5.7 0 . 4 4.5 
Seats 735 885 52 - 40 
Wadgasen CDU SPD FDP NPD WGR1 
Votes % 39.0 38.6 6.2 6 . 2 10.0 
Seats 5 5 0 0 1 
Seats % 45.4 45.4 - - 9.1 
Source: Saariand Statistiches Landesamt. 
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Our analysis at the Land level demonstrated that far right parties often remain 
unrepresented because of their inability to break through the 5% threshold. We can see 
from Table 5.2 that support for the SPD in Wadgasen was below the average for Saariand 
and this, along with the absence of the greens, may have benefited the far right ^are of 
the vote Although the NPD polled a si^ificant enough share of the vote to pass the 5% 
threshold in 1989, the party was hindered by the fact that the district magnitude was only 
11 seats. Since the d'Hondt formula used for seat distribution favours the larger parties 
the 159 votes for the NPD was not significant enough to secure representation. Under the 
d'Hondt rules, all other things remaining equal, the district magnitude would need to be at 
least 15 seats for the NPD to have been represented. This analysis of a lower level of 
election demonstrates that far right parties are not unrepresented purely because of the 
5% threshold. Whilst a far right party may attract a higher share of the vote in local 
elections, it may also be faced with other electoral constraints - in this case district 
magnitude (in combination with a PR system which favours the larger parties). In this 
situation, we would support the claims made by Lljphart (1990) and Blais and Carty 
(1987) that a combination of the seat allocation method ^ district magnitude have the 
strongest impact upon electoral disproportionality. 
5.2.2. The Netheriands The potential impact of district magnitude on the representation of 
far right parties is also illustrated by reference to elections held in the Netheriands. In 
Table 5.3 we outline far right electoral performance over four decades in several 
provinces with a range of district magnitudes (DM): 
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Table 5.3 - A Comparison of Far Right Representation and District Magnitude in Selected Dutch 
Provincial Elections, 1966-1991. 
PROVINCE DM YEAR PARTY VOTES % SEATS 96 
Flevoland 43 1991 CD 1.9 
Utrecht 63 1991 CD 1.6 1.6 
Geldertand 67 1966 BP 9.0 9.0 
North Brabant 71 1966 BP 7.2 7.0 
Gelderiand 71 1970 BP 2.7 2.8 
North Holland 79 1966 BP 8.0 8.9 
North Holland 79 1970 BP 1.5 1.3 
South Holland 83 1991 CD 2.1 1.2 
Source: Nederiands Central Bureau voor de Statistiek. 
We can see from Table 5.3 that even with very low shares of the vote (ag. 1.5% in North 
Holland in 1970) the parties of the far right secured representation in nearly every 
provincial election listed, and by presenting the share of the seats figures we can see that 
representation is highly proportionate - as we have shown to be the general case in Dutch 
provincial elections in our analysis In Chapter Four section 4.5.1. In Flevoland in 1991, 
however, the CD remained unrepresented. Whilst this province has a much lower district 
magnitude than the other provinces in our Table, the far right share of the vote was also 
extremely low and as such we cannot make any conclusive judgements about the impact of 
district magnitude, other than it does not generally appear to be a hindrance for the far 
right at the provincial level. We will now consider whether district magnitude affects far 
right representation at the gemeenten level in the Netheriands. 
The 1978 provincial elections were followed two months later by gemeenten elections in 
which the far right Boerenpartij (BP) polled particularly badly. It may not be 
surprising to see that in the municipal elections the BP polled only 0.08% share of the 
votes nation-wide (compared to 0.5% in the provincial elections) and secured Itself only 
3 of the available 12037 seats (0.02%). But a nation-wide generalisation of support 
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actually under estimates the real level of support for the BP in the handful of gemeenten 
which the party contested. The party provided lists in only 24 gemeenten, though support 
fell well below 10% share of the vote in every case. Table 5.4 lists those municipalities 
where the BP polled at least 5% share of the vote and/or won seats. 
Table 5.4 - The Dutch Gemeenten Elections of 1978 - A Comparison of the BP'S most successful 
results and District Magnitude. 
PROVINCE GEMEENTEN DM VOTES % SEATS WON 
South Holland Hei-en Boeicop 7 7.8 
North Holland Andijk 11 5.4 
Zed and Kortgene 11 5.0 _ 
Groningen Marum 13 5.4 -
Overijssel Staphorst 15 5.6 1 
Gelderland Heerde 17 7.0 1 
Gelderiand Ede 37 2.6 1 
Source: Statistiek der Verkiezingen, 1978. 
We can see from the data in Table 5.4 that even in the 'highly proportional' Dutch 
electoral system district magnitude at the gemeenten level has affected the opportunities 
for far right representation. The seat secured in Ede was one of 37 available and as such a 
smaller ^ r e of the vote was enough to ensure representation compared to gemeenten 
such as Heerde arxi Staphorst where larger shares of the vote also succeeded in securing 
only one seat Generalisations which have been made about the proportionality of the 
Dutch electoral system at the national level, and the findir^ we made at the provincial 
level in Chapter Four which support this claim, may not be as appropriate when analyzing 
proportionality at the lowest level of representation. In Chapter Four section 4.7.1 
we stated that a combination of the district magnitude and the seat distribution method at 
the provincial level creates a de facto threshold of below 2% share of the vote for each 
party. This rule does not apply for gemeenten elections. Whilst the same seat 
distribution is used, the far smaller number of seats available hinders the representation 
opportunities for minor parties. We can also see from Table 5.4 that the de /acto 
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threshold for representation decreases as the district magnitude increases - hence a 5.6% 
share of the vote was sufficient to secure one seat in Staphorst whilst a 7.8% share of the 
vote was unrepresented in Hei-en-Boeicop in 1978. Thus, claims made by Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989) and Gallagher (1991) about the significance of district magnitude do 
apply at the lowest electoral level. 
A similar pattern emerges if we analyse far right success in the 1990 gemeenten 
elections. Table 5.5 outlines the results in all contested gemeenten: 
Table 5.5 - The Dutch Gemeenten Elections of 1990 - A Comparison of CD Representation and 
District Magnitude. 
PROVINCE GEMEENTEN DM VOTES % SEATS WON 
North Holland Purmerend 31 3.6 1 
South Holland Schiedam 33 6.3 2 
North Brabant Tilburg 39 1.2 -
North Holland Haariem 39 3.1 1 
South Holland Dordrecht 39 3.1 1 
South Holland Rotterdam 45 3.8 1 
South Holland 's-Gravenhage 45 4.3 2 
North Holland Amsterdam 45 4.4 2 
Utrecht Utrecht 45 6.6 1 
Source: Statistiek der Verkiezingen, 1990. 
As was the case with the BP in 1978, the far right CD appeared to be extremely small in 
national terms. The CD polled only 0.5% nationwide in the 1990 gemeenten elections and 
secured 11 of the 11071 available seats (0.1%). What is important, however, as we can 
see from Table 5.5, is that the party effectively concentrated electoral participation to 
only nine municipalities. As such, the far right was far better organised in 1991 than it 
had been in 1978 and presented lists in only the largest gemeenten where district 
magnitude did not pose a potential hindrance. As a result, the CD only failed to win 
representation in a single gemeenten - this being Tilburg where the CD's share of the vote 
was very low at 1.2%. From this analysis of district magnitude in the Netheriands we can 
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see that small parties have important lessons to learn about the opportunities for 
representation. When district magnitude is at its smallest (e,g. seven seats in Hei-en 
Boeicop in 1978) we are dealing with d? fecto thresholds which are approximately a 10% 
share of the vote in municipal elections. HerKe, the likelihood of high levels of 
proportionality occurring begin to decrease. 
5.2.3 Belgium Do we find a similar pattem emerging in Belgium where all small parties 
are expected to be penalised by the Imperiali seat distribution system? If we consider the 
performance of far right parties in the 1982 Brussels Communal Elections in Belgium, 
we can see that Vdksunie (VU) participation was restricted to the party presenting lists 
in five of the nineteen communes. Table 5.6 outlines the VU shares of the votes and seats 
won in each of these communes, and the number of seats available (DM) in each case. 
Table 5.6 - A Comparison of District Magnitude and VU Representation in the 1982 Belgian 
Communal Elections. 
COMMUNE DM VOTES % SEATS WON SEATS % 
Jette 35 5.3 1 2.9 
Vorst 37 1.7 
St. Jan Molenbeek 41 2.7 
Anderlecht 45 4.2 1 2.2 
Brussels 47 5.3 2 4.3 
Source: Ackeart, Katholieke Universiteit and Limburgs Universitair. 
We can see from Table 5.6 that VU participation in 1982 was restricted to the larger 
communes where we would expect traditional far right support in Belgium to be located 
(see Chapter Three section 3.4.2c), and tNs was also shown to be the case for far right 
participation in the 1990 Dutch gemeenten elections (see previous section). Second, we 
can see that the VU was affected by district magnitude. Despite polling a 5.3% share of the 
vote in both the communes of Brussels and Jette, the VU was more fairiy rewarded in 
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Boissels. where district magnitude is higher. Since the VU polled a 2.7% share of the 
vote in S L Jan Mdenbeek which has a district magnitude of 41 seats and was unrewarded, 
but polled a 5.3% share of the vote in Jette and secured one seat when the district 
magnitude was equal to 35 seats, this suggests that a combination of electoral factors at 
the municipal level create a de facto threshold of approxirrrately between 3% and 4%. As a 
small party, the VU was disadvantaged by the Imperiali PR system and as such, we can 
demonstrate that the far right is likely to achieve electoral representation only in the 
largest of communes when its share of the vote is well below the 10% level. 
By comparing Belgian sub-national election results in the Flemish gemeenten of 
GrobberKk)nk we can see that the de facto threshold increases as the district magnitude is 
reduced. In both the 1976 and 1982 elections 19 council seats were available, and in 
both elections the VU remained unrepresented despite polling respectable shares of the 
vote. For example, the VU polled a 7.2% share of the vote in 1976 and a 5.0% share of 
the vote in 1982. In both elections, the VU was the smallest and only unelected party, 
therefore emphasising that the use of the Imperiali PR system in a gemeenten with a small 
district magnitude worlcs to the disadvantage of the smallest parties. By comparing our 
findings to gemeenten elections in Brabant we can reinforce the importance of district 
magnitude to far right representation. For example, in the 1976 gemeenten election in 
Bertem the VU won none of the 17 available seats despite pdGng a 7.9% share of the vote. 
In the case studies in Table 5.6 we suggested that a 3% to 4% de facto threshold does exist 
in communes with 35 or more seats. The value of this de facto threshold increases as the 
number of seats decreases. Furthermore, the disproportionality between each party's 
share of the votes and share of the seats also increases when district magnitude is low. 
For example, in Haacht where the district magnitude was 21 seats, the VU polled 10.4% 
share of the vote in 1982 but secured only 1 seat (4.8%). 
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5.2.4 Britain By way of a contrast the British electoral system disadvantages small 
parties due to the fact that the majority of council seats at both the county and district 
level are decided in electoral areas with between one and three seats. In the 1970s the 
National Front (NF) polled significant share of the votes in several areas, including 
16.6% in Leicester in the 1976 district council elections, and 19%, 19.2% and 16.4% 
In Hackney South. Bethnal Green and Stepney respectively in the 1977 Greater London 
Council Elections. Whilst such shares of the vote would almost certainly have ensured 
representation in sub-national elections in Germany, the Netheriands and Belgium this 
has generally speaking not occurred in Britain. The exceptions are two seats won in 
district elections in Blackburn in 1976 and one seat won by the British National Party 
(BNP) in Tower Hamlets in the September 1993 by-election. The first past the post seat 
distribution system means that the finishing order is as important for any party as the 
share of the votes Its polls. Far right electoral participation in Britain has been low-key 
and sporadic since the (ate 1980s and we have a limited anrK)unt of data to analyze. For 
example, there were only four far right candidates in the 1991 district elections, and 
only three candidates In the 1992 Metropolitan Council elections. By comparison, a new 
wave of far right participation emerged for the council elections held in May 1994 when 
43 cancfidates from far rigjit parties stood. Table 5.7 compares some of the strongest 
shares of the votes polled 1:^  far right candidates in the May 1994 local elections: 
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Table 5.7 - Examples of Far Right Electoral Performance in Britain, 1994 - A comparison of 
single and three seat divisions. 
METROPOLITAN BOROUGHS - Single Seat 
Borouah Division Partv Vote 96 Position 
Birmingham longstanding NF 6.1 4th 
Oscott BNP 5.8 4th 
Dudley Lye & Wollescote NF 10.3 4th 
Rochdale Newbofd BNP 5.6 4th 
Smallbridge & 
Wardleworth BNP 5.1 3rd 
San dwell Princes End NF 9.0 3rd 
Tipton Green NF 9.1 3rd 
LONDON - Three Seats 
Borouah Division Partv Vote 96 Combined Vote % . 
Newham Custom House BNP 8.4 
BNP 8.2 21.0 
BNP 7.5 
Tower Hamlets MillwatI BNP 13.1 
BNP 11.4 28.5 
BNP 11.0 
Note: in multi-seat wards in London, BNP vote shares are expressed in terms of each candidate's 
share of all the votes polled. Usually, the aggregate share for all candidates of the same party is 
used in local election analysis (see column S). For the purposes of our analysis, it is more 
appropriate to show each individual share to highlight cases of split ticket voting. 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
Table 5.7 demonstrates that the BNP's most promising results in 1994 occurred in 
London, particularly Mitwalt. In addition to these results, two BNP candidates in the ward 
of Beckton in Newham polled a total share of the vote of 32.9%, though both seats went to 
Labour, who polled a combined vote share of the vote of 42%. What Is of even nrK>re 
interest is that the two Conservative candidates in Beckton were pushed back into third 
place by the BNP - gaining a collective share of the vote of only 20%. Similarly, the 
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Conservatives were pushed into fourth place in Millwall, The BNP also polled well in St. 
James' in Tower Hamlets, despite only providing one candidate in a two-seat ward - the 
BNP canr>e third with a 21.5% share of the vote. Table 5.7 also shows that the far right 
also polled well outside of London. In Lye and Wollescote in CXidley the NF polled a 10.3% 
share of the vote and in Rosedale In Broxboume the BNP polled a 10.1 % share of the vote 
- both single seat wards. We can see, therefore, that the main hindrance to far right 
representation in Britain is not necessarily the share of the vote per se but the fact that it 
is competing in a first past the post system of seat distributioa The strongest examples of 
vote shares in 1994 compare favourably with equivalent levels of far right support in 
sub-national elections in Germany, Belgium and the Netheriands, but the 
disproportionaiity of the electoral system serves to undermine the far right's electoral 
significance in Britain. 
To summarize, the outcome of our analysis of the impact of district magnitude upon the 
representation of the far right in Europe depends upon the level of election which we are 
analyzing. For example, at the laender and provincial levels in Germany and the 
Netheriands respectively district magnitude has no significant impact - but all district 
magnitudes at these levels tend to be high and therefore we would expect proportionality 
(all other factors being equal) to be high for all but the very smallest parties. At lower 
election levels {ag, municipal elections in Germany, the Netheriands and Belgium) we 
find that district magnitude does prohibit far right representation, though seat 
distribution (see section 5.5) is also important when far right parties poll a low share of 
the vote (/.e. below approximately 10%). The claims made by various authors outlined in 
Chapter Two about district magnitude can all be seen to be appropriate depencEna upon the 
level of analysis. Whilst district magnitude may not be a hindrance in higher electoral 
levels, it is a potential problem at the lowest levels in various countries, which is 
precisely where many far right parties poll their best results. In Britain, we have shown 
185 
that the use of multi-seat wards may encourage an increase in the level of far right 
electoral support due to *splrt-ticket voting' although support is rarely high enough to 
overcome the high de facto threshold created by a first past the post system. We will now 
consider the impact of electoral thresholds in more detail. 
5.3 The Impact of Jure apd.Qefacto Thresholds Upop Far Right Representation 
For our analysis of the effect of thresholds upon the representation of far right parties in 
Europe. Gennany provides the only example of the use of a de jure threshold. In this 
section will also outline the de facto thresholds created in Belgium by the combined effect 
of various electoral factors, thus identifying levels of support below which the far right 
and other small parties cannot expect to receive seats. As outlined previously in Chapter 
Two section 2.2.3, cfe fecto thresholds derive primarily from a combination of the seat 
distribution method, district magnitude, and the number of parties participating within 
each electoral district in each election. 
5.3.1. Germanv In Germany the use of the 5% threshold has frequently achieved the 
desired effect of excluding extremist and anti-system parties from representation. For 
example, the NPD contested four consecuth^e Hamburg Land elections from 1966 to 1978, 
achieving its most successful share of the vote of 3.9% in 1966 and gradually declining to 
only 0.3% share of the vote in 1978. Under the d'Hondt seats allocation rules without a 
threshold the NPD's actual poll support of 36654 votes in. 1966 would have given the 
party 4 out of the 120 available seats. The 5% threshold, therefore, was the determinant 
factor in the non-representation of the NPD. The NPD also participated in the Saariand 
Land elections held in 1970, 1975, 1985 and 1990 and again failed to secure 
representation in any of these elections, the party's strongest share of the vote was 3.4% 
in 1970. Of the ax contesting parties in this election only two (the CDU and SPD) 
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secured any of the SO available seats since the FOP, DKP, NPD and SVP all polled below 
5% share of the vote, as shown in Table 5.8: 
Table 5.8 - A Comparison of Each Party's Share of the Vote and Seats, and Measures of 
Proportionality for the Saarland Land Election, 1970. 
PARTIES • 
CDU SPD FDP DKP NPD . SVP 
Votes % 47.9 40.8 4.4 2.7 3 .4 0.9 
Seats % 54.0 46.0 . . . . 
Overall Measures of Disproportionatrty: 
LH= 11.4 LS = 12.8 SL=: 7.1 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
The particularly high disproportionality figures registered in Table 5.8 are not 
surprising when we consider that the total 'wasted vote' in 1970 (i.e. the total share of 
the vote polled by parties who were left unrepresented) was 11.4%. Although a 5% 
threshold is not a hurdle exclusively to far right parties, we have produced evidence to 
suggest that it has been a significant hindrance for the NPD in several Land over a number 
of elections. As a member of the general group 'minority parties*, the far right in 
Germany is continuously hindered by the German de jure threshold. 
We can demonstrate that the 5% threshold is also an obstacle to far right representation 
below the Laender electoral level. Data available for the 1989 North Rhine Westphalia 
gemeinden elections demonstrates that the Republikaner Party provided lists in 39 
gemeinden in total (out of 373), though in many of these it was unable to reach the 5% 
threshold. The party's three best results were in Iseriohn (8.9% share of the votes and 
7.5% share of the seats), Alsdorf (7.6% share of the votes and 6.7% share of the seats) 
and in Mari (7.5% share of the votes and 8.7% share of the seats). In Table 5.9 we 
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compare results in Iseriohn to gemeinden where the Republikaner Party polled 5% but 
was left unrewarded. We have also included the district magnitude (DM) to emptasize the 
relative similarity in gemeinde size: 
Table 5.9 - Comparing Representation for Republikaner Candidates in the North Rhine Westphalia 
Local Elections, 1989 with Far Right Support in the Bremen Land Election, 1987. 
GEMEINDE PARTIES 
Iseriohn 
Votes 96 
Seats % 
SPD CDU 
39.5 36.8 
39.6 39.2 
FDP 
5.7 
5.7 
REP 
8 .9 
7 . 5 
Local list 
9.0 
5.7 
DM 
51 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 4.2 LS = 3.1 SL = 1.5 
Frenchen 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD CDU 
49.4 34.3 
53.3 37.8 
Greens 
6.0 
4.4 
FDP 
5.3 
4.4 
REP 
5.0 
DM 
45 
Overall Measures of Oisproportionality: 
LH = 7.4 LS = 5.3 SL = 6.2 
Konigswinter 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD CDU 
30.1 45.4 
31.1 48.9 
Greens 
10.1 
11.1 
FDP 
9.4 
8.9 
REP 
5.0 
DM 
45 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 5.5 LS = 4.4 SL = 5.4 
Bremen Land 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD CDU 
50.5 23.4 
54.0 25.0 
Greens 
10.2 
10.0 
FDP 
10.0 
10.0 
DVU 
3 .4 
1 .0 
REP 
1 . 2 
Others 
1.2 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 5.1 LS = 3.4 SL = 4.5 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
We can see that the non-representation of the Repubiikaner in Frenchen and Konigswinter 
created higher measures of disproportionality for all three indices in these gemeinden. In 
Frenchen and Konigswinter, the Republikaner was excluded from representation because 
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it did not surpass the 5% threshold. As the example of Frenchen shows, a share of the vote 
of only 0 . 3 % more allowed the FDP two seats on the local council. Even in Iseriohn, 
however, the Republikaner party was slightly under represented with seats due to the 
seats distribution system (see section 5.5) . By comparison, in Bremen the DVU has 
benefited from the division of the Land into two separate electoral areas. In 1987 the DVU 
secured a 1% share of the seats with 3.4% share of the votes overall. Despite being under 
represented the party was able to overcome the 5% threshold due to the particular 
geographic concentration of its support in the sub-division of Bremerhaven (see Chapter 
Four section 4.5 .2 for an explartation). We will now assess the influence of de facto 
thresholds. 
5 .3 .2 Belgium If we turn our analysis towards municipal elections in Belgium we can 
identify the existence of de facto thresholds. Table 5 .10 demonstrates electoral support 
for the VU in the gemeenten of Kalmouth, where district magnitude was 23 seats, over 
three sets of elections. 
Table 5.10 - A Comparison of VU Representation in the Kalmouth Council Elections, 1 976-1988. 
YEAR PARTIES 
1976 CVP LGl SP VU PW LG3 LG2 DM 
Votes96 43.2 20.0 13.6 1 0 . 9 6.8 4.5 1.0 23 
Seats % 52.2 21.7 13.0 8 .7 4.4 
Overalt Measures of Disproportionaltty: 
LH=10 .8 LS = 7.7 SL = 8.9 
1982 CVP LG2 LGl SP VU Agalev PW DM 
Votes % 28.4 18.5 16.5 13.4 9 . 6 7.9 5.7 23 
Seats % 34.8 21.7 17.4 13.0 8 .7 4.4 
Overall Measures of [^sproportionality: 
LH=: 10.5 LS = 7.0 S L = 9.4 
continued. 
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1988 CVP LG2 $P Agalev PW VU LG1 LG3 DM 
Votes % 38.2 24.6 10.8 8.7 5.9 5 .0 4.4 2.S 23 
Seats % 52.2 30.4 8.7 4.4 4.4 - - -
Overall Measures of Disproportionaiity: 
LH= 19.9 L S = 12.4 SL = 21.4 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections database 
By refening to these three sets of elections we can see that the combination of the 
Imperiali seat distribution system in a gemeenten with a district magnitude of 23 seats 
creates a de facto threshold of approximately 5.5% share of the vote. The number of 
competing parties is fairly constant, increasing from seven parties in 1976 and 1982 to 
eight parties by the time of the 1988 election and as such we would only expect this to 
have a minimal effect if any upon the de facto threshold. Overall disproportionaiity was 
significantly higher in the 1988 election than for the 1976 and 1982 elections due to the 
fact that three parties polled shares of the votes below de facto threshold, and this allowed 
the CVP to become significantly over represented (receiving a 14% greater share of the 
seats than it received in shares of the votes). Since the far right VU polled a share of the 
vote below the 5.5% de fecto threshold In 1988 the party was not represented, as it had 
been In 1976 and 1982. 
By turning to the province of East Vlaanderen, we can also use the Gavere gemeenten 
elections held in 1982 and 1988 to again demonstrate the de facto threshold created by a 
low district magnitude, which in this case was 21 seats for both elections: 
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Table 5.11 - A Comparison of VU Representation in the Gavere Council Elections, 1982 & 1988. 
YEAR PARTIES 
1982 LG2 CVP SP VU 
Votes % 46.8 38.6 11.1 3 .6 
Seats % 52.4 42.9 4.8 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 9.9 LS = 7.2 LS = 7.2 
7955 LG2 CVP SP VU LG4 Agafev LG3 
Votes % 48.1 21.3 13.1 6 . 5 4.1 3.5 3.3 
Seats % 61.9 23.8 14.3 - - - • -
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 17.5 LS = 11,9 LS = 21.9 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
By comparing the disproportionality figures for the two sets of elections in Gavere we can 
see that the 1988 elections produced a much higher level of disproportionality. Whilst 
seven parties participated in the 1988 election only three were successful in winning 
seats as Table 5.11 shows, and the VU was the largest of these parties not to win a seat 
Since the VU polled a 6.5% share of the vote in 1988 we can claim tfrat the combination of 
the Imperiali seat distribution system and a district magnitude of 21 seats creates a (h 
facto threshold of at least 6.5%. We have demonstrated, therefore, that district magnitude 
is particulariy important in creating de ^cto thresholds at the lowest electoral level, and 
we can agree with Ujphart (1994a) that de jure thresholds are by no means a guarantee 
of representation. By assessirrg local elections in Belgium, we can see that municipals 
with a medium district magnitude ( e g 21 - 23 seats) creates a /acto threshold of 
between 5.5 - 6.5% - a particular hindrance for small far right parties. We will now 
assess whether those features eariier identified as relevant to secorid order elections (see 
Chapter One section 1.5) help to explain far right electoral support an the sub-national 
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level. 
5.4 The Second Order Hvoothesis and Far Right Support 
In Chapter One section 1.5 we suggested that small, and particularly anti-system, parties 
may enjoy a greater level of support in second order elections because there is 
Mess-at-stake\ Furthernwe, we presented research which suggests that the timing of 
the election in relation to the general election timetable Is also important. If this is the 
case, we may expect to see long term patterns of peaks and troughs in far right support 
across countries. We will assess whether there is any evidence of this by looking at 
pattems of far right support in Germany, the Netheriands and Britain. 
5.4.1 • Germany We have already shown in section 5.3.1 that the far right in Germany 
have been constrained by the 5% threshold in the Hamburg Land elections - for example, 
the NPD's strongest result was a 3.9% share of the vote in 1966. Also interesting in this 
election was the tow turnout which was 68.9%, as shown in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 - Variations in Turnout and Far Right Support in German General and Land Elections, 
1965-1994. 
TYPE OF ELECTION YEAR 
&jnd€stag 7965 7969 7972 1980 1987 7 990 1994 
Tumout % 86.8 86.7 91.1 88.6 84.4 77.8 79.1 
NPD % 2.0 4.3 0.6 0.2 0.6 3.0 -
REP % - - - - - 2.1 1.9 
DVU% - - - - 0.6 - -
Bavaria Land 7966 7970 7974 7986 7 990 7994 
Tumout % 80.6 79.5 77.7 70.1 65.9 68.0 
NPD % 7.4 2.9 2.2 0.5 - -
REP % - - - - 4.9 3.9 
continued. 
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Bremen Land 1967 1971 1975 1979 1987 1991 
Tumout % 76.1 79.4 81.6 78.0 75.1 71.3 
NPD% 8.8 2.8 1.1 0.4 
R E P % - - - - 1.2 1.5 
DVU% - - - - 3.4 6.2 
Hamburg Land 1966 1970 1974 1978 1991 1993 
Tumout % 68.9 72.6 79.5 75.8 65.3 69.6 
NPD% 3.9 2.7 0.8 0.3 
REP & - - - - 1.2 4.8 
DVU% - - - - - 2.4 
Saarland 1970 1975 1985 1990 
Tumout % 81.8 87.9 83.5 82.4 
NPD % 3.4 0.7 0.7 0.2 
REP 96 - - - 3.4 
Schteswig-Holstein 1979 1988 7 992 
Tumout % 82.9 76.8 71.2 
NPD% 0.2 1.2 
REP % - 0.6 1.2 
DVU% - - 6.3 
Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives. Paterson & Southern 1991: 185. University of 
Plymouth Local Elections Database 
We can see from Table 5.12 that the tumout in the 1966 Hamburg Land election was the 
lowest until 1991. The tumout in Hamburg in 1966 is also low compared to that in 
general elections and other Land in the same period. The tumout was also lower than 
usual in the Hamburg and Bremen Laender elections held in 1991 where the Republikaner 
Party made a small electoral breakthrough (though not enough to secure any seats). The 
DVU was far more successful in Bremen in 1991. These low tumout figures are not so 
surprising, however, If we relate to the fact that a General Election was held in Germany 
in the previous year. It may be the case that small anti-system parties appear to poll 
well when in fact support for the mainstream catch-all parties (/.e. the CDU and SPD in 
Germany) is at an ebb. The timing of both elections one year after the general election 
may fit the Van der Eijk hypothesis (1994) that a rise in far right support in Germany is 
effectively a 'protest vote*. 
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In Bremen the NPD contested all four Land elections in the period 1967 to 1979. with its 
share of the vote slowly declining from 8.8% to 0.4%. The 8.8% share of the vote in 
1967 entitled the party to eight of the 100 Landtag seats and as such the NPD enjoyed 
closely proportional representation. Again, turnout was fairly low for a Land election 
(76.1% - as compared to 86.2% in West Bertin In the same year) and remained the 
lowest until the 1987 Land election (75.1%). The 1967 election was heW mid-term 
between the national electtons of 1965 and 1969 and as such the argument that this was a 
protest vote is more justified. Furthenmore, in Schleswig-Holstein, the far right DVU 
secured a 6.7% share of the seats with a 6.3% share of the vote in the 1992 Land election, 
the party perfomied better than the Greens (which polled a 4.9% share of the vote) in an 
election where turnout was particularty low - only 71.2%. Both the low turnouts and 
level of far right support in Schleswig-Holstein strengthen the hypothesis that the 1992 
Land election was perceived by the electorate as an opportunity to express a mid-term 
protest against the main parties. Yet we can see from other results produced in Table 
5.12 that far right support does not improve in all Land in mid-pariiamentary election 
terms, As such, far right support cannot be explained purely in relation to electoral 
timing, and as such relies on more complex political and local issues. 
Does a relationship exist between turnout and far right support at the lower electoral 
levels in Germany? The October 1989 North Rhine Westphalia Kreise Elections provide 
another example of the far right's attempts to participate in sub-national government, 
and electoral participation was largely by the Republikaner Party. Far right candidates 
contested 28 out of 54 districts in total, and in most cases only one far right candidate 
stood in order to prevent a splitting of potential far right support. In the tendful of cases 
where two far right parties partidpated the Republikaner was the stronger party whilst 
the NPD and DVU were very much the poor relations, as the data presented in Table 5.13 
demonstrates: 
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Table 5.13 - Comparing Support for the Far Right (share of the votes and share of the seats) in 
North Rhine Westphalia Kreise Elections, 1989, using examples of large and small district 
magnitude (DM). 
1) LARGE DISTRICTS 
ELECTORAL AREA PARTIES 
M Land 
Votes % 
SPD 
43.0 
CDU 
37.5 
Green 
8.3 
FDP 
6.5 
REP 
2 .3 
Others 
2.4 
Tumout 
65.6 
Koln 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
42.1 
43.2 
CDU 
30.5 
31.5 
Green 
11.7 
11.6 
FDP 
7.0 
6.3 
REP 
7.4 
7 .4 
NPD 
0 . 2 
Others 
1.1 
DM 
95 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 2.1 LS = 1.3 S L = 1.4 
Dusseldorf 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
39.7 
39.8 
CDU 
37.5 
38.6 
Green 
9.9 
9.6 
fDP 
6.0 
6.0 
REP 
6 . 0 
6 .0 
DKP 
0.8 
HP 
0.1 
DM 
83 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 1.2 LS = 1.0 SL = 1.0 
Dortmund 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
52.9 
56.6 
CDU 
25.7 
27.7 
Green 
9.8 
9.6 
REP 
6 . 3 
6 . 0 
FDP 
3.0 
NPD 
0.1 
others 
1.4 
DM 
83 
Overall Measures of Proportionality; 
LH = 5.8 LS = 4.2 SL = 5.8 
2) SMALL DISTRICTS 
ELECTORAL AREA PARTIES 
Gelsenkirchen 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
53.1 
56.7 
CDU 
26.0 
26.9 
Green REP 
9.6 7 . 4 
9.0 7 . 5 
PDP 
2.5 
DKP 
0.8 
MLPD 
0.6 
DM 
67 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 4.6 LS = 3.3 SL = 4.3 
Monchengiadbach 
Votes % 
Seats % 
CDU SPD 
42.6 36.5 
46.3 38.8 
Green fDP 
8.0 7.1 
7.5 7.5 
REP 
4 . 4 
DVU 
0 . 5 
others 
0.9 
DM 
67 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 6.4 LS = 4.5 SL = 6.3 continued. 
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ELECTORAL AREA PARTIES 
Wuppertal SPD CDU Green FDP NPD DKP Wah 
Votes % 44.3 32.8 9.5 9.5 3 . 3 0.5 0.3 
Seats % 47.8 34.3 9.0 9.0 - - -
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 4.5 LS = 3.6 SL = 4.4 
Stanfurt CDU SPD Green FDP NPD DM 
Votes % 42.6 40.9 8.2 7.5 0 . 9 61 
Seats % 44.3 41.0 8.2 6.6 -
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 1.8 LS = 1.5 S L = 1.1 
Hamm SPD CDU Green REP FDP DVU DKP 
Votes% 45.2 35.8 7.1 7.1 3.5 1.1 0.1 
Seats % 49.2 37.3 6.8 6 . 8 - - -
DM 
63 
DM 
59 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
LH = 5.4 LS = 4.0 SL = 5.2 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Sources: Der Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. University of Plymouth Local 
Elections Database. 
We can see from Table 5.13 that the Republikaner polled well in the larger districts, 
though representation was more disproportional in Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen and 
Monchengladbach than in Dusseldorf. As such, there is not a truly positive correlation 
between district magnitude and proportionality, though disproportionality is generally 
lower in the larger districts (ag. Koln and Dusseldorf). Furthermore, the 'wasted vote' 
in Dusseldorf was small compared to Gelsenkirchen and Hamm - hence the low 
disproportionality measures. We can see from Table 5.13 that there are in fact no cases 
of a ds facto threshold higher than the constitutional threshold of 5% being in operation. 
In Gelsenkirchen, Wuppertal, Dortmund and Hamm the disproportionality measures are 
created by the number of parties that are unrewarded whilst high proportionality in 
Dusseldorf and Stanfurt resulted from the way in which the shares of the votes were 
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spread. As these elections were held a year before the first all-German General Election 
and strong far right support compared to support for the other small parties {eg, DKP, 
HP and MLPD) may have resulted from the North Rhine Westphalian electorate using this 
opportunity to protest against mainstream politics. 
We will now consider electoral behaviour in the state of Hessen, which has been one of the 
most fervent areas of far right contemporary support since the late 1980s for both the 
REP and NPD, and where It is not unusual to see the far right polling around 10% share of 
the vote in Krelse elections. In the 1989 and 1993 Kreise Elections far right support in 
selected Kreise was as follows: 
Table 5.14 - Comparing Far Right Electoral Success in the Hessen Kreise Elections, 1989 and 
1993. 
ALL LAND PARTY TURNOUT (%) 
1989 
1993 
Votes % 
Votes % 
SPD CDU Green FDP REP NPD 
45.1 34.5 8.6 4.6 0 . 8 0 . 9 79.2 
37.5 31.9 10.2 4.9 8 . 2 0 . 8 72.4 
HERSFELD-ROTENBURG PARTY TURNOm" (%) DM 
1989 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
51.9 
57.4 
CDU 
32.8 
36.1 
Green NPD 
6.8 4 . 9 
6.6 
FDP 
3.5 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 8.8 LS = 6.3 SL = 9.4 
81.9 61 
1993 
Votes % 
Seats% 
SPD 
46.6 
49.2 
CDU 
27.5 
29.5 
Green 
8.0 
8.2 
REP 
6 . 3 
6 . 6 
FDP 
3.6 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH=:6.5 LS = 4.1 SL 7.1 
NPD 
2 . 9 73.7 61 
continued. 
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RHEINGAU-TAUNUS PARTY TURNOUT (%) DM 
1989 SPD CDU REP Green 
Votes % 37.8 32.3 1 0 . 5 8.9 
Seats % 39.4 33.8 1 1.3 9.9 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 5.2 LS = 3.0 
7993 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
34.5 
35.2 
CDU 
31.7 
32.4 
REP Green 
1 3 . 2 11.4 
14.1 11.3 
Overall Measures of Disproportionality: 
LH = 2.3 L S = 1.5 
FDP 
5.4 
5.6 
NPD 
1.6 
SL = 5.5 
FDP 
7.6 
7.0 
Other 
1.6 
SL = 1.7 
Other 
3.5 77.3 
69.2 
71 
71 
PARTY TURNOUT (%) DM 
1989 
Votes % 
Seats 96 
SPD 
40.5 
48.1 
CDU Green 
30.8 7.3 
36.7 8.9 
REP 
7 . 0 
6 . 3 
NPD 
4 . 8 
FDP 
4.2 
0!^ 
0.8 77.8 79 
Overall Measures of 
LH = 15.1 
Disproportionality: 
LS = 8.9 SL = 17.3 
1993 
Votes % 
Seats % 
SPD 
35.8 
39.5 
CDU Green 
32.2 8.7 
34.6 9.9 
REP 
8 . 6 
8 . 6 
FDP 
4.3 
NPD 
3 . 4 69.2 81 
Overall Measures of 
LH = 8.3 
Disproportionality: 
LS = 5.1 SL = 9.2 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database. 
Both the 1989 and 1993 elections were held mid-term in relation to German national 
elections (held in 1987, 1990 and 1994) and as such it is not surprising to see what 
may potentially be described as mid-term protest voting. Kreise elections held in 1993 
marked the growth in success of the Republikaner in particular, and the far right as a 
whole contested elections in a total of 22 out of 26 districts. The importance of the 1993 
elections in establishing the Republikaner as a serious electoral contender cannot be 
underestimated. In some districts the party built upon a nonexistent or very small base of 
support to the extent that the Republikaner became the third largest party in Offenbach au 
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h4ain, Wiesbaden, Main-Kinzig-Kreis and Rheingau-Taunus. Table 5.14 demonstrates • 
that a notable decline in turnout occun-ed in 1993 compared to the 1989 election, and the 
Republikaner appears to have performed best when turnout was lowest. We can see that 
in the two cases of Rheingau-Taunus (1989 and 1993) and Hersfeld-Rotenburg (1993) 
far right parties were slightly over-rewarded with seats. As such, the 1993 Hessen 
Kreise elections may be a classic example of mld-tenn protest voting, and the far right 
may have capitalized on the electorate's apparent disillusionment with the mainstream 
centre parties since these elections were held some 18 months before the General Election 
and were therefore a key opportunity for the electorate to express its disenchantment 
Has the same pattern of far right electoral success followed the second order hypothesis in 
the Netherlands? 
5.4.2. The Netherlands In provincial elections held in the Netheriands in 1966 the BP 
was the only far right party. The BP provided lists in each of the eleven provinces, and 
secured an overall share of the vote of 6.7% and 44 seats. The party's performance was 
strongest in Gelderiand (9.0% overall share of the vote and six seats) and weakest in 
Friesland (4.2% share of the vote), though this was still enough support to secure the 
party two seats. What is perhaps most interesting about this election is that the BP not 
only contested each province, but also provided lists in every one of the 73 electoral 
districts. As such, far right participation in 1966 did not have a 'localised* element as 
our previous examples of the far right in Germany have demonstrated. In the province of 
Gelderiand, the party polled an impressive 12.3% share of the vote in Apeldoom, 10.5% 
share of the vote in Harderwijk and 10.3% share of the vote in Ede. Overall tumout rn 
this set of elections was 94.6% due to compulsory voting. It could be argued, therefore, 
that the 1966 provincial elections acted as a waming to the governing parties, since they 
were held only 11 months before the 1967 General Election, and according to our 
hypothesis in Chapter One section 1.5 the electorate is more likely to voice a dissenting 
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voice against the political mainstream if voting is compulsory rather than optional. It is 
not surprising to see that the support for the BP had dropped to 4.7% for the Netheriands 
as a whole in the 1967 General Election (2% lower than in the 1966 provincial 
elections), though of course this is still a strong national result for a far right party 
compared to Germany. Table 5.15 outlines variations in far right support in Dutch 
elections over 28 years: 
Table 5.15 - Variations in Far Right Electoral Support at Various Levels in the Netheriands, 
1966-1994. 
TYPE OF ELECTION YEAR VOTES % SEATS WON 
General Election 1967 4.7 7 
General Election 1994 2.5 3 
TYPE OF ELECTION YEAR AREA 
Provincial Elections 1966 Netheriands Geldertand Freisland 
Votes % 6.7 9.0 4.2 
Seats Won 44 6 2 
Provincial Elections 1987 Netherlands Utrecht North Holland South Holland 
Votes % 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Provisional Elections 1991 Netherlands Utrecht Worth Holland South Holland 
Votes % 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.1 
Seats Won 3 1 1 1 
1966 & 1967; far right = BP 
1987, 1991 & 1994; far right = CD 
Sources: Nederiands Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. 
By the time of the Netheriands provincial elections held in 1987, the competing parties 
from the far right had changed to the CD and the smaller Centrumpartij '86 {CP86). 
Whilst the CD polled 0.3% share of the vote nationally, the CP86 polled a tiny share of the 
vote - receiving only 1,032 votes out of over 7 million polled. The CP86 provided lists 
in Flevoland only in 1987, whilst the CD stood in three provinces in total - polling 0.4% 
share of the vote in Utrecht, 0.5% share of the vote in North Holland and 0.7% share of 
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the vote in South Holland (see Table 5.15). As a result of abolishing compulsory voting in 
1970 the overall turnout is these elections was only 66%, but even this is a sharp 
decrease of 13% compared to provincial elections held in 1978. This was not matched in 
1987. however, by a sharp rise in far right support. This set of provincial elections was 
held only 10 months after a General Bection and we would expect protest voting to be less 
likely to occur. In the case of the Netherlands provincial elections, therefore, we do not 
have convincing evidence that voters are using provincial elections as a means of 
'punishing' major parties. Though far right support is concentrated and relatively 
effective, it is by FK) means widespread or dramatically different between first and second 
order elections. 
In comparison to 1987, the provincial elections held in March 1991 saw both the CD and 
CP86 increase their shares of the votes - the CD polling 1.0% share of the votes 
nation-wide, and the CP86 polling 0.3% share of the votes. The 1% share achieved by the 
CD was enough to secure the party three seats. The CD provided lists in seven provinces 
in total - its lowest level of support being a 0.4% share of the vote in North Brabant and 
polling strongest in North Holland and South Holland (2.1% share of the vote in both) -
winning one seat in each and a third in Utrecht (with a 1.6% share of the vote). CD lists 
were also present in Freistand, Flevoland, Geldertand and North Brabant. If we break 
support for the CD down further to the gemeenten electoral area we can see that the CD 
polled 3.7% share of the vote in the gemeenten of Utrecht. In the North Holland province, 
the CD polled strongest in Amsterdam (4.1% share of the vote) and Punmerend (3.5% 
share of the vote). In South Holland the CD polled 4.5% share of the vote in 
's-Gravenhage, 4.1% share of the vote in Rotterdam and 4.0% share of the vote in 
Scheidam. As such, we can claim that the far right enjoyed its strongest support in the 
larger urban areas (as it did in the 1990 gen>eenten elections - see Table 5.5). 
Furthermore, the 1991 elections occurred mid-term between general elections and as 
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such may provide evidence of a recent move towards second order protest voting in Dutch 
elections. 
If we now focus our analysis on the lower level of gemeenten elections in the Netherlands 
we have interesting evidence from those elections held in 1974, two months after the 
provincial elections of that year. In the March 1974 provincial elections, the BP polled a 
3.1% share of the vote overall and secured 2.5% of the available seats. The strength of its 
support varied from a 6.4% share of the vote in North Brabant to a low of 1.4% share of 
the vote in Friesland. Can we identify correlations between the different elections in the 
levels of support for the far right? Support for the far right in local elections was lower 
than in the provincial elections, the BP polled 0.7% share of the vote nationally and 
secured 36 of the 11887 available seats (0.3%). As in the 1966 municipal elections, 
the party polled strongest in Gelderland (1.4% share of the vote compared to 4.5% in the 
provincial elections in March) and weakest in Umburg (0.2% share of the vote compared 
to 3.2% in the provincial elections in March). Yet the BP polled only 0.8% share of the 
vote in North Brabant, in comparison to what was the party's best result in the 1974 
provincial elections (6.4% share of the vote). The BP'S potential was weakened by its 
inability to provide lists in many gemeenten, and it could be suggested that weak BP 
support was linked to the lack of availability of candidates. Table 5.16 outlines election 
results in those municipalities in which the BP received over 10% of the vote. 
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Table 5.16 - Cases of Strongest BP Support in Dutch Gemeenten Elections, 1974. 
GEMEENTEN PARTIES TURNOUT (%) DM 
Marum 
Votes % 
Seats won 
PVDA 
34.2 
5 
WD 
13.8 
2 
BP 
1 2 .4 
2 
PSP 
5.6 
GVP PCG 
3.4 0.7 
4 
74.5 13 
Nieuwieusen 
Votes % 
No. Seats 
CHU PVDA 
31.7 16.3 
4 1 
BP AR WD GVP SGP 
1 4 .7 13.0 6.9 4.6 3.9 
Other 
8.9 
2 
79.3 13 
Andijk 
Votes % 
No. Seats 
CDA 
52.6 
6 
21.3 
2 
CPA/ 
13.1 
2 
BP 
1 3.0 
1 
Other 
2.8 73.3 11 
Hoogkarspel 
Votes % 
No. Seats 
KVP 
46.8 
5 
PVDA 
15.1 
2 
ep 
1 0 . 6 
1 
CPN 
0.7 
Other 
26.8 
3 
69.0 11 
Limmen 
Votes % 
No. Seats 
B P 
1 5.1 
2 
CPA/ 
9.7 
1 
Other 
75.2 
8 
69.9 11 
Hei-en-Boeicop AR PC CHU SGP PVDA BP 
Votes% 26.1 21.5 15.2 13.5 12.9 1 0 . 8 
No. Seats 2 1 1 1 1 1 
94.8 
Ophermert 
Votes % 
No. Seats 
PVDA 
33.2 
2 
BP 
1 7.9 
1 
Other 
48.9 
4 
81.2 
Source: Statistiek der Verkiezingen, 1 974. 
What is interesting about these results is that the BP polled best in small municipalities, 
in which the electorate was often well below 10,000. Yet as well as belonging to the far 
right, the BP was also known as the 'farmers' party and, as such, would be more 
attractive to rural voters than the contemporary far right parties which are most 
successful in the larger, urban areas of the Netherlands. In the gemeenten listed in Table 
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5.16, turnout ranged from 69% to 94.8%, whilst the average turnout nation-wide for 
these elections was only 69.1%. Hence, although the far right polled less well than in the 
provincial elections eariier that year, the BP in fact appeared to do best in smaller 
gemeenten where turnout was higher than the national average. Furthermore, there is 
little correlation between levels of support in the provincial elections in March 1974 and 
the genr>eenten electioris held only two months later. The evidence from Dutch gemeenten 
elections held in the 1970s, does not support the hypothesis that less Is at stake (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980), or the hypothesis that far right support derives from apathy (van der 
Eljk 1994), though we may have some evidence to suggest that this is changing in the 
1990s. 
5.4.3. Britain The far right in Britain is disadvantaged by the electoral system since a 
much higher share of the vote is needed to secure seats than in PR countries and thus 
representation Is a rare event. This does not mean, however, that we should overiook 
variations in support, especially in relation to election timing and turnout. It has been 
suggested (Betz 1993) that the recent revival In support for parties of the far right is In 
fact a 'protest* vote reflecting a general distrust in the mainstream political parties. This 
may explain why sub-national electoral success in Tower Hamlets was short-lived (the 
seat won in the September 1993 by-election was reclaimed by the Labour Party in the 
May 1994 local elections). Support for the five NF candidates who stood in the June 
1994 European Elections was much weaker than results witnessed at the local level a 
month eariier (the highest share of the vote was 2.6% in Binmingham West) and, 
therefore, does not support generalisations made about voting behaviour in all second 
order elections. As such, support for the far right appears to be a particular localised 
feature of British electoral politics, with such parties polling most successfully in inner 
London, the West Midlands and Staffordshire areas. 
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By comparing far right shares of the vote, the number of contested seats and turnout in 
recent local elections we may also be able to judge if electoral success is a result of 'split 
ticket voting' - that is, do voters choose candidates from different parties if they have 
more than one vote? For example, In the Custom House and Silvertown ward in 1994 the 
three BNP candidates polled 21% share of the vote in total, and tumout was 39.3%. Table 
5.17 compares share of the votes and tumout for BNP candidates in Tower Hamlets. 
Table 5.17. - Overall BNP Share of the Vote and Tumout (%) in Tower Hamlets wards, Local 
Elections May 1994. 
WARD VOTES % TURNOUT POSmON 
St. Peters (one candidate) 19.1 53.1 3rd 
St. James (one candidate) 21.5 60.9 3rd 
Holy Trinity* 19.3 58.2 3rd 
Millwall* 28.3 66.5 2nd 
* in both wards there were 3 BNP candidates due to 3 vacandes. Column 2 represents the 
average votes for all BNP candidates per ward. 
Source: University of Plymouth Local Elections Database 
We can see from these results that whilst far right support was greater than a 15% share 
of the vote in each case (thereby challenging the notion that it is a 'small* party), the 
tumout figures were also particularly high for local elections. This could have two 
implications; (i) a disillusioned electorate made the effort to vote and in doing so opted for 
the far right as a protest, or (ii) the high profile of the BNP in Tower Hamlets 
(especially cultivated with the help of the media after the September 1993 by-election) 
prompted the electorate to mobilise in favour of other parties. In either case, support for 
the BNP was high, but not enough to win seats. If we refer back to Table 5.7 which shows 
each candidate's share of the vote in Millwall we can see that the figures are not the same 
and the BNP obviously benefited from split ticket voting. In contrast, away from London, 
the far right may have benefited from low turnout. In the Sandwell ward of Tipton Green, 
the NF polled 9.1% share of the vote whilst the tumout was only 35.7% and in the ward of 
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Princes End the NF polled 9% share of the vote, with turnout being only 23.6% - both 
single seat wards. As such, it is difficult to establish hard and fast rules about support for 
the far right in Britain when assessing sub-rational elections in temrts of timing and 
turnout, but we can suggest that such parties are likely to perform better in Britain in 
multi-seat wards. Whilst the far right in Germany appear to poll wed in mid-term 
elections, the pattern that emerges in the Netheriands is a little more complex. 
5.5 - The Impact of Seat Distribution Upon Far Right Representation 
In this section we will consider the impact of the seat distribution system upon far right 
representation. We stated in Chapter Two that the term proportional representation may 
be misleading since there are different seat allocation systems, many of which work to the 
advantage of larger parties. In this section we will consider which parties of the far right 
have been either (i) smalt enough to expect under-representatron, or (ii) are a large 
enough party to be over rewarded by different seat distribution systems. We will look at 
far right parties in Germany, the Netheriands, Belgium and Britain. 
5.5.1. Germany We have demortstrated in eariier sections that parties of the far right 
often poll shares of the votes so small that even representation at the Land level is not 
possible. For example, NPD participation in Schleswig-Holstein Land elections has been 
sporadic. In 1979 the NPD achieved only a 0.2% share of the vote making it one of four 
small unrepresented parties (eight parties in total contested this election). In 1988 the 
party performed equally as poorly - polling a 0.14% share of the vote. Yet in this 
election only three of the twelve participating parties were represented. The combined 
'wasted vote' for the nine other parties (none of which reached the 5% threshold) was 
almost 12% of the vote. Similarty, the NPD has had Itttle noticeable effect in the 1990 
North Rhine Westphalia Land elections, polling a mere 0.04% share of the vote. In 
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Saxony, the NPD provided candidates for the 1990 Land election and polled only 0.7% 
share of the vote. This election was contested by 12 parties in total, though only five were 
rewarded with seats. 
If we move away from the Land level, however, and consider elections held at lower 
sub-national levels (in both Gemiany and other countries) we may see parties of the far 
right playing a more significant role. In section 5.2.1 we demonstrated that the far right 
had been disadvantaged in the 1989 Saariand gemeinden elections in Wadgasen by the seat 
distribution system, and that under the d'Hondt rules the district magnitude would need to 
be at least 15 seats for the NPD to have been represented. Table 5.18 demonstrates how 
this is the case. The second row indicates the raw votes polled by each party in Wadgasen 
and each row below indicates the divisor left after a seat is allocated. The order of seat 
distribution is indicated by the figure in brackets: 
Table S.l 8 - Seats Required under the d'Hondt rules for the NPD to be represented in Wadgasen, 
Saarland, 1989. 
PARTIES 
SPD CDU FDP NPD WGR1 
997 (2) 1009(1) 161 (14) 159 ( 1 5 ) 259 (7 ) 
Votes After Each 499 (4) 505 (3) 
Divisor 333(6) 337 (5 ) 
250 (9) 253 (8) 
200 (11 ) 202 (10 ) 
167(13) 169(12) 
167(13) 4 
Source: Author's own calculations. 
In the following Saariand Gemeinden Elections held in 1991 parties of the far right 
provided candidates for a total of four gemeinden. As has been shown in eariier chapters, 
to be the norm in Germany, the NPD was the poorer relative of the far right. The NPD 
achieved shares of the vote of 4.4% in Volkingen, 4.5% in Wadgasen and 1.2% in 
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Saarbrucken thereby failing to break through the 5% threshold. The Republikaner stood 
in two gemelnden and was successful in both, polling 5.7% share of the vote in 
Saarbrucken and claiming three of the 63 seats (4.8%). In Saariouis the Republikaner 
polled a spectacular 10.4% share of the vote, entitling it to 9% of the seats. We 
demonstrated eartier that the REP does achieve some representation in German 
sub-national elections, but Is primarily hindered by the 5% threshold. Here we can see 
that where representation does occur the party Is often under represented and therefore 
must really be considered as a small party in Germany. This Is reinforced by the largely 
sporadic nature of far right electoral participation. We rarely see the same gemeinden, 
kreise and even Laender contested In consecutive elections, primarily due to organisational 
difficulties which have plagued far right parties in Germany. 
5.5.2. The Netheriands We have provided a variety of electoral evidence from the 
Netheriands in eariier sections, and we have shown that the far right performed well in 
particular regions In the 1966 provincial and gemeenten elections. The frequency of BP 
lists being presented In gemeenten varied between the provinces. Contestation in the 
1966 gemeenten elections was low in Limburg, North Brabant and Zeeland, but much 
higher In Overijssel, Geldertand and Utrecht. The party polled a 5.7% share of the vote 
over the whole of the Netheriands and won 333 of the 11961 available seats (2.8%). 
Table 5.19 displays the results in gemeenten where the BP polled strongest (e.g. 10% or 
more). 
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Table 5.19 - A Comparison of Seat Distribution and District Magnitude (DM) - Examples using BP 
shares of the vote (10% and more) for Dutch Gemeenten elections, 1966. 
PROVINCE GEMEENTEN DM VOTES % SEATS % 
Gelderiand Apeldoom 39 17.2 17.9 
Gelderland Nijmegen 39 14.4 15.4 
North Holland Haarlem 39 13.2 12.8 
North Brabant Breda 39 13.0 10.3 
North Brabant Tilburg 39 11.8 10.3 
North Brabant Eindhoven 39 10.7 10.3 
Overijssel Enschede 39 10.3 10.3 
Gelderland Epe 21 16.5 14.3 
Geldertand Ede 19 18.2 18.2 
Gelderland Harderwijk 19 13.9 10.5 
Gelderland Groesbeek 17 13.2 11.8 
North Holland Castricum 17 11.7 11.8 
Getderland Putten 15 15.2 13.3 
North Holland Blaricum 13 17.0 15.4 
Gelderland Vorden 13 15.5 15.4 
Overijssel Nieuwieusen n 14.2 18.2 
Utrecht Polsbroek 7 15.7 14.3 
Source: Statistiek der Verkiezingen, 1966. 
We can see from Table 5.19 that at the gemeenten level in 1966 the BP was successful in 
polling the support of a significant sector of the electorate In a handful of municipalities, 
to the extent that it was the second largest party in Ede where it secured almost 20% 
share of the vote. The relationship between shares of the vote and shares of the seats is 
fairly closely, though not totally proportional. Support for the BP was strongest in the 
provinces of Gelderland and North Holland, and the party also polled well in the larger 
gemeenten in North Brabant. Electoral success was by no means restricted to the largest 
gemeenten though, and we can see that there is no direct correlation between the district 
magnitude and the share of the votes polled by the BP. These results along with those 
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presented from Germany, demonstrate that parties of the far right are able to poll 
significant shares of the vote and receive proportional, under and over representation 
(see Enschede, Harderwijk and Nijmegen respectively). This will depend upon the 
number of competing parties and the way in which votes are distributed between them, as 
seats are allocated as 'wholes' - a party cannot win a percentage of a seat. This is only 
evident, however, when we focus upon the lowest sub-national level and such results are 
particulariy localised and are inevitably Most* by a general analysis of support at higher 
electoral levels. 
5.5.3. Belgium If we recall Table 5.11 where we considered the proportionality of two 
sets of elections held in the Belgian gemeenten of Gavere we can see that the Imperiali 
electoral system allowed for the effective over-representation of the largest three parties 
in 1988, and a combination of features created a die facto threshold of at least 6.5% which 
therefore excluded four parties from winning seats (see section 5.3.2). We can also see 
from this Table that overall disproportionality was lower in the 1982 election as only one 
party (again the far right VU) was unrepresented, although the SP was also considerably 
under-represented with seats. This can only be ascribed to the effects of the Imperiali 
seat distribution system. Whilst the number of competing and elected parties is low for a 
PR system, the Imperiali system penalises the two smaller parties (one of which belongs 
to the far right) to the benefit of the two larger parties. 
Yet the far right have at times also enjoyed similar high levels of support at the municipal 
level in Belgium as has occurred in Germany and the Nethertands. We have evklence that 
concurs with Taagepera and Laakso (1980) - just as the Imperiali system penalises the 
far right when the vote share is low, it is also the case that far right parties can be 
over-represented when they are one of the largest parties. Table 5.20 outlines examples 
of gemeenten electiors in which either the VII or VB have been over represented. 
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Table 5.20 - A Comparison of Far Right Over Representation and District Magnitude (DM) in 
Belgian gemeenten elections, 1976 - 1988. 
GEMEENTEN YEAR DM PARTY VOTES % SEATS WON SEATS % 
1988 55 VB 17.7 10 18.2 
1982 25 VU 27.0 7 28.0 
1988 25 vu 27.7 8 32.0 
1982 25 VU 16.9 5 20.0 
1988 21 .vu 28.3 7 33.3 
1976 15 vu 42.5 8 53.3 
Antwerpen 
Herent 
Herent 
Schilde 
Wommelgen 
Unt 
Source: Ackeart, Katholieke Universiteit and Umburgs Universitair. 
We can see from Table 5.20 that parties of the far right are equally as likely to be 
over-rewarded with seats under the Imperiali system when the vote is high {ag, 15% and 
more) and that this appears to occur when district magnitude ranges from 15 to 55 seats 
( l o w to high). In the gemeenten of Herent in Brabant the VU won seven of the 25 
available seats in 1982 with 27% share of the votes and in 1988 eight out of 25 seats 
with 27.7% share of the votes. The 27%+ share of the vote made this party the second 
largest in Herent and thus the VU was over-rewarded by the Imperiali system. Also, in 
Brabant the VU secured 36.8% of the seats with a share of the vote of 32.7% in the 
gemeenten of Kapdle Op Den Bos in 1976, and received 26.2% share of the votes and 28% 
seats in the gemeenten of Maise in 1988, making the VU the second largest party in both 
gemeenten. The far right also polled well in East Vlaanderen and as a result have been 
over rewarded by the Imperiali system, as Table 5.21 demonstrates: 
Table 5.21 - A Comparison of VU Over Representation and District Magnitude in East Vlaanderen 
Gemeenten Elections. 1982-1988. 
(^FMEENTEN YEAR DM VOTES % SEATS WON SEATS % 
Aalter 
Destelbergen 
Kruibeke 
Kruibeke 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1988 
25 
25 
23 
23 
21.9 
19.2 
28.3 
52.1 
6 
5 
7 
14 
24.0 
20.0 
30.4 
60.9 
Source: Ackeart, Katholieke Universiteit and Umburgs Universitair. 
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As we can see, the VU actually became the largest party in Kruibeke in 1988. The effects 
of the Imperiali seat distribution system are, therefore, double-edged for far right 
parties, depending upon the level of popular support 
5.5.4. Britain The re-emergence of the far right at the sub-national level in Britain is, 
in comparison to our studies of other countries, still a recent event. Since the NF and BNP 
only contest a handful of seats at the local, national and European level we must see them 
generally as small parties, though support at the ward level in recent elections may 
suggest otherwise (see section 5.4.3). What may be Interesting In the case of tocal 
elections in Britain therefore, is far right support in relation to the other mainstream 
parties - namely the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Dentocrat parties. The following 
analysis is based upon the elections held in May 1994. In the Thames ward (in Barking 
and Dagenham) the BNP provided one candidate though two seats were available. This 
candidate's 6.9% share of the vote was enough to outstrip both Liberal Denrracrat 
candidates. In the Beckton ward (In Newham) the two BNP candidates polled a total 32.9% 
share of the vote, enough to push the Conservatives into third place (their two candidates 
polling 20% share of the vote). In the much discussed elections in Millwall, the three 
BNP candidates combined share of the vote was 28.3%, putting them In second place to 
Labour. Perhaps most surprisingly, however, the Conservatives received only the fourth 
largest share of the vote. Outside London, the far right performed credibly in Sandwell 
with the NF polling higher shares of the vote than the Liberal Democrats in both Princes 
End and Tipton Green (NF shares of the votes were 9.0% and 9.1% and Liberal Democrats 
shares of the votes were 7.5% and 8.4% respectively). What is Important in Britain Is 
the party's placing rather than its share of the votes. We cannot, therefore, judge party 
size by share of the vote alone. Parties of the far right frequently poll In excess of 10% 
and 15% shares of the vote In sub-national elections In Europe, but whether we judge 
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them as small or significant depends upon the effect of the seat distribution system a]d the 
size of other parties. As such, the first past the post system tends to exclude nrany 
smaller parties from govemment whilst the various fonns of PR usually allow at least 
some reward in terms of seats. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The results of analysis in this chapter are by no means straightforward. In general, we 
can conclude that parties of the far right in Europe fit the classification of 'small parties*, 
though some exceptions occur in the Netheriands and Belgium at the municipal level, and a 
mere handful of examples are evident in recent elections in Britain. Any evidence of 
significant electoral support and representation tends to be at the lowest sub-national 
level and subject to regional concentrations and variations. Also, evidence shows that 
until the eariy 1990s at least, far right parties were only likely to experience success 
under PR electoral systems. Representation under first past the post has been rare, 
though evidence of far right support from the 1994 British local elections suggests that 
such parties may bertefit in wards where two or three seats are available. 
We have demonstrated the importance of district magnitude in PR electoral systems. 
Again, far right parties have been hindered by electoral areas with a low district 
magnitude - especially when the share of the vote is below 10%. Similarly, far right 
representation is hindered by both de Jure and de facto thresholds when the share of the 
vote is low. The 5% threshold in Germany has often penalised the far right, especially at 
the Laender level despite district magnitude being high. In Germany and Belgium 
thresholds of exclusion are created for the far right parties when the district magnitude is 
low. 
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We can find little conclusive evidence to suggest that far right electoral support is related 
to tumout or electoral timing. Far right parties have received high levels of support 
when tumout is both higher and lower than the national and even regional average. Far 
right shares of the votes in second order elections in recent years in all countries tend to 
support van der Eijk's hypothesis that such patterns are a result of mid-term protest 
voting between first order elections, and support for all far right parties in Europe since 
the 1980s strengthens the argument (see Chapter One) that there is a wider general 
malaise in belief in the nr^instream political parties. However, we can by no means prove 
that the second order hypothesis applies to all sub-national elections all of the time. 
Finally, we have demonstrated that as a 'small* party the far right can only be represented 
under PR, ard even then there are often constraints such as district magnitude and 
thresholds which hinder representation. At the same time, we have examples where the 
far right may be judged as Marge* at the sub-national level (when polling a share of the 
vote of 15% and nrore), as demortstrated by gemeenten elections in the Netheriands and 
Belgium. In these situations PR - especially the Imperiali system - over represents the 
far right. We can now adopt a similar framework of analysis for comparing the electoral 
success and proportionality of representation of regionalist parties in Europe. 
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CHAPTER SIX - THE REPRESENTATION OF REgiONAUST PARTIE? IN EUROPEAN 
SUB-NATIONAL ELECTION^. 
6 J introduction 
In Chapter Five we analyzed the proportionality of the representation of various far right 
parties in Europe by considering the impact of the electoral system in general and by 
paying particular attention to the impact of specific electoral features such as seat 
distribution method, thresholds and district magnitude as outlined in Chapter Two. In 
this chapter we will follow a similar pattern of analysis in order to analyze the 
representation of several regionalist parties in various European countries at the 
sub-national level and the degree to which proportional representation occurs. For the 
purposes of analysis, this chapter will focus upon the electoral success and 
representation of those regional parties defined in Chapter Three which are located in 
Belgium, Italy, Spain and Britain and whose electoral history is outlined in Chapter 
Three sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
In relation to the effect of particular electoral systems upon regional party 
representation, Smith claims that: 
"In fact, strong regional parties, with concentrated local support, are 
not penalized at all by a majoritarian electoral system, this being a 
significant qualification to Duverger's Maw* relating the majority vote to 
a two-party system." (Smith 1991: 29-30) 
We can 'test* this particular view by considering the electoral performance of the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC) in Scotland and Wales respectively. 
Can we expect regional parties to elicit a more concentrated level of regional support 
than far right or other snrall parties? As explained in Chapter One section 1.4, the 
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electoral success of regional parties may be accounted for by the competitive approach as 
outlined by Hauss and Rayside (1978: 31-57). That is, the electoral success of regional 
parties is primarily determined by political and institutional factors such as the lack of 
existing parties prepared to promote the regional autonomy issue, the structural nature 
of the electoral system which includes features such as the ballot system and district 
magnitude, and - when in operation - a federalist system (1978: 37). In Chapter Three 
section 4.4 we outlined the electoral history of various regionalist parties in Europe, we 
will now consider the impact of specific electoral rules and features following the 
procedure adopted for analyzing far right parties in Chapter Five. 
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, Belgium has experienced two distinct 
types of regionalism - one type associated with Flanders and the other with Wallonia. In 
relation to regiorxalism in Italy, we have already established in Chapter Three Section 
4.3b that the virtual collapse of the traditional 'catch-air parties is just one factor 
which has encouraged the spectacular electoral success of several regional parties, such 
as the Sardinian Action Party (PSd^Az), the South Tyrol People's Party (STVP), the Lega 
Nord (LN) and the Union Valdotaine (UV), and regional parties have continued to flourish 
despite the recent electoral reforms (see Appendix C). Indeed, Donovan claims that: 
"... local election results in late 1992, including the capture of the 
party's first mayorships, indicated that a plurality system could 
benefit, rather than bury, the Lega's challenge." (Donovan 1995: 52) 
In relation to regional party success in Spain, the Catalonian autonomous elections 
provide a useful case study. We can initially arialyse results at the overall regional level 
and secondly we can break our electoral anajysds down to districts. Catalonia consists of 
four districts; Barcelona, Girona, Ueida and Tarragona. Whilst the regional pariiament 
consists of 135 seats in total, 85 of these seats are in Barcelona, 18 seats are in 
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Tarragona, 17 seats in Girona and the remaining 15 seats in Lleida. Our analysis in 
Chapter Three outlined voting patterns for Barcelona as a whole, where a total of 1 50 
seats are available. Yet Barcelona is further divided into 10 electoral districts for the 
purpose of seat distribution, and each district is allocated 1 5 seats. In this chapter we 
will focus upon changes at the district level based upon each party's representation for 
the two sets of elections held in 1987 and 1991. What is of interest to us here is the 
effect upon regionalist party representation of (i) the 3% and 5% threshold of 
representation, and (ii) the use of electoral districts which range in district magnitude. 
We can also analyze regional party success In elections held in the Spanish region of 
Galicla. The Galician regional pariiament consists of 75 seats in total, though again these 
are broken down into four electoral areas. The largest is the province of A Coruna with 
24 seats, followed by the province of Pontevedra with 21 seats and the provinces of Lugo 
and Orense which both have 15 seats. 
We have already demonstrated in Chapter Four section 4.2.5 that several general claims 
can be made about sub-national elections in Britain. For example, the number of 
unopposed seats has declined, thereby increasing party competition. The number of truly 
'independent' candidates has declined, whilst the number of small parties has increased. 
In terms of Scottish regional elections, we have shown in Chapter Three section 3.4.4d 
that the regionalist SNP is now the second largest party at the sub-national level in 
Scotland, as is the PC in Welsh sub-national elections. What is important when 
analyzing regional party representation in British elections is the impact of the electoral 
system, as first past the post does not work in the interests of second place parties. In 
this chapter we will assess the effects of district magnitude upon regional party 
representation in Belgium, Spain and Britain. Our analysis of de jure thresholds will 
focus upon Spain, whilst we will look at the significance of cfe fecto thresholds in Belgium 
and Britain. Finally we will assess the implications of the seat distribution method for 
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proportionality in Beigiurr), Italy and Britain. We will begin with an analysis of district 
magnitude. 
6.2 The Impact of District Magnitude Upon Reoionalist Party Representation 
In Chapter Five we analyzed the effective representation of parties belonging to the far 
right, and concluded that a low district magnitude in both PR and non-PR electoral 
systems can effectively create a da facto threshold to representation which disadvantages 
the electorally smaller parties. As the number of seats available in each electoral area 
declines and the number of competing parties increases a higher share of the vote is 
required by each party if it is to secure representation. We will now consider sonrre 
examples of the possible impact of varying district magnitudes upon regional party 
representation in a variety of sub-natiortal elections in Belgium, Spain and Britain. 
6.2.1 Belgium: In our earlier general analysis of district magnitude in Belgian 
communes and gemeenten in 1976 (see Chapter Four section 4.5.4), we suggested that 
proportionality is not determined by district magnitude alone but that the seat 
distribution system also has an effect. In the 1976 communal elections the regionafist 
party Front des Francophones (FDF) was the largest party in a total of ten of the nineteen 
Brussels municipalities. A comparison of these municipalities established that the FDF 
polled greater shares of the votes in the larger municipalities, particulariy in 
municipalities with a district magnitude of 31 seats or nrrare. The exception to this rule 
in 1976 was the gemeenten of Watermoal Bosvoorde which had a district magnitude of 29 
seats. However, since the FDF took a considerable share of the vote in all municipalities 
in the Brussels region in 1976 we cannot sufficiently conclude that district magnitude 
had a significant impact upon this party's representation in these elections (the FDPs 
lowest share of the vote was 18.1 % in Andertecht), and we cannot therefore conclude that 
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regionalist party performance in this region in 1976 was directly related to the district 
magnitude alone. Again there is little evidence from the 1988 elections to suggest that 
regionalist party support is related to district magnitude. For example, the FDF was able 
to secure a share of the vote of 18.7% and 24.0% of the seats in St. Agatha Berchem 
where the district magnitude is 25 seats. Hence, evidence suggests that the imperiali 
system actually over rewarded this regionalist party and district magnitude did rtot prove 
to be a hindrarrce for the FDF. 
Whilst regional parties with a significantly large share of the vote may benefit from a 
combination of the Imperiali method of seat distribution and large district magnitude in 
Belgian local elections, there have also been examples of regional party under 
representation in Belgium. Table 6.1 compares the size of municipals (DM) with 
examples of Rassemblement Wallon (RW) under representation in the Belgian communal 
elections held in the Wallonian region in 1976: 
Table 6.1 - A Comparison of Rassemblement Wallon Representation and District Magnitudes in 
the 1976 Communal Elections, Walionian Region. 
COMMUNE DM VOTES % SEATS WON SEATS % 
Gerpinnes 19 14.3 2 I C S 
Ottignes 21 9.1 1 4.8 
Aiseau-Presles 21 13.4 2 9.5 
Nivetles 25 8.6 1 4.0 
Ath 27 8.2 1 3.7 
Chatelet 33 9.7 2 6.1 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholieke Universiteit & Limburgs Universitair Centrum 
Regionalist parties appear to benefit from over rewarding in larger communes, and a 
combination of the Imperiali seat distribution system and a decreasing district magnitude 
reduces the likelihood of proportional representation even when the regional party share 
of the vote is significant i.e. between 10% and 15% share of the vote. Table 6.1 
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illustrates that significant shares of the vote can be under rewarded with seats as the 
district magnitude diminishes. For example, although the RW polled a 14.3% share of 
the vote in Gerpinnes in 1976, this was enough to secure only two seats - thus producing 
a 10.5% share of the seats. Whilst the district nnagnitude was equivalent to 27 seats in 
the commune of Ath in 1976, the RW was under rewarded as the party polled a share of 
the vote of 8.2. This reinforces what we have already shown in Chapter Five, that parties 
polling less than a 15% share of the vote in 'small' Belgian municipals will be treated as 
'smair parties by the Imperial! system, and as such are penalized. As the share of the 
vote declines the opportunity for winning seats also declines, though this is due to the 
nature of the Imperiali system rather than the restrictions of district magnitude alone in 
these examples (see section 6.4.1 for a more detailed analyas of the effects of the 
Imperiali electoral system upon regional parties). 
6.2.2 Spain: As we discussed in section 6.1 of this chapter, the Spanish region of Galicia 
does not act as a single 'constituency* for the distribution of seats in the Galician regional 
elections. We are effectively dealing with a situation in which the region is divided into 
four provinces in order to allocate seats, thus producing four smaller district 
magnitudes. As such it is more appropriate to consider party competition and electoral 
results by province for the regional elections. Table 6.2 compares district magnitude 
with the election results for the provinces of A Coruna and Ourense in order to represent 
the diversity of district magnitude in this region: 
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Table 6.2 - A Comparison of District Magnitude and Regionalist Party Representation For Two 
Gahcian Provinces, 1 989 - 1 993 
Province of A Coruna - 24 s c a t s 
YEAR PARTY 
1989 PP PSG/PSOE BNG EU/UG CG 
Votes% 40.9 35.2 9 . 4 6.1 1.6 
Seats% 45.8 41.7 8 .3 4.2 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 11.4 Least Squares = 7.62 
1993 PP PSG/PSOE BNG EU/UG 
Votes% 49.0 24.6 1 9 . 6 3.7 
Seats% 54.2 25.0 2 0 . 8 -
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 6.8 Least Squares = 4.83 
Province of Ourense - 15 seats 
Verdes Others 
0.3 6.5 
Sainte Lague = 10.91 
AC CG Verdes Others 
0.4 0.4 0.3 2.0 
Sainte Lague = 7.43 
1989 PP PSG/PSOE CG BNG EU/UG ARM Others 
Votes% 44.3 32.5 6.5 5 .4 3.0 0.8 7.5 
Seats% 53.3 40.0 6.7 - - -
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
20.27 Loosemore Hanby = 16.7 Least Squares = 10.78 Sainte Lague = 
1993 PP PSG/PSOE BNG EU/UG CG ARM Verdes Others 
Votes% 54.5 25.4 1 7 .0 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 1.0 
Seats% 60.0 26.7 1 3 .3 - - - ~ 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
4.53 Loosemore Hanby = 6.8 Least Squares = 4.9 Sainte Lague = 
Source: Analise da organizaaon e execuaon das Elecaons o Parlamento Galeoo 1993. Xunta de 
Galicia 
Table 6.2 demonstrates that the regional elections in Galicia were dominated by two 
parties in 1989, these being the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist coalition 
(PSG/PSOE). We may not be surprised, therefore, to see relatively high measures of 
disproportionality. For example, in the province of Ourense in 1989 the lowest measure 
of disproportionality was the Least Squares at 10.78 and the Nghest was the Sainte Lague 
with a measure of 20.27. Disproportionality in A Coruna in 1989 was not as strong -
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again, lowest was the Least Squares measure of 7.62 and highest was the Sainte Lague 
measure of 10.91. The number of dominant parties in Galicia increased to three in 1993 
with the rise in popularity of the regionalist Galician National Bloc (BNG), and in both 
provinces we can see that this had a dramatic effect upon levels of disproportionality. 
Whilst the largest parties have, therefore, tended to be over rewarded by the d'Hondt seat 
distribution system which increases disproporttonality, the use of the 5% de jure 
threshold has excluded the majority of the very small parties from representation and so 
only three or four parties are effectively entitled to seats, thus perhaps hindering the 
opportunity of greater proportionality being achieved. In relation to district magnitude, 
we are comparing provinces with 15 and 24 seats. The lower district magnitude in 
combination with the use of the d'Hondt seat allocation method is nrrare favourable towards 
the largest parties as the province of Orense demonstrates. The most frequent obstacle to 
representation, however, appears not to be district magnitude but, as suggested by 
Lijphart (1994a) the implementation of the 5% de yure thre^ ld . Several of the 
competing parties, such as the Alliance for a Democratic Europe (ARM), the Galician 
Coalitlon(CG) and the Greens (Verdes), poll only a very small share of the popular vote 
and, therefore, would need to participate in electoral areas with high district magnitude 
( a t least 50 seats) in order to secure any seats. 
We can also see from Table 6.2 that district magnitude did affect regional party 
representation by considerirKf the outcome of the 1989 election in the province of 
Ourense. If we exclude the 'others' category which is made up of numerous very small 
parties all polling well below the 5% threshold, we can see that four parties actually 
polled more than 5% - the Popular Party, the Socialist coalition, the Gatician Coalition 
and the Galician National Bloc. Under the d'Hondt seat distribution system, the 6.5% 
share of the votes polled by the Galician Coalition was strong enough to secure the party 
one of the 15 available seats. The 5.4% share of the vote for the BNG, however, was too 
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low for the par^ to win any seats Under the d'Hondt system, the BNG would only have 
begun to secure seats if the district magnitude was at least 17 seats or more. In this 
example, a regionalist party is treated in the same way as any other *smair party due to 
the effects of using the d'Hondt system in an electoral area with a snrtall district 
magnitude, fitting with the claims made by Ujphart (1990) and Blais and Carty (1987) 
about proportionality. 
By turning our attention to the Girona district in the Catalan region of Spain we can 
demonstrate that the district magnitude (In this case 15 seats) also affected the 
proportionality of the ratio between the vote and seat shares for those parties which were 
represented. This is measured by the Sainte Lague (SL) index as presented in Table 6.3: 
Table 6.3 - A Comparison of Shares of the Vote and Shares of the Seats For the Main Parties. 
Girona District of Catalonia, 1984 - 1988. 
PARTY 
1984 CiU PSC ERC AP/PP PSUC/iC 
Votes % 5 9 . 3 21.4 6.1 5.6 3.1 
Seats % 6 4 . 7 23.S 5 . 9 5.9 -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
LH= 7.3 LS= 5.2 SL= 7.3 
1988 CiU P S C ERC PSUC/IC AP/PP CDS 
Votes % 5 5 . 8 23.5 5 -4 3.9 3.7 3.2 
Seats % 6 4 . 7 29.4 5 . 9 - - -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
LH= 14.7 LS= 9.0 SL= 17.0 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: Atlas Electoral de la Ciutat de Barcelona: 1977-1989. Ajuntament de Barcelona. 
We can see from Table 6.3 that the regionalist Esquerra Repubiicana de Catalunya (ERC) 
was slightly under represented in the 1984 election to the benefit of the large parties. 
In the 1988 elections, however, the ERC gained a share of the seats which was slightly 
above its share of the votes despite pollirtg less than in 1984. This is not surprising 
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though if we take into consideration the fact that only three parties secured seats in 1988 
(the other two parties being the CiU and PSC). As such. 100% of the seats were awarded 
to parties which polled a combined share of the vote of only 85% - hence the particulariy 
high Sainte Lague measure of 17.0 in comparison the proportionality of the results in the 
Barcelona district (see Table 6.7) of Catalonia where the district magnitude is much 
higher. 
In the next section of this chapter we will discuss the impact of certain thresholds upon 
regionalist party representation in sub-national elections. We will show that in the case 
of local elections in Barcelona, the regionalist ERC is in some cases hindered by its 
inability to break through the 3% threshold of popular support. There are other cases in 
these elections, however, where the dtstrirt magnitude becomes a more important 
constraint, as shown by an analysis of the Gracia district within Barcelona in Table 6.4, 
where district magnitude is 15 seats: 
Table 6.4 - A Comparison of Regionaiist Representation and District Magnitude in the Gracia 
District, 1987 & 1991. 
YEAR PARTY 
1987 CiU PSC AP/PP tc ERC 
Votes % 4 4 . 2 34.5 6.6 5.6 3 . 3 
Seats % 4 6 . 7 40.0 6.7 6.7 -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
LH= 6.2 LS= 4.9 SL= 4.5 
7997 CiU PSC AP/PP IC ERC 
Votes % 4 3 . 3 33.8 8.1 6.7 3 . 8 
Seats % 4 6 . 7 40.0 6.7 6.7 -
Overall Measures of disproportionatity: 
LH= 7.4 LS= 5.7 SL= 5.4 
LH = Loosemore Hanby LS = Least Squares SL = Sainte Lague 
Source: Barcelona Elecdons Locals 1991, Servei d'Estadistica. Ajuntament de Barcelona. 
We can see from Table 6.4 that the 3% threshold was overcome by the regionalist ERC in 
both the 1987 and 1991 local elections in the Gracia district, and as such the party has 
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enjoyed a slightly greater level of support than was the case in the districts of Ciutat 
Vella and Eixample (see Tables 6.9 and 6.10). By comparing each party's share of the 
votes with its share of the seats we can see that in the 1987 and 1991 elections four of 
the parties were relatively proportionately rewarded with seats. The combination of the 
d'Hondt divisor method of seat distribution along with a district magnitude of 1 5 seats, 
however, works to the disadvantage of the smallest party which - in this example - is the 
regionalist ERG. As will be demonstrated in the later examples from Barcelona's local 
elections, the district magnitude of 15 seats effectively creates a de facto threshold which 
Is approximately equivalent to 5% share of the popular vote. If the ERG were to secure a 
seat in the 1991 elections under the d'Hondt seat distribution method and each party's 
share of the votes remained the same, then a district magnitude of 23 seats would be 
required. District magnitude becomes significant in Spanish sub-national elections, and 
as such fits the claims made by Rae (1967), Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and 
Gallagher (1991). When regions and cities are divided into smaller electoral divisions, 
this disadvantages regionalist parties when they have a low share of the votes {eg. below 
5%). 
6.2.3 Britain: Even when elections operate in a single seat electoral area and thus 
become a case of first past the post, or simple plurality, the district magnitude may not 
be a particular hindrance if a party is able to organize itself effectively and concentrate 
participation in to divisions where it expects to poll a significant share of support. This 
is demonstrated by Plaid Gymru (PG) in particular districts in county council elections. 
PC provided candidates for two of the 14 electoral divisions in Aberconwy in the 1989 
county council elections, and was successful in both cases. The party was unopposed in 
Bro Machno, and in Uanrwst PG polled 54% beating the SDP into second place. This 
pattern was repeated in other districts in the 1989 county council elections. In Dwyfor, 
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for example, only one PC candidate stood despite there being eight electoral divisions, 
though this candidate was unopposed (n the dstrict of Ynys Mon, PC provided candidates 
only two of the eighteen electoral divisions but achieved significant shares of the vote 
both divisions - 59.2% in the Valley division and 58.7% in the Dulas division. What 
important is that the districts of Aberconwy, Dwyfor and Ynys Mon are all in the 
county of Gwynedd, where we would expect PC support to be strongest (see Chapter Three 
section 3.4.3d). These data from the 1989 county council elections, therefore, raise the 
question of whether the PC intentionally provided its limited number of candidates 
strategically in electoral divisions where the party held high expectations of winning. 
Furthenmore, was the party disadvantaged by a lack of candidates, and would it have 
benefitted from similar levels of support in other electoral divisions? We will now 
compare results from 1989 to levels of PC support in the following county council 
elections held in 1993. 
As was the case in the 1989 elections, the PC provided candidate for a handful of the 
Aberconwy electoral divisions in the 1993 county council elections, this time increasing 
contestation to three divisions. The results are outlined in Tables 6.5: 
Table 6.5 - A Comparison of PC Support and Tumout in the 1993 Weteh County Coundl 
Elections. Aberconwy District 
DiVISION VOTES % TURNOLfT % 
Bro Machno Unopposed 
Llanrwst 63.0 51.3 
Conwy 22.0 43.5 
Source; Railings & Thrasher. 1993. 
We can see that the PC was again successfully elected in two divisions. In Bro Machno the 
party remained unopposed and in Uanrwst the party increased its share of the vote to 
226 
63.0% - an increase of 9% from 1989. In Conwy, however, PC only secured enough 
votes to take third place. Thus, whilst regional parties are not necessarily disadvantaged 
by single seat district magnitudes it i s also the case that limited support for the PC may 
not simply be accounted for by a lack of candidates able to contest a majority of the 
available areas. It is interesting that PC ajpport appears to decrease with turnout though 
this handful of results alone is not significant enough to prove anything substantial. 
Instead more in depth analysis may need to take into account increasingly qualitative 
explanations such as the importance of truly 'local' issues and the impact of popular 
candidates which are areas that we cannot cover in this thesis. 
We have demonstrated in this section that district magnitude may be significant In 
Belgian communes, feut in the past regionalist parties have polled their strongest shares 
of the votes in the larger municipalities where district magnitude is not the primary 
hindrance. In Spain district magnitude is significant because regions and large cities are 
divided into smaller electoral districts. This is not a problem as such for regionalist 
parties which secure large shares of the votes such as the CiU, but it is a hindrance for 
the smaller regional parties such as the ERC. Lastly, the first past the post electoral 
system is not a problem for regionalist parties if they can target electoral areas where 
potential support is strong, as the PC is able to do in some areas. It is not necessarily the 
case, however, that an increase in available candidates automatically leads to greater 
representation. We will now consider in more detail the effect of de jure and de facto 
thresholds upon regionalist party representation. 
6.3 The Impact of Pe Jure and D& Facto Thresholds Upon Reaionalist Party Representation 
We have shown in Chapters Two, Four and Five that we can effectively discuss the impact 
of two types of threshold, these bang de jure thresholds and de facto thresholds In 
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Chapter Four we concluded that as district magnitude decreases, and the number of 
competing parties increases, so the facto threshold increases. In Chapter Five we 
demonstrated that the 5% threshold is a hindrance to far right parties in various parts of 
Germariy and that dls/^cto thresholds hinder far right representation in Belgium. We 
wilt now consider the impact of thresholds upon regional party representation, and will 
initially concentrate upon de jure thresholds. 
6.3.1 Spain: An initial overview of regional elections held in the Spanish region of 
Galicia since 1985, produces the results as outlined in Table 6.6: 
Table 6.6 - The Results and Proportionality Measures for Regional Elections held in Galicia, 
1985-1993 
T t A K r<->r> • 1 
1985 PP PSG/PSOE CG PSG/PG BNG CDS PNG/PG Others 
Votes% 41.1 28.7 13.0 5.6 4 . 2 3.2 0.8 3.4 
Seats% 47.9 31.0 15.5 4.2 1 .4 - - — 
Total Seats = 71 seats 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
11.4 Loosemore Hanby = 11.6 Least Square = 6.7 Sainte Lague = 
1989 PP PSG/PSOE BNG PSG/PG CG CDS PNG/PG Others 
Votes% 44.4 32.7 8.1 3.9 3.7 2.9 1.5 2.8 
Seats% 50.7 36.0 8 . 0 2.7 2.7 -
Total Seats = 75 seats 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
9.1 Loosemore Hanby = 9.6 Least Square = 6.0 Sainte Lague = 
1993 PP PSOE BNG Others 
Votes% 52.2 23.5 1 8 .7 5.6 
Seats% 57.3 25.3 1 7 .3 -
Total seats = 7 5 seats 
Overall Measures of dSsproportionality: 
6.4 Loosemore Hanby = 7.0 Least Square = 5.6 Sainte Lague = 
Source: Analise da oroanizadon e execucion das Eleccions o Pariamento Galeqo 1993. Xunta de 
Galicia. Local Elections Database, University of Rymouth. 
In section 6.1 of this chapter we stated that regional elections held In Gaiicia can 
effectively be analyzed in terms of four distinct provinces which have district 
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magnitudes ranging from 1 5 to 24 seats. By considering the data provided in Table 6.6 
we can see that (i) overall proportionality has increased since 1985. This is because the 
number of very small parties (polling less than 3,5% share of the vote) has decreased. 
At a regional level, therefore, Galicia has a ci^  fecto threshold of at least 3.2%. (ii) the 
5% de jure threshold must apply at the provincial as opposed to overall regional level. 
This is because some parties (ag. the BNG in 1985 and the CG and PSG/PG in 1989) 
received seats despite polling less than 5% across the whole of the Galician region. In 
1989, the CG actually polled 7.3% in Lugo and 6.5% in Ourense which entitled the party 
to one seat from each of those provinces. Hence, a 5% threshold may be a hindrance for 
very small regional parties which have support that is thinly spread over the region, but 
not for those who enjoy partial but concentrated support. 
In a similar fashion, the region of Catalonia effectively operates as four electoral 
districts (see section 6.1). Barcelona is by far the largest of these four districts, with a 
district magnitude of 85 seats and Table 6.7 outlines the share of the votes and share of 
the seats for each party from 1980 to 1988: 
Table 6.7 - The Results and Proportionality Measures for the Barcelona District of the 
Cataionian Autonomous Elections. 1980-1988. 
YEAR PARTY 
1980 CiU PSC PSUC/IC ERC 
Votes% 27.1 23.1 20.7 8 .3 
Seats96 3 0 . 6 25.9 23.5 9 .4 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Locsemore Hanby = 9.8 Least Square = 7.2 
1984 a U PSC AP/PDP/UL 
Votes% 44.1 32.1 7.5 
Seats% 4 8 . 2 34.1 8.2 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 7.0 Least Square = 4.3 
CC/UCD PSA 
8.1 3.0 
8.2 2.4 
Sainte Lague =10.1 
PSUC/IC 
6.1 
5.9 
ERC 
4.1 
3 . 5 
Sainte Lague = 6.9 
Others 
8.7 
Others 
6.1 
continued... 
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1988 CiU PSC PSUC/fC AP/PDP/UL CDS ERC Others 
Votes% 43.4 31.2 8.8 5.2 3.8 3.7 2.7 
Seats% 45 .9 32.9 9.4 4.7 3.5 3.5 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 4.2 Least Square = 2.9 Sainte Lague = 3.0 
Source: Atlas Electoral de la Qutat de Barcelona: 1977-1989. Ajuntament de Barcelona. Local 
Elections Database, University of Plymouth. 
We can see from Table 6.7 that overall disproportionalit^ has declined since 1980, and 
that the CiU and the PSC are the main beneficiaries in elections at the cost of the very 
small parties (i.e the PSA, CDS and those so small that they are grouped together under 
the category of 'others'). Seats were only awarded to those parties polling a share of the 
vote of 3% and above, although the nature of the d'Hondt seat distribution system (as 
described by Lijphart 1990 and Gallagher 1991)ensures that the larger parties are 
over rewarded whilst the smaller parties are under rewarded. The 'wasted vote' in these 
elections accounted for by the 'others' category, represented 10 parties in 1980, 11 
parties in 1984 and 16 parties in 1988. The higher measures of disproportionality for 
the 1980 and 1984 elections were artificially affected by the grouping together of 
numerous very small parties into this single categoiy which created a share of the vote 
higher than 5%. Since the collective share of the vote for the 16 parties classed as 
'others* in 1988 is only 2.7% this did not have an excessive impact upon the 
proportionality measures. As such, we can see that the 'others' category share of the vote 
decreased over time whilst the number of parties falling into the others category 
increased. The average share of the vote for parties polling below the 3% threshold has 
actually decreased, and in many cases these parties have polled less than 1 %. Since the 
district magnitude, for Barcelona is 85 seats we would not expect this to act as a further 
threshold of exclusion upon representation, particularty as the number of parties 
actually able to poll at least 3% of the share of the votes is reasonably small (five or six 
parties). We can conclude that under the d'Hondt system of seat allocation a high district 
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magnitude of 85 seats actually enhances the possibilities for true proportionality despite 
the operation of a 3% threshold. 
Does the same rule apply when considering the proportionality of smaller districts in 
Catalonia? The Girona district of Cataloraa has a district nrognitude of only 17 seats. The 
share of the votes and share of the seats for each party from 1980 to 1988 are outlined 
in Table 6.8: 
Table 6.8 - The Results and fVoportionality Measures for the Girona District of the Catalonian 
Autonomous Elections, 1980-1988. 
YEAR PARTY 
1980 CiU PSC CCAJCD ERC PSUC/IC Others 
Votes% 3 6 . 9 19.5 15.1 1 0 . 6 9.3 7.5 
Seats% 4 1 . 2 23.5 17.6 1 1.8 5.9 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 1 K 4 Least Square = 7.4 Sainte Lague = 10.6 
1984 CiU PSC ERC AP/PDP/UL PSUC/iC Others 
Votes% 5 9 . 3 21.4 6.1 5.6 3.9 3.5 
Seats% 6 4 . 7 23.5 5 .9 5.9 
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 7.3 Least Square = 5.2 Sainte Lague = 7.3 
1988 CiU PSC ERC PSUC/tC AP/PDP/UL CDS Others 
Votes% 5 5 . 8 23.5 5 .4 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.3 
Seats% 6 4 . 7 29.4 5 . 9 - - - -
Overall Measures of disprcportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 14.7 Least Square = 9.0 Sainte Lague = 17.0 
Source: Atlas Electoral de la Gutat de Barcelona: 1977-1989. Ajuntament de Barcelona. Local 
Elections Database, University of Plymouth. 
We can see from the elections held in the district of Girona that district nrragnitude does 
begin to have an Impact upon the proportionality of representation when we are provided 
with districts with less than 20 seats. We have several examples of parties polling a 
share of the vote greater than 3% (the PSUC/IC in 1984 and 1988, the AP/PDP/UL in 
1988 and the CDS in 1988) but nevertheless not being rewarded with seats. 
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Furthermore, we can see that the non representation of these three party lists in 1988 
has had a significant impact upon all three disproportionality measures. Whilst the least 
squares measure is the lowest, we have extremely high measures for the Loosemore 
Hanby and Salnte Lague indices, therefore suggesting that the ratio of disproportionality 
between votes and seats is also strong. As a result, we can identify a de facto threshold 
that is higher than a cor«itutional threshold (approximately 4.5% to 5.5% share of the 
vote). 
Continuing with an aralysis of thresholds upon regional party representation in Spain, 
we have already stated that for the purpose of local elections in Barcelona, 10 electoral 
districts are employed each with a district magnitude of 15 seats. Does this create a 
threshold of exclusion for regionaiist parties? We can analyze this point in more detail 
by looking at the share of the votes and share of the seats for the five largest 
parties/coalitions in several electoral districts for the local elections held In 1987 and 
1991. 
Table 6.9 - Comparing Vote Shares, Seat Shares and Proportionality for the Main Parties in the 
Outat Vella District of Barcelona, 1987 & 1991. 
YEAR PARTY 
1987 PSC CiU AP/PP IC ERC 
Votes % 47.6 3 0 . 7 6.9 4.9 2 . 3 
Seats % 60.0 3 3 . 3 6.7 - -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 11.2 Least Squares = 9.7 Sainte Lague = 10.6 
7997 PSC CiU AP/PP IC ERC 
Votes % 49.2 2 9 . 3 8.0 5.7 2 . 8 
Seats % 53.3 3 3 . 3 6.7 6.7 -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 6.6 Least Squares = 4.6 Sainte Lague = 4.0 
Source: Barcelona Elecaons Locals 1991. Servei d'Estadistica, Ajuntament de Barcelona. Local 
Elections Database, University of Plymouth. 
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From Table 6.9 we can see that in the Barcelona district of Ciutat Vella only one of the 
two regionalist parties (CiU) surpassed the 3% representation threshold in recent local 
elections. Though close, the ERC Jras received a share of the popular vote that was just 
below 3% and as such was excluded from representation. By coniparing the indices of 
proportionality measures for the elections held in the Ciutat Vella district In 1987 and 
1991 we can see that true proportionality is not only hindered by the constitutional 
threshold but also by the district magnitude of 15 seats which creates an added ds facxo 
threshold (approximately 5% - 5.5% share of the vote). As we can see from Table 6.9, 
the IC also remained unrewarded in 1987 despite polling a 4.9% share of the vote, due to 
the fact that the d'Hondt divisor method of seat allocation works to the advantage of parties 
as their share of the vote increases. Hence the re^onalist CiU did benefit from this 
system, and as a 'large* party, was actually over rewarded with seats. We can see that 
same occurred in other districts, as Table 6.10 shows: 
Table 6.10 - Comparing Vote Shares, Seat Shares and Proportionality for the Main Parties in 
the Elxample District of Barcelona, 1987 & 1 991. 
YEAR * PARTY 
1987 CiU P S C AP/PP IC ERC 
Votes % 4 7 . 0 31.1 8.9 4.5 2 . 8 
Seats % 6 0 . 0 33.3 6.7 - -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 12.3 Least Squares = 10.1 Sainte Lague = 11.5 
7997 CiU PSC AP/PP IC ERC 
Votes % 4 5 . 0 31.0 11.2 5.8 2 . 9 
Seats % 5 3 .3 33.3 6.7 6.7 -
Overall Measures of disproportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby = 9.4 Least Squares = 7.1 Sainte Lague = 6.5 
Source: Barcelona Elecdons Locals 1991. Servei d'Estadistica, Ajuntament de Barcelona. Local 
Elections Database, University of Plymouth. 
We can see from Table 6.10 that a similar situation to that occurring in the district of 
Ciutat Veila also occun-ed in the district of Eucample. The regionalist party ERC polled a 
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share of the vote which was marginally below the 3% threshold in both 1987 and 1991. 
The IC, however, did receive enough popular support to break through the 3% threshold 
in 1987, although the party did not secure seats because of the da facto threshold created 
by the dstrict magnitude of 15 seats. We can see that the share of the votes for the IC 
party in the 1987 elections for the districts of Ciutat Vella and Eixample were 4.9% and 
4.5% respectively and in both cases the party did not receive seats. In comparison, the 
share of the votes for the IC in the 1991 elections in these two districts were 5.7% and 
5.8% respectively and in both cases this secured the party one of the 15 seats available 
in each district We can conclude, therefore, that In Barcelorxa local elections where 
there are five parties in each electoral area, the de jure threshold of 3% is in fact not the 
primary obstacle to small parties gaining representation. It is actually the district 
magnitude of 15 seats which inflates the effective, or de facto, thre^old to 
approximately 5% to 5.5% of the popular vote. We can also see that, as the largest party 
in Eixample, the regionalist CiU was significantly over rewarded with seats - securing a 
13% greater share of the seats than its share of the votes in 1987. 
6.3.2 Belgium: In contrast to the cases outlined in section 6.2 in which the regionalist 
RW was under rewarded with seats in relation to the share of the vote polled, we can also 
identify Belgian communes in which regional parties were left totally unrepresented. 
Table 6.11 compares dstrict magnitude (DM) with share of the vote in those communes 
where the RW failed to secure any seats despite pdling at least 5% of the vote in the 
1976 local elections: 
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Table 6.11 - The 1976 Belgian communal elections - examples of the RW Polling Above 5% 
Share of the Votes But Winning No Seats. 
COMMUNE DM VOTES% \ 
Moralwelz 25 5.5 
Walcourt 2 3 6.0 
Stavelot 17 7.2 
Veriaine 11 5.2 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholieke Universiteit & Limburgs Universitair Centrum 
We can see from the first three rows listed in Table 6.11 that a positive correlation 
appears to exist between the district magnitude and the threshold of exclusion. As 
district magnitude decreases, the RW requires a higher share of the vote to ensure 
representation which it has not been able to achieve. The example of Veriaine tells us 
that the threshold of exclusion in this commune was at least 5.2%, though it is likely 
that the RW would have required a considerably higher share of the vote in order to 
secure seats. What actually did occur in the 1976 communal election in Veriaine was 
that the eleven seats were secured by only two parties (the PSC-PRL which polled 
67.1% share of the vote and the PS which polled 7.7% share of the vote), and all seats 
were allocated without having to employ the largest remainders method of PR. 
The 1982 communal elections demonstrated similar cases of the RW being totally 
unrewarded, though often this was due to a very low share of the vote Examples of the 
RW polling a 5% or greater ^ r e of the vote but winning no seats occurred in the 
following communes: 
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Table 6.12 - The 1982 Bdgian communal election - examples of the RW Polling a S% Share of 
the Vote and Above But Winrvng No Seats. 
COMMUNE DM VOTES% 
Oupeye 27 5.0 
Fleron 25 5.6 
Spa 21 5.6 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholleke Liniversiteit & Limburgs Universitair Centrum 
As we can see from Table 6.12, cases of the RW receiving 5% share of the vote and beirtg 
unrewarded again occurred in connmunes where district magnitude (DM) was less than 
30 seats (as was the case in 1976). We can strengthen our claim that a smaller district 
ma^itude can act as a d? facto threshold by comparing the above communes in Table 6.12 
with support for the RW in Charteroi in 1982. In this commune the district magnitude 
was 51 seats, enabling the RW to secure one of the available seats with a 4.5% share of 
the vote. The most significant hindrance to small regionalist parties in Belgium, 
therefore, is not purely the Imperiali seat distribution system which certainty under 
rewards small parties, but a combination of the Imperiali system and a low district 
ntagnitude which effectively raises the de facto threshold for representation and penalizes 
small regional parties, thus supporting the theories of Blais and Carty (1987) and 
Lijphart (1990) (remenrtber, a party only needs to poll 15% or more to be Marge' 
within the Belgian party system). We will now consider effective thresholds which 
operate in British sub-national elections and their implications for regionalist parties. 
6.3.3 Britain: Is it the case that regionalist party representation in a plurality, 
partfculariy first past the post, electoral system is particularly sensitive to the impact 
of variations in party competition? As the number of parties/candidates increases in a 
single seat electoral area we may expect the de facto threshold to decrease. For example. 
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a party could expect to secure the seat with a lower ^ r e of the vote when it is competing 
widi three or four candidates as opposed to just one, though this also depends upon the 
distribution of votes. Regional parties in Britain are often the second largest party in 
particular geographic areas (see Chapter Three Section 3.4.4d), although the prospects 
for representation may increase as party competition also increases in each electoral 
division. We will test if this is the case by analyzing the electoral fortunes.of the 
Scottish National Party in certain regions in 1986, 1990 and 1994 and Plaid Cymm in 
county council elections held in 1989 and 1993. 
In the 1990 regional elections held in Tayade, for example, the SNP secured ten seats 
out of the 39 contested, six of which were retained from the 1986 regional elections. In 
those seats retained or won in 1990, the SNP share of the vote was on average stronger 
than in 1986 therefore suggesting that the party had consolidated and strengthen support 
in key areas. Table 6.13 connpares SNP share of the vote with the number of competing 
parties in five of the ten seats won: 
Table 6.13 - The 1990 Regional Elections - examples of Electoral Divisions won by the SNP in 
Tayside. 
ELECTORAL DfVlStON SNP VOTES% COMPETING PARTIES 
Forfar West/Straihmore S9.S 3 
Forfar Easi/Dunnichen 55.6 3 
Brechin 52.3 4 
Arbroath St. Vigeans 46.2 5 
Montrose Lunan 46.0 5 
Source: Bochel and Denver 1990. 
We can see from Table 6.13 that the SNP requires a lower overall ^ r e of the vote to 
secure the seat as the number of competing parties in each division increased beyond 
three parties. For example, the seat won fay the SNP in Montrose Lunan where five 
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parties competed was secured with a 13.5% lower share of the vote than the seat won in 
Forfar West/ Strathmore where only three parties competed. Yet, the SNP share of the 
vote in all these divisions was high d^pite the number of parties competing. We will 
now compare these results with the following regional election. 
For the 1994 regional elections in Tayside the SNP provided candidates In 45 of the 46 
electoral divisions, and the overall SNP share of the vote was 39.6%, therefore 
improving on the 1990 figure by 8.7%. Whilst the SNP claimed the seat in 22 
divisions, Table 6.14 outlines a selection of these results: 
Table 6.14 - The 1994 Regional Elections - examples of Electoral Divisions won by the SNP in 
Tayside 
ELECTORAL DIVISION SNP VOTES96 COMPETING PARTIES 
Kinross 76.8 2 
Forfar West 67.5 3 
Forfar East 63.1 4 
Brechin/Eastern Glens 56.6 4 
Scone & St. Martins 38.0 4 
Glenfarg/Methven 36.4 4 
Carnoustie E/Arbroath W 31.2 4 
Source: Bodiel and Denver 1994. 
We can see from Table 6.14 more clearly than in TaWe 6.13 that the share of the popular 
vote required by the SNP to secure itself the seat in the single seat division declines as 
the number of participating candidates irKreases. The seat won in the Carnoustie East/ 
Arbroath West dwision where four parties competed was secured with a 45.6% lower 
share of the vote than in IOnn>ss where only two parties competed. A similar pattem 
also emerges in other Scottish regions. For example the SNP contested all 34 of the 
electoral divisions in the Central region in 1986, where it polled an average 34.3%, and 
secured five seats, therefore polling better than in Tayside (where the party polled 
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27.9% share of the vote in 1986) but winning less seats. Why was this the case? 
Table 6.1 5 - The 1986 Regional Elections - Electoral Divisions won by the SNP in the Central 
Region. 
ELECTORAL DMSION SNP VOTES% COMPETING PARTIES 
Carriden 69.1 2 
Ochil 60.0 2 
Tryst 56.4 3 
Devonvaie 42.2 3 
Glenfuir 41.3 3 
Source: Bochel and Denver 1986. 
We can see from Table 6.15 that in those divisions where the SNP secured seats its* 
share of the vote was particularly high, with the party polling an absolute majority in 
Carriden, Ochil and Tryst The SNP share of the vote does become lower however when 
party competition iru;reases to three parties, though we must be wary of making 
conclusive assessments since the number of cases in this section of analysis is small. In 
nine divisions the SNP was outpolted into second place by the Labour Party. In all nine of 
these divisions in the 1986 regional elections the SNP polled over 32% of the vote but 
because these divisions were fought as a straight two-party contest between the Labour 
Party and SNP, the SNP was penalized by the electoral system on every occasion. Hence, 
the high overall share of the vote polled by the SNP for the Central region as a whole 
which was shown earlier to be 34.3% may be misleading. In tenms of the general 
proportionality of regional party representation, we have shown that the SNP polled well 
in divisions fought as a straight two party contest, although the first past the post 
electoral system in single seat divisions does not reward second place and as such the high 
SNP shares of the vote in these cases are 'wasted' votesi. 
1 Taagepera claims that regional parties benefit when the district magnitude is equal to two 
seats (1984). 
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Similariy, for the 1990 elections to the Central Region, the SNP polled an average 
29.7% - a decline of 4.6% compared to 1986. Of the 34 divisions contested, the SNP 
won six seats, as outlined in Table 6.16: 
Table 6.16 - The 1990 Regional Elections - Electoral Divisions won by the SNP in Central 
ELECTORAL DIVISION SNP VOTES% COMPETING PARTIES 
Carriden 63.1 2 
Tryst 56.0 3 
Sealock 54.2 3 
Ochii 52.6 4 
Kinnaird 45.8 3 
Devonvale 35.4 4 
Source: Bochel and Denver 1990. 
In 1990, the SNP was able to retain four seats won in 1986 and capture two more 
besides, yet despite this its share of the votes in three divisions actually declined due to 
the increase in party competition in each division. We can again see that the strength of 
support, and hence threshold, declines as party competition increases. For example, the 
seat was won with 63.1 % share of the vote in Camden which was a straight two party 
contest, compared to the seat won in Devondale with a 35.4% share of the vote which was 
in fact a four party contest While Veal' support in terms of 'share of the vote' may be 
declining, therefore, this is not necessarily detrimental to the regionalist party in 
Scotland, and increasing party competition may actually benefit the SNP. The examples 
drawn from the Central region in 1986 show that the SNP does not necessarily prosper 
in straight two party contests. In cases where the SNP has a solid basis of support, the 
party benefits when it is in competition with more parties than merely the Labour Party. 
Does a similar picture emerge in relation to regional party representation in Wales? 
Table 6.17 outlines examples of PC support in the Cynon Valley district: 
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Table 6.17 - The 1989 Welsh County Council Elections - Support and Placing for PC Candidates 
in the Cynon Valley District. 
OMStON VOTES% posmoN COMPETING PARTIES 
Mountain Ash 67.7 1st 2 
Ynysybwl 43.3 2nd 2 
Aberman South 41.4 2nd 3 
Abercynon 40.2 2nd 2 
Cwmbach 38.7 2nd 2 
Penrhiwceiber 38.2 2nd 2 
Aberdare West 30.9 2nd 3 
Source: Railings & Thrasher 1989. 
We can see from the election results in Table 6.17 that in the district of Cynon Valley PC 
provided candidates for seven of the ten electoral divisions in the 1989 county council 
elections. Since Cynon Valley is in the county of Mid Glamorgan, we would expect to see 
the PC polling significant shares of the vote in this area (see Chapter Three section 
3.4.3d). While this indeed occurs, the PC only secured one seat in 1989. For example, 
whilst a 43.3% share of the vote left PC in only second place in the division of Ynysybwl 
in 1989, a share of the vote equal to 41.7% was enough to secure representation in the 
Aberdare West division in 1993 as Table 6.18 shows: 
Table 6.18 - The 1993 Welsh County Council Elections - Support and Placing for PC Candidates 
in the Cynon Valley District. 
COMPETING PARTIES DIVISION VOTES% POSmON C 
Aberman South 64.7 1st 2 
Mountain Ash 62.8 1st 2 
Penrhiwceiber 51.5 1st 2 
Ynysybwl 43.8 2nd 2 
Aberdare West 41.7 1st 4 
Aberdare East 33.4 2nd 3 
Abercynon 30.1 3rd 3 
Hirwaun 26.1 2nd 2 
Aberman North 25.1 2nd 2 
Cwmbach 23.7 2nd 2 
Source: Railings & Thrasher 1993a. 
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We can see from the election results In the district of Cynon Valley in 1993 that PC 
provided candidates for all ten of the electoral divisions thereby improving on the party's 
1989 participation ratio. Furthermore, PC increased representation from one to four 
seats in 1993. As mentioned above, most interesting about the election results in this 
district is the differentiation between the outcome in Ynysybwl in 1989 and in Aberdare 
West in 1993. We can explain this result as being affected by the number of competing 
parties in each division. Whilst the election in Ynysybwl was a straight two-way contest 
between the Labour Party and PC, the division of Aberdare West was contested by four 
candidates. We have already shown with reference to Scottish Regional elections that the 
more candidates in a single seat division there are, the lower the cfe facto threshold 
becomes for the SNP to win a seat. This can also be seen to be the case for PC in Wales. 
We have used examples of both the SNP and PC to show that a regionalist party can poll 
over 40% share of the vote in single seat divisions yet still take second place when the 
election is a two-party contest. What is important is that as long as regionalist parties 
are able to sustain and build upon existing levels of electoral support between elections, 
their opportunities for being successfully elected increase as more parties compete in 
each electoral area and thus the cfe facto threshold for representation decreases. In PR 
elections in Spain and Belgium we were able to estimate the de facto thresholds operating 
in elections, however, we cannot effectively do the ^me in the British case. We can 
ascertain that in a four party contest, for example, the effective de facto threshold is 
equal to 25% of the valid vote plus one vote, but rarely are shares of the votes between 
parties so closely balanced. The use of PR in multi seat electoral areas allows a more 
predictable indicator of cfe/acto thresholds than the first past the post system - hence 
reinforcing that placing is more crucial for SNP and PC candidates than share of the vote. 
Our last section of this chapter will analyze the relationship between seat distribution 
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systems and regional party representation. 
6-4 The Impact pf $eat Distribution Upon Regioria|ist Party Representation 
This section of analysis will consider the effect of the seat distribution formula upon 
regionaiist party representation for parties in both PR systems and the plurality system 
As was discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two section 2.3.3, the seat distribution 
formulae vary in proportionality in relation to their treatment of small parties, but this 
raises the added complexity of defining 'small' parties. For the purposes of analysis in 
this section we will focus upon regional parties and the seat distribution effect in 
Belgium, Italy and Britain. 
6.4.1 Belgium If we recall our analysis of the 1976 communal elections in Belgium (see 
section 6.2.1) we can see that the PDF benefitted from the Imperiali method of seat 
distribution, and in fact there were no examples of the PDF being under represented in 
the 1976 elections. In the commune of Anderiecht, for example, the PDF was slightly 
over represented (19.1% share of the seats with an 18.1 % share of the votes). In those 
municipalities where the PDF polled highest, the party was more significantly over 
represented. In the commune of Oudergem in 1976, the FDF won 51.6% of the seats with 
a share of the vote of 42.2%, in Etterbeek the party secured 67.6% seats with a 55.7% 
share of the votes, and in St Lamb Woluwe the FDF won 51.4% of the seats with a 42.5% 
share of the vote. As such, the PDF was over rewarded in the 1976 communal elections 
though we can also darify that it was not a small party and, therefore, we ^ould not be 
surprised by the fact that this regional party was significantiy over represented due to 
the effects of the Imperiali method of seat distribution. 
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A^in, the 1988 communal elections in Belgium demonstrated the effect of the use of the 
Imperiali system upon regionalist party representation. Whilst the PDF was over 
rewarded with seats when the share of the vote was large it was also under rewarded 
when the vote was not so strong. Table 6.19 compares district magnitude (DM) with the 
difference in the FDF*s shares of the vote and shares of the seats in six Bmssels 
communes in 1988: 
Table 6.19 - The Impact of the Imperiali Seat Distribution Method Upon FOF Representation, 
1988 communal elections. 
MUNICIPALITY DM VOTES% SEATS96 
St. Agatha Bcrchem 25 18.7 24.0 
Watemioal Bosvoorde 27 35.8 44.4 
Oudergem 31 48.6 58.1 
Evere 31 11.8 9.7 
St. Gillis 3S 7.0 5.7 
Scharbeek 47 9.5 8.5 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholieke Universiteit & Limburgs Universitair Centrum 
We can see from Table 6.19 that electoral success and representation for the FDF is at 
the mercy of the seat distribution system rather than purely the number of seats 
available. The FDF is at an advantage when it is one of the largest parties and as a result 
is over rewarded with seats (e^ in St. Agatha Berchem, Watermoal Bosvoorde and 
Oudergem). It is, however, penalised when its ^ r e of the vote is close to or below the 
10% mark (e.g. in Evere, S t Gillis and Scharbeek). This occurs regardless of low or 
high district magnitude though we must be wary of the validity of discussing low district 
magnitude when the lowest example is 25 seats, as was the case in the commune of St 
Agatha Berchem. As was demonstrated in Chapter Four sectk>n 4.5, although the 
constraints of district magnitude are related to the number of competing parties, there is 
a level at which the number of seats refrains from being the primary hiruirance to party, 
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particularly smalt party, representation. From the data that is available for Belgian 
communal elections our analysis suggests that a regionalist party can only be classified 
as 'smair when it polls below 10% of the popular vote, but at or below this point it is 
likely to be under rewarded or completely unrewarded. 
Of course, the FDF is not the only regionalist party in Belgium. Support for the 
regionalist RW in the 1976 communal elections in the region of Wallonia ranged from 
the party polling less than 1% to it actually being the largest party in other communes, 
although the RW was over rewarded with seats in only a handful of cases. In the commixne 
of Trois Ponts for example, the RW won 63.6% of the seats with a 58% share of the vote 
in 1976. In Charleroi the RW received a smaller though still significant share of the 
votes of 19.2%, for which it received an almost equally proportional share of the seats of 
19.6%. It is important to bear in mind that whilst the district magnitude in Trois Ponts 
was 11 seats, the district magnitude in Charteroi is 51 seats, and we should not be 
surprised to see a far more proportional vote-seat ratio in the larger commune. Table 
6.20 compares district magnitude (DM) with each party's share of the votes and seats 
and the indices of proportionality for the 1976 elections in these two communes: 
Table 6.20 - A Comparison of District Magnitude and Each Party's Share of the Vote and Share 
of the Seats and Overall Measures of Disproportionality In the 1976 Belgian Communal Elections 
- Communes of Charleroi and Trois Ponts. 
COMMUNE PARTY DM 
Charteroi PS RW PSC PRL PCB NR1 PTB 
Votes% 49.1 1 9 , 2 1S.4 10.9 4.4 0.8 0.3 51 seats 
Seats % 52.9 1 9 . 6 15.7 9.8 2.0 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby= 4.6 Least Squares= 3.4 Sainte Lague= 2.9 
continued... 
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COMMUNE PARTY DM 
Trols Ponts RW PS 
Votes% 58.0 42.0 11 seats 
Seats % 63.6 36.4 
Overall Measures of Proportionality: 
Loosemore Hanby= 5.7 Least Squares= S.7 Sainte Lague= 1.3 
Source: J . Ackaert, Katholieke Universiteit & Umburgs Universitair Centrum, University of 
Plymouth Database. 
Table 6.20 provides some interesting information. We can see that, generally speaking, 
the absolute difference between the share of the votes and share of the seats for each 
individual party is lower for the election held in Charferoi than the election held in Trois 
Ponts. This is reflected in the lower Loosemore Hanby and Least Squares measures of 
disproportionality in Charieroi. Since both indices are measuring the absolute 
differences between each party's share of the votes and share of the seats we would expect 
the measures in Charteroi to be lower, since the much higher district magnitude allows 
for tfie seats to be more proportionally allocated among parties. We would expect the 
Sainte Lague measure to be lower in Trois Pont, however, since this index is measuring 
the relative differences in a party's share of the votes and share of the seats, and relative 
differences increase as the number of cases of disparity (/.e the number of parties 
competing) increases. This evidence from communal elections held in Belgium in 1976 
supports the claim made by Taagepera and Laakso (1980: 443) that one of the major 
determinants of proportionality is district magnitude, although in a commune with a 
small district magnitude which employs PR (but no other electoral constraints) the 
fewer the number of parties the greater the opportunity is for true proportionality to 
occur. We have already ascertained, however, that the Imperiali system over rewards 
the largest parties and since the district magnitude in Trois Ponts is only 11 seats, we 
have an example of much stronger disproportionality than if the district magnitude 
matched that of Charieroi but all other factors ( e ^ the number of competing parties and 
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their shares of the votes) remained the same. 
6.4.2 Italy: We can assess the impact of the seat distribution method upon regional 
party performance in the Italian region of Val D'Aosta by employing data available for the 
regional assembly elections held in 1983, 1988 and 1993. In all three elections the 
district magnitude was 35 seats and the Hare quota method of seat allocation was applied 
2. Despite the high number of parties participating in each election (12 in 1983, 14 in 
1988 and 12 in 1993) the seat distribution system in fact produced substantial 
opportunities for representation as the de facto threshold was less than a 2% share of the 
vote. Representation for the two regionalist parties - the Union Valdotaine (UV) and Lega 
Nord (LN) - is outlined in Table 6.21: 
Table 6.21 - Examples of Regionalist Party Shares of the Vote (%) and Shares of the Seats (%) 
in the Val d'Aosta Regional Elections, 1983 - 1993. 
YEAR PARTY VOTES% SEATS% 
1983 
1988 
1993 
1993 
UV 
UV 
UV 
LN 
27.1 
34.2 
37.3 
7.6 
25.7 
34.3 
37.1 
8.6 
Source: Regione Autonoma Valle d'Aosta, 1 993. 
We can see from Table 6.21 that both regionalist parties received a highly proportional 
seat reward in relation to their share of the votes. In the case of the UV, this was in fact 
the party with the highest share of the vote in all three elections and as such the close 
correlation between share of the votes and share of the seats is not surprising. We can 
also see, however, that over representation is not necessarily derived from greater 
2 To determine the Hare quota, votes for each list are added together. This total is divided by 
the number of seats to detenmine the quota. If a list polls less votes than the quota its votes 
are subtracted from the original total. This new total is divided by the number of seats to 
give a new quota. 
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shares of the vote as occurs with the Imperiali system employed in Belgium. The Lega 
Nord was one of ten parties to secure representation in 1993, with twelve political 
parties competing in total Since the overall measures of disproportionality for the 
1993 election in Va) d'Aosta are only 5.5 for the Loosemore Hanby measure and 2.6 for 
the Least Squares measure we <^ n state that the seat distribution method used in this 
region is in fact highly proportional, particularly when we take into account the district 
ntagnitude (35 seats), the high number of participating and represented parties, and the 
fact that the de facto threshold Is low. The seat distribution method in the Val d'Aosta 
region is highly proportional despite other variables, rather than because of them. 
6.4.3 Britain: An analysis of the impact of seat distribution upon regional party 
representation under the first past the post electoral system in single seat divisions 
provides an interesting contrast to the discoveries we have made concerning PR systems 
in Belgium and Italy. In Scotiand, district magnitude always equals one seat, whilst in 
Wales we have cases of multi-seat wards. In the 1986 regional elections in Scotiand the 
SNP provided candidates in 41 of the 46 electoral divisions in the Tayside region. The 
average tumout In contested divisions in Tayside in 1986 was 47.2%. The overall SNP 
share of the vote was 27.9%, and the party won nine seats in total (22% of those 
contested). Using other cases of Scottish regional elections in section 6.3.3 we 
demonstrated that there was a con-elation between SNP share of the vote and party 
competition, and this is reinforced in this section. In Forfar East in 1986, for example, 
the SNP polled almost 60% of the popular vote in a two-party contest between itself and 
the CoTYservative Party. In comparison, the 36% of the vote polled by the SNP in West 
Ferry in 1986 was also enough to win the seat, due to the fact that there were five 
competing candidates - thus reducing the de facto threshold needed to win in that division 
(though effectively the de facto threshold may be as low as 20% of the valid vote plus one 
vote in a angle seat division with five competing parties). In this section we will focus 
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upon electoral divisions in which the SNP came second: 
Table 6.22 - A Comparison of Party Shares of the Vote in Electoral Divisions in which the SNP 
Took Second Place - 1986 Regional Elections in the Tayside Region. 
ELECTORAL DIVISION SNP VOTES % 1st PARTY 1st PARTY VOTES % 
Letham 38.0 LAB 48.6 
Craigiebank 30.9 LAB 32.1 
Ardler/Blackshade 14.5 LAB 84.9 
Kinross 40.4 CON 48.3 
St rat ht ay 34.0 CON 37.6 
Longforgan/Sidlaw 32.6 CON 35.9 
St. Martins 26.1 CON 44.3 
Source: Bochel and Denver 1986. 
The SNP took second place is 25 electoral divisions within Tayside in the 1986 regional 
elections and these divisions were fairly evenly divided between those won by the Labour 
Party and those won by the Conservative Party. If we look at the range in shares of the 
votes in divisions in Table 6.22 in whrch the SNP took second place to Labour, we can see 
that in Craigiebank the SNP come close to beating the party (Labour polled only 1.2% 
more). In other cases, however, the SNP share of the vote was at least 10% behind that 
of the Labour Rany. The same is not true though where the SNP came second to the 
Conservative Party. The largest differential between the Conservative Party and SNP 
was 18.2% share of the vote in the division of St. Martins. In comparison, the largest 
differential between the Labour Party and SNP was 70.4% in the division of Ardler/ 
Blackshade. As such, the SNP was a much closer second party to the Conservatives in 
Tayade in 1986 than it was to the Labour Party. There are no prizes, however, for 
polling second place in a first past the post seat distribution system and we can see that 
significant levels of electoral support for the SNP in some divisions became effectively 
'wasted' votes. We stated earlier that Taagepera claims that regional parties perform 
best when district magnitude equals two seats (see section 6.3.3). Is It the case that 
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regional parties in Britain benefit from elections in multi-seat wards? In order to test 
this we will consider variations in PC support and representation in multi seat divisions 
in the 1987 and 1991 district elections to demonstrate the impact of split ticket voting 
in a plurality system. 
For analytical purposes we have chosen six wards in which split ticket voting occurred in 
both the 1987 and 1991 district elections, and in which the PC successfully secured a 
proportion of the available seats. Table 6.23 outlines the information by listing the ward 
name and district within which it lies, the year of election, the district magnitude (DM), 
the share of the vote to each PC candidate standing, and the number of PC canddates 
dected 
Table 6.23 - A Comparison of PC Support in Selected Multi-Seat Wards - 1987 and 1991 
District Elections. 
Islwyn Dist r ic t 
Crumlin Ward 
PC V07ES96 CANDIDATES 
YEAR DM 7 S t cand 2nd cand 3rd cand ELECTED 
1987 3 21.6 18.3 14.3 2 
1991 3 18.7 16.1 12.7 1 
Pontllafraith Ward 
PC VOTES% CANDIDATES 
YEAR DM 7 S t cand 2nd cand 3rd cand 4th cand ELECTED 
1987 4 16.3 14.2 10.5 10.4 2 
1991 4 14.3 12.7 8.9 8.7 2 
Rhymney Valley District ' 
Aber Valley Ward 
PC VOTES% CANDIDATES 
YEAR DM 7 S t cand 2nd cand 3rd cand ELECTED 
1987 3 18.0 12.6 8.6 1 
1991 3 14.2 11.6 8.8 2 
continued. 
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Rhymney Valley District 
Hengoed Ward 
PC VOTES% 
YEAR DM 1st cand 2nd cand 
CANDIDATES 
ELECTED 
1987 
1991 
Penrfieol Ward 
YEAR DM 
26.0 
30.6 
7 S t c a n d 
24.2 
23.3 
PC VOTES% 
2rtd cand 3rd cand 4th cand 
CANDIDATES 
ELECTED 
1987 
1991 
13.8 
15.4 
11.1 
12.3 
10.8 
12.1 
10.8 
11.6 
Taf f Ely District 
Uantwit Fadre 
YEAR DM 
PC VOTES% 
7 S t cand 2nd cand 
CANDIDATES 
ELECTED 
1987 
1991 
22.8 
24.5 
18.8 
17.1 
Source: Railings & Thrasher, Local Elections Database. 
Each PC's share of the vote percentage was calculated as a share of the number of votes as 
a whole and. therefore, may appear much lower than share of the vote figures discussed 
in relation to county council election results in single seat divisions in Wales. We can 
see from Table 6.23 that in the six wards chosen, considerable vote-splitting occurred 
which benefitted some PC candidates and not others. Some significant differences between 
highest and lowest PC shares of the vote occurred - particularly in Aber Valley in 1987 
and Crumlin in 1987. What is obvious from the different shares of the votes is that the 
electorate used split-ticket voting to elect candidates horn more than one party. We have 
shown in section 6.3.3 that both major regionalist parties in Britain have successfully 
established a significant level of support at the county and regional election level but are 
often hindered in straight two-party contests in single seat divisions. Multi-seat wards 
at the district election level do not provide the same problems and the PC appears to 
benefit as a 2 nd, 3 rd and 4th choice from split ticket voting at the sub national level. 
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We can see, therefore, that there are several aspects important to the analysis of the seat 
distribution method upon the representation of regional parties in sub-national 
elections. The most obvious difference is the contrast between proportional 
representation systems and plurality systems. The observations we have made in this 
section are by no means unique to regionalist parties or the sub-national level of 
election. What is of more importance, however, is the effect of the different forms of PR 
seat distribution. The Imperiali method does not operate In favour of the smaller parties 
and as such recponallst parties in Europe may be at a disadvantage If they are unable to 
pott over 10% of the popular support In sub-nationat elections. Whilst regionalist 
parties under the British plurality system are increasing In electoral popularity, they 
are still very much hindered by the sngle seat system, though opportunities do Increase, 
as the PC experience shows, in multi-seat ward when voters choose to split voting 
preferences between parties. 
Conclusions 
From the diversity of analysis presented in this chapter, we can make various claims and 
assumptions about electoral support and representation of regionalist parties at the 
sub-national level In Europe. In relation to district nnagnitude, regional parties which 
poll a small level of electoral support are threatened in electoral divisions with a low 
district magnitude - thus supporting those claims made by Rae (1967), Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989) and Gallagher (1991). Whilst low district magnitude is the norm in 
plurality systems, we have also shown It to be a hindrance to regional parties operating 
within proportional representation systems at the lowest, municipal, level of elections. 
In Belgium, large regional parties such as the FDF do not appear to be affected by district 
magnitude, though smaller examples such as the RW have been affected. From the 
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examples used to represent regional party electoral success in Spain, we are able to 
show that the district nragnitude is not allocated at the regional level in Galicia, but at the 
provincial level, and that smaller provinces do hinder the opportunities for 
proportionality (though this is not necessarily the primary hindrance to 
representation). In local elections held in Barcelona, however, district magnitude does 
become an observable constraint. We can further clarify that low district magnitude can 
effectively create dl? fecto thresholds to small party representation which have an impact 
both instead of and as welt as de jure thresholds. 
In relation to the two types of electoral thre^olds, we can see that they help to restrict 
the diversity of multi-party councils and assemblies at the sub-national level. As 
suggested by Ujphart (1994a), they effectively exclude many very small parties which 
are often encouraged to participate by the very presence of proportional representation. 
In the case of Galician elections, regional parties can overcome de jure thresholds if 
support is concentrated in specific provinces. Yet it is nnore common to see 
representation restricted by a die ^cto threshold, as this increases as the district 
magnitude decreases. This has also affected the reglonalist RW party in Belgian 
communal elections. We have shown that in some cases of proportional representation 
systems, the de facto threshold is actually higher than the de jure threshold. This 
occurred in the smaller districts for the Catalonian autononrraus elections and local 
elections held in Barcelona. Furthermore, in first past the post systems, the de facto 
threshold decreases as we move away from straight two-party contests towards multi 
party contests, demonstrated by our study of the SNP in selected regional elections in 
Scotland and the PC in certain counties in Wales. 
The seat distribution system is of crucial importance. By analyzing communal elections 
in Belgium we were able to show that a large regionalist party such as the PDF, has 
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benefitted from the use of the tmperiali seat distribution method. Similariy, the 
Imperiali system will penalize regional parties if they are electorally small, which also 
applies to the PDF in municipalities such as Schar i^k and Evere. The Hare quota 
distribution system as used in the Val rfAosta region of Italy tends to be more 
proportional towards all but the very smallest of parties. Both regionalist parties (the 
UV and LN - large and small parties) are relatively proportionally represented in 
regional elections because of the seat distribution ^stenx The first past the post 
electoral, or simple plurality, system is not necessarily a problem for regional parties 
provided they are able to consolidate support in targeted electoral divisbns. Our 
analysis finds, however, that in many divisions both the SNP and PC take second place 
despite significant levels of support. The use of single seat divisions results in a large 
amount of 'wasted* regional support, and actual seats won often under estimates real 
levels of electoral support The prospects are not so gloomy if plurality operates in 
multi-seat areas, because regionalist parties appear to benefit from split-ticket voting 
where the opportunity arises. Furthermore, in the case of the SNP, the party 
apparently benefits as party competition increases. If the party tas a hard core 
consistent level of support across sub-national elections, then the party may prosper as 
the number of parties increases and the de facto threshold declines. In our final chapter 
we will draw together the findings made from our quantitative analysis of sub-national 
electoral systems and their effect upon party representation arxi attempt to clarify some 
of the questions raised in the eariier chapters. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSIONS 
The main body of this thesis consists of two distinct sections. In Chapters One to Three we 
presented a critical analysis of established research into electoral systems, party 
systems and two party families which has primarily drawn conclusions from analysis at 
the national electoral level. Whilst others have chosen to ask why the electorate in 
various European states are less likely to vote for the traditional 'catch-all' parties, we 
have instead focused upon the mechanical operation of elections at the sub-national level 
in order to establish a clearer understanding of the circumstances which facilitate greater 
changes in party representation, and eventually, party systems. We will now attempt to 
answer some of those questions posed in eariier chapters, and justify statements made 
about far right and regionalist parties in particular, by referring to the data used and 
observations made in Chapters Four to Six. 
In Chapter One we raised several issues regarding the status of contemporary electoral 
and party system research. Despite the growing volume of literature raising issues about 
electoral change in western Europe which has proliferated since the 1980s, we 
demonstrated that it could also be argued that the notion of radical change is a 'myth' 
(Mair 1993). Yet electoral and party system analysis has, until now, remained largely 
concerned with national elections. There may be good reasons for this - after all, 
governments are chosen via national elections and thus may be deemed more important and 
likely to exhibit the highest rates of turnout. This should not, however, render sub-
national elections 'unimportant', and it has been our intention to outline the effects of 
electoral systems, and to a lesser extent, the stability of party systems, as they exist in 
various west European sub-national systems. In doing so we have considered some 
general patterns of stability and change (within Chapter Four), and more precisely looked 
at the relationship between far right and regionalist party representation and 
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proportionality in a number of sub-national case studies. 
Precisely because sub-national elections do not choose the government of the day, they are 
interesting for several reasons. First, features such as turnout may tell us something 
about the 'legitimacy* of sub-national govemnrient - i.e. the extent to which it Is seen as 
important in terms of being politically effective. If local government Is seen as being 
politically 'toothless' (as some would argue is the case in Britain and the Republic of 
Ireland), then the electorate may be less inclined to vote In the first place. Second, If 
sub-national government Is weak In terms of Its political impact, sub-national elections 
may also be used as effective 'opinion polls' indicating in between general elections the 
popularity of the major political parties (see Reif and Schmitt 1980, van der Eijk et at 
1994) . 
In comparison, It may not be at all appropriate to Judge sub-national elections by the 
criteria used for national elections. If particular minority groups (be they ethnic, 
linguistic, economic etc) are not to be left to feel marginalised or excluded, they must 
have some political say and in one form this may be achieved with political party 
fonmatioa This has created a fragmentation of the traditional party systems in some 
states ( e g Belgium, Spain, Italy arid Britain) and allowed parties such as regionalists and 
the far right to develop and build upon support. In federalized countries and states with 
areas of regional autonomy, sub-national elections may be taken very seriously by the 
electorate and for some (especially those belonging to minority populations) may even be 
more Important than general elections {eg. in Belgium, Germany and parts of Spain and 
Italy). Thus, not only Is a comparative analysis of sub-national elections in western 
Europe long overdue, but it allows us to test some Important observations made about 
electoral rules and the role of small parties which have developed from national electoral 
analysis. 
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In Chapter One we identified several political changes which have been labelled by others 
as primary facilitators of electoral volatility and change. These include the 'decline of the 
central state', and the weakening salience of support for anti-ideological, catch-all 
parties which have dominated the electoral scene in many countries through much of the 
post-war period. Paradoxically, as the central state has weakened in some countries, the 
simultaneous emergence and resurgence of peripheral demands for autonomy has brought 
about a surge of new and small parties onto the electoral scene, and it is the success of two 
party families seeking representation that is of particular interest to our research -
those of the far right and regionalists. 
Within Chapter One we considered a variety of explanations regarding how and why small 
parties may be an important topic to research. Muller-Rommel (1991) claims that the 
significance of small parties is marginalised by the reluctance of academics to look beyond 
the outcome of general elections. As a result, the frequency and tendency to categorize 
small parties as 'others' is an annoying hindrance to those whose interests lie beyond the 
handful of established large and coalition partner parties. Analysis at the national level 
can be hindered by low national support making comparative analysis difficult - though 
this is not necessarily the case at the sub-national level. There are both organisational 
and systemic reasons why new and small parties are most likely to succeed, at least to 
begin with, at the sub-national level {i.e. financial resources, availability of candidates, 
media attention etc. as well as electoral system effects and the significance of a 
decentralized political system). Indeed, few parties literally *burst onto' the national 
electoral scene without having successfully built upon established support at the sub-
national level. We do not seek to answer who votes for small parties, but what happens to 
such parties when voters do. What effect do electoral rules have and how does 
proportionality change? 
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Sub-national electoral success has, until now, been a neglected area of research as little 
comparative electoral analysis has ventured beyond general elections. The diversity of 
sub-national government systems does not make comparative analysis a simple task. Nor, 
on the surface do sub-national electoral systems appear uniform. Small parties, 
therefore, have important lessons to leam about where and when they can expect to 
maximize various levels of electoral support (Taagepera & Shugart 1989). For example, 
less votes are needed to win seats at the sub-national level than in general elections and 
multi-seat elections hold greater opportunities for small parties, whilst the electoral 
system may have more indirect influences upon new and small party opportunities -
particular ballot systems and thresholds may deter voters from 'wasting' their vote on 
less-established, fringe groups. 
Small parties may, therefore, only be small in national and not sub-national elections. 
Technical obstacles such as thresholds are effectively lower and publicity opportunities 
are better. But there are other reasons for studying sub-national elections. Deep-seated 
regional trends and variations are often clouded over by generalisations made about 
national results - suggesting conformity rather than diversity. Also, the snrall though 
significant research conducted on 'second order* elections provides important 
observations which we can further test with our data. For example, is tumout lower -
and does this have particular implications for certain parties? Reif and Schmitt claim 
the prospects for new and smaller parties should be brighter as control of national 
government is not at stake. This is supported by Gallagher (1989) who suggests that 
'unimportant* elections enable us to identify weakening party attachments before 
wholesale realignment actually occurs. Small parties may also prosper in sub-national 
elections because they can tune in to truly local issues, and the 'institutional-procedurar 
dimension (the electoral system itselO may work to their advantage. Hence, the *sub-
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national electoral system may act as an accessible vehicle for minority party 
representation and establishment within the general party system' (Chapter One page 
27 ) . 
Within Chapter Two we have identified particular electoral rules and features which have 
been deemed as significant in determining the proportionality of representation. Some of 
these rules are constitutional e g de Jure thresholds and supplementary seats, whilst 
others are arbitrary - such as district magnitude, and dbfecco thresholds. This is not to 
imply, however, that they do not have as important an influence upon proportionality. 
We agree with Rae's comments (1967) that all electoral systems tend to yield 
disproportionate results and that some electoral systems are particulariy prejudiced 
towards the larger parties. Rae also claims that no electoral system positively 
accelerates snnall party success, but rather some are 'weaker brakes' to their 
development. We have sought to identify these brakes. M elections must have a district 
magnitude, all contested elections must have a potential de fecto threshold for 
representation and all elections adopt an established method of seat distribution. It is 
these core elements and some secondary factors which provide the focus for the majority 
of our analysis in later chapters. Whilst many countries operate simitar national and 
sub-rrational electoral systems there are often variations to a lesser or greater degree 
( e g Italy and Germany). 
One factor which does vary significantly in many cases is district magnitude. Hence, 
assumptions made about the impact of electoral systems in each country at the national 
electoral level will not necessarily apply when analyzing sub-national elections in those 
sanne countries. We stated that the general assumption at the national electoral level is 
that small parties only realistic opportunities lie within PR systems. This may also be 
the case sub-nationally, but our assumption of which parties are small at this level may 
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change. If Jackman*s (1987) claim that increased disproportionality discourages voters 
from supporting minor parties is correct, then again we can reinforce our claim that 
small parties have important lessons to team about which electoral systems and rules 
will maximize the opportunities for representation. 
Powell (1986) cited in Chapter Two, asserts that PR has two sets of consequences - it 
produces more parties and produces some extremist parties. We can accept neither as 
entirety applicable to sub-national elections. First, we have cases of PR where many 
parties participate (ag, 10 or more parties in Spain and Italy), but we have also shown 
that we have as littie as three parties in PR systems ( e ^ at the municipal level in 
Belgium). At the same time, party competition is increasing in British sub-national 
elections. PR does not, therefore, necessarily encourage more parties at the sub-national 
level. Does it produce extremist parties? If we use the far right as an example then yet 
again we cannot prove this is the case. PR certainly enhances representational chances, 
but the far right have persisted in British electoral politics for a significant part of the 
post-war period, albeit with few candidates and extremely small levels of support. 
Ultimately, we must suggest that other factors produce extrenrtist parties, but certain 
electoral features at the sub-national level work to their benefit. 
In Chapter Two we also discussed the notion of 'proportional representation' and the 
political implications this often creates. Gallagher (1991) firstly states that the issue of 
proportionality has by and large been overtooked. For example, different electoral 
systems and particularly different PR systems, create different types of proportionality 
because they embody different principles regarding representation - /.e. who ^ u l d be 
included/excluded and to what extent? If certain parties are to be excluded, an electoral 
system has to be manufactured to enat}le this to occur i.e. with thresholds for very small 
parties and with a majoritarian system for extremist parties. We have demonstrated 
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throughout this research that disproportionality is not affected by the method of seat 
distribution alone - one also needs to consider the distribution of votes between parties, 
the district magnitude, the number of competing parties and the influence of both de jure 
and cfe fectD thresholds. The political 'character of disproportionality' (Cox & Shugart 
1991) should be the central concem of those parties focused upon in this research. The 
extent to which electoral systems and rules favour the larger parties at the cost of the 
small parties is our main focus. Just as the others have disputed which electoral rules 
are most significant in determining proportionality we too have shown that different 
rules become more significant at different sub-national levels - district magnitude 
becoming more Important at the lowest electoral level. 
Since we are partlculariy Interested In the representation of small parties we are 
concemed with disproportionality indices that denrwnstrate (i) cases of large seat-vote 
discrepancy (the Least Squares Index) - particularty If this affects far right and 
regionalist parties, and (ii) numerous cases of small parties being unrepresented - a 
small party alone may be 'politically uninteresting' but a certain level of support for a 
collective of small parties will affect proportionality (measured by the Loosemore Hanby 
Index). The Saint Lague Index Is suitable because it Is not biased towards any particular 
seat distribution formula. In relation to the electoral features most likely to affect 
proportionality, district magnitude is favoured by Rae(1967), Taagepera and Shugart 
(1989) and Gallagher (1991), and the seat allocation formula by Lijphart (1990) and 
Blals and Carty (1987) . 
Can we simply say that PR is the most effective means of representation for far right and 
regionalist parties In West Europe? Apparently not. Both types of party benefit from 
Increased support in multi-seat elections in Britain, and although representation is not 
guaranteed, there is evidence of split-ticket voting which does benefit smaller parties 
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when *less-is-at-stake' compared to single seat general elections. Even in PR systems, 
far right and regionalist parties must be able to gauge potential support. If the parties 
are large e.g. polling a share of the vote of 20% or more, representation is not a problem 
and over-representation can often occur. Yet if the share of the vote is likely to be below 
10% various electoral features have to be taken into consideration - namely the district 
magnitude, the seat distribution system and the number of competing parties. The 
conr>bination of these three factors creates important de facto thresholds which may be 
difficult to surpass. The strategic contestation of sub-national elections, therefore, can 
provide the make or break factor for new and small parties in Europe - pi-oviding an 
invaluable base from which to build up a platform for contesting national elections. PR is 
not an 'ideal* system - proportionality is a value laden measure depending upon whose 
interests we prefer to see represented. As such, multidistricts in a plurality system 
may be a fitting compromise for smaller parties in Britain. 
In Chapter Three we discussed the established literature regarding west European party 
systems and the opportunities available for party system change. As was observed in 
relation to electoral systems, research of west European party systems has tended to focus 
upon the national electoral level. If Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) claim that the 
effective number of parties at the national level has gradually increased since 1970, then 
opportunities for new parties should be even rosier at the sub-national level. If the 
notion that traditional parties and party systems are under challenge is correct, support 
for new and small alternative parties will first become apparent at the sub-national level 
- as the opportunities for representation are less stringent. Wolinetz (1988) claims 
that certain electoral laws serve to maintain party system stability by providing a hurdle 
for new and small parties. Our aim has been to establish the significance of this hurdle at 
the sub-national level. 
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Within Chapter Three, we defined the two party families which we have used as case 
studies for analyzing electoral system effects. Whilst acknowledging that there exists 
some debate about which parties fit into the categories far right and regior^list, we have 
nevertheless chosen case studies which attract the greatest degree of consensus. For 
various reasons, far right and regionalist parties have attracted a significant amount of 
political research attention in the last decade. In relation to far right electoral success, 
we noted that Ignazi and Ysmal suggest the 'new' far right is most successful whilst 
parties with stronger ties to the legacy of fascism are electorally weak. This is certainly 
true when comparing the electoral fortunes of the new far right in Gemiany and the 
Netheriands with the old far right of Britain and Belgium. We must re-assert, however, 
that a weakness with Ignazi and Ysmal's claim is that they do not define 'electoral 
success'. Many associate success with votes polled. Since we are concerned with 
proportionality we would choose to define electoral success with at least proportionate, 
and even over, representation. 
For the purposes of research, we have analyzed both old far right parties (established 
before 1980) and new far right parties (established since 1980). In Germany, the NPO 
was electorally successful in a handful of states in the late 1960s, but has since been 
overshadowed by the success of Die Republikaner. The DVU-Ust D is electorally 
concentrated in the states of Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein. Thus, Die Republikaner is 
the largest and most diversely spread far right party in Germany. Since its formation in 
1983, the party has experienced various peaks and troughs in sub-national support, 
possibly suggesting that the party is a recipient of 'protest' votes. 
In the Netheriands, the 'old' far right have been replaced by the 'new* far right (CD and 
CP86). Whilst these parties have enjoyed some very small success at the national level, 
they are more rapidly growing in effective support and representation at the sub-national 
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level. In Belgium, various far right parties have existed in the post war period though by 
far the most successful is the Vlaams Blok. Since 1987, this party has significantly 
increased its profile at the national and sub-national level, and as a result is hardly small 
in sub-national terms, and is actually one of the larger parties in the province of 
Antwerpen. By comparison, far right support in Britain is extremely weak. Both far 
right parties have enjoyed only small and sporadic bursts of support, which tend to be 
concentrated in specific, working class areas. Apart from a handful of council seats in the 
1970s and a by-election victory in 1993, the far right in Britain has remained on the 
electoral fringes. 
In relation to regionalist parties in western Europe, we suggested that such parties form 
for a variety of reasons with a range of demands - often based on notions of ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural difference and with a belief that their interests are exploited or 
Ignored by an 'alien' central state. We should not be surprised to find numerous, 
successful regionalist parties in Belgium, and such parties have existed since the 1950s. 
We have shown that the RW has apparently benefitted from second order voting -
performing better in sub-national elections than in general elections, whilst the Flemish 
VU has been losing support since the late 1980s (though this is probably due to the 
success of the regionalist and far right nature of the VB). In Italy, regionalist parties 
have experienced a dramatic rise in support since the collapse of the mainstream parties 
in the late 1980s and eariy 1990s - provoking claims that Italy is truly fragmenting 
into at least two and possibly three identifiable cultural regions. Linguistic-ethnic 
regional parties such as those in Sardinia and Val d'Aosta have received a constantly 
significant and increasing share of the vote at the sub-national level since the 1970s and 
1980s. The most significant regionalist party in Italy is now the Northern League which 
has used cultural-economic motives to attract a phenomenal level of support both locally 
and nationally since the early 1990s, to the extent that it is the third largest party in 
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national terms in Itaty. 
In Spain, the most prominent examples of regionalist parties lie in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country, and to a lesser extent in Galicia, with the former two having more than 
one regionalist party. In Catalonia, the CiU has been the largest party since 1980, as has 
been the PNV in the Basque Country. In Britain regionalist parties have developed in 
Scotland and Wales for both economic and cultural reasons. Both parties have been 
significantly disadvantaged at the national electoral level, but have performed 
increasingly well in sub-national electior^ since the 1980s. Both are now the second 
largest party in terms of shares of the votes in their respective countries. In order to 
analyse successful representation of far right and regionalists more accurately at the 
sub-national level we have considered particular case studies of electoral support and 
representation. 
As a result of a general overview of sub-national electoral and party systems in seven 
European countries in Chapter Four, we were able to make the following general 
comments: First, federal states in particular demonstrate strong variations in sub-
national party systems. Second, the Dutch electoral system appears to be highly 
proportional at (a) the overall national level, and (b) the overall provincial level. 
Declining turrxxit since the 1970s as a result of the ending of compulsory voting has 
similarly been matched by a decline in support for the mainstream political parties 
which have dominated much of post-war Dutch politics. Third, the 5% threshold is a 
significant constraint for small parties in Germany. Yet parties polling below a 10% 
share of the vote are also vulnerable to under-representation because of the predominant 
use of the d'Hondt seat distribution system. Suggestions have been made elsewhere 
(Conradt 1993) that German Land elections may reflect an element of second order 
protest voting. Conradt also suggests that Laender elections have acted as indicators of 
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change in national politics. Our analysis of the second order hypothesis, however, 
suggests otherwise. Fourth, the constitutional federalization of Belgium has had a 
significant effect upon the Belgian party system - effectively meaning that there are no 
truly 'nationar parties. The relatively high occurrence of 'local' parties ensures that 
small parties are in fact the norm in Belgian sub-national elections. The imposition of 
compulsory voting in Belgian elections ensures that turnout is high, though slightly on 
the decrease. The seat distribution system is the predominant hindrance to small parties 
in Belgium, and it is particularly disproportional if a small district magnitude is also in 
operation. 
Fifth, the Republic of Ireland is generally viewed as a system of local goverrtment with 
relatively irttle autonomy, where local elections act as a form of national government 
popularity test The possibilities for true PR are hindered by the use of several small 
electoral areas within counties and county boroughs. As a result, the Irish sub-national 
system is similar in outcome to multi-seat plurality - small parties perform better if 
they effectively concentrate appeal in one or two electoral areas rather than generating a 
thinly spread-county wide fevel of support. Sixth, compared to sub-national government 
in other west European states, British local government is probably viewed by its 
electorate as being the least autonomous, thus questionir^ the extent to which sub-
rtational elections are merely an opportunity for the electorate to voice its opinions about 
the natlortal political climate. This has since been challenged, however, (Railings & 
Thrasher) with the suggestion that what we can actually see in sub-national elections is 
'context voting*. Certainly, intra-party competition has increased. In relation to sub-
national elections, disproportionality is under-stated by aggregate levels of analysis. Yet 
the first past the post system does not necessarily penalize small parties as long as their 
support is concentrated in specific areas. 
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Finally, sub-national govemment in Spain is a relatively *new* phenomenon compared to 
our other case studies - with the autonomous regions demonstrating higher tumout as 
they are seen as having greater power. Regionalism has had a similar effect in Italy. 
Regions with 'special autonomy' are also characterised by prominent regionalist parties. 
What is distinguishable about Italian electoral politics compared to our other case studies 
is the recent far reaching electoral reforms - demanded by the public as a signal of 
defiance against the old corrupt political system. In relation to sub-national elections in 
particular, the reformed system places emphasis upon the role of mayoral candidates at 
the communal level. 
In Chapters Five and Six we focused our attention upon specific electoral rules which 
were to the advantage or disadvantage of far right and regionalist parties. Generally 
speaking, far right parties are small i.e. polling below 10% share of the vote, though 
some exceptions do occur for the far right at the municipal level in Belgium and the 
Netheriands in specific areas. We considered a variety of regionalist parties which 
ranged from being very small to being considerably large parties at the sub-national 
level, though by the very nature of their political concem we should not be surprised by 
their large electoral appeal in some countries. We will now summarize the comparative 
outcomes of our research. 
7.1 - Sub-National Party Systems in Westem Europe 
Although our research has focused upon the impact of specific electoral rules upon certain 
parties of the far right and regionalist families, a secondary interest concerns the 
'importance' of these parties at the sub-national level. Whilst these, and others, may be 
classified as small or minor in national election terms, we have attempted to demonstrate 
that many countries do rtot operate a single sub-national party system, but a whole series 
267 
of party systems, which far right and regionalist parties may have some opportunity to 
break into. In relation to sub-national party systems in general, in Belgium we should 
not be surprised to see a proliferation in, and the strong performance of, local Mists*. 
Our comparison of dominant parties at the municipal level in Belgium demonstrated 
strong variations between provinces. The christian democrats in both communities have 
lost support throughout the 1980s to numerous parties including the far right, the 
liberals, the greens and local lists. As such, we cannot sufficiently explain variances in 
sub-national party systems within Belgium without looking at particular micro-level 
features of local politics. 
In relation to sub-national party systems in Germany we can identify patterns of left and 
right strongholds at the Land level, although as yet we have been unable to study sub-
national party systems below this level. Although some states have seen a move away 
from a dominant party of the right to the left since the late 1980s, e.g. Schleswig Holstein 
and Rhineland Palatinate, this was not marked by an ousting of the CDU-led govemnrtent in 
the 1994 general election. We cannot conclude, therefore, that ctenges in support in 
Land elections signal changes in forthcoming general elections, at least not in the short 
term. Within the Republic of Ireland, sub-national party systems are also subject to 
identifiable regional variations. Both mainstream national parties are consistently 
weaker in support at the sub-national level. The Labour Party is strong in south-eastern 
counties but often totally absent in northern counties. The Green Party, though very 
small is most prominent in and around Dublin, whilst Sinn Fein retains its popularity in 
the border counties. As a result, Ireland really does experience several sub-national 
party systems. 
In relation to the Netheriands, we can see provincial allegiances towards either the PvdA 
(in Groningen and Drenthe), and the CDA (Utrecht, Limburg, Overijssel, Gelderiand, 
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North Brabant, North Holland and South Holland). There is no evidence of any 
particularly strong regionalisms existing, though far right support does have a 
particular regional profile. The far right in the Netheriands in the 1990s has 
denrK)nstrated the effectiveness of focuar^ limited candidates and other resources to just a 
handful of large gemeenten which are most likely to ensure representation. In Britain, 
we suggested that there are distinct sub-national party systems. The most notable 
distinctions are in Scotland and Wales where the party ^stem is dominated by the Labour 
Party and the SNP, and the Labour Parly and PC respectively. In Spain, the national 
party system is translated to the sub-national level in many regions except those with 
special autonomies. In both Catalonia and the Basque Country the party system is 
dominated by at least one specifically regional party, whilst in Galicia regionalist parties 
are smaller but still influential (third parties). In Italy, a similar pattem emerges. 
National parties dominate in sub-national elections in regions with ordinary status, 
whilst regions with special autonomy are dominated by predominantly autonomist parties. 
Hence, we could find no singular trend to sub-national party systems. Generally, the rule 
appears to be that sub-national party systems are more likely to vary where a sense of 
regional autonomy is strongest. Second, evidence from our aralysis suggests that when 
parties which are 'small' at the national level become important parties in the sub-
national party system, they are more likely to belong to the regional party family rather 
than the far right. 
7.2 - The Second Order Hypothesis And Far Right Support 
In eariier chapters we considered the thesis which suggests that we may be witnessing a 
process of second order voting, in which voters are more aware of context of an election 
and are willing to stray from their traditional party alignment when less is at stake. We 
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suggested that parties of the far right may be particular beneficiaries of second order 
voting as (i) when compulsory voting applies, voters may choose to 'protest' by 
supporting anti-system parties rather than abstaining, and (ii) when voting is not 
compulsory, the electorate may choose to 'punish' the mainstream governing parties -
particularly in the period labelled as 'mid-term blues'. Minor parties may also benefit 
from low turnout because their natural supporters are more dedicated. If our theory 
were correct, therefore, we would expect to see distinct peaks and troughs in far right 
support at the sub-national level. 
We considered far right support at the Land election level in Germany in the period 1945 
to 1994 and found that in some areas, there was indeed evidence in the mid 1960s and 
eariy 19905 that the far right begins to ^ow signs of growth in state elections held not 
long after a general election, when tumout is particularly low. An analysis of the lowest 
election level in North Rhine Westphalia and Hesse for example, provided evidence to 
suggest that the far right prosper in the 18 months to a year preceding a general election, 
and there was also evidence to suggest that far right support was linked to levels of 
turnout - performing strongest where turnout was low. 
In relation to far right support in the Netheriands, we suggested that the strong support 
for the BP in the 1966 provincial elections could possibly be seen as a waming to the 
mainstream parties as they were held only 11 months before a general election, 
particularly as support for the BP in 1967 was considerably lower. By comparing far 
right support in the 1974 gemeenten elections to the outcome of provincial elections held 
two months later, we found no correlation between BP support for these two closely held 
elections and, in contradiction to our theory, BP support was higher where tumout was 
higher. For comparative electiorts held in the late 1980s and eariy 1990s we were 
unable to find significant differerrces between levels of far right support between general 
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and provincial level elections. Patterns of far right support in the Netherlands therefore, 
do not support our ideas that these parties benefit when there is less at stake or from 
mainstream voter apathy. 
Lastly, our analysis of far right support in Britain suggests that the limited support these 
parties do receive is more likely to be related to local political factors than timing. We did 
show that significant levels of BNP support in Tower Hamlets in May 1994 were also 
matched by particularly high tumout, but this could be disillusioned voters tuming 
towards the far right or because other parties mobilized otherwise apathetic voters in the 
wake of events eight months eariier. In contrast, outside of London, the far right appeared 
to poll best where turrrout was low in 1994. We cannot, therefore, identify any 
convincing patterns to far right support in British sub-national elections in the 1990s. 
The second order hypothesis appears to fit well to far right support at the sub-national 
level in Germany, but not elsewhere. 
In relation to the second-order hypothesis regarding electoral timing and small party 
support, our evidence is far from conclusive. We cannot claim that far right electoral 
support is merely a process of mid-term protest voting, though iri'egular peaks and 
troughs in support since the 1980s does lend itself towards the general understanding 
that a wider disillusionment with mainstream political parties is affecting the electoral 
scene in many west European countries. The far right can only really expect 
representation under PR, and,proportionality is only likely to derive from cases of high 
district magnitude. We have demonstrated two extreme cases under PR. First, the 
generally 'highly proportional' Dutch PR system is not replicated at the gemeenten level, 
where the far right are frequently under-rewarded with seats. Second, the Imperiali 
system in Belgium actually benefits the far right when their share of the vote makes them 
one of the three largest parties in communes and gemeentea 
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7.3 - Compulsory Voting And Tumout 
An electoral rule which does apply in a handful of west European countries is compulsory 
voting and, although not an electoral rule as such, tumout is a factor which may be 
influenced by the electoral system and may likewise have implications for small party 
representation, particularly bearing in mind our discussions concerning electoral change 
and growing disenchantment with the mainstream catch-all parties in many west 
European stales. Unsurprisingly, the predominant rule affecting tumout is compulsory 
voting. Within our analysis of turrrout in Chapter Two we suggested that compulsory 
voting may encourage small party support as voters see 'protest' voting as a more viable 
altemative to not voting at all. We have reiterated within this thesis that a pronounced 
decline in turrxxjt is occurring at the national election level in many west European states 
and that this is. to some extent, mirrored in sub-national elections - particularty when 
compulsory voting is not enforced. An issue we were particulariy interested in observing 
was whether there is a recognisable correlation between declining tumout and changes in 
support for particular parties. 
In relation to the Netheriands, we suggested that the abolition of compulsory voting in 
1970 has had a significant impact upon tumout both nationally and sub-nationally, and 
we also noted that at the same time support for the main parties at the provincial level 
has declined since the 1980s. Furthermore, the ratio of main party decline between 
1987 and 1991 correlates with the ratio of decline in turnout. It would be useful to see 
if this short term trend continues as it may have important implications for the belief in 
mainstream political legitimacy in the Netheriands. What we were not able to do was 
indicate exactly who benefits from electoral volatility at the provincial level. This 
appears to be a combination of various smaller parties ag, the greens, the far right and 
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other issue related movements. 
In relation to tumout in the German Laender, we can see that turTK>ut has gradually 
declined since the 1970s, but that there is no particular consistent pattem - probably 
because Land elections follow different electoral cycles - hence tumout varies 
considerably between states and across time. There is little evidence to suggest, however, 
that if tumout does decline, it will have a significant effect upon mainstream party 
support. We can identify particular cases when the 'other* parties prosper, but there as 
yet Is no consistency across time. It is more appropriate, therefore, to account for 
changes in tumout and sub-national party support as electoral blijDs rather than long 
term patterns for the time being at least 
In the Republic of Ireland we demonstrated that tumout is also declining at both the sub-
national and national electoral levels. We suggested that variatior\s in sub-national 
tumout are better explained in terms of sense of community and locality rather than 
wholesale political disillusionment. Whilst there has been a decline in support at the 
sub-national level for the mainstream national parties this cannot be connected in any 
way to patterns of turnout, but is nrrore understandable if we look at the rise in the 
number of participating parties/ candidates. 
7.4 - District Magnitude And Proportionality 
In our analysis of the impact of district nrragnltude upon overall electoral proportionality 
at various sub-national levels in westem Europe we made some interesting findings. Our 
general analysis of the Netheriands was conducted at the provincial electoral level, and 
our findings tend to reinforce the established observations that the electoral system is 
highly proportional. We concluded that there is not a direct correlation between 
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provincial district magnitude and proportionality alone - other factors must play their 
part For example, the number of competing parties is a significant variable -
particulariy when numerous very small parties participate (see the comments on de fxto 
thresholds for an explanation of *very small*). Since a large district magnitude may in 
fact encourage very small parties to participate, we must therefore conclude that district 
n^gnitude at the Dutch provincial level is not a sufficient guarantee of proportionality. 
We were able to show, however, that the far right has been hindered in the smaller 
provinces in the Dutch provincial elections. The 1.9% share of the vote polled by the CD 
in Flevoland in 1991 was too small to secure representation, yet 1.6% secured 
representation in Utrecht in 1991 and 1.5% secured representation in North Holland for 
the BP in 1970, both of which operate higher district magnitudes than Flevoiand. An 
analysis of district magnitude at the gemeenten level in Holland and its impact upon the 
far right showed that it is an important variable. For example, in the 1978 gemeenten 
election the BP was only successful in gemeenten with a district magnitude of 15 seats or 
more. Despite polling greater shares of the vote in smaller municipals, the district 
magnitude created a de facto threshold blocking representation. Hence, the argument that 
the Dutch electoral system is highly proportional begins to weaken as we analyze far right 
support at the lowest electoral level. What is of interest is that in our analysis of far 
right electoral fortunes in the 1990 gemeenten elections, the CD only participated in 
large, urban genneenten and as a result secured 0.1% of the seats with a 0.5% total share 
of the vote. This leads us to question whether the new far right has actually learnt to 
exploit the electoral system, realising that its best opportunities lie in avoiding smaller 
municipals. 
Our analysis of German Land elections produced similar results. As with Dutch 
provinces. Landtag district magnitude is significarttly varied but also quite large, and we 
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found no correlation between district magnitude and proportionality at this level. Again, 
we found that the participation of numerous small parties was more likely to increase 
disproportionality - the occurrence of which is increased in likelihood by the 
implementation of the 5% die jure threshold (see below), in relation to the impact of 
district magnitude upon the proportionality of far right representation, we were able to 
show that district magnitude has not been an obstacle to the far right at the Land level in 
Germarry for those able to surpass the 5% threshold. We have already said, however, that 
district magnitude in Land elections is sufficiently large enough to not be the major cause 
for concem when analyzing disproportionality. By further analyzing the far right at the 
gemeinde level of election we demonstrated that a district magnitude of 11, for example, 
in combination with the d'Hondt seat distribution system, was significant enough to 
inhibit the NPD when it polled a 6.2% share of the vote. As such, district magnitude does 
begin to become important in small electoral districts because it serves to create (in 
combination with other features) increasingly high de facto thresholds. 
Dutch provinces and German states provide examples of large district magnitude. Within 
an analysis of counties and county boroughs in the Republic of Ireland we found that the 
allocation of seats via small electoral districts {i.e. seven seats or less) has a significant 
effect upon proportionality. The effect of small electoral areas is so significant that 
parties with a thinly spread share of the vote will be penalized at the cost of candidates 
which are able to focus their appeal in key areas. Thus the effect of district magnitude at 
the sub-national level tends to produce results closer to those found in multi seat 
plurality systems than under our examples of PR. 
We also analyzed the effect of district magnitude in Belgian communal elections -
comparing very snrtall communes (i.e. ten seats and below) with large ones (i.e, 30 seats 
plus). Again, we found that the cause of disproportionality lies beyond a pure district 
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nrragnitude explanation - in Belgium's case we also need to consider the number of 
competing parties and the seat distribution ^stem. In relation to far right success in 
Belgian local elections, we discovered that the VU benefitted from contesting elections in 
only the largest municipals in the region of Brussels. Because the party was only small 
(polling less than 5.5% in any commune) and thus was likely to be punished by the 
Imperiali system, it needed at least 4% shares of the vote (the de facto threshold) in the 
largest municipals. The significance of a low district magnitude increasing the de facto 
threshold at the local level In Belgium was reinforced by the VU's electoral performance 
in the Flanders region. In relation to district magnitude and regionalist party 
representation in Belgium, we found at the municipal level that the regionalist FDF 
apparently polled its best shares of the vote in the larger municipalities in Brussels {e.g. 
with 30 seats or more) where in fact it was the largest party in 1976. Yet another 
regionalist party, the RW, did not fare so well in Wallonian communal elections in 1976 
and the likelihood of representation was threatened in communes with low district 
nriagnitudes, particularty when the party could not poll more than 15%. 
In relation to Spain, our analysis of regional elections in Galicra demonstrated that 
assembly size and district magnitude are not necessarily equal in PR systems. As a result 
of using the provinces as electoral districts, we find that the regionalist BNG was 
frequently under rewarded with seats in 1989 and 1993 even with vote shares as high as 
17%. The combination of district magnitude ranging from 15 to 24 seats and the d'Hondt 
systems can still penalize relatively large regional parties. In Catalonia the main 
regionalist party (CiU) is able to overcome problems of district magnitude as it is the 
largest party. The smaller ERC, however, struggles to achieve proportional 
representation because it only polled around 5-6% in the 1980s. Where the party polled 
less than 4% at the local level in Barcelona, this led to non-representation, whilst the 
CiU as the largest party continued to be over represented. 
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Finally, our analysis of the general effect of district magnitude looked at proportionality 
in Britain. We were able to show that, unsurprisingly, there is no relationship between 
assembly size and proportionality. The single seat plurality system which operates in the 
nrrajority of sub-national elections can create high levels of disproportionality, 
particulariy when the number of parties increases. In relation to the effect of district 
magnitude upon far right representation in Britain we do not have enough case studies of 
success from which to deduct any conclusive observations. The far right has, however, 
recently (1994) appeared to poll well in 'traditional' areas of support where there are a 
multiple of seats available and there are clues that split ticket voting may be occurring. 
The main hindrance to the small number of far right candidates in British sub-national 
elections is not necessarily the share of the vote they can attract, but the first past the 
post systems in which they operate. For sub-national elections in Britain we 
demonstrated that the use of single seat divisions is not necessarily a hindrance for either 
regionalist party if they can effectively mobilize voters in certain targeted areas. 
Our detailed comparative analysis demonstrates, therefore, that district magnitude alone 
is not the primary determinant of dl^roportionality (contrary to Rae 1967, Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989 and Gallagher 1991) and we can substantiate this by comparing the 
outcome of both small communes and large Land and provinces. District magnitude does 
appear to become of more relevance when it is below 10 seats in size, and when it is 
assessed in combination with the number of competing and elected parties, and it has been 
a particular problem for far right parties at the lowest electoral level in several 
countries when their share of the vote is below 15%. 
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7.5 - Thresholds And Proportionality 
In relation to the impact of thresholds we have shown that some elections use de jure 
thresholds but all elections with more than one competing party must have de facto 
thresholds. Whilst the former is a set figure and is only a threshold of exclusion, the 
latter will vary quite dramatically depending on the district magnitude, the number of 
parties and the seat distribution system. In Chapter Two we outlined the argument 
provided by Rae that small parties polling below 20% at the national level are 
disadvantaged. This nray be the case in aJl plurality elections in single-seat electoral 
divisions. Within PR systems however, parties polling 20% are not noticeably 
disadvantaged at the sub-national level, though those polling less than 10% in the 
Netheriands at the gemeenten level are, and those polling betow 15% in small municipals 
in Belgium are. In relation to Wolinetz*s claim that thresholds are a hurdle for new and 
small parties which actually serve to maintain the party system status quo, we have 
shown that the constitutional threshold is still a particular stumbling block for far right 
parties at the land level in Germany, and also for the smaller regionalist party in 
Catalonia. Yet de jure thresholds do not guarantee representation for all parties 
surpassing the mark and it is often the case that higher de facto thresholds apply and, they 
apply in all countries - increasingly so as the district magnitude decreases and the 
number of competing parties increases. 
Our preliminary analysis of de Jure thresholds was restricted to a consideration of Land 
elections in Germany. We need to reiterate that this sort of threshold is only one of 
exclusion and therefore does not guarantee representation. We had vefy little evidence 
(only from Bavaria in the 1940s and 1960s) that parties polling over 5% were excluded 
from representation. We were able to show, however, that the 5% threshold has a notable 
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effect upon proportionality when there are one or more parties polling between 4-
4.99%. As a result, many small parties - including the liberal FDP and Greens - are 
often excluded from representation at the Land level by the 5% threshold - hence the 
debate surrounding the arbitrary rtature of thresholds. 
Our analysis of Bavarian elections demonstrated that even when parties polling slightly 
nrore than 5% are excluded from representation, this is of lesser significance to overall 
disproportionality than the differences between vote and seat ratios created by the seat 
distribution system. At the Land level in Germany, therefore, the de jure threshold Is a 
concern for small parties seeking representation, but is balanced out as a major cause of 
disproportionality by other factors ag. the district magnitude and the seat distribution 
method 
The initial dnve behind the imposition of a 596 threshold in Germany was precisely to 
exclude extremist and anti-system parties from the political system and we demonstrated 
that the 5% threshold has been the primary obstacle for the NPD In the Hamburg state 
from 1966 to 1978. and in the state of Saariand from 1970 to 1990, though of course 
the 5% threshold is a hurdle to numerous small parties and not just those from the far 
right. By analyzing below the land level of elections in Germany, we were able to show 
that there are numerous cases in which the far right are "too small" at the gemeinde 
level {eg. the Republikaner in North Rhine Westphalia in 1989), and due to the combined 
effects of district magnitude and the seat distribution system, even a vote share of 5% is 
not necessarily a guarantee of representation. 
We analyzed the effect of de jure thresholds upon regionalist parties in Spain and found 
that in regional elections in Galicia the BNG benefits because the 5% threshold operates at 
the provincial rather than the overall regional level. This is an advantage because BNG 
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support is concentrated in certain provinces. In relation to local elections in Barcelona, 
the smaller regionalist party (ERC) is affected by the 3% threshold, though in fact a 
higher /acto threshold operates (approximately 5-5.5% share of the vote) which 
affects other small parties. 
We have shown that although constitutional thresholds are only occasionally employed in 
western Europe sub-national elections, fecCo thresholds are in fact a feature of all 
contested elections. In our preliminary analysis of overall sub-national outcomes in 
Chapter Four, we found that due to the highly proportional nature of Dutch provincial 
elections the de facto threshold is extremely low - le. below a 2% share of the vote. This 
reinforces claims made about proportionality at the national level in the Netherfands. 
As a comparison, we sought to identify the level of de facto thresholds as they operate in 
Belgian municipal elections because district magnitude is much lower. By comparing 
gemeenten we found that a district magnitude of 33 seats creates a de facto threshold of 
around 4%, though this increased to over 6% in a gemeenten with only 21 seats. By 
comparing these findings to a gemeenten with only 11 seats, we found that the de facto 
threshold increased to around 13% share of the vote. As such, the largest municipals in 
Belgium produce low db ^cto thresholds in line with those observed in Dutch provincial 
elections. The combination of a low district magnitude, the Imperial! seat distribution 
system, and the number of competing parties does have the potential to create high 
thresholds even within a PR system. 
In our analysis of the impact of dfe fecto thresholds upon far right representation, our 
analysis of municipal elections in Belgium showed the restrictions for the far right are 
created a combination of the seat distribution system, the number of competing parties 
and the district magnitude. For example, a gemeenten with 23 seats effectively excludes 
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the far right when it polls below 6%, and even under represents those polling less than 
11-12%. As such, parties of the far right cannot afford to be 'too small' at the local level 
in Belgium. In relation to regional party representation at the local level in Belgium we 
demonstrated that the combination of the Imperiali system and district magnitude was 
effective in creating de facto thresholds to RW representation. The de fecto threshold Is 
between 5-6% for communes with 25 seats and increases in direct correlation to district 
magnitude. 
An analysis of the impact of dfe ferto thresholds operating in the Republic of Ireland 
showed that in the 1985 elections, parties such as the Labour Parly in Tipperary N.R. and 
Sinn Fein in Dublin Belgard and South Dublin were penalized because numerous candidates 
received a moderate share of the votes whilst independent carKftdates capitalized on 
concentrated levels of support in individual electoral districts. We could not observe a tfe 
facto threshold as such, but suggested that since county council elections to some extent 
resemble multi-seat plurality elections, then a thinly spread level of support for 
numerous candidates from one party creates an effective de facto threshold inhibiting 
representation. In Britain, the d /^acfio threshold in single seat divisions relates to the 
number of competing parties and the distribution of votes between them. If it is the case 
that regional parties enjoy a relatively large (&g. 30% plus) and consistent share of the 
vote in certain areas then they will usually benefit from an increase in the number of 
parties, as remaining votes become more diffusely spirt. 
- Seat Pistribution And Proportionality 
In relation to seat allocation under PR, we can support the claims made by Lijphart 
(1994a) that the Hare-Ntemeyer system Is more proportional than both the Imperiali 
and d'Hondt systems. In our initial analysis of seat distribution at the sub-national level 
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in Chapter Four we made two observations. First, we were able to demonstrate that the 
Hare-Niemeyer method in Germany is certainly more proportional than the more 
frequently employed rfHondt method when considering elections at the Land level. The 
d'Hondt method is particularly a hindrance for small parties which have been able to 
surpass the 5% threshold. In our analysis of the effect of the seat distribution method 
upon far right representation, we found that in Germany at the gemeinde level the far 
right had been disadvantaged by the d'Hondt seat distribution system 
Our analysis of disproportionality at the county level in British sub-national elections 
demonstrated that an aggregation of results under the plurality system in fact serves to 
hide true disproportionality by aggregating out the effects of the most extreme results. As 
the total number of seats at the county or district level increases, so the apparent level of 
disproportionality decreases. Yet by considering the impact of seat distribution in each 
electoral division we can see that disproportionality is Incredibly strong, and indeed 
increases as party competition increases. In Britain, parties of the far right obviously 
are disadvantaged by the plurality system. Vote shares such as those polled in areas of 
London in 1994 would almost certainly have been rewarded under PR systems. We have 
shown, therefore, that far right parties frequently poll in excess of 15% and 20% of the 
vote in European sub-rrational elections but whether we judge them as small depends upon 
the seat distribution system and the size of other parties. The highly disproportional 
system operating in Britain becomes more disproportional as the number of competing 
parties increases, though we have shown that this may not be to the detriment of regional 
parties. By considering mufti seat wards in Welsh district elections in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s we demonstrated that the regionalist PC appeared to benefit from 'split 
ticket' voting - securing some, but not all seats. 
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In Belgium, we would expect the Imperiali seat distribution system to create some level of 
disproportionality. By comparing far right success in a variety of communes we showed 
that small far right vote shares created under representation, whilst in municipals where 
the far right received large votes shares ( a ^ 15% plus) these parties were significantly 
over represented - regardless of district magnitude size. We considered the impact of the 
seat distribution formula upon regional representation in Belgian local elections and 
found that the FDF benefitted in 1976 when it was a 'large' party. By 1988, however, 
the FDF's popularity was waning and it was just as likely to be under rewarded as a small 
party (12% and below) and over rewarded as a large party (18% and above). This is due 
to the nature of the Imperiali system, regardless of district magnitude. From our 
analysis we concluded that a regional party can be classified as 'small' at the local level in 
Belgium when it polls approximately 10% and less. 
By analyzing regional parties in Italy (pre-electoral reform) we found that in regional 
elections in Val d'Aosta the Hare electoral system was strongly proportional for both large 
(the UV) and small (LN) regional parties. Hence, it is stili the case that simple 
plurality, the d'Hondt and the Imperiali (but not Hare) systems discriminate against far 
right and regionalist parties when their shares of the vote are small (the definition of 
which varies between countries and between levels). The plurality and Imperiali 
systems, however, are equally as generous to these parties when they are sufficiently 
'large'. 
7.7 - Prescriptions For The Future Qf New And Small Parties 
Our analysis of sub-national electoral systems in general and the proportionality of far 
right and regionalist party representation in particular have produced some interesting 
283 
results. First, it would be unwise to suggest that one particular electoral feature is more . 
responsible for disproportionality than others. This will ultimately depend upon the 
sub-national level. For example, district magnitude is not particularly important in 
large provinces/ regions because it is so large. Small parties in these elections face 
greater challenges from the imposition of thresholds and the bias of the seat distribution 
system. Paradoxically, whilst 'highly proportional' systems may encourage the 
participation of very small parties, the number of competing parties is an influential 
factor upon the size of the facto threshold, which can then have negative implications 
for the snrtaller parties. 
We have shown, however, that district magnitude does become influential at the lower 
sub-national electoral levels, particularly in areas with 1 ^ than ten seats. Again, the <h 
facto threshold has significant implications for small parties. 'Clever* small parties 
should, therefore, look at electoral opportunities kjgically. With limited funds and 
candidates, small parties in PR systems do well to participate in large district magnitudes 
where de jure thresholds are not used. Seat distn'bution uang the Hare system is a 
particular benefit. Yet small parties can also benefit in areas of low district magnitude If 
they can effectively target concentrated electoral districts. Thus we must turn to the 
question, what is a 'small* party? We have demonstrated that parties judged as *smair at 
the national level can in fact be significant participants in the sub-natkjnal party system. 
This is particulariy the case for some regionalist parties, but also applies to the far right 
in the Belgian province of Antwerpea What we have shown is that the definition of 
'smair - /.e. the level below which a party will consistently be disadvantaged - varies 
between 10% and 18% - varying between countries and between electoral levels. 
It is quite probable that regional parties will continue to prosper as long as the notion of 
'the crisis of the state* still exists If the legitimacy of national governments continues to 
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be challenged as it has been in Italy in recent years, then the electoral prospects for small 
parties are certainly brighter. Sub-national elections may be developing as an important 
measure of *context voting'. Although not all national govemment parties/coalitions are 
under immediate electoral threat, alternative voting patterns in sub-national elections 
now may be indicators of longer voting realignments in the future. In relation to the 
electoral opportunities for far right parties in particular, they do not appear to be yet 
strong enough to be a serious national challenge in those countries analyzed. Support is 
slightly stronger at the sub-national level however, particularly in certain areas using 
PR and in certain multi-seat wards in Britain. We have yet to see if the new far right are 
merely an electoral blip deriving from widespread feelings of political malaise and 
alienation, or whether they will be a longer term feature of sub-nationat elections in 
order to reflect a move towards more complex patterns of voting behaviour. 
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APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Alternative Voting - Voters are asked to list candidates in order of preference. 
Categoric Voting - The voter can give their vote to one party only. 
Cumul des Mandats - A term applying to local elections in France. Politicians use success 
at the sub-national level as a launch pad from which to enter the national political scene. 
A similar system operates in the Republic of Ireland. 
De Facto Thresholds - Operate in all contested elections, and are referred to by Lijphart 
(1994a) as 'thresholds of exclusion'. They do not consist of a 'fixed' share of the vote 
(see de jure thresholds) but will be derived from a number of electoral features 
(including the number of seats available, the number of competing parties and the 
distribution of votes). A de facto threshold can be expressed as ' the share of the vote 
below which any party cannot expect to gain representation*. 
De Jure Thresholds - A formal, or constitutional, threshold set by electoral legislation to 
effectively exclude very small parties from receiving representation. 
District Magnitude (DM) - The number of representatives elected per electoral area. 
This is not necessarily the same as the assembly size. 
Effective Number of Parties - This is the number of parties which form the party system 
- that is, those which have access to political power. 
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First Past The Post - A term used to refer to the British simple plurality system. In a 
single seat electoral area, the candidate with the most votes will win the seat, regardless 
of whether or not they have obtained an absolute majority of the support. 
Indices of Proportionality - Methods used to measure the extent to which each party 
receives a share of the seats proportionate to its share of the votes. Different indices will 
embody different notions of proportionality. 
Ordinal Voting - The voter can divide their vote between two or more parties. 
Proportionality - True' proportionality occurs when each participating party receives a 
share of the seats equal to its share of the votes. For various reasons, this rarely occurs 
in any election. 
Proportional Representation (PR) - A loose, generic term used to denote a type of 
electoral system which attempts to reward all parties with a share of the seats equal to its 
share of the votes. Realistically, the srfiallest parties are usually unrewarded and 
proportionality is rarely exact. 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) - A method of seat allocation. Voters are required to list 
candidates in order of preference. As a candidate is elected, or becomes the least popular, 
the vote is then allocated to the voters* second choice. This process continues until all 
seats are distributed and aims to overcome the possibility of 'wasted votes'. 
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Split Ticket Voting - May occur in multi seat elections. It occurs when voters (for 
various reasons) choose candidates from more than one party. As a result, all available 
seats may not be secured by just one party. 
'Wasted Votes* - Refers to votes cast for an unelected party. The single transferable 
voting system is employed to avoid the wasted vote syndronna 
288 
APPENDI)^  B - PARTY INDEX 
BELGIUM 
AGALEV Ariders Gaan Leven 
CVP Christlijke Volkspartij 
ECOLD Ecologists 
FDF Front des Francophones 
FN Front National 
NR Local GroupsPRLParti pour Reform et Liberte 
PCB Parti Communiste de Belgique 
PFN Parti de Forces Nouvelles 
PS Parti Socialiste 
PSC Parti Social Chretien 
PTB Parti Traveille Belgique 
PW PartiJ voor Vrijheid and Vooruitgang 
RW Rassemblement Wallon 
VB Vlaams Blok 
VU Volksunie 
GREAT BRITAIN 
BNP British National Party 
COMM Communist Party 
CON Conservative Party 
CPGB Communist Party of Great Britain 
GREEN Green Party 
IND Independent Candidate 
LAB Labour Party 
IVA Liberal Alliance 
LD Liberal Democrats 
LIB Liberal Party 
MRL Monster Raving Loony Party 
NF National Front 
PC Plaid Cymru 
PPP People Pension Power 
RAG Ratepayers Action Group 
RATI Ratepayer (Assoc) 
RCP Revolutionary Communist Party 
RLP Raving Loony Party 
SDP Social Democratic Party 
SLD Social and Liberal Democrats 
SML Scottish Militant Labour 
SNP Scottish National Party 
TCRM Twentieth Century Reformation Movement 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
AR Anti-Revolutionaire Partij 
BP Boerenpartij 
CCP Combinatie van Christelijke Partijen 
CD Centmmdemocraten 
CDA Christen Democratisch Appel 
CHU Christelijk Historische Unie 
CP86 Centrumpartlj '86 
CPN Communistlsche Partij Nederland 
DG De Groenen 
FNP Fryske Nasjonale Partij 
GL Groen Links 
GVP Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond 
KVP Katholieke VolkspartiJ 
LPG Lokate Partijen Gelderland 
NVU Nederiands Votksunie 
PAK Progressief Akkoord 
PC Protestants-Christelijke Lijst 
PCG Protestants Christelijke Groep 
PSP Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij 
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid 
RPF Reformatorische Politieke Federatie 
SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 
SP Sociallstlese Partij 
WD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratic 
GERMANY -
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union 
CSU Christlich Soziale Union 
DKP Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
DVU-List D Deutsche Volksunion 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei 
GDP Gesamtdeutsche Partei 
Grune Greens 
HP Humanistische Partei 
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
MLPD Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands 
NPD Nationatdemokratische Partei 
O D P Okologisch-Demokratische Partei 
PDS Partei Demokratisches Sozialismus 
REP Die Republikaner 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland 
SVP Saariand People's Party 
WAV German Centre Party Economic Construction Union (Bavaria) 
WGRl Local Group (Saariand) 
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REPUBUC OF IREUVND 
FF 
FG 
Gr 
IND 
LAB 
PD 
SF 
WP 
Fianna Fail 
Fine Gael 
Green Party 
Ind^ndent Candidate 
Labour Party 
Progressive Democratic Party 
Sinn Fein 
Workers Party 
SPAIN 
fiG 
AP 
ARM 
BNG 
CC/UCD 
CiU 
CDS 
OG 
CP/PP 
ERC 
EU/UG 
HB 
IC 
lU-AC 
PA 
PDP 
PNG 
PNV 
PP 
PSA 
PSC 
PSOE 
PSUC 
Verdes 
Altematista Galega 
Alianzia Popular 
Agrupacion Ruiz Mateos 
Bloque Nacionalista Galeco 
Centristes de Catalunya-UCD 
Convergencia I Unto 
Centro Democratico y Social 
Coalicion Galega 
Coaiicion Popular 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
Coalition Esquerda Unida - Unidade Galega 
Herri Batasuna 
Izquierda Comunista 
Izquierda Unida-Coministasde Andalucia 
Patido Andalucista 
Partido Democrata Popular 
Partido Nacionalista Gallego 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
Partido Popular 
Partido Socialista de Andalucia 
Parti dels Socialistes de Catalunya 
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol 
Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya 
Verdes de Galega 
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ITAUY 
DC Democrazia Cristiana 
LL Lega Lombarda 
LN Lega Nord 
PCI Partito Communista Italiano 
PDS Partito della Sinistra Democratica 
PSd'Az Partito Sardo d'Azione 
srvp Sudtiroler Volkspartei 
UV Union Vaidotaine 
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APPENDIX C 
An Outline of Local Govemment Structure in the Twelve European Union DenrKx:racies 
In order to be able to assess the significance of any electoral system upon parties at the 
sub-national level it is first necessary to outline the structure and hierarchy of local 
govemment within each country. The main issue this raises concems the 
"comparability" of sub-national govemment between nations. As this outline shows, 
each country within the European Union operates on a variety of local govemment levels 
(ranging from one to three). What is important to this thesis is examples within 
countries where each level of sub-national govemment operates a different electoral 
system since this may determine the realistic opportunities for minority party 
representation. Since not all countries were used as case studies in Chapter Four and not 
all have parties belonging to the far right or regionalist families, we have outlined below 
the sub-national govemment structure in those twelve states which formed the 
membership of the European Union prior to 1995 
BEUGIUM 
Since 1993. Belgium has been classified as a federal state in order to accomnrKxfate the 
emergence and establishment of the different Wallonian and Flemish cultures, and as such 
has been faced with a process of widespread state reform - including considerable 
electoral reform. Belgium has elections for three levels of sub-national government; the 
gemeenten, the provinces and the Brussels region. 
Communales/Gemeenten - At this most local level of government, each of the 589 
municipal councils (308 in the Flanders region, 262 in the Walloon region and 19 in the 
Brussels region) is elected every six years, the date being fixed as the second Sunday in 
October. Ballot papers are presented as party lists and both national parties and 
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independent candidates stand. The number of seats per municipality is determined by its 
population size and ranges from 7 - 5 5 members. Elections are held using a single round 
of voting and seat allocation follows the Imperiali PR system of seat distribution. 
Electoral turnout tends to be high (i.e. 90% and more) due to the imposition of 
compulsory voting, although absenteeism has increased slightly since the 1980s. Any 
comprehensive analysis of local elections is only feasible from 1976, since until that 
year the Home Department was only responsible for publishing the results from main or 
larger populated cities. Furthermore, there has been several waves of local govemment 
reform, meaning that the actual number of Gemeenten has been greatly reduced The 
present number of municipals was set in 1983. Our research focuses upon municipal 
elections held between 1976 and 1988. 
Provinces - For the nine provinces, elections are held every four years using a 
Proportional Representation list-ballot system. Since the recent state reforms, 
elections will be held on a six year cycle to coincide with Municipal elections. Each 
Provincial Council has between 50-90 members, depending upon population size. 
Regions - Belgium consists of three electoral regions at the sub-national level; 
Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia, each of which is elected for a four year term, although 
only the Brussels region is directly elected. The Brussels Regional Council has 75 
members. 
DENMARK 
Local Govemment is provided for under Section 82 of the 1849 Constitution. Denmark 
holds elections for two levels of sub-national government, these being the Kommuner and 
the Amter levels - both of which were reduced in numbers by the Local Govemment 
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Reform Act of 1st April 1970. Turnout is usually around 70% of the electorate, 
although participation is higher in rural rather than urban areas. 
Kommuner - Denmark consists of 275 Kommuner (reduced from 277 in 1974) at the 
lowest local level, two of which (Copenhagen and Frederiksberg) are metropolitan 
municipalities. Electoral procedure is determined by the same electoral law for all 
Kommuner, thus ensuring that each election takes place on the same day (the 3rd Tuesday 
in November every 4th year), under the same electoral rules in multi-member 
constituendes. 
Prior to 1985, ballot papers took the form of a fixed party list, thereby ensuring that 
candidates towards the top of the list were favoured. Since 1985, a 'paraller running 
list has been adopted, enabling candidates to indicate preferential votes for specific 
candidates, although evidence tends to suggest that names at the top of the list still receive 
more votes. Seat allocation is detennined via the d'Hondt rules. Under the terms and 
conditions of the Local Government Act, the number of seats per Kommuner must be odd 
and may vary between 13 and 31 for itie city Kommuner of Odense, Aalborg and Arhus 
(although the capital, Copenhagen, is an exception with 55 councillors), and between 5 
and 25 for all other Kommuner. The number of seats is determined by the population 
size. There are a total of twelve Danish parties, although it is rare for more than eight to 
run in any one Kommuner. However, the five major parties (the Social Democrats, 
Conservatives, Liberals, Progress Party and the Socialist People's Party) run in most 
Kommuner. 
Amter - Denmark consists of 14 Amter (counties), which operate under the same 
electoral rules as the Kommuners. Elections are every four years. Each council has 
between 13 and 31 members. 
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FRANCE 
The French sub-national government system operates on three levels; Communes, 
Departements and Regions, although these distinctions do not imply a hierarchy of power 
as in some other countries, and many powers are exercised on all three levels. Between 
1965 and 1975 all French elections (except in Paris) operated under a two ballot 
majority system, though various reforms have been implemented at the different levels 
since then. 
Communes - Each Commune, of which there are approximately 363941, holds an 
election on the same day of every sixth year. Council size ranges from 9 - 8 9 seats. In 
communes with a population less tPran 3500, councillors are elected by a two-ballot 
blocked list system, with the option for small parties to merge before the second ballot is 
held. A different system operates in communes with an electorate in excess of 3500. 
Prior to 1982, all council seats were given to the party winning the majority vote. 
Since then, the 1982 Decentralisation Laws have combined the majoritarian and PR 
rules so that opposition parties do win some seats. The two-ballot system means that if 
no list wins an absolute majority and 25% of the electorate vote at the first election, 
then any list which gained at least 10% in the first round may stand in the second 
election. For either case, the lowest even number of seats over 50% of the total go to the 
list with the largest number of votes and the remaining seats are spilt between the other 
lists which achieve at least 5% of the votes, using the highest average formula - thus 
benefiting those smaller parties which refuse to enter into coalitions. The 5% threshold 
is used to prevent the minority candidates from gaining any seats. The exceptions to these 
rules are the cities of Paris, Marseille and Lyon which are each divided into districts 
1 figure provided by S. Mazey, "Developments at the French Meso Level: Modernizing the 
French State", in Sharpe (ed) 1993: 61. 
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with their own election lists. 
Oepartements - France consists of 96 metropolitan and 4 overseas Oepartements. 
Departmental councils are composed of general councillors, who each represent one 
canton (there were 3694 mainland and 155 overseas cantons in 1982). Each member is 
elected for a 6 year term, although elections are held for each half of the members every 
3 years. Elections take the form of a two-ballot majoritarian system in single member 
constituencies - that is to say, to be elected by first ballot a candidate requires an 
absolute najority and a number of votes equal to a quarter the size of the electorate. The 
second ballot requires a relative majority but only includes those who acquired a share of 
the vote of at least 10% of the total electorate in the first round. 
Regions - France consists of 22 metropolitan and four overseas regions created over 
the last twenty years, which have only held direct elections since the 1982-3 
Decentralisation refornris. Thus, the first direct regional elections did not take place 
until 16th March 1986 (although Corsica held its first regional election in August 
1984), using a single-ballot, blocked party list electoral system in multi-member 
departments. 
Regional elections are held every six years for Regional Councils consisting of 31-197 
members depending upon population size. Only lists with 5% or more of the total votes 
can claim seats. The Socialist Government of 1989 reformed the electoral system to 
reflect the one operating in the Communes. 
GERMANY 
Unlike most European countries (with the exception of Belgium which is still in a 
process of change), Gemiany is a federal state characterised by truly fragnnented and 
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decentralised political power. The German system of subrnational govemment operates " 
on three levels; the Gemeinden, the Kreis and Kreisfreie Stadte and the Laender. 
Gemeinden - The 8,500 Gemeinden form the lower tier (the actual figure in 1987 was 
8.503). Due to the relatively autonomous nature of sub-national govemment In 
Germany (guaranteed under Article 28 (2) of the Basic Law), there is no singular 
identifiable constitutional system. As a result, elections are held variably between four 
and six years, with county councils composing of 20-80 members, and municipalities of 
5 - 8 7 members. Voting follows a system of PR (usually closed lists), and seat 
allocation is determined via the d'Hondt rules. Panachage and preferential voting are 
allowed in Baden-Wurttemberg, Lower Saxony and Bavaria. This highly localised system 
of sub-national govemment means that federal/national policy does not necessarily have 
the same significant impact on election results as is experienced within other European 
countries - leaving more room for local interest groups and voter associations to create 
an Impact, and marginalising the tendency for unified trends to occur at the local level. 
Kreis and Kreisfreie Stadte - In 1987 (and. therefore, prior to reunification) 
there were some 237 Kreise and 87 Kreisfreie-Stadte (counties and County Free Cities) 
in Germany. Elections are usually held every five years for county councils composing of 
20 - 80 members. Again, a form of PR electoral system is used. 
Laender - Germany consists of sixteen Laender (including West Beriin), which hold 
elections every four years - except North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, 
Thuringia and the Saariand which hold elections on a five year cycle. Ail use some form 
of PR. In most cases this is the d'Hondt system, although some use the Hare-Niemeyer 
method of seat distribution. The smallest Land in terms of seats is the Saartand (with 51 
seats) and the largest is West Beriin (with 241 seats). 
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GREAT BRITAIN 
For much of Britain there are two levels of sub-national govemment system. At the 
lowest level there are district councils with a total of 386 districts (296 in England, 37 
in Wales and 53 in Scotland). Each authority is elected for a four year term, although 
the process of elections does vary. Most districts hold elections for the whole body every 
four years. Some districts in England and Wales, however, have chosen to hold annual 
elections with only a fraction of the council seats being contested. District councils in 
England and Wales have between 20 - 68 members, whilst for Scotland the figure is 10 
- 66. The balloting system follows the categoric rules, and seat allocation is on a 
plurality basis. 
There are important exceptions to this pattem of two-tier local govemment. In the more 
densely populated metropolitan areas there is just one level of sub-national govemment 
following reforms in 1986. Thus London is now govemed by a total of 32 separate 
Boroughs v^ilst cities such as Birmingham and Manchester are covered by 36 
Metropolitan boroughs. For London Boroughs there are between 48 - 70 council seats, 
whilst for the Metropolitan Districts the figure is 48 - 117. They employ the same 
voting procedures as the districts. 
The next level of local govemment varies between the countries. England and Wales are 
represented by 47 counties/local authorities which are elected every four years. Each 
council has between 43 - 102 members. Until 1995 in Scotland, there were nine 
regional councils and three island councils - again elected every four years - with half 
elections taking place every two years. These councils had between 27 and 104 members. 
The final Scottish regional elections were held in 1994 and since 1995 Scotland operates 
as a single-tier of local govemment with 29 unitary authorities. 
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gRE^CE 
The Greek sub-national level of government is determined by Article 102 of the 
Constitution which was adopted in 1975. There are 5,999 local authorities In Greece 
which take the form of 304 Demes (larger towns) and 5695 Koinotites (small 
towns/villages), both of which hold elections every four years. The number of 
councillors ranges from 7-11 in the koinotites and 11 - 41 in the demes. Voting is 
compulsory. 
The method of voting varies - for example, in municipalities with a population of 
5,000+, candidates are grouped into lists which do not bear party names, but which bear 
a close resemblance to national parties or party coalitions. The leaders of a list must 
receive at least 50% of the vote to be elected nrayor. If this does not occur, a second 
ballot is held a week later between the two leading candidates. In 1982, neighbourhood 
councils were introduced in the larger municipalities - and Athens, Pireaus and 
Thessaloniki are divided into diamerismata (districts) which elect their own councils. 
On a higher level. Greece consists of 55 Nomoi (4 of which are administrative 
sub-divisions in Attica) which are appointed by central government, although a 
programme is currently being produced to change this into an elected council. 
I R E L A N D 
Ireland consists of sub-national government on two levels; the larger authorities are 
Counties and County Boroughs, with Boroughs, Urban Districts and Towns forming the 
smaller bodies. All local elections in Ireland are covered by the Local Government Act 
(1941) and the Electoral Act (1963). Elections are based upon a system of Proportional 
Representation, using the Single Transferable Vote. Until recently, local government in 
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the Republic of Ireland has enjoyed relatively little autonomy and as such is not held in 
particulariy high esteem by the general public. However, the Local Government Act 
1991 has produced limited reforms in terms of autonomy - although this has not affected 
the actual electoral ^stem. The operation of the STV system means ttet members of the 
same party are often in connpetition with each other. 
Boroughs, Urban Districts and Towns - There are a total of six non-county 
boroughs. 49 urban districts and 30 towns. Each council sits for a period of five years. 
Elections take the fomn of Single Transferable Voting, and seat allocation Is via the Droop 
quota. Borough councils usually have 12 members, and urban district and town councils 
usually have 9 members. There are a total of 758 councillors for these 85 authorities. 
Counties and County Boroughs - Elected for a six year term, Ireland has 29 
counties (3 in Dublin) and 5 county boroughs within Ireland. The domination of national 
govemment interests in the Republic means local elections can be postponed and be held 
at a 'convenient time' providing a sporadic election cycle. Bections again take the form of 
Single Transferable Voting, and seat allocation is detemnined by the Droop quota. County 
councils usually have between 20 and 48 members, and for county boroughs the figure is 
15 -31 . The exception to this is Dublin County Council which has 78 seats and Dublin 
county Borough wNch has 52 seats. 
HALl 
Italy operates sub-national govemment on three levels; the Communes, Provinces and 
Regiorts. Longitudinal analysis is complicated by the widespread process of institutional 
and electoral reforms which have been a prominent feature of Italian politics since the 
late 1980s. 
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Communes - Italy consists of 8,100 Communes which range in size from large cities 
(such as Rome and Milan) to small communities of only several thousand inhabitants. 
The election date is not fixed by the constitution, although Communal elections are 
required at least once in every four years. Councils range in composition from 15 - 80 
members with a grand total of over 100,000 councillors. 
The electoral system differs in relation to population size with the laws most recently 
reformed in March 1993 and applied to elections held the following June. Where the 
population is less than 5,000 the single-ballot majority system is used to elect the 
mayor and the council, enabling the strongest party to claim four-fifths of the seats. For 
communes with a population not exceeding 15,000, a single-round, PR list system with 
preferential voting is used. For cities with populations of more than 15,000 a 
two-ballot system is used. Since June 1993 the mayor in these cities has been directly 
elected. The mayor may be elected by the first ballot alone with a absolute majority, or 
in the second ballot when only two candidates may stand - again using the rule of simple 
majority. For councillors, a party gaining 50% of the vote takes 60% of the seats in 
both rounds and the remaining seats are distributed via quota. The situation in Italian 
communes is made increasingly complex by the fact liiat there is an ongoing series of 
reforms which are moving towards the majoritarian system in order to prevent the 
systematic occurrence of power crises and frequent elections. 
Provinces - Italy has 95 territorial provinces, each of which has a directly elected 
council which serves for a four year term. Elections take the fomn of a single-round 
using a PR system. 
Regions - Since the regionalisation programme of 1970, Italy consists of 20 Regions at 
the sub-national level - 15 of which hold elections at the same time. The other five 
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regions - Friuli-Venezia Glulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta 
were established eariier (1948-1963), have strong regional and cultural identities, 
and varying special powers. Each is elected for a term of five years using PR, and has 
between 30 and 80 members. 
LUXEMBOURG 
The grand Duchy of Luxembourg is the smallest country to be a member of the European 
Union with a total population of approximately 389,000. Luxembourg has a single level 
of local government 
Communales - Luxembourg consists of 118 communales and voting is compulsory. 
Elections are held every six years and the process of seat allocation varies. For example, 
in communales with a population of 3,000 or less, an simple plurality system is 
employed. For those communales with 3,000+ inhabitants, the d'Hondt system of 
proportional representation using preferential voting is used. The size of the communal 
council varies between 7 and 29 members, depending upon population size and is always 
an odd nunnber. 
T H E N E T H E R L J ^ N D S 
Local government in the Netheriands operates on two administrative levels, these being 
gemeenten and provincial states. Compulsory voting was enforced in Dutch local elections 
until 1970 and since that date turnout has gradually declined. Dutch sub-national 
government acts as an 'agent' of central government since its behaviour is ultimately 
limited by constitutional constraints and is dependent to a large extent on central 
government grants. 
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Gemeenten - There are 677 gemeenten in The Netheriands, with the number of 
members on each council ranging from 7 to 45 depending on the population size. 
Elections are held every four years in a single round using party lists, with the 
possibility of preferential voting for individual candidates. Seat distribution follows the 
d'Hondt highest average system of proportional representation. 
Provincien - The Netheriands is divided into twelve provincial regions, and again the 
number of members sitting on these councils varies with the size of the population from 
43 members in Flevoland up to 83 in South Holland. Elections take place every four 
years with party lists and use the d'Hondt system of proportional representation. 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
Local govemment in Northem Ireland follows a completely different pattem to that on 
the mainland of Britain. In Northem Ireland there are 26 councils covering the 
province. Unlike the rest of the United Kingdom these councils, which range in size from 
between 15 and 51 members, are elected using the Single Transferable Vote as opposed to 
simple plurality. The STV system allows voters to number the candidates on a ballot 
paper according to preference. Seat allocation is determined at the ward level using a 
slight variation on the Droop quota. The quota is calculated by dividing the number of 
valid votes + 1 by the number of seats + 1. 
Prior to the local elections held in 1985, there were a total of 526 council seats. This 
was increased to 566 for the 1985 election. The number of elected councillors since the 
1993 election stands at 582. Most of these new seats are in the greater Belfast area. 
This election was also significant in terms of new electoral legislation. Voters must now 
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produce some form of identification in order to prevent personation which until then had* 
created a situation referred to as Vote eariy vote often*. Tumout Is much higher than In 
British local elections - approximately two thirds of the electorate. This reflects the 
significance of local politics in Northem Ireland, whilst the electoral system Itself 
encourages the religious minorities within each ward to vote. There is a significant 
range in overall council size in Northem Ireland. Since the 1993 elections, three 
councils have only 15 seats (Lame, Limavardy and Moyle) whilst the largest council is 
Belfast with 51 seats. These difference do not however produce a balanced councillor 
electorate ratio across the councils. The council of Moyle may have only 15 seats but this 
represented one councillor for every 703 members of the electorate. Belfast may have 
51 seats but this represents only one councillor for every 4090 members of the 
electorate. 
PORTUGAL 
Since the establishment of the current democratic constitution In 1976, local 
govemment in Portugal (under Chapter VII) operates on three levels; the freguesias, the 
municipios and regiones admlnlstrativas. 
Freguesias - Portugal is divided Into 4208 freguesias (4138 for the 1985 local 
elections), each of which is elected for a four year term, using blocked lists (although 
individual independent candidates may stand) and the d'Hondt rules of seat allocation. 
Municipios (Counselhos) - There are 305 municipios in Portugal (275 on the 
mainland and 30 in the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira). Each municlpio 
has two elected goveming bodies, both of which serves for a four year term. Members 
are elected simultaneously on the basis of party lists with no individual candidates 
permitted and seat allocation follows the d'Hondt mles as stated in Article 116 of the 
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Constitution. The elected members sit in the Assembleia Municipal (a deliberative body) 
alongside the presidentes of the freguesias. The executive bodjy is called the Camara 
Municipal and is made up entirely of elected members. Elections for the Freguesias and 
the Municipios occur on the same day. 
Regioes - The reformulation of this level of local govemment in Portugal is yet to be 
completed It is in operation in the Regiao Autonomas of Madeira and the Azores, with 
authorities being elected for a four year term using a system of proportional 
representation. There are a further 18 districts. 
SPAIN 
Democratic sub-national govemment in Spain was established along with the 
Constitutional Monarchy in 1978 and defined by the 2 April 1985 Law, operates on two 
levels; the municipalities and the regions. 
Municipios - Election laws in Spain ensure that the 8069 Municipal governments are 
elected every four years as stated in Article 141 of the Constitution. Each municipality 
of up to 100,000 residents has between 5 - 2 5 councillors with an additional councillor 
awarded for every additional 100,000 residents. Balloting follows the PR system using 
closed and blocked lists, and seats are allocated using the d'Hmdt rules to parties which 
obtain at least 5% of the votes cast The first elections were held in 1979. 
Comunidades Autonomas - Spain consists of seventeen Comunidades Autonomas 
(regions), each of which has its own pariiament. Within these regions there are a total 
of 52 provinces. Provincial councils vary in size from 25-51 deputies. Elections take 
place every four years using blocked lists and following the rfHondt system of 
proportional representation. This higher level is comprised of 41 Diputaciones 
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Provinciates, 7 Cabildos Insulares (Island councils in the Canary Islands), and 3 
Consejos Insulares (Islands Councils In the Balearic Islands). Seven regions - Catalonia, 
the Basque country, Galicia, Andalusia, Navarra, Valencia and the Canary Islands -
operate on a different level of autonomy to the other 10 regions, and have their elections 
at different times. The other 10 hold their elections together, at the same time as 
their municipalities. 
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